Avadh Behari Rohatgi, J.
(1) These are eight land acquisition appeals. Four are by the owners: Four are by the acquiring authority, the Union, of India. This judgment will govern them all.
(2) These appeals were heard in the first instance by YogeshwarDayal, J. Before him the question arose whether a post notification sale can be taken into consideration in determining the market value of the land on the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act).Two rulings were cited before him. One was a decision of the division bench of this Court (Jagjit Singh and Safeer, JJ) in Ms.Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1). The other was a decision of one of us (Avadh Behari.J.) in *Delhi Simla Catholic Archdiocese v. Union of India (RFA363 of 1968 decided on 24-4-79) (2). The learned judge found that these two decisions were conflicting. He, thereforee, referred the matter to a larger bench by his order dated 1/12/1980.
(3) In order to appreciate the question which arose before the learned Judge and which arises on these appeals before us,it is necessary to recite a few facts. The land of the owners in all these appeals was acquired by a notification dated 7-3-1962issued under Section 4 of the Act. The owners relied upon a sale transaction of 24-5-1962 by which a plot of land measuring756 sq. yards situate in South Extension Part Ii was [email protected] Rs. 58.60 per sq. yard. This very plot was originally sold on11-10-1961 (@ Rs. 26 per sq. yard. After a few months it was resold on 24-5-1962 at Rs. 58.50 per sq. yard, as we havesaid. The owners strongly relied upon this post-notification sale to show the rising trend of the prices, though there is a gap of2-112 months between the notification under Section 4 i.e.7-3-1962 and the resale i.e. 24-5-1962. The question for decision is whether this post-notification sale can be accepted as a guide for determining the market value of the land on 7-3-1962.This question troubled the learned Judge. It may be mentioned here that though the resale took place on 24-5-1962 the agreement to sell was entered into on 20/04/1962. It will be noticed that between the first sale of 11-10-1961, the agreement to sell on 20-4-1962 and the actual resale on 24-5-1962 there is a close proximity of time which, in our opinion, ought to make the sale as well as the resale admissible in evidence. The first sale is anterior in point of time by nearly five months.The resale is posterior in time by 2-112 months. Should the court refuse to look at the post-notification sale There is no dispute that the sale dated 11-10-61 can be classed as a guide to the market value of the land.
(4) In Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. the facts were that the appellant purchased the land in May, 1957, after the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act which was issued in that case on 2-1-1957. The question arose whether the price which the purchaser had paid could be taken into consideration in determining the market value of the land. The learned Judges held that the price which the purchaser had paid after Section 4 notification could not be taken into consideraion. They relied on Section 24, clause seventhly which says
'24.But the Court shall not take into consideration--Seventhly, any outlay or improvements on. or disposalof, the land acquired commenced, made or affected without the sanction of the Collector after the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1).'
The learned Judges said:
'IT is the market value of the land as on the date of the publication of the notification under section 4 which is to be taken into consideration for determiningcompensation.'
(5) As regards the purchase by Modi Sugar Mills alter the notification under section 4 had been issued the judges said :
'THE effect of clause 'seventhly' quoted above, is that while computing compensation the price evidenced by any transactions which may have taken place after the date of the publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act, cannot be taken into consideration.'
(6) In our opinion the learned Judges were perfectly right in deciding as they did. Section 23(1) says :
'23(1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the court shall take into consideration first, the market value of the land at tile date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1).
(7) 'THE law is well settled that the market value for purposes of compensation under the Act has to fixed on the date of the notification under section 4. It is equally well settled that a purchaser who purchases the land after the notification under section 4 cannot claim that he should be paid compensation according to the price which he had paid. Nor that the price which he had paid reflects the market price of the land. The crucial date for the determination of the market value is the date of the publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act. The seventhly clause of section 24 says that any outlay or improvements on such land made, commenced or affected, with the intention of enhancing the compensation to be awarded under the Act, is a matter to be 'neglected' in determining compensation. This is a sound principle.Otherwise the owner of the land will increase the burden of the taker of the laid nv making additions or improvements on the land acquired (Mercer v. Liverpool St. Helens and South Lancaster Railways (1904) Ac 461 (3), Modi Nagar Mills, in our opinion, was correctly decided.
(8) The question with which we are concerned in the present appeals really arose not in Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. but in Delhi Simla Catholic Archdiocese. A post notification sale can be helpful in determining the market value of the land in a greater or a lesser degree. It may show the rising trend of prices.The material date, no doubt, for awarding compensation is the date of notification under section 4(1). But a sale made immediately after the notification or a few days after cannot he disregarded entirely. In Melwood Units Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Main Roads (1979) All E.R. 161 (4), the Privy Council said:
'NOW it is plain that in assessing values for the purpose of compensation for resumption on compulsory acquisition a tribunal is not required to close its mind to transactions subsequent to the date of resumption:they may well be relevant or of assistance to a greater or lesser degree.'
(9) This is what one of us (Avadh Behari, J.) said in Delhi Simla Catholic Archdiocese. A sale at or about the material time can be taken into consideration. What evidentiary value should be attached to that sale is a question of fact which has to be determined by the tribunal assessing the compensation,taking all the circumstances of the case into account. In Delhi Simla Catholic Archdiocese reference was made to MugneeramBengur and Co. v. State of West Bengal, : AIR1974Cal369 , where it was said :
'THERE is no rule that a post-notification transaction of sale of land similar to the acquired land cannot be looked into. If in considering a post-notification sale.the court finds that after the publication of the notification, the price of the lands in the locality has been affected, in that case it will not be proper for the court to rely on such a transaction of sale, for it will not be any guide for the determination of the market value of the acquired land.'
(10) These appeals illustrate vividly the value to be attached to a post-notification sale. On 11/10/1961, a plot of land measuring 756 sq. yards was sold at Rs. 26.50 per sq. yard. On24-5-1962 it was resold for Rs. 58.50 per sq. yard. By mailing adjustment one' can well arrive at the value of the land on 7-3-1962, the valuation date. During this period of nearly eight months the rise in the price of the land was nearlyRs. 4 per month. From Rs. 26.50 per sq. yard the price shot to Rs. 58.50 per sq. yard. here was an increase of Rs. 32per sq.-yard. It will be unjust to the owners if Rs. 26.50 per sq.yard is taken as the yardstick to measure the value of the land,The resale shows, if anything, that there has been an upward trend in the value of the land. Prices were increasing by leaps and bounds. The resale certainly shows this. The price ofRs. 58.50 per sq, yard was agreed upon between the parties.us we have said, on 24/04/1962, though the sale was consummated on 24/05/1962. So between 7-3-1962 and20-4-1962 the difference is only of a month or so. That Rs. 58.50per sq. yard mirror the market value is, in our opinion, a safe conclusion to arrive at with the help of this post-notificationSale. This post-notification sale is a reliable guide to the value of the land in this locality. More so when we have dependable evidence of sale of this very plot on 11-10-1961 when it was sold for Rs. 26.50 per sq. yard.
(11) So on the question referred to us by the learned judge our conclusion is that it is all a question of proximity of time.A sale of neighbouring land. no matter how similar to the loadtaken, is not admissible unless the sale was so near in point of time as to furnish a test of present value, and the determination of this fact is left to the discretion of the trial court. Remoteness in point of time, however, will condemn the evidentiary value of a sale only where there has been such a change in conditions during the interval as to make the sale an unreliable test of value. By proving a change in market conditions either party may explain away the significance of the sale (Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, pages 286-287).
(12) So the principle is that the evidence of the price paid at voluntary sales of land similar to that taken at or about the time of the taking is admissible as independent evidence of the value of the land. Such evidence has considerable probativevalue. Market value, of course is the price at which an article sells in the open market. This price is fixed by sales actuallyconsumated. Such sales, when made under normal and fair conditions are necessarily a better test of the market value than the speculative opinions of witnesses; for truly, here is where 'money talks.' The question whether such evidence shall be admitted does not depend upon any fundamental principle of the law of evidence, but is a purely practical one. depending upon whether the post- notification sale is of any help in arriving at the market value. It may well be relevant or of assistance to a greater or lesser degree, having regard to the proximity in time. As the Privy Council said the tribunal is not required to close its mind to transactions subsequent to the date of the notification for the purpose of determining compensation.
(13) Having dealt with the question referred to us by the learned judge we now turn to the appeals. First, we will take up the appeal of Gurmukh Singh Chawla.RFA No. 479 of 1969;(S. Gurmukh Singh Chawla, deceased through S. Joginder Singh Chawla v. Union of India).
(14) The owner's land measuring 8 bighas l6 bids was in Village Masjid Moth was acquired by the Government pursuant to a notification under section 4 dated 7-3-1962. In due course the Land Acquisition Collector made the award (AwardNo. 1351). He divided the acquired land into two blocks A and B. For Block 'A' he assessed the market value at Rs, 4,000per bigha. For Block 'B' he fixed Rs. 3,000 per bigha..
(15) Displeased with the award the owner asked for a reference under section 18 of the Act. On reference the learned Additional District Judge fixed the market value of the land at Rs. 28.50 per sq. yard. Neither side was satisfied with thisoutcome. The owner appeals to this Court for further enhancement. He claims compensation. @ Rs. 39/64 per sq. yard. The Union of India appeals for reduction.It may be mentioned here that the appellant purchased the land in question at an auction held by the Ministry of Rehabilitation in 1959 @ Rs. 10 per sq. yard.
(16) Before the Additional District Judge evidence of various sale transactions was given. He discarded all of them. He accepted the sale of 24/05/1962, though a post-notificationsale, as a safe and reliable guide to the market value of the land. This land which was sold on 24/05/1962 at Rs. 58.50per sq. yard touches the land of the appellant. It is situated in close vicinity. It has the closest proximity in space. Adjoining sale is the best evidence to estimate the market price. The judge did not find other sale transactions of any assistance.
(17) Sale dated 16-1-1962 at Rs. 166 per sq. yard of a plot of 250 sq. yds. was rejected on the ground that it was situated on the Ring Road and was more valuable than theappellant's land. Another sale dated 8-6-1962 where a plot of250 sq. yards was sold for Rs. 120 per sq. yard was rejected on the ground that it was a sale of shop-cum-residential plot.All the sales except the sale of 24-5-1962 were rejected either on the ground that the land was more advantageously situated,as for example on Ring Road, or that the transaction was of residential-cum-shop plot, or that the plot sold was a small plot or that the sale was not proximate in time because it was made much after the notification under section 4, some time in June or July of 1962. On the sale of 24-5-1962 the learned judge said:
'THE sale deed Ex- A-36 gives us the value of plots in the adjacent colony at a time nearest to the date of publication of notification under section 4 in the present case (i.e. 7-3-62). It is, thereforee, plainthat the transaction covered by the sale deed Ex.A-36 is the best possible instance comparable in time and situation to the acquired land I, thereforee,follow the same and hold that the market value of the residential plots in the immediate vicinity of the land in question was Rs. 58.50 per square yard.'
(18) It is admitted that the sale of 24-5-1962 related to a developed plot of land in the colony of South Extension Part Ii, that all the amenities like water, electricity, sewerage etc.were available in that locality. The owner's land in the present appeal is undeveloped land. thereforee, the judge reduced the price of Rs. 58.50 to Rs. 28.50 by taking into account the development charges and the area to be left out for roads,open spaces etc. The manner in which he arrived at the price of Rs. 28.50 per sq. yard is depicted in the following calculation which he adopted:
'(1) Total plot table area 1000 square yards(2) Area to be consumed byRoad, Lanes and open spaces etc. 400 ' '(3) Area of plots 600 ' '(4) Price of 600 sq. yds. atRs. 58.50 p. per sq. yd. Rs. 35,100(5) Development charges atRs. 4.50 p. per sq. yd.on the gross area. Rs. 4.500(6) Misc. charges on account of brokerage. Administration,interest on investment,time and money spent on obtaining the scheme approved and selling theplots etc. (i.e. roughly at6 per cent of the price of plots) Rs. 2,100(7) Net Price of 1000 sq. yards Rs. 28,500(8) Rate per square yard. Rs. 28.50 '
With mathematical accuracy the judge found that the value of the land on the valuation date was Rs. 28.50 per sq: yard.
(19) Before the judge evidence was given that the present appellant S. Gurmukh Singh and S. Amar Singh. appellant in appeal No. 502 of 1969, and two others took concrete steps to develop the land by dividing it into plots and with this endin view they actually submitted a layout plan to the authorities concerned. Their registered architect went into the witnessbox. On the evidence led before him in the case the judge summed up his conclusion in these words:
'IT is obvious from the oral and documentary evidence discussed above that S. Gurmukh Singh and SAmar Singh along with some other persons took concrete steps to develop the land into plots about a year before its acquisition and that they would have achieved their object if the land had not been acquired on 7-3-62. The land in question was infact adjacent to a developed colony of South Extension Scheme No. 11 and the same, after development, would have become a part of that colony if it had not been acquired. In these circumstances the petitioner is justified in claiming compensation on the basis of hypothetical building scheme and not on the rates of agricultural land.'
(20) In our opinion the judge ought to have taken into consideration this fact that the present appellant had associated with him. Amar Singh and two others who had vast lands next to him and had proposed to develop their lands by framing a common scheme and by pooling all their resources together.When an owner of the land puts his land into a common to the is likely to make a greater profit. If two or more contiguous plots are to be developed under one common scheme they will admit of a larger and more advantageous disposition or improvement than a single lot. Where two or more contiguous lots are developed under a joint scheme, real estate appraisers frequently accord to them as a group a greater value than the aggregate value of the land separately considered. This is known as the doctrine of pottage in American Law. in that doctrine the ownership of all the contiguous lots is one. Here it is not so, it is true. Four owners have agreed to build on their lands according to a common building scheme and for this purpose they submitted a lay out. thereforee it cannot be doubted that they can ask for a greater value than the value of their lands separately considered, (See alfred D. Jahr Eminent Domain: 1953 Edition, page 114: Nichols On EminentDomain, Vol. 5, page 143). If a single building had to come up as a housing complex, as was the idea of these four owners,it was the best use to which they had planned to put theirproperty. The constituent lots considered separately will not have the same price in the market than the assemblage of theselots. The housing scheme which was submitted to the Delhi Development Authority by these four owners ought to have in our opinion, a greater value than the separate value of the constituent lots.
(21) The learned judge did not consider this aspect of thematter. All elements of value which are inherent in the property merit consideration in the valuation process. It has,in fact, been said that no general rule can be inflexibly adheredlo. Each case necessarily differs from all others in so far as its factual situation is concerned. Exceptional circumstances render a fair degree of elasticity in the application of the fundamental rule. It seems almost unnecessary to point out the self evident fact that in the method adopted for the ascertainment of such value, it is incumbent upon the State to endeavor to reach a result that is truly 'just compensation', that is, a result that is just to the public as well as to the owner of the propertytaken. (Nichol's on Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, pp. 2-5) :
'IT is the duty of the valuer to take into consideration every intrinsic quality and every intrinsic circumstance which tends to push the value either up ordown, Just because it is relevant to the valuation and ought thereforee to be cast into the scales of the balance before he looks to see the resultant figure on the dial at which the pointer finallyrests.'
[Per Scott L.J. in Robinson Brothers (Brewers) Ltd. v Houghton and Chesterls Street Assessment Committee, (1937) 2KB 445 (6).
(22) One common argument which has been raised before us in all these appeals is that we should have regard for the value of the commercial plots in the New Delhi South Extension Colony which were being sold at prices ranging between (X) and 166 per sq. yard. In this connection we were referred to a decision of division bench in S.L.R. Sawhney v. Union of India, R.F.A. No. 105-D/66, decided on 2/08/1978(7) (Prakash Narain and Leila Seth, JJ.) and a decision by one of us (Avadh Behari, J.) in Union of India v. Uttam ChandKohli, R.F.A. No. 512 of 1971 (8), decided on 5/09/1979.
(23) Counsel in these appeals, one after the other, submitted that to ascertain the market value of the appellants' land we should not confine ourselves only to residential plots but also take into account the fact that these appellants could have put their property to commercial use also. We cannot accept thisargument. It is abundantly clear from the evidence on the record of these appeals that the owners in all the four appeals wanted to use the land which they had purchased from the Ministry of Rehabilitation only for residential purposes. It is now too late in the day to say that their intention was also to use it for commercial purposes. The burden of proof for establishing the market value of the land is on the owner. He has to establish by affirmative evidence that the highest and the best use of the land was commercial and that he could so useit. 'The owners in their evidence have not deposed that they were intending to put the property to commercial use.
(24) Counsel next submitted that we should take the market value of the residential plots and the commercial plots and find out the average price for the purpose of determining the market value. This reasoning does not appeal to us.
(25) It must be remembered that the comparison is made with lands which are similar to the land taken. It is true that the two parcels are exactly alike. Only such parcels may be compared where the dissimilarities are reduced to a minimum,and allowance is made for such dissimilarities. It is, thereforee,imperative to consider such differences as may exist in the physical and environmental conditions and a proper allowance made to cover any differential that may exist by virtue of the difference in the time of the sales. It is evident that there may be considerable difference in the size, shape, situation and immediate surroundings of two estates, and yet the price which one brought may be of substantial assistance in determining the value of the other. Market value of the land in the vicinity can be considered in arriving at the value of the acquired land.It is bound to be helpful in some degree.
(26) Market value is dependent upon activity in the market and its existence is generally considered a question of fact. Actual sales as a criterion of value in cases of similar lands 'are almost as conclusive as the daily quotations of the exchange in the case of corporate stocks'.
(27) Generally, certain preliminary requirements must be observed before evidence of comparable sales may be adduced.Thus, it must first be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that the property involved in such sale is sufficiently similar and proximate to the property in litigation as to be of utility in reflecting the market value of the latter.
(28) Property similarly situated need not exactly confirm to the property in suit. When property, in the same or an adjoining street, is described as bearing a close resemblance, or nearlycorresponding, to the one in question as to improvements, size,location, general adaptability, and within the same businesscenter, it may be said to be similarly situated. There can beno fixed definition of 'Similarly situated'. Similarity .does not mean identical, but having a resemblance. Obviously, no two properties can be exactly alike, and no general rule can be laid down regarding the degree of similarity that must exist to make such evidence admissible.
(29) Whether a property is similar depends on a number offactors. It depends on the location, the character, the surroundings and the topographical features of the property. It has also to be seen whether the sale was made near about the time of acquisition. Nearness or remoteness in point of time will have to be seen. A sale sufficiently near in point of time makes the evidence of the price paid helpful in ascertaining the market value of the land. The proximity between the landin controversy and the land the price of which is in evidence has also to be established.
(30) thereforee, the rule is that evidence of the price paid at sales of other land, to be admissible in a land acquisitioncase, must be confined to land similarly situated and of the same character as that taken; and, as a general proposition, to consttutesland in the same neighborhood. It cannot be said, however,as a matter of law how large an area, in feet or blocks, constitutes a neighborhood, and no hard and fast rule can be laid down on the subject. In determining the value of the land the court must have regard to the requirements of proximity's well as of similarity. A sale of neighbouring land, no matter how similar to the land taken, is not admissible lineless the sale was so near in point of time as to furnish a test of presentvalue. The judges have deplored the practice of determination of compensation on the value of small plots. Again and again we are told that undue importance must not be given to sale of small plots. The court may properly exclude evidence of the price paid for similar land in close proximity to the land taken if the land sold is much smaller than the land in controversy.
(31) The use to which the property is to be put is oftenrelevant. (Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, pages 280to 289).
(32) Applying these principles to the facts of these cases it is abundantly plain that the land of the appellants was to be used for purposes of a residential property. It will be wrong to evaluate it according to the value of the commercial property. Nor do we agree with the method of averages which counsel pressed upon us. Residential and commercial values are entirely different. It will be improper to combine them both and to give compensation on the average arrived at by such combination Only the likes can be compared. Unlikes cannot be compared. To give to the appellants the value of a commercial plot in these cases will be unfair to the State, In Bauman v. Ross 167 U. S. 548 (9), decided in 1896,Grey, J., in one of his characteristic opinions cleared up thesubject. The compensation, he says, must be
'JUST,not merely to the individual whose property istaken, but to the public which is to pay for it. The just compensation required by the constitution to be made to the owner is to be measured by the loss caused to him by the appropriation. He is entitled to receive the value of what he has been deprived of, and no more. To award him less would be unjust to him : to award him more would & unjust to the public'.
(33) We, thereforee, reject the argument of averages. Weal so cannot take the value of the commercial or residential cum-commercial plots into account for ascertaining the market value. In agreement with the learned judge we hold that the sale of 24-5-1962 is a safe and a reliable guide to the value of the land at the critical time. We will be unfair to the State if we award more than what the evidence justifies as regards the value of residential plots at the relevant time.
(34) Commercial plots are not only dissimilar but also much smaller in size as compared to the acquired lands of the appellants. They do not furnish relevant evidence ofvalue. The learned judge rejected these transactions in his process of evaluation and we think he was right. That the land had a commercial potential was never put forward as the case for compensation. The learned judge promised his assessment on the fact that these were residential plots. He accepted the sale of 24-5-1962 as a highly relevant piece of evidence for the evaluation of compensation in the case of Gurmukh Singh and Amar Singh. Since these two owners with two others had planned a housing complex scheme we have taken the view that this single factor significantly added to the value of the land in the hands of these two appellants. This is why we have increased the value. In the case of Dhawan. andDr. Satyawati their lands had the added advantage of location.They were right on the road. We have given them more. That there was an upward trend in market value generally is affirmatively supported by satisfactory proof. In our judgment the sale and resale of the residential plot of 756 sq. yds. nearabout the time of section 4 notification is a comparable instance and ought to be adopted as a yardstick for measuring compensation in these appeals. That it was a developed land and thereforee allowance will have to be made for this differencing any process of evaluation.
(35) These cases vividly illustrate the point referred to us.The Post-notification sale can be really helpful in determining the market value of the land in question. In Delhi Simla Catholic Archdiocese v. Union of India 1980 RLR 98, one of us (Avadh Behari, J.) held on the facts that the post-notification sale of 10/04/1957 could be safely relied upon and accepted as a guide to the value of the land. The date of notification under section 4 in that case was 2/01/1957 and 10/04/1957 was the date of thesale. The facts in these cases are very much similar so far as the post-notification sale is concerned. The judge accepted it as a reliable guide. We are in agreement with him. The Privy Council said the same thing in. Melwood (supra).
(36) Giving the matter our best consideration we are of the opinion that the lands of Gurmukh Singh (now represented by his legal representative) and Amar Singh, appellantinappeal No. 502 of 1969, ought to have been valued at a price higher than Rs. 28.50 per sq. yard. Taking the topographical situation and the locality of the land we fix the market value of the lands of these owners at Rs. 35 per sq. yard.
(37) The appellant is awarded compensation @ Rs. 35,000per bigha Whatever has been paid will be deducted. In addition the appellant will be entitled to solarium at 15 percent and interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of dispossession till the date of payment and proportionate costs.Cross R.F.A. No. 433 of 1969:(Union of India v. S. Gurmukh Singh Chawla, deceased through S. Joginder Singh Chawla).
(38) As the owner S. Gurmukh Singh Chawla (now represented by his legal representative) has succeeded in his appeal.this appeal of the Union of India automatically fails and isdismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.R.F.A. No. 502 of 1969 :(S. Amar Singh and others v. Union of India)
(39) As we have said, Amar Singh's land adjoins the land of S. Gunmukh Singh. His case is identical with the case of Gurmukh Singh. The appellants' land admeasuring 5 bighas5 bids was was acquired by the Government pursuant to the notification dated 7-3-1962 under section 4 of the Act. By a common judgment dated 6/05/1969 the learned Additional District Judge decided his appeal as well as the appeal of Gurmukh Singh Chawla. He awarded to these appellants compensation at the rate of Rs. 28.50, as he did to GurmukhSingh Chawla.
(40) The appellants claim in this appeal compensation atthe rate of Rs. 39.64 per sq. yard.
(41) It may be mentioned here that the appellants purchased the land in 1959 at an auction held by the Rehabilitation Ministry at the rate of Rs. 13.50 per sq. yard.
(42) The case of present appellants is the same as of Gurmukh Singh Chawla. For reasons given above we award to the appellants compensation at the rate of Rs. 35,000 per bigha.Whatever has been paid will be deducted. In addition the appellants will be awarded solarium at the rate of 15 per cent and interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of dispossession till payment and proportionate costs.Cross R.F.A. No. 435 of 1969 :(Union of India v. Amar Singh Sadana & others)
(43) As the owners have succeeded in their appeal, this appeal of the Union of India automatically fails and is dismissed,leaving the parties to bear their own costs.R.F.A. No. 130 of 1972 :(Chaman Lal Dhawan & Ors. v. Union of India)
(44) The appellants' land admeasuring 5 bighas 12 bids was was acquired by the Government pursuant to the notification dated 7-3-1962. The Land Acquisition Collector awarded themRs. 4,000 per bigha. On a reference the Additional District Judge raised the compensation to Rs. 20 per square yard. The appellants claim compensation at the rate of Rs. 60,500 perbigha.
(45) It may be mentioned here that the appellants purchased the land in question at auction in 1959 at about Rs. 7 per square yard.
(46) The appellants' land is more favorably situated than the lands of Gurmukh Singh and Amar Singh. Apart from the fact that their land adjoins the Medical Enclave and the D.L.F.South Extension Colony, which advantage they enjoy in common with other appellants in other appeals, their land abuts ona 60 feet wide road. Another advantage the owners of the land enjoy is that adjoining their land is the bunglow of the Ex-Auditor General of India. We think that the appellant sought to be awarded a higher compensation than GurmukhSingh and Amar Singh. We fix the value of their land atRs. 40,000 per bigha. This, in our opinion, is just and fair compensation for the acquired land.
(47) We, thereforee, award compensation to the appellant sat the rate of Rs. 40,000 per bigha. Whatever has already been paid will be deducted. In addition they will be entitled to solarium at 15 per cent and interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of dispossession till payment and proportionate costs.Cross R.F.A. No. 123 of 1972 :(Union of India v. Chaman Lal Dhawan & Ors.)
(48) As the owners have succeeded in their appeal, this cross appeal of the Union of India automatically fails and is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.R.F.A. No. 283 of 1975 :(Dr. K. Satyawati v. Union of India)
(49) The appellant's land admeasuring 5 bighas and 8 bids was in Village Masjid Moth was permanently acquired by the Government pursuant to the notification dated 7/03/1962.In due course the Land Acquisition Collector made the award(award No. 1351). He awarded Rs. 4,000 per bigha, placing the appellant's land in Block 'A'. On a reference the learned Additional District Judge awarded her compensation at the rate of Rs. 20 per square yard. In appeal she claims Rs. 60,000per bigha.We may mention here that the appellant purchased this plot in the year 1959 at an auction held by the Ministry of Rehabilitation at about Rs. 7 per sq. yard.
(50) The facts of this case are similar to the case of ChamanLal Dhawan. The Additional District Judge has found thatthe land enjoys an advantageous situation. It is adjacent to Village Masjid Moth, and All India Institute of Medical Sciences. It is quite close to the Ring Road and posh colonies such as New Delhi South Extension, Yusuf Sarai and Green Park.'The judge awarded her compensation at the rate of Rs. 20 per square yard.
(51) For the reasons we have given in Chaman Lal Dhawan'sappeal we fix the market value of the appellant's land at Rs. 40per square yard.
(52) We, thereforee, award to the appellant compensation atthe rate of Rs. 40,000 per bigha. Whatever has already been paid will be deducted. In addition she will be entitled to solarium at the rate of 15 per cent and interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of dispossession till payment and proportionate costs.Cross R.F.A. No. 272 of 1975 :(Union of India v. Dr. K. Satyawati).
(53) As the owner has succeeded in her appeal, this appeal of the Union of India fails and is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
(54) This disposes of allthe eight appeals. At the conclusion of the hearing we announced our decision on 18/05/1984.Now we have given reasons for our decision.