P.S. Safeer, J.
(1) Respondent sued the appellant for eviction and one of the grounds was non-payment of arrears of rent. The Controller made an order on 18.11.72 U/S 15(I) that arrears of Rs. 15,750.00 be deposited within a month. The tenant deposited only Rs. 14,750.00. Respondent finding the deposit short by Rs 1,000.00 made an application U/S 15(7) for striking out the defense. Appellant Was served with this application on 24.1.73. Appellant then on 27.1.73. applied that due to bona fide mistake deposit less by Rs. 1,000.00 was made and he be allowed to deposit the same. It was allowed on the same day but the counsel did not know of this at least until 1.2.73. Deposit was made on 7.2.73 and application U/S 15(7) waa also fixed for same day Delay was not condoned and defense was struck out. Appellant appealed against the same and remained unsuccessful. He then filed second appeal.] It was held:-
(2) Taking into consideration the working days in January and February, 19 3 the Rent Control Tribunal took the. view that in the circumstances in which the appellant had become aware of the default on the 24th of January, 1973 he should have exercised vigilance and after the making of the order on the 27th of January, 1973 permitting him to make the deposit, he should have made it either on the 27th of January or at the most on the 29th of January, 1973 as the 28th of January was a.holiday. The Rent Control Tribunal found that the appellant had not been vigilant and had been taking the things lightly.
(3) In this case discretion has been exercised in order to enforce the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Act. Section 15 in the Act was enacted to achieve the object that during the pendency of eviction proceedings the tenants should not escape the liability to deposit the arrears of rent and to pay the rent which may continue to become due.
(4) Where an application for eviction is moved on several grounds one of which may be the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent or on the only ground that the arrears of rent had not been paid then as a matter of obligation the Rent Controller has to pass an order under section 15(1) of the Act. In ease of an eviction petition urged on other grounds the Rent Controller is to act under sub-section (7) of section 15 of the Act. Where there is a dispute as to Who is entitled to receive the amount the Controller cap still make an order under sub-section 4 of section 15 directing that the tenant may deposit the amount which may not be withdrawn until it is decided as to who is the person entitled to receive it. It is to enforce the intendment in the proceeding provisions that sub-section (7) occurs in section 15 of the Act. Where a tenant fails to make a payment or to deposit the amount in accordance with the order made under sub-section (1) or (2) of section 15 of the Act, the Rent Controller may order the defense against eviction to be struck out. Even then he has to proceed with the hearing of the application. The application for eviction may fail for many other reasons. The tenant in spite of his defense having been struck out cannot be absolutely expunged from the proceedings. He can still address the Controller in order to convince him that leaving aside the defense raised against the eviction petition, the eviction petition by itself is liable to fail because of any patent illegality. If effect is. not given to the provision contained in sub-section (7) of section 15 it would create a precedent for the tenants to show scant regard to the orders which may be passed under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 15 of the Act. In every case where an order may have been passed under those provisions the tenant committing default will only have to set up some grounds in order to get the benefit of any observation which may tend to interfere with the true scope of sub-section (7) of section 15 of the Act. Unless it is perverse or illegal on the face of it the discretionary order passed under sub-section (7) of section 15 of the Act should not be lightly interfered with by the High Court for the added reason that it would not be raising any substantial question of law within section 39 of Act; 59 of 1958.