Hardyal Hardy, J.
(1) This second appeal has been filed by a tenant whose eviction has been ordered from a small loom described as a servant quarter and an open court-yard in a
(2) The respondents had purchased bungalow No. 49 on Hanuman Road, New Delhi in 1958. At the time of purchase ey gto vacant possession of the entire bungalow except a small room described as a servant quarter and an open Court-yard which was in occupation of the appellant who claimed to have been in possession of the said portion of the property for the last 30 to 35 years, as according to him his father was an employee of the previous owner. The respondents who were Joint owners of the said bungalow with their father (since deceased) started living in the bungalow immediately after it was purchased by them. On the evidence that has been accepted by buth the Courts below, the respondents' family consisted of 18 or 19 members. Although the bungalow appears to be a fairly commodious one, the respondents sought eviction of the appellant on the ground that the accommodation available to them was nto sufficient to meet their requirements. Learned Additional Kent Controller however came to the conclusion that the respondents had no need for any further accommodation and that as such the requirements of section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, had nto been satisfied.
(3) Aggrieved by the decision of the Additional Rent Controller, the respondents preferred an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal who on a consideration of the entire evidence, differed from the conclusion reached by the Addition Rent Controller and held that the respondents were entitled to evict the appellant on the ground of personal bonafide requirement under section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
(4) Before me, Mr. H. S. Dhir, learned counsel for the appellant has attacked the judgment of the Kent Control Tribunal on the ground that in arriving at his conclusion about the bona fide requirements of the respondents' family the learned Tribunal had taken into account the necessity of providing accomm dation for the domestic servants of the family. He further urged that according to section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, it was only the requirements of the dependent members of the family which could be taken into account and as such the provision of accommodation for servants could nto be treated as the requirement of the members of the family because the servants could nto be treated as members of the family. I am afraid, Mr. Dhir is doing less than justice to the learned Tribunal when he says that he has equated the requirement of the servants with the requirement of the members of the family. What the. learned Tribunal has said, may better be reproduced in his own words : -
'FORa family of this status the keeping of domestic servants and employees may appear to be a necessity and their requirements could beurged as the requirements of the family of the landlords and as long as the servants would be occupying the quarter as a mere licensee of the landlords it cannto be said that the quarter would nto be occupied by the landlords or their family.'
(5) It does nto need much argument to convince any one that in affluent house hold the keeping of domestic servants is regarded more or less a necessity, in a bungalow with servants quarters,. and if the bungalow has servants quarters attached, to it, the servants have to live in those quarters. The occupation of the servants quarters by the servants is in such circustances the requirement of the family and nto of the servants themselves. Having regard to the financial and social status of the respondents' family, the necessity of keeping domestic servants appears to be too obvious and even if it is held that the premises in the occupation of the appellant are going to be used by the respondents for the residence of their domestic servants the requirement would still be the bonafide requirement of the respondents themselves.
(6) Mr. Dhir has next contended that although to start with, the respondents' family consisted of 18 or 19 members, two of its members have since passed away, while two toher members have now taken up their residence at Calcutta. This has reduced the number of the members of the respondents' family from 18 or 19 to 14 or 15, and considering the accommodation already in their occupation there can be no genuine need for addition of a small room. The identical argument was raised on behalf of the appellant before the learned Tribunal and the effect of diminution in the number of members of the family was duly considered by him. The argument was, however, repelled by the learned Tribunal and I see no reason to differ from the view taken by him.
(7) Mr. Dhir has further urged that according to the view taken by the learned Tribunal the landlord would be the sole arbiter of his requirements. Mr. Dhir argued that this view of law no longer held the field. It is true that in a recent Division Bench ruling of the Punjab High Court in Roop Lal Mehra v. Kamla Soni the view taken in some of the earlier judgments of that Court about the landlord being the sole arbiter of his needs did nto find favor with the learned Judges (Dulat and S. K. Kapur JJ) deciding that case. But in my opinion there is ntohing in the judgment of the learned Tribunal which justified any such criticism. On the toher hand the learned Tribunal was fully alive to this aspect of law and his decision under appeal clearly refers to the afore-mentioned judgment of the Division Bench.
(8) In V. N. Sarin v. Major Ajit Kumar Popjai a Bench consisting of D. K. Mahajan and S. K. Kapur JJ. held that section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act provides for a second appeal but such appeal lies only if it involves some substantial question of law A finding by the Rent Control Tribunal that the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his use and for the use of the members of the family dependent upon him, is a finding of fact and is nto open to review in second appeal under section 39.
(9) I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observation of their Lordships. In this case the Tribunal has considered all the relevant circumstances and has come to the conclusion that the respondents-landlords want to occupy the premises in question themselves and that they have no collateral object in view. He has also made a proper assessment of the requirements of the members of the respondents' family. The conclusion reached by him is essentially a conclusion on a question of fact. There is thereforee, no merit in this appeal which is consequently dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
(10) By his order dated 7th May, 1966 the appellant was given a period of six months under section 14(7) of the Delhi Rent Control Act for vacating the premises. He is thereforee nto entitled to any further time being allowed to him.