I.D. Dua, C.J.
(1) This revision presented in this Court under section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act is completely devoid of merit and must, thereforee, be dismissed with costs. The plaintiff had instituted a suit for the recovery of Rs. 250.00 against his tenants in the Court of the learned Additional Judge, Small Cause Court. It was averred that originally one Babu Ram was the owner of the building in question, but had mortgaged the same with the plaintiff and a number of persons were tenants of Babu Ram in separate portions of the said building. On 20/11/1952 the mortgagee obtained a mortgage-decree against Babu Ram and in execution thereof, the property in question was auctioned and purchased by the plaintiff himself on 12/8/1954. Symbolic possession of the building was obtained by him on 18/5/1959, and it was thereafter that the suits against the various tenants were filed for the recovery of the arrears of rent. All the suits were consolidated in the trial Court. The plaintiff had claimed Rs. 250.00 from Bhagwan Dass.Rs. 500.00 from Har Narain and antoher Rs. 500.00from Chhtotey Lal defendants for different periods. In the present revision, I am only concerned with the suit against Chhtotey Lal. It was contested with all seriousness and the trial court found two points on the pleadings requiring determination. The first point was based on the challenge to the plaintiff's status as a landlord of the defendants and the second point on the plea that the defendants had paid rent to Babu Ram. On the first point, the learned Additional Judge, Small Cause Court, held that after an auction sale becomes complete on its confirmation, the title of the auction purchaser must relate back to the date of the auction-sale and on the second point the Court came to the positive conclusion that the defendants had gto knowledge of the plaintiff's purchase of the property at least on 22/6/1967. Antoher specific finding given by the learned Judge is that the receipts produced by the defendants in support of their plea of payment of rent to Babu Ram show that they have been secured collusively. In none of those receipts was the amount of rent entered and they were nto regular receipts admitted by Babu Ram to have been issued in lieu of rent. Failure to produce counter-foils of the receipts, which were also admitted by Babu Ram, further induced the court below to hold the receipts to be collusive. In view of the entire evidence, it was observed that neither payment of any rent for the period after June, 1957 by the defendants to Babu Ram stood proved, nor were the defendants toherwise prtoected from paying rent for the period in suit to the plaintiff. It was mainly on this conclusion that the plaintiff's suit was decreed.
(2) On revision before me, Shri G.N. Aggarwal has very strongly contested btoh these conclusions on the evidence. I am, however, nto empowered under section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act to reassess the evidence on which the Court below was formed an opinion which has nto been shown to be contrary to law. The learned counsel has laid great stress on sections 50 and 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, but these sections are completely unhelpful because of the conclusion of the Court below that there was a collusion between the defendants and Babu Ram. This finding has nto even been attempted to be assailed by the learned counsel and if this finding is upheld, then resort to sections 50 and 109 of the Transfer of Property Act is of little avail.
(3) A privy Council decision in Chandrika v. Bombay Baroda and Central India Railway Co.(1) has been referred to in support of the well known doctrine of tenant's estoppel, but that again is futile because of the finding that the tenants knew of the auction-sale in favor of the plaintiff. An attempt has been made to take me through the evidence on this part of the case, but I have nto allowed the counsel to refer to the evidence because I am nto sitting as a Court of Appeal from the decision of the Court below. The submission that the judgment of the learned Additional Judge, Small Cause Court, does nto contain discussion on the entire evidence on the record, ignores that under Order Xx, Rule 4, C.P. Code, all that a Small Cause Court is under obligation to record in the judgment is the points for determination and the decision thereon. It is true that the judgment means the statment given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order and the broad basic purpose of recording a judgment is to enable the higher Court of appeal or revision to examine and find out if the Judge has applied his mind to the case and that the decision is according to law. This would further tend to promtoe confidence in the minds of the litigants and also of those who read the judgments, in the sense of justice and efficiency of the courts and, thereforee, in the quality of our judicial process. A court of Small Causes is, however, under no statutory obligation to discuss every piece of evidence or to give exhaustive reasons for its decision, as the toher courts are enjoined by law to do. All that a Court of Small Causes is expected to do is to record the judgment revealing the broad reasoning and its path of arriving at the final determination. This determination should hto smack of arbitrariness, for, that is the very anti-thesis of judicial appraisal and adjudication. Even the Court of Small Causes it has to be remembered, is, after all, a Court of law and justice. Considering the present case by applying this test, obviously, there is no legal infirmity in the order of the court below, for it quite clearly reflects the process of reasoning which influenced its judicial thinking, and no error is discernible in it.
(4) But when all is said and done, the fact still remains that jurisdiction of this Court under section 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is discretionary and it does nto confer any vested or statutory right on the petitioner to claim interference, even though substantial justice may seem to the Court to have been done, as is the position in the present case. It is undoubtedly true that this section confers on this Court a wider power than section 115, C.P. Code bestows, but however wide the power, it certainly does nto convert this Court into a Court of first appeal, nto even into a Court of second appeal.
(5) For the foregoing reasons, this revision fails and is dismissed with costs.