N.N. Goswamy, J.
(1) This is second appeal by the tenant is directed against the judgment dated 6-2-1931 passed by the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi whereby his appeal was dismissed on two grounds. Firstly, on the ground that he had failed to comply with the order passed under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act inasmuch as he had deposited the rent for the month of April, 1977 on 16th May, 1977 while he was expected to deposit the same on or before 15th of May, 1977. The second ground being that the appeal filed by him against the order of the Additional Rent Controller was incompetent inasmuch as he had failed to implead cotenants within the period of limitation.
(2) The respondent-landlord instituted a petition for eviction of the tenant under Section 14(1) provisos (a), (c) and (j) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. It is not necessary to deal with clauses (c) and (j) because the same were decided against the landlord and were not pressed before the Rent Control Tribunal. During the course of proceedings, the Additional Rent Controller passed an order on 27-10-1976 under Section 15(1) of the Act directing the tenant to pay or deposit the arrears of rent from 1st March, 1974 up to the date of the order at the rate of Rs. 9.00 per month within one month and further to continue to pay or deposit the future rent month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month at the same rate. In compliance with the said order, the tenant deposited the arrears of rent on 26-11-1976, which was admittedly within the stipulated time. The rent up to March, 1977 was also admittedly paid within the time stipulated. The dispute is only regarding the rent paid for the month of April, 1977. The said rent was paid on 16-5-1977 and from this date, it was concluded by the Additional Rent Controller as also by the Tribunal that the rent having been deposited beyond the 15th day of the month was obviously not in accordance with the order and as such, there was a default.
(3) It has been brought to my notice that 14-5-1977 was a second Saturday and thus a holiday and 15-5-1977 being Sunday, the rent could not be deposited and as such, the rent was deposited on 16-5-1977. The learned Tribunal as also the Additional Rent Controller have not taken into consideration the provisions of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act according to which if the last day happens to be a holiday, the act done on the next day would be considered to have been done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the court or office is open. 15th May, 1977 being Sunday, the deposit made on 16-5-1977 has thereforee to be held as valid.
(4) As regards the second ground, it is not disputed that the decree of eviction was passed against the appellant and four others One of those four persons has since died and his legal representatives were also brought on record when the proceedings were pending before the Additional Rent Controller. The appellant while filing the appeal before the Tribunal did not implead the other three persons and the legal representatives of the fourth co-tenant and he instituted the appeal only against the landlords. The Tribunal, relying on a judgment in the case of Choudhry Singh v. Manohar Lal, A.I.R. 1977 Sc 240 and in the case of Invest Imports v. Watkin Mayour Co. (the citation of the case is not mentioned) held that the appeal filed by the appellant was incompetent and there was no ground to allow the application for bringing on record those persons and for condensation of delay. The said applications were also dismissed. The case decided by their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to above is clearly distinguishable on facts from the present case inasmuch as in that case one of the decree-holders was not imp leaded as a respondent and in that situation, it was held that there will be conflicting decrees in case the appeal is allowed to be proceeded with without impleading one of the decree-holders. The provisions of Order 41 Rule 4 had no application to the facts of that case. The direct authority, in my opinion, is 'Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram and. Others.' : 3SCR301 . In this case, Jage Ram and two others were lessees of certain property belonging to Mahabir Prasad and his mother Gunwanti Devi and his wife Saroj Devi. The plaintiffs commenced an action in the court of the Subordinate Judge, First Glass, Delhi for a decree for Rs. 61.750.00 being the amount of rent due by the defendants. The Subordinate Judge, Delhi decreed the suit. The execution of the decree was resisted by the defendants on the plea.' Inter alia, that the decree was inexecutable because of the provisions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. The Subordinate Judge upheld that contention and dismissed the application for execution. Mahabir Prasad alone appealed against that order and imp leaded Gunwanti Devi and Saroj Devi as party-respondents. Saroj Devi died in November, 1962 and Mahabir Prasad applied that the name of Saroj Devi be struck off from the array of respondents. The application was allowed. However) the High Court dismissed the appeal holding that because all the heirs and legal representatives of Saroj Devi were not brought on record within the period of limitation as prescribed by the Limitation Act, the appeal abated in its entirety. Against that order an appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in paragraph 5 of the judgment observed as under :-
'COMPETENCEof the appellate court to pass a decree appropriate to the nature of the dispute in an appeal filed by one of several persons against whom a decree is made on a ground which is common to him and others is not lost merely because of the person who was jointly interested in the claim has been made a party-respondent and on his death his heirs have not been brought on the record. Power of the Appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 4 to vary or modify the decree of a Subordinate Court arises when one of the persons out of many against whom a decree or an order has been made on a ground which was common to him and others has appealed. That power may be exercised when other persons who were parties to the proceeding before the Subordinate Court and against whom a decree proceeded on a ground which was common to the appellant and to those other persons are either not imp leaded as parties to the appeal or are imp leaded as respondents. The view taken by the High Court cannot thereforee be sustained.'
(5) In view of this clear pronouncement, I am of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Tribunal was not correct. The appeal filed by the appellant was thus competent.
(6) In this case, the arguments commenced yesterday when neither the counsel for the respondents nor the respondent was present and the matter was again listed as part-heard for today but the situation remains the same. Thus I have not had the advantage of hearing the learned counsel for the respondents.
(7) For the reasons recorded above, the appeal is allowed and the eviction petition of the landlord is dismissed as the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Since there is no appearance for the respondents, the parties are left to bear their own costs.