S.N. Andley, J.
(1) The selection and appointment of Mohammad Rehmat Ali (respondent No. 6) as Reader in Economics in the Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, hereinafter referred to as 'the Jamia', is challenged by the two petitioners in writ petitions Nos. 7 and 20 of 1972. Originally these two persons had jointly filed Civil Writ No. 7 of 1972 but on January 5, 1972, their counsel wa.s 'directed to file a separate petition in respect of petitioner No. 2 Mohammad Sultan' who then filed Civil Writ No. 20 of 1972.
(2) The petitioners in Civil Writ No. 1050 of 1971 have challenged the selection and appointment of respondents Nos. 5 and 6 as Readers in Education.
(3) Some common questions of law arise in these petitions and. thereforee, they are being disposed of by this judgment. We will first deal with Civil Writs Nos. 7 and' 20 of 1972. Civil Writs Nos. 7 and 20 of 1972.
(4) Both petitioners and respondent No. 6 were, until the selection and appointment of respondent No. 6 as Reader in Economics, Lecturers in Economics in Jamia College.
(5) The Jamia is a Society registered under the Indian Societies Registration Act (Act No. Xxi of 1860) and its object is to promote and provide for the religious and secular education of Indians, particularly, Muslims. The Government gave substantial grants-in-aid to the Jamia from 1954 onwards. The Government of India issued a notification dated June 19, 1962. under section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 whereby the Jamia was deemed to be a University for the purposes of this Act. The Jamia has the following authorities: (i) Anjuman Jamia (Court) : (ii) Majlis-i-Muntazimah (Executive Council); (iii) Majlis-i-Talimi (Academic Council); (iv) Majlis-i-Maliyat (Finance Committee) and (v) the various Faculties. In this judgment, reference to the various authorities will be according to the equivalent expression in English.
(6) The Academic Council is responsible for the maintenance of standard of instructions, education, examinations, health and discipline of the students of the Jamia and has to perform such other functions as may be conferred or imposed upon it by the Rules. It is required to advise the Executive Council on all academic matters. Rules and Regulations have been made under clauses 12 and 14 respectively of the Memorandum of Associ- ation of the Jamia.
(7) The Executive Council has the power, inter alia, to appoint various officials and professors, readers, lecturers and such other members of the teaching staff as may be necessary on the recommendation of a Selection Committee to be constituted for the purpose.
(8) One of the functions of the Academic Council as prescribed by Rule 8 (iii) is 'to recommend to the Majlis-i-Muntazimah the creation and abolition of academic posts and departments of studies Suo Motu or on the recommendation of Faculty concerned'. Selection for the posts that are created is to be made through Selection Committees appointed for the purpose under Rule 22. This Rule further provides that the Selection Committee for the purpose of making recommendations for appointment to the post of Reader is to consist of the Vice-Chancellor (Shaikhul Jamia); the Dean of the Faculty concerned; the Head of the Department concerned and two persons who are neither employees of the Jamia nor members of the Executive Council or the Academic Council and who are nominated by the Vice- Chancellor out of a panel of seven persons to be suggested by the Academic Council for their special knowledge of, or interest in the subject with which the Reader would be concerned.
(9) SUB-CLAUSE (v) of Rule 22 requires the Selection Committee to consider and submit to the Executive Council recommendations as to the appointment referred to it. In case the Executive Council does not accept the recommendations made by the Committee, it has to give its reasons and to submit the case to the Chancellor (Amir-i-Jamia) for final orders. If the recommendations of the Selection Committee are accepted by the Executive Council, the Chancellor does not come into the picture and the Executive Council, in exercise of its power, can make the appointment of the person recommended. If the recommendations of the Selection Committee are not accepted by the Executive Council, the matter is to be submitted to the Chancellor who can make final orders either by accepting or by rejecting the recommendations of the Selection Committee.
(10) It is not disputed that a Visiting Committee of the University Grants Commission visited the Jamia in August, 1967 and in its letter dated February 27, 1968 recommended, inter alia, that 'if the Jamia introduces teaching in these areas a Reader may be provided in each of these subjects.' This letter Along with the report of the aforesaid Visiting Committee was was placed before the Academic Council in its meeting held on March 30, 1968 and before the Executive Council in its meeting held on April 27, 1968.
(11) On or about December 12, 1968, the Registrar (Musajjil) of the Jamia published an advertisement inviting applications for the posts of Readers in various subjects including Economics. Minimum qualifications prescribed for this post were,-
'ATleast Ii class Master's Degree in the subject concerned with a research degree or published work of equal I merit and 5 years experience of teaching and guiding research at the post-graduate level. Qualifications relax able at the Jamia's discretion in case of candidates otherwise well qualified.'
(12) Although four persons applied, the post of Reader in Economics was again advertised on May 24, 1969. The minimum qualifications and the condition of relaxbility of the qualifications remained the same. It was intimated that persons who had applied in response to the earlier advertisement need not apply again.
(13) No appointments were made in pursuance of these advertisements. Then a third advertisement was published on May 22, 1970. The minimum qualifications were :-
'ATleast Ii class Master's degree in the subject concerned with a research degree or published work of equal merit and 5 years experience of teaching and/or guiding research at the post-graduate level.'
(14) In so far as the minimum qualifications are concerned, the only change was that instead of guiding research at the post graduate level being one of the minimum qualifications as in the first and second advertisements, it became a minimum qualification alternative to 5 years experience of teaching. There was also a variation with regard to relaxation of any of the qualifications. It was provided,-
'RELAXATIONin any of the qualifications may be made on the recommendation of the Selection Committee in case of candidates otherwise well qualified.'
(15) A Selection Committee was appointed comprising of five members. One of its members, according to the Rules, was Professor M. Mujeeb (respondent No. 3) who is the Vice- Chancellor of the Jamia. He was also the Chairman of this Selection Committee.
(16) The two petitioners: respondent No. 6 and Yogindar Kaul appeared for interview before the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee found that none of the candidates fulfillled one of the minimum qualifications, namely, five years experience of post-graduate teaching. It did two things. First it recommended that this qualification be waived and, second, it recommended the name of respondent No. 6 for appointment as Reader in Economics as his published work appeared to them to be of equal merit to a research degree. The relevant minutes of the Selection Committee are as follows :-
'WEinterviewed four candidates for the post of Reader in Economics. As none of them had any experience of post-graduate teaching, we recommend that this condition be waived. Of the four candidates we recommend the appointment of Shri M. Rehmat AH. His published work appears to us as of equal merit to a research degree.'
(17) The recommendations of the Selection Committee were placed before the Executive Council in its meeting held on January 28, 1971. Respondent No. 6 was a Iii Class M.A. from the Osmania University but according to the respondents he had obtained a Ii Class M.A. degree in Economics from the Southern Illinois University in 1961 to fulfill the minimum qualification of Ii Class Master's degree in Economics. In this meeting, the Executive Council passed a resolution to ask the Inter University Board of India and Ceylon whether this American degree was equivalent to a high Second Class Master's degree. Dr. Amrik Singh, Secretary of the Inter University Board, assessed the status of the Southern Illinois University and the rating of the grades obtained by respondent No. 6 at this University in his letter dated March 10, 1971. He rated the performance of respondent No. 6 as equivalent to a high Second Class degree. Dr. Amrik Singh states that it was not clear from the record made available to him as to why respondent No. 6 did not proceed for Ph. D. programme after his M.A.
(18) The Executive Council met again on May 4, 1971 and passed a resolution on this date rejecting the recommendation of the Selection Committee. Since this resolution is of some importance, it is quoted below :-
'THEExecutive Council rejected the recommendations of the Selection Committee on the ground that, though the recommended candidate, Shri Rehman Ali, has an M.A. and M.S. degree of the Southern Illinois University that can be rated according to the transcript as a good second class, he has obtained a third class througout his academic career in India from the High School to the M.A. and has taken a longer time than usual to pass his examinations. He passed his B.A. in the Supplementary Examination. Moreover, the Inter University Board, who were asked to give their opinion about the rating of the Southern Illinois University as well as the M.A. and M.S. transcript of Shri Rehmat Ali, have stated that, the normal thing for a candidate after having done M.A. is to proceed to the Ph. D. programme. In this case the candidate chose to do M.S. Why this should have happened is not clear from the record made available to us.' The Executive Council having considered these facts were of the opinion that in view of his consis- tently poor academic record and of the fact that a Reader now appointed would have to develop a growing depart- ment, the recommendation of the Selection Committee be not accepted and decided that under Rules 22 (v) the matter be submitted to the Amir-i-Jamia for his final order.'
(19) While the assessment of the academic qualifications of respondent No. 6 is apparent from the above resolution which led to the rejection of the recommendation of the Selection Committee for appointing him as Reader in Economics, there is no mention of any reasons with regard to the other recommendation of the Selection Committee relating to the relaxation of the qualification of experience of post-graduate teaching. By reason of Rule 22 ( v), the entire matter was submitted to the Chancellor.
(20) An order was made by the Chancellor on July 3, 1971, to the effect that the Executive Council ought not to have reversed the recommendation of the Selection Committee and the recommendation of the Selection Committee should be accepted. It is not disputed by the respondents that this order contained certain adverse comments against the Executive Council who, in their meeting held on August 30, 1971, decided to refer the matter again to the Chancellor for reconsideration. Upon reconsideration, the Chancellor amended his order and the date of the amended order appears to be September 20, 1971. The Chancellor recapitulated the facts in his order and came to the same conclusion as arrived at earlier that the recommendation of the Selection Committee should be accepted. He states his opinion thus:-
'NOWin my opinion the Executive Council constituted themselves into a Selection Committee without the opportunities which the Selection Committee had. They were in error in taking into account the doubt expressed by the I.U.B. about the M.S./Ph. D. matter without obtaining an Explanationn from the candidate. There could be a very good reason for his choice. They were also in error in describing his career as 'consistently poor'. On the other hand his career at the Southern Illinois University was described by the I.U.B. as 'consistently creditable.' The candidate measured up to the standard set by the Advertisement. He held a Second Class Master's degree from an American University. His published work was considered by the Selection Committee to be equal to a Research degree. He had 5 years' teaching experience and the qualification about guiding research was waived and remains waived as the E.C. does not mention it. I am of the opinion that the E.C. ought not have reversed the recommendation of the S.C. They went more by the previous poor record than by the later consistently creditable record. They paid attention to a casual doubt expressed by the I.U.B. without obtaining the Explanationn of the candidate.'
(21) This order was kept back by the Chancellor because he was informed that the petitioners had submitted certain representations for his consideration which were being sent to him by post. There are endorsements by the Chancellor bearing the date September 21, 1971, on the representations by the two petitioners. On the representation received from the petitioner in Civil Writ No. 7 of 1972. the Chancellor stated :----
'RECEIVEDby post. I have already considered the case but had kept buck my order so that I may see these representations which I was told on phone were to be submitted to me. I told the applicants to use the post as I could not grant an interview. I have since read them. As they have been rejected by the S.C. and not nominated by the E.C'. they have no standing. Rejected. Sd. Hidayatullah 21-9-1971.'
On the representation of the petitioner in Civil Writ No. 20 of 1972, the endorsement by the Chancellor was as follows:- Rejected. For orders see the representation of A.R. Rizvi. sd/- Hidayatullah. 21-9-1971'
(22) The order of the Chancellor was verbally communicated to the Executive Council in its meeting held on October 14, 1971 and a letter of appointment was issued to respondent No. 6 on October 15, 1971 appointing him to the post of Reader in Economics.
(23) The first point urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the recommendation by the Selection Committee for relaxation of the essential qualification of post-graduate teaching experience was illegal and had because the relaxation was not on the ground that the 6th respondent was otherwise well qualified but on the ground that none of the candidates appearing before the Selection Committee had this qualification. A subsidiary point in this connection is that even if the relaxation by the Selection Committee was not illegal or bad, its recommendation in this behalf had not been accepted by the Executive Council.
(24) It may be repeated that the advertised qualifications were not fulfillled by any candidate in spite of three advertisements. At the final stage, there were seven candidates in the field but only four of them, namely, the two petitioners; respondent No. 6 and one Yogindar Kaul were interviewed for the post of Reader in Economics. An extract of the qualifications of all these candidates had been placed before the Selection Committee and it appears there from that the four candidates who were interviewed did not have any post-graduate teaching experience as advertised but had teaching experience of graduate classes for various periods. While the teaching experience of the petitioners and respondent No. 6 was for a period of more than 5 years, the teaching experience of Yogindar Kaul was only for 5 years.
(25) In substance, the contention of the petitioners is that what the Selection Committee did was to reduce the minimum qualifications from the qualifications advertised which they had no power to do and there is no finding by them either in relation to each of the four persons individually or collectively that they were otherwise well qualified and that, thereforee, the relaxation was illegal and bad. It is true that the Selection Committee has not said in so many words that the four persons who appeared before them were otherwise well qualified but it does appear from the aforesaid extract that barring Yogindar Kaul aforesaid, the period for which the petitioners and respondent No. 6 had teaching experience of graduate classes was far in excess of the requisite 5 years post-graduate teaching experience.
(26) The order of a Selection Committee in matters such as this cannot be construed with the same strictness as statutes or laws are construed. The substance of the matter has to be considered. The substance of the matter is that in the case of the petitioners and respondent No. 6, the teaching experience of graduate classes was for a period of more than 5 years. From the fact that the qualification of 5 years post-graduate teaching experience was relaxed in case of persons who had teaching experience of graduate classes for a longer period, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the Selection Committee were of the view that this longer experience made the petitioners and respondent No. 6 otherwise well qualified for the post.
(27) The Rules do not require the Selection Committee to record their reasons for the relaxation. The Selection Committee must be presumed to have been aware that they could recommend relaxation of any of the qualifications only if the candidates were otherwise well qualified. The Selection Committee have in fact relaxed the qualification. Their failure to say that the candidates were otherwise well qualified is immaterial.
(28) Reliance by the petitioners on the Full Bench decision reported in Air 1967 Jammu & Kashmir 106 in re : Subash Mohan Jalali and others v. Principal, Medical College and others appears to us to be misconceived. The learned Chief Justice observed that in a modern well ordered society as ours, selection of candidates to technical institutions must be fair and objective and must partake of a somewhat competitive nature. This observation was made in the context that the Selection Committee which was required by the Government order to select candidates for admission to medical college either by written test or by interview at which credit was to be given to physical fitness, personality, general knowledge and aptitude for profession was held to have acted in an arbitrary manner as they had, in the interview, allotted 40 marks for personality and only 10 marks for aptitude. The Full Bench was of the view that by such allotment of marks it was obvious that the consideration of academic merit of a candidate was bound to suffer and the selection made by the Committee on the basis of such allotment would be purely subjective in nature and vocative of Article 14 of the Constitution. They further observed that even if the Government had not allocated separate marks under various counts. the Selection Committee should have allocated equal marks to the four heads. The case here is entirely different. The advertisement required some minimum academic qualifications and it was upon a consideration of the academic qualifications at the time of interview that selection for the post of Reader in Economics was to be made by the Selection Committee. The mere fact that the Selection Committee did not give any reasons as to why they made the relaxation of the qualification of 5 years post-graduate teaching experience would not lead to the inference that the selection by the Selection Committee was not objective. We have held that they must be deemed to have been conscious of the fact that such relaxation could be made only it the candidates were otherwise well qualified. Then reliance is placed upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case reported in : 6SCR368 in re: R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore and others') that objective criteria should be laid down for selection and that was not done in the present case. In our view, the reliance on this case is also misconceived because in the present case objective criteria in the shape of requisite academic qualifications were laid down. The Supreme Court observed-'Selection by interview is one of the well- accepted mode of selection and it cannot be condemned by adopting a wide statement that, whatever may be objective tests laid down, in the final analysis it gives ample room for discrimination and manipulation as the awarding of marks is left to the subjective satisfaction of the Selection Committee and hence it is inherently repugnant to the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14.' The Supreme Court further observed-'In the ultimate analysis, whatever method is adopted its success depends on the moral standards of the members constituting the selection committee and their sense of objectivity and devotion to duty.' No reflection has been cast on the members of the Selection Committee in this case except some allegations of mala fide against the Vice Chancellor which will be dealt with later. In our opinion, the setting down of the academic qualifications was a sufficiently objective criteria and the selection cannot be struck down merely on the ground that no objective tests were laid for the interview apart from the candidates fulfillling the academic qualifications.
(29) We also do not find any substance in the argument that relaxation should have been in the case of each candidate separately. There might have been substance in this argument if the candidates lacked in different qualifications but in a case where all the candidates lack a common qualification, there is no reason to hold that the case of each candidate should have been separately discussed as to how he was otherwise well qualified.
(30) As to the subsidiary point regarding the absence of acceptance of recommendation as to relaxation in the minutes of the Executive Council dated May 4, 1971, there is no specific mention in its minutes of this date of the rejection of the recommendation of the Selection Committee as to relaxation. If the Executive Council had been of the view that no relaxation should have been made in the case of respondent No. 6, they would have said so. As appearing from this minute, the Executive Council went on to consider the merits of the qualifications of respondent No. 6 and they expressed their doubt as to whether the degree of the Southern Illinois University obtained by respondent No. 6 was equivalent to a Ii Class degree in M.A. They were also of the view that respondent No. 6 had a 'consistently poor academic record'. thereforee, it is a reasonable view to say that the Executive Council would not have considered the merits of the qualifications of respondent No. 6 if they had been of the view that the recommendation of the Selection Committee relaxing the qualification as to 5 years post-graduate teaching experience in the case of respondent No. 6 should not be accepted.
(31) It is relevant to state at this stage that the Chancellor also read the minute of the Executive Council in this way because he states that the qualification about guiding research (which was equivalent to 5 years' post-graduate teaching experience) 'was waived and remains waived as the Executive Council does not mention it.'
(32) There is another way to approach this question. The Selection Committee had made two recommendations-one as to relaxation of the qualification and the other as to the appointment of respondent No. 6. Rule 22(v) requires the Executive Council to give reasons if they do not accept the recommendation of the Selection Committee. The Executive Council has given reasons as to why they do not accept the recommendation of the Selection Committee as to the appointment of respondent No. 6 but there are no reasons given with regard to their alleged non-acceptance of the recommendation as to relaxation of the qualification. In the absence of reasons, it is a legitimate inference that the recommendation of the Selection Committee as to relaxation was accepted or, as the Chancellor puts it, remained waived at the stage of the Executive Council.
(33) Again, in the event of disagreement between the Executive Council and the Selection Committee, the Chancellor could exercise all the powers exerciseable by the Executive Council in- eluding the power to relax. This position was ultimately conceded by Mr. Sanghi, one of the learned counsel for the petitioners. Even if, thereforee, the Executive Council had rejected the recommendation of the Selection Committee as to relaxation, it was open to the Chancellor to accept that recommendation of the Selection Committee as to relaxation. While approving the recommendation for appointing respondent No. 6 to the post of Reader in Economics, the Chancellor must be taken to have accepted the recommendation of the Selection Committee as to relaxation also and even if the understanding of the Chancellor as to non-relaxation of the qualification by the Executive Council was erroneous, in the ultimate analysis, it is immaterial and has led to no miscarriage of justice.
(34) We thereforee, do not find any substance in the point that relaxation of the qualification by the Selection Committee was illegal or had or that the Executive Council had rejected this recommendation.
(35) The next point urged by the petitioner in Civil Writ No. 7 of 1972 (Anwer Raza Rizvi) is that the Selection Committee were given wrong information about him and all his academic qualifications were not placed before it. The first qualification about which complaint is made is that this petitioner had a Diploma in Statistics in the 1st Division from the University of Aligarh and that it was not mentioned in the extract of qualifications which was before the Selection Committee. Now, the application form submitted by candidates contains various headings. One of the headings is 'Examinations passed'. The alleged Diploma in Statistics is not mentioned in the various sub-heads of this heading. One of the matters mentioned in the application under another heading 'Schools, Colleges and Universities attended' is the Diploma Course in Statistics as one of the courses attended in 1958 but even here it is not mentioned as to whether this petitioner had been granted the Diploma. The case of this petitioner is that the Diploma was obtained by him long before the meeting of the Selection Committee. Even if that was so, the complaint of furnishing wrong information to the Selection Committee cannot be justified because the academic qualifications mentioned in the extract submitted to the Selection Committee correctly corresponded to the information contained in the application under the heading 'Examinations passed'. If this petitioner had been granted a Diploma, he should himself have pointed it out to the Selection Committee at the time of his interview. The point is that he cannot charge the respondents with giving wrong information to the Selection Committee.
(36) The next qualification which is alleged not to have been disclosed to the Selection Committee in the extract is the Master's degree in Economics alleged to have been given to him by the University of Western Australia. Here again what this petitioner mentioned under the heading 'Examinations passed' in his application is that his thesis entitled 'Studies in the demand for and supply of gold' was resubmitted for the degree of Master of Economics of the University of Western Australia which had originally been proposed for Ph. D. degree. The grant of the degree of M.A. Economics is not mentioned by him in his application. The information given by him under the aforesaid heading is faithfully recorded in the extract submitted to the Selection Committee under the heading 'Research/published work'. This petitioner relies upon a letter dated June 10, 1970, from 1. Bowen, Professor of Economics in the University of Western Australia where It is stated that this petitioner has successfully completed the thesis for the Master's degree in Economics on the subject of the part played by gold in international monetary arrangements and that this thesis was worthy of the award of the degree. This letter does not say that the degree of M.A. in Economics had been granted by the University of Western Australia. The charge that any wrong information was supplied by the respondents to the Selection Committee is not substantiated.
(37) At this stage it might be convenient to deal with the allegations that the Vice-Chancellor of the Jamia was interested in having respondent No. 6 selected and appointed as Reader in Economics and that his actions show lack of bona fides on his part.
(38) It is stated that some time in April, 1963, the University Grants Commission had written a letter dated April 9, 1963, to the Registrar of the Jamia that 'the revised grade should be extended only to those teachers who were found to possess the minimum qualifications prescribed in this regard by the Delhi University . . . . . . and that the qualifications prescribed by the Delhi University for the post of Reader are :-
'GOODAcademic record, with first or High Second Class Master's degree in the subject concerned, with Doctorate degree or equivalent published work. Independent published work (in addition to the published work mentioned above) with at least 5 years teaching experience in Honours/Post-Graduate class essential.'
(39) It is contended that to suit respondent No. 6, the qualifications 'good academic record' and 'independent published work' were not included in the three advertisements; the qualification of First or High Second Class Master's degree and the qualification of Doctorate degree or equivalent published work was modified to research degree or equivalent published work. It is alleged that the qualifications prescribed by the Delhi University were approved by the Academic Council and the Executive Council in August, 1963. In the counter affidavit it has been denied that the Jamia teachers were to have the same qualifications as prescribed by the Delhi University or that the aforesaid recommendation was approved by the Academic Council or the Executive Council of the Jamia. There is substance in the contention of the respondents that the recommendation of the University Grants Commission based upon the report of its Visiting Committee was in respect of the existing staff and was specifically meant for the purpose of revision of pay scales of the then existing posts of Lecturers and not Readers. There is also substance in the contention of the respondents that if the qualifications prescribed by the Delhi University had been advertised, then the petitioner in Civil Writ No. 20 of 1972, Mohammad Sultan, and others would not have been eligible for the post of Reader in Economics. Further the qualifications as advertised for the post of Reader in Economics appear to have been approved by the Academic Council in its resolution No. 17 dated November 11, 1970 which was approved by the Executive Council in its resolution No. 2 passed in its meeting dated May 4, 1971. The reason for the modification of the qualifications appears to be the fact that the response to the first two advertisements was not encouraging and the third advertisement was modified to enable more persons to apply so that the Selection Committee could have a wider choice. The aforesaid allegations remain completely unsubstantiated.
(40) The next allegation relates to the constitution of the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee is to consist of the Vice Chancellor; the Dean of the Faculty concerned; the Head of the Department concerned and two persons, not being employees of the Jamia or members of the Executive Council or the Academic Council, to be nominated by the Vice Chancellor out of a panel of seven persons to be suggested by the Academic Council for their special knowledge of, or interest in the subject with which the Reader will be concerned. It is alleged that the Academic Council took up the matter of nominating a panel of experts for the post of Reader in Economics but the names of the seven persons said to be approved by it were not disclosed in its meeting. These allegations are denied and it is stated in the counter affidavit that the names were disclosed to the Academic Council and were approved by it in its meeting on January 21, 1970 but the names of the experts were not recorded in its minute as a matter of convention, expediency and secrecy following the practice prevailing in many Universities including the Delhi University. That a panel of names was proposed by the Vice Chancellor in the meeting of the Academic Council is proved by its resolution which states that 'the proposed panel of experts for the Selection Committees of the posts of Readers in Political Science, Economics and Hindi are approved.' We are satisfied that the Explanationn of the respondents about keeping the names secret for the reasons stated is valid. In fact, we asked the respondents to produce the list of names which had been submitted by the Vice Chancellor in the meeting of the Academic Council and such a list was shown at the time of the hearing of these petitions. We, thereforee, do not find any substance in these allegations.
(41) An argument has been advanced that bye-law Vii subclause (6) requires the Selection Committee to make a categorical recommendation of a panel of names in order of preference and that in the present case no such panel was made by the Selection Committee who recommended the name of respondent No. 6 alone. We see no reason why a panel must consist of more then one name and cannot consist of only one name.
(42) Then it is contended that against their non-selection by the Selection Committee, the petitioners had made representations to the Executive Council and these representations were not placed in the meetings of the Executive Council which was considering the recommendations of the Selection Committee nor were they sent to the Chancellor while the Vice Chancellor forwarded the representation of respondent No. 6 to the Chancellor after the A Executive Council had rejected the recommendations of the Selection Committee appointing him. Under Rule 7 (v) it is within the powers of the Executive Council 'to entertain, adjudicate upon, and if it thinks fit to redress any grievance of the officers of the Jamia, the teaching staff and the non-teaching staff of the Jamia who may for any reason feel aggrieved otherwise than by the act of Court.' Now, what had happened was that after the recommendations of the Selection Committee to appoint respondent No. 6, the petitioners made representations to the Executive Council. It is true that these representations were not placed in the meetings of the Executive Council but the reason assigned by the respondents which cannot be disputed by the petitioners is that the petitioners themselves had sent copies of their representations to each member of the Executive Council. In these circumstances, we cannot attach any significance to the omission of the Vice-Chancellor to place their representations in the meeting of the Executive Council.
(43) Then it is complained that after the rejection by the Executive Council of the recommendations of the Selection Committee, the matter had been sent to the Chancellor under the Rules but these two representations were not forwarded to him and that shows the animus of the Vice Chancellor against the petitioners. It is not very clear from the averments as to whether or not these two representations were a part of the record which was sent to the Chancellor but the fact remains that these representations were brought to the notice of the Chancellor and were sent to him by post after he had made but not issued his order dated September 20,1971. It is clear from the endorsements made by the Chancellor which have been extracted earlier that he did consider these representations and rejected them on the ground that the petitioners had no standing.
(44) We cannot assume mala fides on the part of the ViceChancellor or his interest in respondent No. 6 merely from his omission to forward the representations of the petitioners to the Chancellor particularly when the decision of the Executive Council was in their favor. The record of the minutes of the Executive Council and what happened before it in its two meetings was before the Chancellor and the omission of the reprcsentations of the petitioners from the record sent to him cannot be of any significance. If the petitioners had been aggrieved by any decision of the Executive Council as respondent No. 6 was. we could have appreciated the significance of the Vice Chancellor's omission to send their representations to the Chancellor.
(45) It is only a person who is aggrieved by an order who can be said to have some sort of a right to make a representation against such order. But the petitioners can by no stretch of imagination be said to be aggrieved by the decision of the Executive Council. On the other hand, respondent No. 6 having been recommended by the Selection Committee was aggrieved by the decision of the Executive Council and can be said to have a right to make a representation to the Chancellor against that decision. The petitioners had not even been selected by the Selection Committee.
(46) We are, thereforee, of the view that the allegations of mala fide against the Vice-Chancellor are without substance and the petitioners have completely failed to show his interest in respondent No. 6.
(47) Then it is contended that the post of Reader had not been created in accordance with the Rules of the Jamia. It is a curious argument coming from a person who was himself a candidate for the post. However, we will examine the argument. According to the Rules of the Jamia, it is the Department of Studies which 'recommends creation of teaching and research posts in the departments to the Committee of Courses in accordance with its needs.' Then the Committee of Courses 'make proposals regarding the creation and abolition of teaching posts in subjects assigned to the Committee'. Then 'each Faculty shall recommend to the Majlis-i-Talimi (Academic Council) after considering the recommendation of the Committee of Courses concerned, the creation and abolition of teaching posts.' Then the Academic Council 'recommend to the Majlis-i-Muntazimah (Executive Council) the creation and abolition of academic posts and department of studies Suo Motu or on the recommendation of the Faculties concerned.' Lastly, the Executive Council is 'to appoint from time to time ..... Readers ........ and such other members of the teaching staff as may be necessary on the recommendation of the Selection Committee constituted for the purpose. .....' It is contended that the whole process for creating a post of Reader was not gone through. We may here emphasise that according to the Rules extracted above, the Academic Council may recommend the creation of academic posts suo motu. It is admitted by the petitioners that the Visiting Committee of the University Grants Commission in its report submitted in 1968 recommended that if the Jamia introduces Honours teaching in the various areas including Economics, a Reader may be provided for these subjects. In the counter affidavit it is averred that the practice followed by the Jamia was that when it receives sanction of a new post from the University Grants Commission itself, such letters of sanction are placed before the Academic Council and Executive Council for their approval and the posts are deemed to have been created and in such cases, the suggestions or proposals for creating posts which normally originate from the Committee of Courses are dispensed with because where the University Grants Commission itself suggests creation of new posts, it is meaningless to call for suggestions or proposals from the Committee of Courses, particularly when in the matter of creation of posts, only the recommendation of the Academic Council is obligatory. In this case a post of Reader was suggested by the University Grants Commissions and we agree with the averments of the respondents that in such cirumstances it was pointless for the Committee of Courses to consider the creation of posts of Readers in various subjects. In any case, the Academic Council can suo motu recommend the creation of posts and the fact being that the suggestion of the University Grants Commission was placed before the Academic Council and Executive Council, we are unable to hold that even then it was necessary for the entire process to be repeated. There does not appear to us to be any substance in this contention.
(48) The last contention of the petitioners is that the order of the Chancellor suffers from errors apparent on its face and it is, thereforee, vitiated. The Chancellor has given a reasoned order covering a few pages. First it is contended that the Chancellor misread the opinion of the Inter University Board in saying that according to it the career of respondent No. 6 at the Sourthern Illinois University was 'consistently creditable' where it is clear that the opinion of the Inter University Board was, as recorded by the Chancellor himself earlier, that respondent No. 6 'did not fare well in the beginning later he maintained a consistent creditable record.' It is contended that there is a clear inconsistency and a fair reading of the opinion of the Inter University Board could not justify the Chancellor in saving that according to the Inter University Board the career of respondent No. 6 at the Southern Illinois University was consistently creditable. It is true that the Inter University Board has opined that respondent No. 6 did not fare well in the beginning but in view of the further opinion that 'later he maintained a consistent creditable record' we cannot say that the reading of the Chancellor amounted to an error apparent on the face of the record.
(49) The Inter University Board did use the word 'consistent' and the maintenance of a creditable record which can be described, as has been described, by the Chancellor, as 'consistently creditable.'
(50) The next error pointed out is the statement by the Chancellor that respondent No. 6 measured up to the standard set by the advertisement. Without anything more, this statement of the Chancellor would not be correct because obviously respondent No. 6, like the other candidates interviewed, did not have one of the minimum qualifications of 5 years post-graduate teaching experience. But notice had to be taken by the Chancellor of the relaxation recommended by the Selection Committee with regard to the teaching experience/guiding research. With this relaxation, which is mentioned by the Chancellor, respondent No. 6 like the other candidates would measure up to the advertisement. This cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.
(51) Then it is pointed out that the Chancellor was in error in saying that the qualification as to teaching experience/guiding research 'remains waived as the Executive Council does not mention it.' It is urged that the Executive Council has not mentioned the question of relaxation in its minutes and it .cannot, thereforee, be said that this qualification which had been waived by the Selection Committee remained waived by the Executive Council. As pointed out earlier, the Selection Committee had made two recommendations-one relating to the relaxation of the qualification of post-graduate teaching experience and the other relating to the appointment of respondent No. 6. The Executive Council have given reasons for rejecting the recommendation for appointing respondent No. 6 but they have not given any reasons, as they are bound to give under the Rules, for rejecting the recommendation relating to relaxation. In fact, they have not even mentioned the question of relaxation. In view of the fact that the Executive Council have to give their reasons for rejecting the recommendation it is not only a possible but a probable view that the non-mention of their reasons amounts, at least, to implied waiver by the Executive Council.
(52) We, thereforee, do not find any errors apparent on the face of the order of the Chancellor which would justify its quashing even if this Court could issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution in that behalf.
(53) Mr. Bishamber Lal, one of the Advocates for the petitioners, urged that the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents is only by the Registrar of the Jamia and not by the Vice Chancellor and, thereforee, the facts relating to the allegations of mala fide against the Vice-Chancellor must be deemed to be admitted in the absence of an affidavit by the Vice Chancellor. He relies upon the observations of the Supreme Court in : (1966)ILLJ458SC in re:. S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjabi) and Air 1964 S C 1962: C. S. Rowjee v. State of Andhra Pradesh. The two allegations as to mala fides are only that the petitioners' representations were not sent to the Chancellor by the Vice Chancellor and that he helped respondent No. 6 in making his representation with reference to the record. Even if true, these allegations would not amount to mala fides and for that reason we cannot attach any significance to the omission to file an affidavit by the Vice Chancellor. Lastly, it is urged that these two allegations have been denied by the Registrar by an affidavit which is stated to be true to his knowledge and since these could not be within his knowledge, the affidavit is improper and should not be taken into consideration. Even if the affidavit is improper as to these two matters, no inference can be arrived at in favor of the petitioners particularly when the affidavit must have been sworn by the Registrar with reference to the record which contained all the representations.
(54) The petitioners' right to challenge the appointment of respondent No. 6 is questioned by the respondents. Their contention is that the petitioners have no locus standi as they were not selected by the Selection Committee who did not even place their names on a panel. The petitioners contend that they have a right to challenge the appointment of respondent No. 6 even as members of the public because the post of Reader in Economics is a public office and that is why they have prayed for a writ of quo warranto. The respondents' case is that a teaching post like a Reader in Economics cannot be said to be a public office. The Jamia is not the creature of any statute. It is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act having its Memorandum of Association; its Rules, Regulations and Bye- laws. The question whether the Jamia is an 'authority' of public character and as such amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has been decided by a Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in I.L.R. 1969 Delhi 202 in re : Amir-Jamia and others v. Desharath Rai. By a notification dated June 19, 1962 issued by the Government of India under section 3(f) of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, the Jamia was deemed to be a University for the purpose of the said Act. This Court was considering the question whether a writ of certiorari could be issued against the Jamia under Article 226 of the Constitution against its order expelling a student and debarring him from entering the Campus of the Jamia without issuing a show cause notice or giving an opportunity of a written representation or oral hearing. This Court held,- .
'Abody of persons may become a public authority either because in its inception it is created by a statute pi or because the Governmental authority is conferred upon it later either by statute or even by executive action. The Governmental authority to confer degrees on its students was the right derived by the Jamia Millia from a notification issued by the Government under the University Grants Commission Act, though Jamia Millia had existed before the notification as a privately formed institution. From the moment the power to confer degrees was given to Jamia Millia under a statute which expressly called it an 'authority' there can be little doubt that it was an authority of a public nature and as such amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226. Our decision to regard it as a public authority is, thereforee, fully covered by the princeple underlying Article 226 and Article 12 of the Constitution, though we may be adding a new example of the principle.'
(55) We, thereforee, take it that the Jamia is a public authority emenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The question, however, is whether even so a teacher in the Jamia can be said to be holder of a public office so as to attract the issue of a writ of quo warranto. In the words of the Supreme Court in : 4SCR575 in re : The University of Mysore v. C. D. Govinda Rao and another,-
'BROADLYstated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions: it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office; in some cases, persons not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not.'
(56) It is, thereforee, necessary that it must be established that there is a public office; the holder of that office has been appointed by executive action in accordance with law and that such holder has no valid title to it. Although these observations were made, the Supreme Court did not go into the question whether the appointment made by the University of Mysore could be challenged by the issue of a writ of quo warranto and they decided the case on the basis that it was open to the High Court to quash the challenged appointment. In Air 1964 Mysore 159 in re: Dr. P. S. Venkataswamy setty v. University of Mysore and others'), a Division Bench of that Court was considering the question whether Professors and Readers in the Mysore University were holders of public office. After discussing the English law and various cases their Lordships observed :-
'HENCEin India the nature of office in respect of which quo warranto will lie must be taken to be an office created by the Constitution itself or by any statute and invested with the power or charged with the duty of acting in execution or in enforcement of the law. We might add that the office may be either an elective office or one in respect of which a nomination or appointment is made by a specified authority and that in the case of elective office, we generally have the procedure of election petitions which makes it unnecessary for any one to proceed by way of a writ of quo warranto. Provided the office is of the character or nature described above, it is well established in England that the petitioner who is only a relator need not have any personal interest in the matter. All that is necessary is that he should act bona fide in public interest and should not be a mere man of straw acting at the instance of others or on ulterior motives. The writ, as already stated, is purely discretionary with the Court and will not issue unless the Court is satisfied that it is necessary to issue the writ in public interest.'
(57) Applying these observations, their Lordships held that in the absence of any provision of the Mysore University Act enumerating or designating Professors, Readers or teachers as statutory functionaries, Professors and Readers of the University could not be said to exercise any Governmental functions nor could they be said to be invested with the power or charged with the duty of acting in execution or enforcement of the law. They were merely employees under a statutory body. They could not, thereforee, in any sense be described as holders of public offices in respect of which quo warranto will lie. In 1967 (72) Calcutta Weekly Notes 50 in re: Sashi Bhusan Ray v. Pramathnath Banerjee and others , a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was considering the question whether the office of the Principal of the University Law College was a public office. The Bench noticed the following passage from Ferris on 'Extraordinary Legal Remedies':-
'Apublic office is the right, authority and duty created and conferred by law, by which an individual is vested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the Government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public, for the term and by the tenure prescribed by law. It implies a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power. It is a trust conferred by public authority for a public purpose, embracing the ideas of tenure, duration, emoluments and duties. A public office is thus to be distinguished from a mere employment or agency resting on contract, to which such powers and functions are not attached. The Common Law Rule is that in order for the writ to lie, the office must be of a public nature. The determining factor, the test, is whether the office involves a delegation of some of the solemn functions of Government, either executive, legislative or judicial, to be exercised by the holder for the public benefit. Unless .his powers are of this nature, he is not a public officer. As one authority puts it, the tests to be applied in determining whether an information will lie, are the source of the office, which should be from the sovereign authority, the tenure, which should be fixed and published; and the duties which should be of a public nature.'
(58) Their Lordships then proceeded to examine the question before them and noticing that the Calcutta University was imparting education with State aid observed :-
'ITdoes not seem to us that the office of the Principal of the University Law College involves a delegation of any of the solemn functions of Government either executive or legislative or judicial to be exercised by the Principal for public benefit. The Principal of the Law College is the head of an institution maintained, as we shall see later, by the Calcutta University and engaged in imparting legal education to those who are the students of that college. He may have administrative and pedagogic duties to be discharged in the interest of the students of his college; but we do not see how those duties can be said to be the duties of a public nature which Ferris has hinted at in the passage quoted above. If there is failure or neglect on his part to perform his duties, his students or their guardians and in some cases even the staff of the college may be affected; but the public as such are not interested in the due observance of the obligations of his employment. In any event, the interest of the public, if any, is so remote that his office does not become a 'public office' as explained by Ferris.'
In 1972 (1) Supreme Court Cases 623 in re: Shri Vidya Ram Misra v. Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narain College, the Supreme Court were considering whether a dismissed lecturer of the College could invoke Article 226 of the Constitution. The College in question was an associated College of the Lucknow University and the services of the lecturer were alleged to have been terminated in violation of the statute passed under the Lucknow University Act, 1920. Their Lordships noticed the decision reported in (1964) 3 All ERs 866 in re : Vidyodaya University v. Silva where a teacher appointed by a University constituted under a Statute was held not to be holding an office or status. They also noticed the criticism of this decision by various authors and by the House of Lords in (1971) Weekly Law Reports 1578 in re: Mallock v. Aberdeen Corporation, but held that whether the decision in Vidyodaya University Council v. Sillllva was correct or not, in the case before their Lordships, there was no element of public employment, nothing in the nature of an office or status which was capable of protection.
(59) It, thereforee, follows that the holder of the post of a Reader in the Jamia cannot be said to be the holder of a public office and a writ of quo warranto is not maintainable.
(60) We have already held that the challenge of the petitioners to the entire process of selection and appointment of respondent No. 6 has failed because the allegations have not been substantiated and further that the order of the Chancellor is not vitiated by any errors apparent on the face of the record. These conclusions have been arrived at by us on the assumption that a writ of mandamus and/or certiorari will be available to the petitioners.
(61) In the result, these two petitions are dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee in each petition is assessed at Rs. 200.00 i.e. Rs. 100.00 for counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 5 and Rs. 100.00 for counsel for respondent No. 6. C.W. No. 1050 of 1971.
(62) In this writ petition, the selection and appointment of respondents Nos. 5 and 6 as Readers in Education in the Teachers College of the Jamia have been challenged by the two petitioners who were candidates for these posts.
(63) The post of Reader in Education was first advertised on August 12, 1969. The qualifications were :-
'ATleast Second Class Master's degree in Education or Sociology with a research degree or published work of equivalent merit and 5 years' experience of teaching and guiding research at the post graduate level.'
Relaxation in any of these qualifications could be made on the recommendation of the Selection Committee in case of candidates otherwise well qualified. The Selection Committee appointed for the purpose recommended respondent No. 5 for appointment by its recommendation dated September 23, 1969. This recommendation was accepted by the Executive Council of the Jamia in its meeting held on October 25, 1969 and the Registrar of the Jamia informed respondent No. 5 of his appointment.
(64) Some time later another advertisement for another post of Reader in Education was issued in or about May, 1970. The minimum qualifications advertised were :-
'ATleast Ii Class Master's degree in Education or any related field with a research degree or published work of equal merit and 5 years' post-graduate teaching experience and/or research preferably with training or experience in Education Planning.'
Relaxation in any of the qualifications could be made on the recommendation of the Selection Committee in case of candidates otherwise well qualified. The Selection Committee in its meeting held on January 28, 1971, recommended the appointgment of respondent No. 6. While recommending respondent No. 6 for appointment, the Selection Committee 'were of the view that his published work though in the form mainly of articles, was of a high standard and that he gave evidence of an unusual grasp of his subject, ability to express his ideas lucidly and of a strong likelihood of further development of knowledge and competence.' The recommendation of the Selection Committee was approved by the Executive Council and respondent No. 6 was appointed as Reader in Education by the Registrar's letter dated May 17, 1971.
(65) These petitioners also have raised a contention that these two posts were not created according to the Rules of the Jamia. The averments and the counter averments are the same as in the case of the earlier writ petitions dealt with by this judgment and for the reasons given therein, we find no substance in this point.
(66) The next contention of petitioners is that respondent No. 5 lacked one of the essential qualifications, namely, experience of teaching and guiding research at the post-graduate level.
(67) Taking the case of respondent No. 5, it cannot be disputed that he does not have the requisite teaching experience or guiding research at the post-graduate level. It is, however, clear from the particulars of respondent No. 5 as to teaching experience that he has taught for one year (1967-68) to post-graduate participants of the N.I.E. Associateship course; taught the course 'Problems of Indian Education : Sociological Perspectives'' to the lecturers and readers of Post-graduate Teachers Training Colleges (1968-69); taught Sociology of Education Course to Principals of Training Institutes, organized by the Department of Teacher Education and engaged in higher research in Sociology of Education. Literally speaking, respondent No. 5 does not fulfill one of the minimum qualifications relating to 5 years post-graduate teaching experience and guiding research. It does not appear either from the proceedings of the Selection Committee or of the Executive Council that this qualification was relaxed in the case of respondent No. 5. The Selection Committee as well as the executive Council had the power to relax. They did appoint respondent No. 5 who lacked the essential qualification of 5 years post-graduate teaching and guiding research, At the same time, he had a few years teaching experience at post-graduate level. It would not, thereforee, be unreasonable turn us to assume that both the Selection Committee and the Executive Council were conscious of the fact that respondent No. 5 lacked the aforesaid essential qualification but they appointed him considering his other qualifications and they must be assumed to have relaxed the essential qualification considering him to be otherwise well qualified.
(68) There is another aspect of this matter. Both the petitioners were candidates at the time when respondent No. 5 was selected. They must have been aware of the lacuna in his qualifications yet they did not take any action or make any representation when respondent No. 5 was appointed in October, 1969 or con- firmed in 1970. Respondent No. 5 was not a lecturer in the Jamia at the time when he was selected for appointment as Reader in Education and it is clear from the appointment letter issued to him that he was a lecturer in the National Institute of Education, New Delhi. Upon his appointment in 1969 and confirmation in 1970, he must have broken all connections with the National Institute of Education and it will be extremely hard if at this late stage we were to entertain this objection by the petitioners as to his qualifications when they could easily have done so upon his appointment in 1969. Respondent No. 5 accepted the appointment by giving up his post in the National Institute of Education. If objection had been taken in time, he might have thought twice about leaving his post in the National Institute of Education. We are, thereforee, of the opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to raise this plea after such a length of time.
(69) Then we come to the case of respondent No. 6. Admittedly he holds a Second Class Master's degree in Education. As to the research degree or published work of equal merit, the Selection Committee were of the view, as stated above, that his articles were of a high standard and they equated them to the requirement of the published work. In any case, the Selection Committee must be deemed to have relaxed this qualification and, not being a Court of appeal, we will not be justified in appraising the value of his articles and to determine whether they should be equated to a published work as required by the advertisement. In the opinion of the Selection Committee and also the Executive Council, respondent No. 6 fulfillled this qualification and we cannot go behind it.
(70) Another qualification which respondent No. 6 is alleged to lack is 5 years teaching experience at post-graduate level. Amongst other teaching experience, respondent No. 6 was a lecturer for 5 years at the Regional College of Education at Ajmer. It is not disputed that the Regional College of Education at Ajmer is a college for granting bachelor of education degree, it is, however, contended by the petitioners that a lecturer to bachelor of education classes cannot be said to have post-graduate teaching experience. Again, it is not disputed that it is only after obtaining an ordinary degree that a person is eligible for taking the bachelor of education course, in its plain ordinary English meaning, thereforee, a bachelor of education course would be a post-gradute course. It is contended by the petitioners that the Delhi University does not consider the bachelor of education course as a post-graduate course while it is contended on behalf of the respondents that the Jamia considers the bachelor of education course as a post-graduate course. We have to take the plain ordinary English meaning of the term 'post-graduate' and taking that we arc of the view that respondent No. 6 having taught for 5 years to bachelor of education classes had 5 years post-graduate teaching experiernce. We are. thereforee, of the view that no fault can be found with respondent No. 6 Lacking an essential qualification as alleged.
(71) Then it is contended that respondent No. 6 was appointted in spite of a report to the Vice Chancellor that he had been prosecuted in Criminal Courts and cases were still pending against him in Rajasthan. Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 have stated that when the previous conduct and record of respondent No. 6 was brought to the notice of the Vice-chancellor, enquiries were made from the then employer of respondent No. 6. It was found that there was no decision of any Court convicting him for the offences alleged and, thereforee, it was thought that it would be unfair to debar him from being appointed on the basis of mere allegations. Even if there is any truth in the allegations, the moral character of a particular candidate for appointment to an educational institution is primarily a question for the members of the Selection Committee or the Executive Council or the Vice Chancellor or the Chancellor of the Jamia. It is for them to make a decision whether such a person should or should not be appointed. This is not a question which will entitle this Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere either in the selection or appointment of the particular candidate.
(72) Then it is contended that the petitioners being more qualified and experienced than respondents Nos. 5 and 6 have a fundamental right under Article 16 of the Constitution to be promoted and appointed as Readers in Education. The plea is misconceived. Article 16 contemplates only consideration and so long as a candidate who is eligible is considered by the persons whose duty it is to select, Article 16 is satisfied. The function of selection and recommending for appointment is that of the Selection Committee. The persons who constitute the Selection Committee are expected to be experts in their line. It is not for this Court to sit in appeal over their decision in so far as the actual merits of the selection are concerned. We, thereforee, do not find any substance in this contention.
(73) In the result, this petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 100.00 to counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 4.