R.N. Aggarwal, J.
(1) The relevant facts for the decision of this second appeal are these : The appellant Shital Parshad is a tenant of premises described as 307/2 Mohalla Ram Nagar, Gandhi Nagar, at a rent of Rs. 46.00 per month under Mohan Lal. On 13th September 1973 the landlord served a notice on the tenant demanding the arrears of rent since 1st July 1973. On 16th November 1973 grounds : (a) non-filled an application for the eviction of the tenant on the landlord payment of arrears of rent and (b) that he required the premises bonafide for his own occupations.
(2) The tenant in reply controverter the allegations of the landlord. The tenant pleaded that the rent for July 1973 was paid to the landlord but he refused to issue the receipt inspire of registered notice dated 7th September 1973. The tenant further pleaded that he had tendered the rent for the months of August, September and October 1973 to the landlord but the landlord refused to accept the rent. The tenant further denied that the landlord required the premises bonafide for his own occupation.
(3) On 27th November 1974 the question of making anorder under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter, for the sake of brevity, called 'the Act') came up for consideration before the Additional Rent Controller but he deferred the matter till after the parties produce evidence.
(4) On 9th July 1976 the Additional Rent Controller found that the landlord did not require the premises for his own occupation and further made the following order in regard to the arrears of rent :
'The result is that petition succeeds under Clause (a) but fails under clause (e) of provisions to sub-Section (1) of Section 14 Drc Act. u/s/ 15(i) the respondent is directed to deposit arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 46.00 since 1.7.73 up to 30.6.76 within one month from today failing which he shall be evicted from the disputed premises but on his depositing the said amount, he shall get the benefit of Section 14(2) and in that event the application u/s 14(l)(a) shall stands dismissed'. On 5th August 1976 the tenant deposited the arrears of rent from 1st July 1973 to 30th June 1976. On 20th September 1976 the Additional Rent Controller found that the full amount of the arrears of rent had not been deposited and consequently issued an order for the eviction of the tenant.
(5) Against the above order the tenant filed an appeal in the Court of the Rent Control Tribunal. Mr. J.D. Jain who heard the appeal found that the tenant had not made the deposite as required by Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 and upheld the order of the Additional Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal.
(6) Against the above order the tenant has come in second appeal to this Court.
(7) The relevant portion of Section 15 with which we are concerned in this case reads as under :-
'15(1).In every proceeding for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clauses (a) of the paoviso to Sub-Section (l) of Section 14 , controller shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, make an order directing the tenant to pay to the landlord or deposit with the Controller within one month of the date of the order, an amount calculated at the rate of rent which it was last paid for the period for which the arrears of the rent were legally recoverable from the tenant including the pericd subsequent there to up to the end of the month previous to that in which payment or deposit is made and to continue to pay or deposit, month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate. (2) If a tenant makes payment or deposit as required by Sub-Section (1) or Sub-Section (3), no order shall be made for the recovery of possession on the ground of default in the payment of rent by the tenant, but the controller may allow such costs as he may deem to the landlord.'
(8) From a reading of the above provision it is clear that the tenant has to deposit the arrears of rent legally recoverable from him including the rent for the period subsequnet there to up to the end of the month previous to that in which payment or deposit is made. Mr. P.L.Sood, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the rent for the month of July had not become payable on 5th August and, thereforee, the tenant was not liable to deposit the rent for the month of July along with the other arrears of rent. The counsel in support of his contention relied upon Section 26(1) of the Act, which reads as under ;
'26.(1) Every tenant shall pay rent whithin the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the fifteenth day of the month next following the month for which it is payable.'
The counsel contended that there was no contract between the parties regarding the time for payment of rent, and, thereforee, the rent for the month of July became payable only on 15th August. I do not agree in this contention. A tenant who does not pay the arrears of rent within 2 months of the notice of demand served on him by the landlord incurs the disability of eviction under clause (a) to the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act. Section 15 gives the tenant the benefit of protection. Against eviction provided he pays to the landlord or deposits the rent in accordance with the provisions of Section 15(1). The words 'for the period for which the arrears of the rent were legally recoverable' in Section 15(1) refer to the arrears of rent for which a notice of demand was given by the landlord to the tenant. If a tenant wants to get the benefit of protection against eviction he is required to deposit not only the arrears of rent for which the notice of demand was served upon him but also all the rent that has become payable up to the end of the month previous to that in which payment or deposit is made and thereafter continues to pay or deposit the rent, month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month. The above is a concession to the tenant. In my opinion section 26 of the Act does not apply to an order under section 15(1). This, in my humble opinion, would be proper construction of Section 15. The appellant had deposited the rent under Section 15(1) on 5th August 1976. On that the rent for the month of July 1976 had become payable under Section 15(1) and the tenant was to deposit the rent for the month of July in order to escape the disability of evection.
(9) Mr. P.L. Sood next contended that the order of the Additional Rent Controller provided that the tenant was to pay the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 46.00 from 1st July 1973 to date within one month from the making of the order and that in accordance with the above order the tenant was to deposit the rent only up to 30th June 1976 which was complied with by the tenant and, thereforee, the tenant should not be made to suffer for the mistake made by the Additional Rent Controller in not clearifying in the order that the arrears of the rent were to be deposited as provided in Section 15(1), I find force in this contention Under the order dated 9th July 1976 the tenant was required to deposit the arrears of rent from 1st July 1973 till date within one month en the making of the order. The words 'to date' mean uptil the date the order was made. There can be no doubt that the deposit is strictly in compliance with the order made. It appears that the error crept in because of the language in which the order was couched by the Additional Rent Controller. Any person, even a legally trained mind, could, in my opinion, be misled to think from reading of the order dated 9th July 1976 that the deposit of the arrears of rent is to be made only uptill 30th June 1976.
(10) In the above view the question would arise whether the Court should take a strict view of the law or follow the well known principle that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors. I would prefer to follow the latter course. On the peculiar facts of this case, J am of the opinion that the deposit of the arrears of rent made by the tenant should be considered to be a vlaid deposit. In the result, I would allow the appeal and dismiss the prayer of the landlord for recovery of possession of the premisses in dispute. The parties are left to bear their own costs.