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Khalil Ahmed and ors. Vs. the Delhi Administration and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtDelhi High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Writ Appeal No. 79 of 1967
Judge
Reported in8(1972)DLT49
ActsLand Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 4, 6 and 48; General Clauses Act, 1897 - Sections 21
AppellantKhalil Ahmed and ors.
RespondentThe Delhi Administration and anr.
Advocates: D.K. Kapur and; S.S. Chadha, Advs
Cases ReferredPt. Lila Ram v. Union of India and
Excerpt:
property - acquisition - sections 4, 6 and 48 of land acquisition act, 1894 and section 21 of general clauses act, 1897 - petition filed that notification issued under section 6 be quashed as being illegal - petitioner contended that government could not issue successive notifications under provisions of section 6 as there was no notification issued under section 4 and condition precedent to issue of notification under section 6 is that there should have been notification existing under section 4 - no evidence that earlier notification issued under section 4 repealed and withdrawn - petition rejected. - - 2. that this notification under section 6 has been issued without disposing of the objections filed under section 5-a of the act and, thereforee notification was bad. it is no doubt.....rajinder sachar, j.(1) this order of mine will dispose of two writ petitions i. e. cw 79 of 1967, c.w 1409/67.(2) in c. w. no. 79 of 1967 it was allege' that the petitioners are owners of 56 bighas and 6 bids was of land situated in khasra n0. 638/ 199/1, sadhora kalan, delhi. on 13 ii.1989 anotification was issued under section 4 of the lacd acquisition act, 1894 (hereinafter called the act) slating that the land measuring 34070 acres specified in the said notification was required by the government for the purpose of planned development of delhi. the land of the petitioners was included in the said notification. the petitioners filed their objections under section 5-a of the act. another notification dated 19.7.1965 was published on 29.7.1965. this notification also included land which.....
Judgment:

Rajinder Sachar, J.

(1) This order of mine will dispose of two writ petitions i. e. Cw 79 of 1967, C.W 1409/67.

(2) In C. W. No. 79 of 1967 it was allege' that the petitioners are owners of 56 Bighas and 6 bids was of land situated in Khasra N0. 638/ 199/1, Sadhora Kalan, Delhi. On 13 II.1989 anotification was issued under Section 4 of the Lacd Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Act) slating that the land measuring 34070 acres specified in the said notification was required by the government for the purpose of Planned Development of Delhi. The land of the petitioners was included in the said notification. The petitioners filed their objections under Section 5-A of the Act. Another notification dated 19.7.1965 was published on 29.7.1965. This notification also included land which had also been included in the notification dated 13.11.1959. The petitioners filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act to this notification issued under section 4 of the Act dated 19.7.65 subsequently an other notification dt. 5.4.1966 was published in the gazette under Section 6 of the Act. The said notification is attached as annexure 'E' to the petition, and includes the land of the petitioners. Thereafter another three notifications dated 29th October, 1966 were published in consecutive order in Delhi Gazette. By the first of these notification No. F. 15;57)/64-L & H (i), it was alleged that the land mentioned in the notification be deleted from the Notification dated 5th April, 1966 issued under Section 6 of the Act. The specification included the land of the petitioner. By the second notification No F.15(57)/64L & H (ii) certain land mentioned in the specification was deleted from the notification of 19th July, 1985 issued under Section 4 of the Act. The specification included the Sand of the petitioners. By the third notification No. F. l5(57/64-L & H(iii) a declaration was made under the provision of Section 6 of the Act and this included the land of the petitioner is. It was in these circumstances thatC.W.79 of 1967 was filed and a prayer was made that the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act dated 29.10.1965 namely F.l5(a7)/6l-L & H(iii) be quashed as being illegal.

(3) One of the points taken in writ petition No. 79 of 1966 was that the government could not issue successive notifications under the provisions of Section 6 of the Land Aquisition Act in furtherance of a single notification under Section 4 of the Act. This was presumably based on the decision of the Supreme Court reported as The State of Madhya Prenesh v. Vishnu Prashad Sharma.

(4) After the filing of the said writ petition Land Acquisition Amendment and Short Title Validation Ordinance, 1967, was promulgated The petitioners filed an application in C.W, No. 79 of 1967 i. e. C.M. 943 of 1967 by which the petitioners wanted to add grounds challenging the validity of the sale Ordinance. The respondents, however, reserved their right to contest the petitioners right to challenge the virus of the aforesaid Ordinance by means of the additional. ground. Subsequently the said Ordinance was substituted by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Short Title Validation) Act. 1967. In order to avoid any technical objection the petitioners are stated to have filed C.W, No. 1409/67. In this petition challenge has been made to the validity of the Land Acquisition and Short Title Validation) Act,19b7. It e writ petition No. 1409 of lt67 thereforee, was filed mainly to challenge the validity of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Short Title Validation) Act, 1967. The challerge on this ground, however, is no longer available to the petitioners as the Supreme Court has up-held the validity of the Act by its decision reported as Udai Ram Sharma v. The Union of India. It was for this reason that Mr Kapoor, the learred counsel for the petitioner, did not address any argument in C.W. 1409/67. Mr. Kapur addressed his main arguments in C.W. 79 of 1967 and my order disposes of both these writ petitions. 5, Mr. Kapur raised the follow in? main points before ire :-

1. that the notification of 29th October, 1966 namely F 15 (57)/64-L & H (iii) which purports to have been issued under Section 6 of the Act is illegal as there is no notification issued under Section 4 of the Act in pursuance of which the said notification could have been issued. 2. that this notification under section 6 has been issued without disposing of the objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act and, thereforee notification was bad. 3. that the notification has been issued by the Lt. Governor of Delhi who was not competent to issue the same as the same should have been issued by the President of India. 4. that the notification did not bear the name though in the gazette there is signature of Shri Jagmohan under some other notifications and not under the impugned notification. Even otherwise Shri Jagmoban was not authorised to sign the impugned notification.

(5) That the authentication has not been done by the Secretary to the Government as required by the Land Acquisition Act.

(6) Mr. Kapur contends that the original notification was issued on 13th November, 1959 annexure 'A' to the petition under Section 4 of the Act to which he had filed his objections under Section 5-A of the Act. He says that without there having been issued any notification under Section 6 of the Act . In pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act on 13.11.1959 another notification was Issued under Section 4 of the Act dated 19.7.1965, annexure 'C' to the petition Thereafter the petitioners had filed their objections under Section 5-A of the Act to this notification of 19.7.1965, and a notification under Section 6 of the Act had been issued on 5.4.1966 annexure E' to the petition. Subsequently, however, the government by means of a notification dated 29.10.1966, (Notification No. F.l5(57)/ 64-L & H (i) deleted from the notification of 5th April, 1966 issued under section 6 of the Act, the land of the petitioners and also deleted from the notification of 19th July, 1965, issud under Section 4 of the Act the land of the petitioners. But it issued a notification No. F. 15 (57/64-L&Hiii;) under Section 6 of the Act including the land of the petitioners. The contention of Mr. Kapur is that when the government issued a notification on 19th July, 1965 under Section 4 of the Act it amounted to repeal of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act dated 13.11.1959. According to him there was in existence only one notification issued on 19ih July, 1965 and the earlier notification of 13.11.1959 must be deemed to be nonexistent from that date. Proceeding further Mr. Kapur maintains that when the governmert issued notification No. F. 15(57)/64-L & H (ii) on 29th October, 19.6 deleting the land of the petitioners from the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act dated 19.7.1965 and deleting the land of the petitioner from the notification dated 'th April, 1966 by virtue of notification No. F. 15(57)/64.L & H(i) dated 29th October, 1966 the result was That there was no notification under Section 4 of the Act concerning the land of the petitioners as the land had been deleted from the notification of 19th July, 1965 under section 4 of the Act and the notification dated 5th April, 1966 under Section 6 of the Acl which had been issued in pursuance of the notification dated 19th July, 1965. it is the contention of Mr. Kapur, that, thereforee, when the notification No. F 15(57)/64-L & H (iii) dated 29th October, 1966 was issued making a declaration under Section 6 of the Act it was without any authority of law because there Was, in fact, no notification under Section 4 of the Act existing on that date. It will be seen that this argument of Mr. Kapur is based on the fact that the original notification of 13th November, 1959 must be deemed to be cancelled or withdrawn when the notification of 19th July. 1965 was issued

(7) From the above facts it would beseen that so far as the land of the petitioners is concerned it has been specifically deleted from the notification of I9th July, 1966 issued under Section 4 of the Act and also from the notification dated 5th April, 1166 issued under section 6 of the Act. There is thus a notification No F.15(57)/64-L&H;(iii) dated 29th October, 1966. issued under Section 6 of the Act which includes the land of the petitioners. The question thereforee, is whether the source of this notification dated 29th October. 1986 issued under Section 6 of the Act which includes the land of the petitioners can be traced to the notification dated 13th November, 1959 issued inder Section 4 of the Act. Because if the source of the notification of 29th October, 1966 (Notification No. F.l5(57)/64-L&H;(iii) , cannot be traced back to the notification of 13.11. 1959 it is common ground that this notification Issued under section 6 of the Act would amount to issuing a notification under Section 6 of the Act without first having issued a notification under Section of the Act. It is not disputed that the condition precedent to the issue of notification under Section 6 of the Act is that there should have been a notification existing under S. 4 of the Act. In the retarn It is maintained that the Notfication dated 13-11-1959 very much exists and that the source of thenotification issued under S. 6 of the Act dated 29-10-1966 (Notification No.15(57)/ 64-L&H; (iii) is the original notification dated l3-l1-1959. It was maintained in the retain that the subsequent notification issued under S. 4 of the Act namely of 19- 1965, had been issued under a mistake but it did not have the efftct of cancelling the previous notification of l3-ll-1959. It was also maintained that acquisition of the land in question was never abandoned by the appopriate government after the issuance of the notification and the procedure under Section 48 of the Act was never adopted.

(8) Mr. Kapur suggests that when the second notification under Section 4 of the Act dated 19-7-1961 was issued it really meant that the government had cancelled us previous notification dated 13-11-1959. He, however, conceded that there wag no separate notification cancelling the notification dated 18 11-1959 He, however, maintained that the issue of another notification dated 19 -7-1965. which also included the land of the petitioners must be deemed to be taken to mean that the earlier notification of l3-ll-19-9 had, in tact. been cancelled impliedly. I am afraid I cannot rend into the notification of 19-7-1965 a compelling mandate that the earlier notification of 13-11-1959 must be treated to have been cancelled Even a comparison of the two notifications will show that a much larger area was covered by the notification of 13th November, 1959 and in the subsequent notificasion of 19th July, 1965 comparatively smaller area had been included. It is no doubt true that it does not speak well of the efficiency and method of working of the concerned authorities that a notification of 19th July, 1965 should have been issued including the land of the petitioners which was also covered by the earlier notification of 13th November, 1959 but for this reaso'i I cannot hold that by the subsequent notification of 19th July, 1965 the earlier notification of 13th November, 1959 must be deemed to he read as excluding the land of the petitioners. It would be seen that the notification of 13th November, 1959 covers the area of 34070 acres, and thereforee, to hold that the notification of 19th July, 1965 impliedly excluded out of that area the land of the petitioners will really mean rewriting and amending that notification There is no warrent to do so. Under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the Government has the power to amend or rescind any notification. It is specifically men tioned there that power to rescind a notification is to be exercised in the like manner as the power to issue notification. If, thereforee, the govenmenthas to issue or rescind the earlier notification of 1959 one has to find some positive act of the government indicating its desire to do so by a subseqpent notification. T, thereforee cannot subscribe to the contention of Mr. Kapur that by the mere fact of the issuance of a notification of 19th July, 1965, the earlier notification of 1959, should be deemed to be cancelled. Mr. Kapur then contended that if both 1959 and 1965 notifications are held to be holding the field together then the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act dated 5th April, 1966 must be deemed to be in pursuance of the earlier notifications of 1959 and 1965. This argument is advanced to support the contention that as subsequently by the notification of 29th October, 1966, the land of the petitioners was deleted by Notifications No. F. 15(.57)/64-L & H (i) and No F. Is (57)/64-L&H; (ii) from the notification of 19th July, 1965 and 5th April, 1966 no source of notification under Section 4 is left for the third notification No. Fl5(57)/64-L&H;(iii) issued on 29th October. 1966, because according to this argument the earlier notification of 1959 and 1965 must be deemed to have spent themselves out when the notification to 5th April, 1966 was issued. In my view this is again the same argument as noticed earlier though in a different form. If the issue of notification dated 19th July, 1965 does not ipso facto cancel the earlier notification of 13th November, 1959, it is not possible to hold that the subsequent notification issued under section 6 dated 5th April, 1966, must necessarily mean that the source was not the notification of 19th July, 1965 but also the earlier notification of 13th November, 1965. It has been stated in the return specially that the 5th April, 1966, notification was in pursuance of the notification of 19th July, 1965. In that view of the matter it cannot he held that the notification of 13th November, 1959 ceased to exist en issue of notification dated, 5th April, 1966

(9) If that be the correct view and I do so hold, the result would be that when notification of 29th October, 1966, was issued, the petitioners land stood deleted by Notification No. F. 15(57),/64.L & H (ili) from the notification under Section 4 dated 19th July, 1965 and was also deleted from the notification dated 5th April, 1966, issued under Section 6 of the Act. Thereafter when the third notification No. F. 15(57/64-L & H(iii) dated 29th October, 1936, was issued which included the land of the petitioners it obviously related back to the source of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act dated 13th November, 1959 After the notifications No. F. 15(57)/64.L & H (i) andF.15(57/64-L&H;(ii) dated 29th October, 1966, there was only one notification which included the land of the petitioners under Section 4 of The Act and that was the notification of 13th November, 1959. In pursuacse of that power a notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued namely Notification No. F. 15(57)/64-L & H (iii) on 29th October, 1986 The main ground on which this notification was challenged related to the power of the successive notifications issued under Section 6 of the Act. As I have already indicated, the validity of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Short Title Validation) Act, 1967 was up-held by Supreme Court by Udhai Ram Sharma's case It, thereforee cannot be held that notification No. F. 15(57)/64.L & H (iii) issued on 29th October, 1966 could not be validly issued in pursnance of the power of the notification dated 13th Nov. ember, 1959.

(10) In order to clear any doubt whether the earlier notifications of 19th July, 1965, did not result in excluding the land of the petition crs from the earlier notification of 13th November, 1959,1 looked into the original record. From the original record it transpired that the notification of 19th July 1965, under section 4 of the Act was issued after the Land Acquisition Collector had certified that the land to be included in the said notification was not covered by the notification of 13th November, 1959, issued under section 4 of the Act. Later on. however, when the notification under section 6 had been issued the matter was examined in the department anj it transpired that the earlier information that land of the petitioners had not been included in the notification of 13th November, ;9 9, was incorrect and had been wrongly mentioned, The matter was thus examined and it was then suggested that as land of the petitioners was already included in the general notification of 13th November, 1959 issued under section 4 of the Act, the mention of the said land may be deleted from the notification of 19th July, 1965, and notification of 5th April, 1966, and action be taken in pursuinc- of the notification under section 4 of the Act. It was, thereforee that the present notificition of 29th October, 1966, was issued. This would show that at no stage the respondents even by implication cancelled the previous notification of 13th November, 1959. It is relevant to mention that the earlier notification of 13th November, 1959, covered an area of over 34(70 acres. No amendment of that notification can be deemed to be there unless it is speciafically so made. In this view of the matter there is no force in the contention of Mr. Kapoor that the earlier notification of 13th November, 1959, had been impliedly repealed and withdrawn and consequently there was no jurisdiction in respondents to issue a notification No. F. 157)/64-L & H (iii), dated 29th October, 1966.

(11) Mr. Kapoor sought to surest that possibly the notification 19-7-1965 had been issued because the objections filed by the petitioners to the notification of 13-11-1959 .had been found weighty and as such the land had been released from the notification issued earlier to the notification of 19th July 1965. I have already mentioned above that the original record does not support this contention of Mr. Kapur. Moreover the original record also shows that the objections which were filed by petitioners were disposed of separately. Mr. Chadha, the learned counsel the the respondents, states after looking into the record that the petitioners appeared before the Land Acquisition Collector on 19th May. 196 . and thereafter the Collector made his report on 1st June, 1961. The objections along with the report were considered by the office and the recommendation was made that the objections may be ignored and notifications under section 6 be issued. The Chief Commissioner specially approved of this recommendation an 19th October, 1961. It will thus be seen that the objections filed by the petitioners under section 5A of the Act In pursuance of notification dated 13th Nov. ember 199. were not accepted by the Chief Commissioner, it is not therfore, correct to say that the respondents had decided to drop the acquisition proceedings against the petitioners, and as the objections under section 5-A of the Act had been up-held. Mr. Kapur referred me to Jugal Kishore Bhagar v.The State of Bihar which lays down that if an order has been passed by appropriate government after considering the objections under section 5-A, there is no jurisdiction thereafter to review or reconsider the matter subsequently. In my opinion this case bus no relevancy because in the present case objections under section 5A of the Act were not accepted, rather they were rejected. thereforee, there is no question of the respondents reviewing or reconsidering the matter after they had accepted the objections under section 5-A of the Act. in the present case the objections had been rejected and the land of the petitioners was in eluded in the subsequent notification by over-sight the deletion of the petitioners' land from the subsequent notifications cannot be held to be barred on any principle of law.

(12) Mr Kapur referred to Corporation of Calcutta v. Omeda Khatun Bewa, and State of Bihar and another v. Tulsi Ram Tibriwala'. These cases only lay down that thers. cannot be piecs meal notifications issued under Section 6 of the Act in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act. But these authorities have no applicablity because by virtue of the Land Acqusition (Amendment and Short Title Validation) Act , the validity of which has been up-held by the Supreme Court In Udai's case the impugned notification of 29.10-1966 cannot be attacked on the ground that by virtue of the earlier notification of 13-11-1959 some other notifications earlier to the present one had been already issued under Section 6 of the Act.

(13) The next argument of Mr.Kapur is that Section 48 of the Act is the only provisions which deals with the withdrawal from the acquisition proceedings and that as the land of the petitioner was with. drawn from the notification on 19-7 1965 it must he taken that the government has withdrawn from the acquisition proceedings. I am afraid I cannot accept this contention. The power to issue notification includes the power to rescind by virtue of the Section 21 of the General Clauses Act This power is independent of the power to withdraw from acquisition proceedings under Section 48 of the Act The notification can be cancelled at any time under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act without having resort to Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. This was so held in the State of Madhya Pradesh v Vishnu Prasad Sharma. There is thus no force in this argument

(14) Mr. Kapur's next contention is that it is mala fide to issue a notification in 1966 under Section 6 of the Act after a lapse of 7 years from the notification of 13.11-1959 issued under Section 4 of the Act. parse there is nothing mala fide in it. Similar arguments were sought to be raised but were negatived by the Supreme Court in Udai Ram Sharma's case. There is thus no mala fide simply because the notification under Section 6 had been issued in 1966, once, the power to issue successive notification cannot be challenged.

(15) The next contention of Mr. Kapur is that Section 6 of the Act postulates that a declaration shall be issued if the appropriate Government is satisfied. Mr. Kapur's contention is that the appropriate government is defined in clause (ee) of Section of the Act to mean in relation to acquisition of land for the purposes of 'the Union the Central Government. Thus declaration under Section 6 of the Act, according to Mr. Kapur can be issued by the Central Government. He then referred me to Article 77 of the Constitution of India which reads that all executive action of the Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President. Mr Kapur sought to argue that by virtue of Article 77 of the Constitution all executive action of the Government of India should be taken to be iti the name of the President and, thereforee, the impugned notification which has been issued in the name of the Lieutenant Governor does not comply with the requirement of Section 6 of the Act I am afraid there is an obvious fallacy in the argument of Mr. Kapur. Article 77 of the Constitution has no rslavancy to the interpretation of appropriate government as mentioned in section 6 of the Act. Article 77 only postulates that the executive action of the government shall be expressed to be in the name of the President. There is nothing in this Article by which to interpret the word 'appropriate government' mentioned in Section 6 of the Act Now the Central Government is defined by the General Clauses Act, 1897. as per Section 3(8) the 'Central Government' shall :

'(A)x x x (b) In relation to anything done or to be done after the cumnuencement of the Constitution, mean the President, and shall include :- (i) xxx (ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment Act, 1956) the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority action within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution as the case may be, (iii) x x x'

(16) Article 239 of the Constitution as substituted by the Constitution (seventh Amendment) Act, 1956. reads as under :-

'289(L)Save as otherwise provided by Parliament by law, every Union territory shall be administered by the President acting, to such extent, as he thinks fit, through an administrator to be appointed by him with such designation as be may specify. (2) Noth- with standing anything contained In Part Vi, the President may appoint the Governor of a State as the Administrator or an adjoining Union territory, and where a Governor is so appointed, he shall exercise his functions as such Administrator independently of his Council of Ministers'.

Prior to this. Article 239 reads as follows :-

'239(L)Subject to the other provisions of this Part, a State specified in Part C of the First Schedule shall be administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit, through a Chief Commissioner or a Lieutenant-Governor, to be appointed by him or through the Government of a neighbouring State : Provided that the President shall not act through the Government of a neighbouring State save after- (a) consulting the Government concerned; and (b) ascertaining in such manner as the President considers most appropriate the views of the people of the State to be so adminis- tered. (2) In this article, rc-ferences to a State shall include references to a part of a Stale.'

(17) Before the passing of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, Delhi was amongst the States specified in Part C of the First Schedule to the Constitution of India, and their administration was provided turn in Part Viii of the Constitution from Articles 239 to 242. On -9th August, 1954, a notification was issued under Article 239(1) which reads as follows :-

'INpursuance of clause (1) of Article 239 of the Constitution, the President hereby directs that the Chief Commissioners of Delhi, Ajmer and Coorg shall, subject to the control of the President and until further orders, exercise the powers and discharge the functions of the Central Government under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1891), within their respective States.'

(18) On the enactment of the Seventh Constitution Amendment Act of 1956, Part 'C' State erased to exist and some of them were desiganted as Union Territories and it was because of this that Article 239(1) was amended as has been mentioned above. In pursuance of the amendment a farther notification was issued on 1st November, 1956, which reads as follows :-

'INpursuance of clause (1) of Article 239 of the Constitution as amended by the Constitution (Seventh amendment) Act 1956, and all other powers enabling him in this behalf, the President hereby directs as follows :- Where, by virtue of any order made in pursuance of Article 239 or, as the case may be. Article 243 of the Constitution as in force immediately before the 1st day of November, 1956 or any other power under the Constitution, any powers and functions which were, immediately before that day, the powers ard functions : (a) x xx (b) the Chief Commissioner of the State of Delhi, Maaipur or Tripura. and (e) xxx and such powers and functions shall, on and after the said day, be exercised and discharged, respectively by....... (i) xxx (ii) the Chief Commissioner of the Union territory of Delhi, Minipur or Tripura, and (iii) z x x subject to the like control by the President, as were exercised by him before the said day over the Lieutenant Governor, or as the case may be, the Chief Commissioner referred to in clause (a), (b) or

(19) It will thus be seen that the powers which had been given to the Chief Commissioner to act under the Land Acquisition Act en behalf of the President were now to be exercised by the Lieutenant Governor under the second Notification The Lieutenant Governor thereforee, has the same powers as the Central Governmei..t for the purpose of the Land Acquisition Act. Accordingly thereforee, has the same powers as the Central Government for the puroose of the Land Acquisition Act. Accordingly thereforee, the appropriate Government in section 6 of the Act which is competent to issue the declaration is the Lieutenant Governor. He is the competent authority to issue the notification. The record shows that it was he who had approved of the issue of the notification and it was only thereafter that the notification was issued. The contention of Mr. Kapur thertefore, that the notification under Section 6, was not issued by the appropriate government is, thereforee, not correct. This view of mine finds support from two Division Bench Judgments of this Court ; Civil Writ No. 76-D of 1961 ; Pandit Lila Ram v. The Union of India decided on 8th May, 1964 and The Nagrik Adhikar Samiti, Sarai Pipal Thala Extension, Regd. v. The Delhi Administration and others,' (C.W. No. 42 of 1969) decided on 26th November, 1969.

(20) Mr. Kapur next contended that Section 6 of the Act provides for adeclation under the Act shall be made under the Act which shall be made under the signatures of the Secretary of centr 1Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders. He submits that under the impugned notification No. l5(57)/64-L&H;(iii) dated 29th October, 1966 no signatures are to be found and he-efore, this notification Is bad. I have referred to the original notificaton which has been published in the gazette. A leading of that will show that a number of notifications were issued on the same date and the name of Mr. Jagmohan finds mention at the end of all these notifications and not at the end of each notification. I do not think this is an objection as the original notification according to Mr Chadha bears the signatures of Mr. Jagmohan. In the return filed by Mr. Jagmohan it has been specifically stated that be is competent to sign and authenticate the same.

(21) Another objection of Mr. Kapur was that section 6 of the Act requires that the declarition should be under the signatures of a Secretary to such a government or of some officer duly authorised. The contention of Mr. Kapur being that a secretary to such a government must be a secretary to the Central Government. As the land was being acquired for Delhi which is a Union Territory and as Mr. Jagmohan was not a Secretary to the Central Government this was not a Secretary to the Central Government this was not a declaration under section 6 of the Act. But Mr. Kapur over-looks the second part of section 6 which says that the declaration may be made under the signatures of a Secretary to Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify. As I have already held that the appropriate government in section 6 of the Act for Delhi is the Lieutenant Governor He is, thereforee, competent to issue notification and act under it and obviously is competent to authorise any officer to certify its order. It cannot-be suggested that though the Lieutenant Governor may be competent to issue a declaration yet fce is not competent to authorise any officer to certify its order and that the certification should be done either by the Secretary to the Government or by some officer authorised by the President himself. This would, really be defeating the object of the notification issued by the President authorising the Lieutenant Governor to exercise the power under the Land Acquisition Act. The authorisation to exercise power under section 6 necessarily carried with it the powers to authorise any officer to certify the orders issued by the Lieutitenant Governor. Mr. Jagmohan who has authenticated these notifications has sworn an affidavit that be is competent to authenticate the same on behalf of the Lieutenant Governor. Along with the return notification issued in the exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 7 of the Rules of Business of the Delhi Administration, by the Administrator has been filed as annexure R-IV. Under the said notification Delhi Authentication of Government Orders Rules, 1961, have been framed. Rule 3 of the said Rules lays down that every such order or instruement of Delhi Administration shall be signed, by amongst others, the Deputy Housing Commissioner and such signatures shall be deemed to be the proper authentication of such order or instrument. Mr. Jagmohan is the Deputy Housing Commissioner, Delhi, and is, thereforee, competent to authenticate the order. No fault can be found with the order on this ground also.

(22) Mr. Chadha has relied on Ishwarlal Girdharlal joshi etc. v The State of Gujarat, for the proposition that any officer duly authorised by virtue of Kules of husines? may authenticate the order and this is as required by section 6 of the Act.

(23) Mr. Kapur also raised point that Planned Development of Delhi, the public purpose mentioned in the impugned notification is not the public purpose at all and is a mere make belief. This argument has aleady been raised and was rejected in the case ; Pt. Lila Ram v. Union of India and others' (C.W. 76-D of 1961) decided on 8th May 1964, which was followed in The Nagrik Adhikar Samiti's case' (C. W. 42 of 1969), decided on 26th November 1909.

(24) Mr. Kapur raised the point that because of the Delhi Development Act 1957 the land could only have been acquired under the said Act and not under the Land Acquisition Act. It cannot, thereforee be held that because the purpose the Planned Development of Delhi is the pur' pose within the Delhi Development Act, it ceased to be a public purpose within the meaning of Land Acquisition Act. It was so held in The Nagrik Adhikar Samiti's case (C.W. 42 of 1969) desided on 26th Novernber, 1969.

(25) There is thus no force in the writ petitions and the same are rejected with costs.


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