Sultan Singh, J.
(1) The question for decision in this second appeal is whether there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Briefly the facts are that Hardit Singh, predecessor of the appellants and respondents 2 and 3 was inducted as a tenant in two rooms with two front verandahs, latrine and open court-yard at 118-B Kalkaji, New Delhi on a monthly of Rs.40.00 excluding other charges in June, 1955. Mool Chand respondent No. 1 on 1st October, 1971 filed an application for the eviction of Hardit Singh, tenant under section 14(l)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') alleging that the premises were let for residential purposes and were required bona fide for occupation for himself and the members of his family dependent upon him, that he was the owner tliereof having no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation, that he had been ordered to vacate the railway quarter No. 25-E/A, Subzi Mandi, Delhi by the concerned authorities. Hardit Singh in the written statement pleaded that he was tenant under Amir Ghand and not under Mool Ghand, that Amir Ghand alone had let the premises to him and was Realizing rent from him. Mool Ghand, 'respondent in his replication pleaded that Amir Chand was his father and that he was Realizing rent on his behalf from Hardit Singh. The question in dispute before the Controller was whether there was any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Hardit Singh, tenant died during the pendency of the proceedings before the Additional Controller and his four daughters were substituted. The Additional Controller vide judgment and order dated 1st March, 1976 held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between Mool Chand and Hardit Singh and dismissed the eviction application. On appeal by Mool Ghand the Tribunal held that Amir Ghand father of Mool Ghand no interest in the property in question, that he was managing the property on behalf of Mool Chand and in that capacity had let out the premises to to Hardit Singh. The Tribunal further held that Mool Chand, owner of the property in question, was 'Landlord' as defined under the Act. The Tribunal thereforee held that there was relationship and tenant between the parties and remanded the case to the Controller for decision in according with law.
(2) In this second appeal on behalf of the heirs of Hardit Singh, deceased-tenant, it has been urged that Amir Chand, father of Mool Chand was the landlord who had never disclosed at any time that he was acting on behalf of Mool Chand. Learned counsel further submits that Mool Chand, respondent No. 1 is not the landlord and thereforee the eviction petition is not maintainable.
(3) The word 'Landlord' has been defined in Section 2(e) of the Act as follows:
'LANDLORD' means a person who, for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of, or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant'.
Under this definition any person who is entitled to receive rent is the landlord. In other words, an owner who is entitled to receive rent is landlord' within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act. Further any person, who for the time being is receiving rent whether on his account or on account of or on, behalf of, or for the benefit of any other person is also a landlord. The dennition of the word landlord' as given in the Act is the widest. An owner os the property is also a landlord. Any person who realise the rent on' behalf of another is also landlord' within the meaning of the Act. The Tribunal after appreciating the entire evidence has concluded that Amir Chand, father of Mool Chand was managing the property on behalf of his son and that he was collecting rent on behalf of his son Mool Ghand. Amir Chand was thereforee a landlord within the meaning of the Act. Mool Chand has been held to be the owner of the suit property. Ex.A. I is the certificate of sale in favor of Mool Ghand while Ex.A.2 is the certified copy of the lease deed of the plot in his favor besides there is receipt showing payment of house tax by Mool Ghand, respondent No. 1. There is no doubt and has been rightly held so by the Tribunal that Mool Ghand, respondent No. 1 is the owner of the suit property. Under the definition of the word 'Landlord' Mool Ghand would be landlord as he is entitled to receive rent of the property. The property has been let out on his behalf by his father. His father was also a landlord. Section 14(1)(e) of the Act reads as under :-
'S.14(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or controller in favor of the landlord against a tenant; 1. Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely :- xx xx xx (e) that the premises let for residential purposes arc required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Explanationn: For the purposes of these clause, 'premises let for residential purposes' include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes'.
Under this clause the premises can be got vacated for bona fide requirement by a person who is 'owner' as well as landlord'. It has already been held that Mool Chand, respondent No. I is the owner. If he is owner, he is landlord and entitled to institute the eviction application. Amir Chand, father of Mool Ghand has appeared as a witness and has deposed that he; let out the property belonging to his son. Mool Chand who also appeared as a witness has deposed that his father let out the property on his behalf. The conclusion is that the father let out the property on behalf of his son. The father is the landlord' under Section 2(e) of the Act and he has a right to evict the tenant but he being not the owner is not entitled to evict the tenant under Section 14(l)(e)oftheAct. Mool Ghand is the owner as well as the landlord, and thereforee he has a right to institute an application for eviction of the tenant under Section 14(l)(e) of the Act and he would be entitled to obtain such an order if other ingredients of Section 14(l)(e) of the Act are fulfillled. In Smt. Savitri Devi Abdali and others v. Ram Bhaj Datta, : 12(1976)DLT334 this court held that the definition of 'landlord' as given in Section 2(e) of the Act is of the widest amplitude and would embrace within it a landlord who is also an owner of the property. In Madan Lal Narula v. Hazard Singh, 1977 (2) R L R 641 this Court has observed that the definition of the word landlord' covers a person who is entitled to receive rent. It has been further observed that the ordinary meaning of the word landlord' includes the owner. In that case premises were let out by a house agent and subsequently the owner filed an eviction petition and it was held that the owner was entitled to file the eviction petition. Thus if a property owned by a person, is let out by a third person, the owner is entitled to institute an eviction application as he is also a landlord' within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act.
(4) The next question is : What is the effect of not disclosing by Amir Ghand that he let out the premises on behalf of his son It is an admitted fact that Amir Ghand let out the premises and at no stage he disclosed that he was acting on behalf of his son. In the eviction petition filed by Mool Ghand it was stated that he was landlord-owner of the premises. In the written statement an objection was taken that the premises were let by his father and he alone was the landlord. It was disclosed by Mool Ghand in replication that his father was acting on his behalf. The point thereforee is Whether it was necessaiy for Mool Ghand to disclose in the eviction petition initially the facts showing that he had locus standi to institute the eviction application. In Amrit Sagar Gupta and others v. Sudesh Behari Lal and others, : 3SCR1002 it has been laid down that it is not necessary to describe all the facts which give locus standi,'to sue, in the plaint. If the title of the person who files a suit or takes the action is disputed, those facts can be disclosed subsequently and gone into. In Smt. Bhagwanti v. Kidar Nath etc. 1974 R L R 110 an attorney was acting as landlord for the owner. The attorney-landlord died. The heirs of the owner and not of the attorney were substituted, I am, thereforee, of the view that it was not not necessary for Mool Chand to disclose in the eviction application how he was entitled to institute the eviction application. It was sufficiently pleaded by him that the premises were let for residence, that he was owner-landlord of the premises, that he bona fide required the same for his family members and that had no other reasonably suitable residential accommondation. It is thereforee held that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and Mool Ghand had locus standi to file the eviction application.
(5) There is no infirmity in the Judgment and order of the Tribunal. The second appeal is thereforee, dismissed with no order as to costs. Parties are directed to appear before the Additional Controller on 24th May 1982. The eviction application may now be disposed of in accordance with law.