B.N. Kirpal, J.
(1) The appellants were tenants of the respondents- landlords in respect of the premises 1/6, New Double Storey Lajpat Nagar Iv, New Delhi. The landlords let out the premises after obtaining permission under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act from Shri K. S. Gupta, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi for a period of two years with effect from 1st March 1976. In the application under Section 21 it was, inter-alia, stated that the landlords did not require the premises for a period of two years. It. was specifically pleaded that 'the petitioner's son Sh. Gurdip Singh Passi is a student and studying in B. A. and the petitioners want to settle him in life and to marry him after studies, and the premises in suit will be required for residence of the petitioners and their son Sh. Gurdip Singh Passi, after the expiry of two years from the date of letting'. The said application was signed by the landlords as well as the petitioners. On 17th February 1976, statement of one of the landlords Shri Shadi Lal was recorded. Thereafter on 17th February, 1976 the Additional Rent Controller passed the following order:
'HAVINGregard to the averments made in the petition and the statements of the parties recorded above, permissions under S. 21 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is granted to the petitioners for letting out the aforesaid entire ground floor shown in red in the plan Ex. A I of House No. 1/6, New Double Storey, Lajpat Nagar Iv, New Delhi, to the respondents for residence for a period of two years with effect from 1st of March, 1976. File be consigned to the record-room.'
(2) After the expiry of period of two years .the respondents-landlords filed an execution application on 25th April, 1978. Notice was served on the appellants for 7th July 1978. Appellant No. 1 appeared on that date and took time to file areply. He was directed to file the reply to the execution application on 4th August 1978. Notice was directed to be issued to the unserved appellant No. 2 for that date. On 4th August, 1978 no representative on behalf of appellant No. 1 appeared and nor was any reply filed. The court, however, aujourned the case to 22nd September, 1978. Appellant No. 2, it might be stated, had been served but did not put in any appearance. On 22nd September, 1978 no one appeared on behalf of the appellants and the trial court ordered that warrants of possession may be issued. After the order had been passed Shri J. R. Tandon, Advocate appeared on behalf of appellant No. 2 and wanted time to file objections. This request was accepted and Shri Tandon was permitted to file objections by 25th September, 1978. As the Presiding Officer was on leave the case could not be taken up on 25th September, and it was ordered that the case be listed on, the next day. On 26th September, 1978 again no one appeared on behalf of any of of the appellants and warrants of possession were directed to be issued. Subsequently when an application was made for sanctioning police aid the same was allowed by the trial court. Efforts were being made by the respondents to execute the warrants.
(3) It is only on 11th September, 1979 that the appellants moved an application challenging the order of eviction. In the said application the permission which had been granted for letting out the premises under Section 21 was assailed. It is pertinent to note that this application was filed only after the decision of the Supreme Court which had been delivered on 6th August, 1979 in the case of S. B. Noronha v. Prem K.Khanna, 1979 Rajdhani Law Reporter 425.
(4) By order dated 12th October, 1979 the trial court came to the conclusion that the appellants had failed to explain as to why the objections had been filed at that late stage and no Explanationn had been given as to why the objections had not been filed when the opportunity was granted in the year 1978. The trial court accordingly dismissed the application. Being aggrieved, an appeal was filed before the Rent Control Tribunal. By order dated 10th April 1980 the Rent Control Tribunal dismissed the appeal.
(5) In the second appeal which is now filed it has been contended on behalf of the appellants that there is no provision in law which prescribes the time within which the objections will be filed. According to the learned counsel it was open to the appellants to file the objections at any time prior to the handing over of the possession. It is contended that the rejection of the application raising the objections without deciding the same on merits was had in law. lam unable to accept the aforesaid contentions. The court has the power to entertain objections to the execution. The exercise of this power would also be in consonance with the principles of natural justice. The granting of an opportunity to a party to file objections would be for the benefit .of that party. It is open to the party to avail of the opportunity which is granted or to waive it. It is clear that in the present case the court, before making any order regarding the issuance of the warrants of possession, gave more than adequate opportunity to the appellants to file objections. Despite time having been taken no objections were filed. The courts below were, thereforee, quite right in coming to the conclusion that the appellants missed the . bus. Once the warrants of possession have been issued, after adequate opportunity having been given to the appellants to raise any objections if they wanted to the appellants could not thereafter be permitted to raise objections to the passing of the eviction order under Section 21. The warrants of possession ought to have been executed long' ago. The delay in the execution acquired only because the appellants did not vacate the same. The police assistance had to be requested for. The objections were filed after the court had ordered the rendering of the police assistance. It is true that no time limit is prescribed in the Act as to when the objections should be filled but then when the court has given a reasonable opportunity for filing the objections, the appellants ought to have availed the same. It must, thereforee be held that they have waived their right to avail of this opportunity. The courts below, thereforee, rightly rejected the application.
(6) In view of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.