P.N. Khanna, J.
(1) This second appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Rent Control Tribunal dismissing the appellant-tenant's appeal against the order of the Controller refusing to stay the appellant's eviction in execution of an order to that efct.
(2) The respondent-landlord filed an eviction application against the appellant on the ground of his personal bona fide requirements for the premises. In the written statement, the appellant admitted that the respondent was a landlord and that the premises in question were purely residential and had been let out to him for residential purposes. He, however, contested his eviction on the pleas that the respondent did not require the premises bona fide for himself or for his family members dependent on him and that he had another suitable accommodation at 7/23 Daryaganj.
(3) On September 12, 1967 the parties arrived at a compromise and made a statement on oath saying that an order for eviction in favor of the respondent against the appellant be passed in view of the respondent's ownership of the premises and his bona satisfied requirements for the same. It was also agreed that the appellant be granted time (two years and eight months) to vacate the premises up to May 31, 1970' and that respondent would not execute the eviction order before June 1, 1970. On that very date, an order was passed by the Controller saying that in accordance with the statements of the parties, an order for eviction in favor of the respondent and against the appellant be passed. Time, however, was granted for vacating the premises till May 31, 1970. On May 19, 1970 the appellant filed an application under section 47 read with Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, pleading that the eviction order passed on the basis of a compromise was outside the competence of the Controller. It was further pleaded that on April Ii, 1970 the respondent had entered into a fresh compromise, according to which he had accepted the appellant as a regular tenant on the same terms and conditions, and accepted rent for the period from February 10, 1970 to March 9, 1970 and also undertook to get the satisfaction of the eviction order recorded before the Controller, but that the respondent afterwards changed his mind. Prayer was made that the eviction order be declared a nullity and and non executable; and the decree-holder be restrained from executing the same. A separate stay application was filed praying for the stay of execution proceeding till the disposal of the objection petition. The learned Controller came to the conclusion that the appellant had no prima fade case. The application for stay of execution proceeding was, thereforee, dismissed. The learned Rent Control Tribunal concurring with the views of the Controller refused to interfere with the said order. The tenant has under these circumstances come up to this Court in second appeal.
(4) Choudhry Mohan Singh, the learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the respondent had no prima fade case in his favor in view of the order of eviction being obviously without jurisdiction. The Controller was not competent to pass the order of eviction unless he had satisfied himself about the truth of the respondent's claim. In this case the controller, it was urged, had not considered the matter at all the order being passed merely on the compromise between the parties. Such an order, the learned counsel contended, was a nullity. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on three judgments of the Supreme Court in Bahadur Singh and another v. Mur Subrat & another, 1969 Rcr 151(1), Smt Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal, 1969 Rcr 703(2), and Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal and another, 1970 Rcr 375(3). He also relied on two decisions of the Mysore High Court, Palakurti Hussain Sahib v. S. Gururaia Rao, 1970 Rcr lOOO, and Subhana v. B. Seethamma, 1970 Rcr 41. The three Supreme Court decisions relied upon by the learned counsel dealt with cases arising under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, No. 38 of 1952, the requirements of which were different from those under the Delhi Rent Control Act, No. 59 of 1958 which applies to the present case. The relevant portion of section 13 of the 1952 Act was as follows :
'13.Protection of a tenant against eviction.-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any Court in favor of the landlord against any tenant (including a tenant whose tenancy is terminated) :
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to suit or other proceeding for such recovery or possession if the Court is satisfied,- Under the said Act 38 of 1952, the satisfaction of the Court as is apparent from the language of section 13, was a condition precedent for the passing of an order fore eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the various clauses of the proviso. In Bahadur Singh's case (1970 Rcr 1510), the decree had been passed on the basis of an award. The Court had not considered the merits of the case at all. In Smt. Kaushalya Devi's case, (1969 Rcr 703, the compromise arrived at between the parties was in the following terms :
'(A)Decree for ejectment be passed in favor of the. plaintiff against the defendant, the decree will be executable after the 31st December, 1958, if the defendant does not give possession till then.
(B)The standard rent of the premises be fixed at Rs. 40.00 per mensem, instead of Rs. 50.00 paid at present payable from the 1st July, 1956, till the defendant vacates the premises.
(C)The amount in deposit with this Court be paid to the plaintiff which will be adjusted between the parties.'
(5) No reference was made in the compromise to the grounds on which ejectment was claimed (viz. for bona fide personal requirements). In Ferozi Lal Jain's case (1970 Rcr 375) , the compromise petition, as is specifically mentioned in the judgment itself, did not make any reference to the alleged sub-lease, the case being for eviction on the grounds of subletting. In all these cases, the Court at no stage was called upon to apply its mind to the question whether the alleged ground for eviction has been proved or not. The Court just acceded to the prayer for passing an ejectment order, without the justification of the ground for eviction being specified. The satisfaction of the Court, which was the first requirement of section 13 of 1958 Act was never recorded. It was for this reason that in all these three judgments, the Supreme Court held that an order for eviction based on compromise was a nullity,
(6) A change was, however, introduced in the corresponding provision in section 14 of the new Act No. 59 of 1958, by deleting the expression 'if the Court is satisfied'. Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act No. 59 of 1958, reads as follows :
'14.Protection of Tenant against eviction.-(1) Not withstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or Controller in favor of the landlord against a tenant : PROVIDED that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely :- ous and the interpretation put by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments on the language of the earlier Act cannot be used for interpreting the language of the new section.
(7) In Palakurti Hussain Sahib's case, (1970 Rcr 1000)(^), the learned Judge of the Mysore High Court after reproducing the provisions of section 13 of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 and of section 21 to the Mysore Rent Control Act, (which is more or less analogous to section 14 of the Act 39 of 1938), held that the provisions of the two sections were almost similar. With ut- most respect to the learned Judge, it appears that the deletion of the words 'if the Court is satisfied' occurring in the( Delhi's 1952 Act. from the provisions of the Mysore Act was not brought to his Lordship's notice and the difference in the two provisions was not properly appreciated. The learned Judge under the impression that the provisions of the two enactments were almost similar, applied the Supreme Court decisions to the Mysore case and decided it accordingly. In Subbana's case (1971 Rcr 41, the decision in Palakurti Hussain Sahib's case (1970 Rcr 1000) was followed without discussing further the distinction in the two enactments.
(8) A comparison of section 13 of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 and section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, makes it clear that the condition 'if the Court is satisfied', has been deleted from the proviso to section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. This deletion obviously is deliberate as is further clear from a reading of sub-section (8) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which reads as follows :
'(8)No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in clause (g) of the proviso to sub-section (1), unless the Controller is satisfied that the proposed reconstruction will not radically alter the purpose for which the premises were let or that such radical alteration is in the public interest, and that the plans and estimates of such reconstruction have been properly prepared and that necessary funds for the purpose are available with the landlord'.
(9) The requirement of Controller's satisfaction has thus been retained, where it was considered necessary to retain it, just as it was done in sub-section (8) of section 14 of the 1958 Act, by introducing the expression 'unless the Controller is satisfied', when dealing with clause (g) of the proviso to section 14(1) only. The omission of the requirement of the Controller's satisfaction in respect of other clauses of the proviso to section 14(1), thus, is deliberate and the Courts are not privileged to introduce into the enactment a phrase which the legislature in its wisdom has deliberately deleted. (Also see Mohammad Ishas v. Mst. Jannat Bi, 1970 Dlt 440, a judgment by Mr. Justice S. Rangarajan of this Court).
(10) In the present case, the appellant in his statement on oath, at the time of getting the compromise recorded, admitted the nature of the respondent's requirement for the premises in dispute to be bonafide. This implied a further admission on his part that the alleged accommodation in Darya Ganj was not suitable for his needs and that is why he conceded that the accommodation in dispute was bona fide required by him. Now, if these admissions are read along with the admissions in the written statement, there was left nothing further to be tried by the Controller and no further evidence was needed to prove the allegations of the respondent in support of the grounds on which he sought the appellant's eviction. The Controller, thereforee, was justified in passing an order in accordance with the statement of the parties. And after enjoying the period of two years and eight months granted to him by the Controller's order, the appellant cannot now be allowed to turn round and repudiate his own admission (see Seth Muna Lal v. Seth Shiv Rattan G. Mohafla, 1968DL-T-401.
(11) In this case it was thus proved by the appellant's own admissions that the premises were let for residential purposes, that they were required bona fide by the respondent for occupation as a residence for himself, that he was the owner thereof, and that he had no other reasonably suitably residential accommodation. In face of this the Controller was well within his jurisdiction to pass the order of eviction under clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
(12) The contention of Ch. Mohan Singh that prima facie, the order for the recovery of possession was not within the competence of the Controller, cannot thereforee, be accepted. The Rent Control Tribunal also took into account that the tenant in this case has already enjoyed a postponement in the execution of the .order of eviction for a period from 12th September 1967, up to May 31, 1970 and as such the balance of convenience was considered to lie heavily in favor of the respondent. I do not, under the circumstances, find that there is any error in the exercise of discretion by the Courts below.
(13) There is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. In the special circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.