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S. Inder Singh Vs. Nanak Chand and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtDelhi High Court
Decided On
Case NumberSecond Appeal No. 351 of 1967
Judge
Reported in5(1969)DLT149
ActsDelhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Sections 14
AppellantS. Inder Singh
RespondentNanak Chand and anr.
Advocates: K.L. Sethi,; M.L. Dhawan and; K.C. Dewan, Advs
Cases ReferredShri Krishan Lal Sethi v. Smt. Pritam Kumari
Excerpt:
- - i have, thereforee, no hesitation in repelling this challenge as well......control tribunal, had dismissed an application for amendment of the written statement and of the grounds of appeal against the order of the rent controller and an application under article 227 of the constitution was presented in this court against the said order of dismissal. this application (civil misc. (main) 83 of 1967) came up for preliminary hearing before hardy, j. who considered the same to be premature. the learned counsel, however, prayed that the said petition should be held over the an appeal against the order of the tribunal was presented in this court. this order was made on 15th november, 1967. on 8th april, 1968, the said application was placed before 0m parkash, j. although no one appeared in support of that petition, the learned judge directed that the same should be.....
Judgment:

I.D. Dua, C.J.

(1) Concurrent orders of eviction in favor of the respondents made by the learned Rent Controller on 18th April, 1967 and by the Rent Control Tribunal made on appeal on 13th November, 1967 are the subject of challenge in this second appeal from order under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 (hereafter called the Act).

(2) The eviction of the tenant was sought on the ground of personal bona fide requirements by the landlords and also on the ground of acquisition of alternative accommodation by the tenant under clauses (e) and (h) respectively of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act. The ground of acquisition of alternative accommodation by the tenant was nto pressed by the landlords during the' course of arguments. On the toher ground, however, it was common case before the controller that the premises in dispute had been let to the tenant for residence and the ownership of the landlord was also held to be proved by the sale-deed Exhibit A. I, The tenant had conceded in his submission that the landlords were the owners of the superstructure though his case was that the lease-hold rights of the land underneath had nto been conveyed to the landlords. The landlords were thus held the owners of the premises in question. The requirement of the landlords was also held genuine in view of the status and size of their family and the accommodation which was already in their actual use and occupation. Btoh the landlords are real brtohers and are married.

(3) The Controller, as observed earlier, made an order for recovery of possession of the said premises in favor of the landlord-petitioners against the tenant. Six month's time v.was granted to the tenant to vacate the premises.

(4) On appeal, it was observed that the- premises in dispute had admittedly been let out for residential purposes and the ownership was upheld on the basis of Exhibit A. 1. In regard to the bofa fide requirements also, the impugned order shows that the landlords were admittedly the heads of the families consisting of Ii members including themselves. Their father, a retired medical practitioner, also lived with them and Nanak Chand, one of the landlords, was a doctor and the toher Raj Kumar a shop-keeper. The premises have only four rooms, a verandah. and a court-yard besides a kitchen, bath and latrine on the first floor. On the ground floor, they are in occupation of two shops with verandahs. in front of each and they are used by them for commercial purposes besides two rooms with verandahs in front of each available for their resdence. There is also an open court-yard, a bath and a latrine on the ground floor. Two rooms accommodation with the landlords was considered nto to be sufficient for their requirements and, thereforee, they were held justified in claiming the premises in dispute for their residence. The appeal was, as already observed, dismissed.

(5) On second appeal, a faint attempt was made to urge that there was no plea in the application for eviction that the premises had been let for residential purposes. This argument, in my opinion, is nto permissible at this stage, the same having nto been urged either before the Controller or before the Tribunal. It is ntoeworthy that even in the memorandum of appeal before the Tribunal, containing as it did, 16 grounds, no grievance was made on the basis of this plea and indisputably, it was nto argued before the Tribunal. As a matter of fact, it appears to me that it was common case of the parties that the premises in question were residential in nature and were used as such, with the result that it must also be assumed that they were let for residential purposes. No objection having been taken either at' the trial of the eviction petition or on first appeal, it is far too late to seek to raise it on second appeal. It may he remembered that second appeal under the Act is competent only if it involves a substantial question of law, and the plea now sought to be raised for the first time can by no stretch be held to involve a substantial question of law. Incidentally, my attention has been drawn to a Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Shri Krishan Lal Sethi v. Smt. Pritam Kumari, in which it has been held that in an application under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act for eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement of the residential building for personal occupa.tion, it is unnecessary for the landlord to re-state in the application the statutory conditions set out in paragraphs (b) and (c) of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 13(3). Omission to refer to those conditions could nto, according to this decision, be any ground for surprise to the tenant.

(6) It was next contended that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings because the landlords were nto the owners. Except for the bald assertion, my attention was nto drawn to any statutory provision or to any principle or precedent which my induce me to hold that these landlords are nto the owners within the meaning of section 14(1) proviso (e). ownership as an interest recognised by law, consists of innumerable claims, privileges, powers and im1. munities with regard to the thing owned. The word 'owner' may, thereforee, have varied meaning depending on the context in which it is used. As used in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act. I do nto think it means that the person concerned must nec'ssarily be the absolute owner of the site on which he has constructed a building which has been let out to the tenant whom he seeks to e]'ect.

(7) It was then contended that in this case no ntoice was given by the landlords under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and that for this reason, the order of eviction made by the Controller and affirmed by the Tribunal deserves to be quashed. The plea of want of ntoice having nto been taken in the written statement and having nto been urged either before the Controller or before the Tribunal, does nto deserve to be allowed to be raised on second appeal.

(8) It was next contended that the Rent Control Tribunal should have allowed the tenant to amend his written statement so as to contain the plea of want of ntoice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, What seems to have happened in this case was that the Rent Control Tribunal, had dismissed an application for amendment of the written statement and of the grounds of appeal against the order of the Rent Controller and an application under Article 227 of the Constitution was presented in this Court against the said order of dismissal. This application (Civil Misc. (Main) 83 of 1967) came up for preliminary hearing before Hardy, J. who considered the same to be premature. The learned counsel, however, prayed that the said petition should be held over the an appeal against the order of the Tribunal was presented in this Court. This order was made on 15th November, 1967. On 8th April, 1968, the said application was placed before 0m Parkash, J. Although no one appeared in support of that petition, the learned Judge directed that the same should be put up along with the appeal. On 1st August, 1968, when it was placed before me, I considered that application to be infructuous because the same ground had been taken in the memorandum of appeal. In the case in hand, the order of the learned Tribunal disallowing amendment of the written statement and of the grounds of appeal from the order of the Controller have nto been shown to me to be tainted with any such grave infirmity as would, justify second appeal under section 39 of the Act. The question pertained to the discretion of the Tribunal and I am far from convinced that the discretion had been exercised on such erroneous grounds as would involve a substantial question of law. I have, thereforee, no hesitation in repelling this challenge as well.

(9) For the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.


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