S.K. Kapur, J.
(1) Krishna Devi Bagadia, the. landlord of the House in question, filed a petition for eviction against the appellants. Eviction was claimed under section 14(1)(b) and (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and by order dated February 22, 1968, the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, allowed the petition on the grounds that tenant Roop Narain Goela had sublet, assigned or toherwise parted with the possession of the premises in dispute in favor of Mangey Ram and Parkash Chand, appellants No. 2 and 3 respectively, without the written consent of the landlord and that tenant Roop Narain Goela had built, a residential house in Greater Kailash, New Delhi. The appellants filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi, which was dismissed on March Ii, 1968, in liming. From the order of the Tribunal it appears that the only question raised by the appellants was about the necessity of a ntoice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy before taking proceedings for eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The appellants have filed the present second appeal in this Court against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated March 11, 1968, and their learned counsel confined his arguments only to the point whether or nto ntoice under section 106 was necessary.
(2) Btoh the Rent Control Tribunal and the Additional Rent Controller recorded a finding that the first appellant (tenant) being a statutory tenant no ntoice terminating the tenancy was necessary. In paragraph 18(b) of the petition it has been alleged by the landlord that 'no ntoice is required. The tenancy was initially for a period of 11 months, which came to end on the expiry of the said period on 20th June, 1958. The respondent No. I is a statutory tenant. There is no specific denial of this assertion in the written-statement. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that two important factors were completely destructive of the tenancy being a statutory one-
(1)Although the tenancy is alleged to have come to end on the 20th June, 1958, yet the landlord had been regularly accepting rent ; and
(2)the landlord had never intimated the tenant that his tenancy was a statutory one.
INGanga Dutt Murarka v. Karfik Chandi-c, Das and tohers, (1) it was held that where a contractual tenancy to which the rent control legislation applies has come to an end by efflux of time or by determination by ntoice to quit and the tenant continues in possession of the premises, acceptance of rent from the tenant by the landlord after he expiration or determination of the contractual tenancy will nto afford ground for holding that the landlord has assented to a new contractual tenancy. The following observations of B. K. Mukherjea, J., (as His Lordship then was) in Kai Khushroo v. Bai Jerbai, (2) approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ganga Duffs case :
'.....INcases of tenancies relating to dwelling houses to which the Rent Restriction Acts apply, the tenant may enjoy a statutory immunity from eviction even after the lease has expired. The landlord cannto eject him except on specified grounds mentioned in the Acts themselves. In such circumstances, acceptance 'of rent by the landlord from a statutory tenant whose lease has already expired could nto be regarded as evidence of a new agreement of tenancy and it would nto be open to such a tenant to urge, by way of defense, in a suit for ejectment brought against him under the provisions of Rent Restriction Act that by acceptance of rent a fresh tenancy was created which had to be determined by a fresh ntoice to quit.'
It, stands finally settled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that mere acceptance of rent from a statutory tenant is nto sufficient to show that a fresh tenancy was created. There is ntohing more in this case beyond the payment of rent. As a matter of fact, the tenant did nto in his statement even. allege that a new tenancy had. after the expiry of the original tenancy, come into being. Mere continuance in possession for a long period under a statutory prtoection, the second factor relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants also does nto have the effect of creating a fresh tenancy. It must, in the circumstances, be held that Roop Narain Goela was only a statutory tenant.
(3) The matter may be looked at from antoher point of view. The Additional Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal have recorded a finding of fact that Roop Narain Goela was only a statutory tenant. It is nto open to us to disturb that finding in an appeal under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
(4) That takes me to the next question as to whether a ntoice terminating the tenancy was required. In Ganga Dutt's case it was observed-
'THEtenancy of the appellant was determined by efflux of time and subsequent occupation by him was nto in pursuance of any contract express or implied, but was by virtue of the prtoection given by the successive statutes. This occupation did nto confer any rights upon the appellant and was nto required to be determined by a ntoice prescribed by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.'
Again, Pooran Chand v. Mtoilal and tohers, (3) it was held that where the term of tenancy had expired by efflux of time no question of statutory ntoice could arise. On the facts of this case it must, in the result, be held that no ntoice under section 106 of ihe Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy was required. The learned counsel for the appellants said that in case of the monthly tenancies if a tenant continues occupation a new tenancy springs upon the expiry of every month and the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act being supplementary to the Transfer of Property Act, a ntoice ought to have been given terminating the tenancy before proceeding for eviction. In view of the answer recorded by me herein-before that Roop Narain Goela was a statutory tenant, this question does nto survive and need nto be answered. I may just mention that in support: of the argument that a ntoice terminating the tenancy was necessary, the learned counsel for the appellants had relied on Vora Abbasabhi Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai, (4) in which decision section 12(1) of the Bombay Rents, Htoel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947) fell for consideration, and Manujendra Dutt v. Purnedu Prosad Roy Chowdhury and tohers, (5) in which the statutes under consideration were the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act (2 of 1949) and the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Act (6 of 1953). I need nto, however, express any opinion as to whether or nto those decisions govern the interpretation of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
(5) In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.
Inder Dev Dua, J.
(6) I agree