Om Parkash, J.
(1) The question, which requires decision in this revision petition, against an order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, is whether the Controller, appointed under the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is a Court, .within the meaning of section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure. The question arose in a complaint, filed under section 193, Indian Penal Code, by the petitioner, against the respondent. The allegations in the complaint were as under:-
The respondent was a tenant of a portion of premises No. 4024, Chawri Bazar, Delhi. The petitioner and his brother had purchased the premises on the 12th May 1961. The respondent had Continued to be a tenant in the portion occupied by him.
(2) On the 9th May 1962, the petitioner and his brother had made an application, under section 14(1) of the Act, before the Controller, for eviction of the respondent from the portion of the premises occupied by him. The eviction had been sought on various grounds. One of the grounds was that the respondent had acquired or had been allotted a residence after the commencement of the Act. The Controller entrusted the application to the Additional Controller for disposal. The real Magistrate, the Additional District Magistrate refused to take cognizance of the complaint on the ground that the offence under section 193, Indian Penal Code, was alleged to have been committed in proceedings before the Additional Controller, who was a Court as the complaint was nto filed by the Additional Controller, but by e petitioner only, section 195(1)(b) , Code of Criminal Procedure, was a bar to taking cognizance of the complaint.
(3) A revision petition against the order of the Additional District Magistrate was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge. Hence the present revision petition.
(4) Notice of the revision petition was given to the respondent.He was served; but he did nto appear, despite service.
(5) The learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the correctness of the view of the two Courts below that the Controller was a Court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure, and that that section barred taking cognizance of the complaint of the petitioner. The learned counsel contended that the scheme of the Act clearly indicated that the intention of the legislature was that the Controller should be regarded as a Court for certain specified purposes and nto for other purposes. The learned counsel referred to sections 14,35,36,37 and 41 of the Act in support of his contention. The learned counsel submitted that the Act does nto say that the Controller will be deemed to be a Court for purposes of section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Controller was not, thereforee, a Court within the meaning of that section.
(6) The contentions raised by the learned counsel have gto validity. The word 'Court' has been used both in the Code of Criminal Procedure and in the Act. But neither of the two defines the word 'Court'. The significance of the word 'Court' has been considered by the Supreme Court in various decisions. In Thakar Jugal Kishore Sinha v. The Sitamarhi Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. and another, previous decisions were noted by the Supreme Court. The following definition of the word 'Court' given in Halsburys' Laws of England (Third Edition-Vol. 9) at page 342 was also noted:-
'ORIGINALLY the term 'Court' meant among other meanings, the Sovereign's palace; it has acquired the meaning of the place where justice is administered and, further, has come to mean the persons who exercise judicial functions under authority derived either immediately or mediately from the Sovereign. All tribunals, however, are nto Courts, in the sense in which the term is here employed, namely, to denote such tribunals as exercise jurisdiction over persons by reason of the sanction of the law, and nto merely by reason of voluntary submission to their jurisdiction.'
(7) The Supreme Court, also approved the observations made in the earlier case, Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. Stale of Punjah, which were:-
'IT may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declares the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question, thereforee, arises as to whether an authority created by 'an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court.'
(8) The question to be considered is whether having regard to the provisions and scheme of the Act, the Controller possesses all the attributes of a Court. Section 14 of the Act lays down that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favor of the landlord against a tenant. Then follow grounds on which a Controller can order eviction of a tenant. The language of section 14 indicates that the legislature intended to maintain distinction between a Controller and a Court and that the intention was that the Controller should nto be regarded as a Court. Section 36(2) of the Act confers only certain powers of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for summoning of witnesses etc., on a Controller but nto all the powers under that Code. This section also lays down that a Controller shall be deemed to be a Court for purposes of section 480 and section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no provision in the Act that the Controller shall be deemed to be a Court within the meaning of Section 195, Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 37(2) provides that the Controller shall follow the practice and procedure of a court of small causes. Under Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules 1959, the Controller is to be guided by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, while deciding any question relating to procedure. It is clear that the Controller has been invested with the powers of a civil Court relating to practice and procedure only and nto with all the powers of a civil Court. Section 42 of the Act provides that an order made by the Controller shall be executable by the Controller as a decree of the civil Court and for this purpose, the Controller shall have all the powers of a civil Court. This section also indicates that the Controller can exercise the powers of a civil Court for certain purposes only.
(9) It is clear from the provisions set forth above that the intention of the legislature was that the Controller should be regarded as a Court for certain specified purposes only and nto for all purposes and that the Controller does nto possess all the attributes of a Court. The Controller, thereforee, cannto be held to be a Court for purposes of section 195(1)(b), Code of Criminal Procedure.
(10) Support for the above view is forthcoming from the decision in Ram Parshad Rastogi v. Jagdish Narain, wherein it was held that a controller is nto a Court within the meaning of section 476, Code of Criminal Procedure. The ratio of the decision will apply for holding that Controller is nto a Court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b). Code of Criminal Procedure. In Ved Parkash v. Harish Chander Rastogi, (4), it was held that a Controller is nto a Court.
(11) In Thakur Jugal Kishore v. The Sitamarhi Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. supra, the Assistant Registrar discharging the functions of a Registrar, was held to be a Court within the meaning section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Assistant Registrar, besides having powers of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling the production of documents etc. in the same manner as provided in the case of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, had also powers of review vested under section 114 and Order XIvii Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, and inherent jurisdiction specified in section 151, Code of Civil Procedure. The Controller, under the Act, is nto invested with the powers of review or with inherent jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure, but is invested with the powers of summoning witnesses, compelling production of documents etc. only.
(12) A Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Original No. 14 of 1967 (The State v. Ram Dass T. Chugani) decided on the 17th December, 1968, has held that the Tribunal under the Act is a Court within the meaning of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. It is to be noted that while only certain specified powers under the Code of Civil Procedure have been conferred on the Controller, all the powers of a Court under that Code have been conferred on the Tribunal when hearing an appeal vide section 38(3). This is an important distinction between the powers of a Controller and the Tribunal. The decision of the Division Bench will nto govern the case of the Controller.
(13) It follows, from the above discussion, that the Controller, appointed under the Act, is nto a Court within the meaning of section 195 (1) (b). Code of Criminal Procedure. That section did not, thereforee bar the taking of cognizance of the complaint, filed by the petitioner, which alleged the commission of an offence under section 193, Indian Penal Code in proceedings before the Additional Controller which term is included in the word 'Controller'.
(14) The revision petition is allowed. The orders of the Courts below are set aside. The complaint is remitted to the Additional District Magistrate for disposal in accordance with law.