S. Rangarajan, J.
(1) The appellant is aggrieved by by the order of the Rent Control Tribunal, dismissing his appeal, which he had preferred against the order of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi whereby he has refused to stay the proceedings in execution pending decision of the objections, against him in the following circumstances:- The landlord had applied for evicting the tenant from the premiess in question on the ground that she required the premises for re-roofing the same i. e. for effecting the 'reparis' under Section 14(f) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958. There was a compromise between the landlord and the tenant on 28th April, 1961 or. the basis of which a decree for eviction was passed in terms of the compromise. By the said compromise the tenant admitted that the landlord had to get the roof-re-re-laid. He, thereforee, agreed that an order for eviction be passed against him and in favor of the landlord and that he would vacate the premises on or before 15th August, 1961 and hand over possession to the landord, in which event the landord was to return possession of the premises the tenant after repairs by 15th September, 1961. The compromise further provided that in case the tenant did not surrender possession as agreed he would be liable to eviction at once and would not be entitled to restoration of possession after effecting of repairs. It was also stipulated that Rs.2uCOwere to be paid as damages to the tenant if the landlord did not put him back in possession of the propertey after effecting the repairs.
(2) An application for review of the above order was made on 26th August, i961, by the tenant, in which it was a stated that a representation had been made by the landlored that the necessary plans for carrying out reparis had been sanctioned while it was seen that the landlord had not made any such application for carrying out the repairs. It was further stated that it was a duty, under the Delhi Rent Control Act 59 of 1958, cast on the part of the Pent Controller to satisfy himself that the conditions as laid down in 14 (f) of the Act were fulfillled and the Rent Controller not having expressed such satisfaction the decree was a nullity. This application for the review was dismissed by the Rent Controller on 23rd September, 1961.
(3) The landlord later applied for evicting the tenant after getting the permission of the Competent Authority under the Slum Area (Improvement & Clearance) Act, the premises in question being situate in the slum area. The tenant also applied, on 2nd June, 1966 to the Rent Controller under Section 14(8) and 20 of the Delhi Rent Control Act read with Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a declaration that the decree itself was unexecutable and to set aside the decree in the event of landlord not being able to take possession of the premises for re-roofing the house and handing it back to the tenant. Pending determination of this application he had also applied or stay which was refused by the Rent Controller. Against this order he appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal. This second appeal is directed against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing is appeal.
(4) It is contended before me that the view of the Rent Control, Tribunal, that the tenant had no prima fade case, is erroneous for the reason that before granting eviction on the basis of the compromise the Rent Controller had to express his satisfaction concerning the ground on which the landlord required the premises. In support of this contention reliance is placed on two decisions of the Supreme Court (1) Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat and (Z) Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. K L. Bansal. The former decision was followed in the latter decision. It is seen that both the decisions were rendered under the previous enactment which was then in force in Delhi namely, the Delhi Rent Control Act of I 52. The relevant provision of that Act, Section 13, which reads as follows:
'13.Protection of a tenant against eviction. - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any court in favor of the landlord against any tenant (including a tenant whose tenancy is terminated; Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply to any suit or other proceeding of such recovery of possession if the court is satisfied etc. (empha-sis added) Clauses (f) and g) of Section 13 of the said Act were similar to caluses (f) and (g) of the later enactment, which alone is applicable to the present case namely, the Delhi Rent Control Act 59 of 1958.
(5) The relevant words of Section 14 instead of those of section 13, already set out, are as follows:-
'14.Protection of Tenant against eviction- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession, of any premises shall bemade by any ourt or Controller in favor of the landlor ' against a tenant: Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely, etc. etc '
Compling the two enactments, thereforee, it is seen that the entire schema of the two enactments is different in so far as the present question is concerned. It has been noticed that under the old Act the Controller was required to express his satisfaction regarding every one of the grounds, mentioned therein, on which the vacation was ought for. This scheme was changed by Section 14 of the new Act which not only omitted the requirement of the Rent Controller expressing his satisfaction on all the grounds mentioned therein, but on the other hand confined, under Section 14(8), the need for the Controller to express his satisfaction to a case falling under clause (g) alone.
(6) Before proceeding further with this aspect, it is necessary to read clauses (f) and (g) of sub-section (1) as well as sub-section (f) of Section 14:-
(F)that the premises have become unsafe or unfit for human habitation and are bona fide required by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated: (g) that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of building or re-building or making there to any substantial additions or alterations and that such building or rebuilding or addition or alteration cannot be carried out with-out the premises being vacated; (8) No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in clause (g) of the proviso to sub-section (1), unless the Controller is satifised that the proposed reconstruction will not radically after the purpose for which the premises were let or that such radical alteration is in the public interest, and that the plans and estimates of such reconstruction have been properly prepared and that necessary funds for the purpose are available with the landord.
(7) It is not seriously contended before me that the requirement of the landlord in this case falls within clause (g): on the other hand even in the application for review, as seen earlier, it was specifically stated that the present case fell within 14 (f . Even regardless of the above said admission the present case is seen to fall within (f) and not (g). If it is a mere case of the premises being required by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated the case fell under (f) on the other hand, if it is a case of the landlord requiring the premises for the purpose of building or-re-building or making there to any substantial addition or alteration (the same not being able to be carried out without the premises being vacated) it falls under clause (g) Once the matter falls under (f) according to the plain intendment of section 14, there is no jurisdiction, or much less any requirement on the part of the Rent Controller to impose any condition in that regard. In such a case he is clearly not called upon to express his satisfaction, it is a different question, however, if that matter falls under clause (g) when the Rent Controller has to be satisfied about the further following matters, because in the very nature of that situation the purpose in granting eviction and restoring possession to the landlord cannot be effectuated without the following conditions being present: - (a) The reconstruction would not radically alter the purpose for which the premises were left. (b) That such radical alteration (if that is the case) is in the public interest. (e) The plans and estimates of such reconstruction have bee properly prepared and (d) That necessary funds for the purpose are available with the landlord.
(8) It is also instructive in this connection to note the Building Bye Laws of 1967, framed in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-Section (1) of section 342, sub-section (1) of section 481 and section 482 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act 1957-67 A (b) is the relevant Bye-law and may be set out: - (67-A) 'repairs' means and inculde: - (b) reroofing or renewal of roof including roof of intermediate floor at the same height or by raising the height of the walls of rooms provided final height is not less than that provided under the building bye-laws. Rule 67-A also contains a note to the following effect:-
'NOsanction shall be necessary for carying out repairs as defined in this clause.'
(9) It will be thus seen that the view of the Rent Control Tribunal that the appellant has no case on the merits appears justified over on the simple ground of the present case falling under clause (f) and not (g). thereforee, there was no need for the Controller to express any satisfaction about the ground on which the landlord wanted possession of the premises.
(10) As already noticed in the above said decisions of the Supreme Court the old Act, but not the new, fell for consideration. The former (Bahadur Singh) was concerned with a decree for eviction being passed on an award to which the landlord was not a party and the Rent Controller and not satisfied himself that the ground for section existed. The expression in the proviso to Section 13(1) of the old Act requring the Rent Controller to satisfy himself about the ground of eviction urged by the landlord was expressly relied upon. In the latter case (Kaushalya Devi) the landlord required the premises on the grounds (a) that he required it for the residence of himself and the memebers of his family, (b) the tenant owning another house in Delhi which was suitable for him and (e) the tenant also having committ default in payment of rent. Since, under the Old Act, the satisfaction of the Controller was required on all the grounds mentioned by the landlord and that was not there, it was held that the decree for eviction passed by the Rent Controller, without expressing his satisfaction but merely on the basis of compromise was not valid.
(11) Since the present case arises under the Act of 1958 and in view of the above discussion I am unable to see any ground which will merit interference with the order of the Rent Control Tribunal confirming the order of the Rent Controller declining to grant stay of the proceedings in execution for eviction. The second appeal against order of the Rent Control Tribunal is consequently dismissed with costs.