Avadh Behari, J.
(1) This is a landlord's appeal from the order of the rent control tribunal under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act.)
(2) The landlord brought an application for eviction of the tenant under section 14(1)(e) read with section 25B of the Act. The tenant made an application for leave to contest the eviction case. Leave was given. After leave was granted the landlord made an application under section 15(2) requiring the controller to make an order against the tenant to deposit arrears of rent. The additional controller made the order under section 15(2). The tenant was required to deposit all arrears of rent and future rent month by month. From this order the tenant appealed to the tribunal. Following my decision in R. K. Parikh v. Uma Verma the tribunal held that an application under section 15(2) is not maintainable in the proceedings brought by the landlord under section 25B of the Act. He thereforee dismissed the application.Now the landlord appeals to this court.
(3) Chapter III-A was introduced by the Amendment Act 18 of 1976. (w.e.f. 1-12-1975). It provides fora 'summary trial of certain applications' as the title suggests. Under this newly introduced procedure it is open to the landlord to make an application for the eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement under section 14(1)(e). He can elect that his case be tried in accordance with the procedure provided in section 25B. The landlord in the present case so elected. Now in such a case the procedure is laid down in chapter III-A. The tenant has to obtain leave. On leave being granted the tenant can contest the application. But if leave is refused the controller passes an order for recovery of possession. From the order of recovery of possession made by the controller no appeal or second appeal lies. A revision to the High Court is provided. In R. K. Parikh's case I held that no appeal lies to the Tribunal from a case heard and decided under section 25B. The Supreme Court has now expressly approved Parikh's case (see Vinod Kumar v. Narain Devi).
(4) Can the landlord make an application under section 15(2) of the Act when his case is being tried in accordance with the procedure indicated in section 25B This is the question to be decided. I was referred to sub-section (10) of section 25B in support of submission that procedure for the disposal of the application for eviction under section 14(1)(e) is the same as in other cases and, thereforee an application under section 15(2) is maintainable. I do not agree. In my opinion an application under section 15(2) cannot be made for 40 the simple reason that an order under section 15(2) is made appealable by the Act under section 38 to the tribunal. But the scheme of section 25B clearly shows that the tribunal completely goes out of the picture in the new procedure outlined in Chapter III-A. The rent tribunal in section 25B has no role to play. He has no function to perform. The truth is that he has no work to do. Under section 25B the controller has to deal with the application for an order for recovery of possession and a revision lies to the High Court from his order. No appeal or second appeal lies. Now if I were to hold that an application under section 15(2) can be made, as is contended by counsel for the landlord, it will mean that an appeal can be preferred to the tribunal by a party aggrieved by the order of the controller. A fortiori a second appeal will lie to the High Court. This is entirely inconsistent with the scheme and the structure of section 25B. The legislature has made no provision for recourse to the tribunal under section 25B by parties who may be aggrieved by such orders.
(5) This apart, an application under section 15(2) will impede and delay the expeditious trial of the case. The object of section 25B is to eliminate delays. If the tenant does not deposit rent his defense will be struck out under section 15(7) This is totally incongrous and incompatible with the scheme of section 25B. Section 25B is based on the conception of leave. The notion of striking off the defense is foreign to it. I, thereforee, hold that application under section 15(2) was unmaintainable and the decision of the tribunal is right.