B.N. Kirpal, J.
(1) The appellant had let out shop No. 692, Lal Katra, Nai Sarak to respondent No. 1. A notice of demamd dated 10th August 1963 was sent by the appellant demanding the payment of rent due to it. It was also stated in the said notice that the premises had been sub let, assigned or otherwise parted with possession without the consent of the appellant, by respondent No. 1 in favor of respondent no. 2 M/s Bipin Kumar Satish Kumar.
(2) Despite the service of demand notice full amount of rent was not paid. The appellant filed aneviction petition under Section 14(1)(a) and (b) on the ground of non-payment of rent and sub-letting of the premises. On the filing of the aforesaid petition the rent cotroller passed an order under section 15(1) of the Rent Control Act on 9th September 1964. The tenant was directed to deposit the arrears of rent as well as to pay future rent. The arrears were not deposited within time. The first deposit was made on 15th December, 1964. Thereafter default was again committed and rent was next deposited in court on 8th September 1965.
(3) In view of the fact that the orders under section 15(1) had not been complied with, the appellant made an application under section 15(7) of the Act. The Additional Rent Controller was satisfied that there had been a non-compliance of order under section 15(1). By an order dated 15th October. 1965, passed under section 15(7) of the said Act, the defense of the respondent was struckout. On 26th November 1965 the Additional Rent Controller passed an order of eviction. By an order dated 26th November 1965 the eviction of the respondent was ordered on the ground of sub-letting under section 14(1)(b). With regard to the ground contained in section 14(l)(a), the Additional Rent Controller came to the conclusion that as rent had already been paid, even though there had been non-compliance with the order under section 15(1), no order of ejectment could be passed because the arrears of rent specified in the notice of demand had been paid.
(4) Appeal were filed by the respondent against the orders passed under section 15(7) as well as the order of eviction under section 14(l)(b). The Rent Control Tribunal by its order dated 31st March 1967 inter-alia came to the conclusion that where there was small delay in the deposit of arrears, after an order underseciionl5(1) had been passed, the delay should be condoned on payment of costs. The Rent Control Tribunal came to the conclusion that the defense should not have been struckout and awarded sum of Rs. 150.00 as costs. He set aside the order of eviction passed under section 14(1)(b) and remended the case to the Rent Controller.
(5) The Appellant filed two appeals to this court, on 8th May 1972 a full bench of this court allowed the said appeals. It was held that the delay in the appliance of section 15(1) could not be condoned and the order under section 15(7) had been rightly passed. The appeals were accepted and the eviction was ordered on the ground of non-payment of rent under section 14(1) of the Act. Appeals were filed against the said judgment of this court to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by its judgment reported as Hem Chand v. Delhi Cloth General Mills Ltd 1977 Sc 1986 held that the Rent Controller had no discretion to extend the time under section 15(1). It was further held that the Rent Controller has a discretion as to whether an order under section 15(7) should be passed or not. Even if an order under section 15(7) had been passed, the Rent Controller is to be fully satisfied that the necessary igredients in ordering the eviction exist. The appeals were remended by the Supreme Court with the following directions :
'The result is that the appeal by the tenant is allowed and the matter remitted to the High Court with the direction that it shall hear both the appeals preferred by the landlord afresh and dispose them of according to law in the light of our observations. If the High Court holds that the Rent Controller was right in striking out the defense of the tenant, it will allow the appeals of the landlord and direct recovery of possession from the tenant. But in the event of the High Court holding that the order of the Rent Controller striking out the defense was erroneous, it will remit the matter to the Rent Controller for fresh disposal after hearing the parties. Ordered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.'
(6) The first question which has not to be considered is as to whether the Rent Controller was justified in ordering the striking out of the defense of the tenant. It will be seen, as held by the Supreme Court, that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to extend the time for the compliance of the order under section 15(1). It is not disputed that the said order under section 15(1) had not been complied with. There was delay in the payment of the arrears of rent ; monthly rent directed to be paid by the said order was also not deposited in time and the first payment of arrears of rent was made only on 15th December 1964. There was persistent default on the part of the tenant in the deposit of rent. The Rent Control Tribunal had come to the conclusion that order under section 15(7) should not have been passed and the delay should have been condoned. This reasoning is not correct. The delay could not be condoned. There was no extenuating circumstance which existed in this case. Financial stringency could be no ground for not complying with the order under section 15(1). I thereforee, come to the conclusion that the Rent Controller was right in striking out the defense of the respondent - tenant.
(7) In view of the fact that the Rent Controller had rightly struckour the defense of the respondent and as, admittedly, rent was not paid in compliance with the order under section 15(1) and further the igredients contained in section 14(1)(a) exist, I have no option but to order the eviction of the respondent on the ground of non-payment of rent. The appeals are accordingly allowed and an order for recovery of possession of the premises mentioned in the application is granted infavor of the appellant-landlord and against the tenant on the ground (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14. Parties to bear their own costs.