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S.P. Malik Vs. Parpati Bai Haryanvi - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtDelhi High Court
Decided On
Case NumberCivil Revision Appeal No. 1195 of 1982
Judge
Reported in28(1985)DLT181
ActsDelhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Sections 14(1)
AppellantS.P. Malik
RespondentParpati Bai Haryanvi
Advocates: R.K. Makhija,; Ravinder Chadha and; U.L. Watwani, Advs
Cases Referred and Madan Lal Puri v. Sain Dass Berry
Excerpt:
tenancy - vitiated finding - section 14 (1) of delhi rent control act, 1958 - petitioner-landlord nowhere admitted having three bed rooms, one drawing room, one dining room and one drawing room-cum-office - plan filed by landlord not disputed - finding of trial court based on non-existing admission - finding vitiated and can be interfered with within scope of interference - ejectment application filed by landlord against respondent-tenant accepted - held, order of eviction passed in favor of landlord under clause (e) to proviso to section 14 (1). - yogeshwar dayal, j. (1) this is a petition for revision against the order of the learned additional rent controller, delhi dated 24th september, 1982 filed by shri s.p. malik, petitioner landlord. (2) by the impugned order, the learned additional rent controller had dismissed an eviction application which had been filed by the petitioner on the grounds contained in clause (e) to the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the delhi rent control act, 1958. (hereinafter referred to as the act). (3) the petitioner, shri s p. malik was working as technical adviser to delhi cloth & general mills ltd., and retired in the year 1971 as the technical adviser. thereafter, he worked with super bazar, delhi. the landlord has three sons, namely, subhash chander, yogesh chander and mahesh chander......
Judgment:

Yogeshwar Dayal, J.

(1) This is a petition for revision against the order of the learned Additional Rent Controller, Delhi dated 24th September, 1982 filed by Shri S.P. Malik, petitioner landlord.

(2) By the impugned order, the learned Additional Rent Controller had dismissed an eviction application which had been filed by the petitioner on the grounds contained in clause (e) to the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. (Hereinafter referred to as the Act).

(3) The petitioner, Shri S P. Malik was working as Technical Adviser to Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd., and retired in the year 1971 as the Technical Adviser. Thereafter, he worked with Super Bazar, Delhi. The landlord has three sons, namely, Subhash Chander, Yogesh Chander and Mahesh Chander. Yogesh Chander was married in the year 1970. There is one child from that wedlock. That marriage went into difficulties and ultimately there was a separation between him and his wife and he was marriage again in the year 1984. First son Subbash Chander is a Doctor in Science (Chemistry) and Ph.D. He is running a factory at Nangloi. The second son Yogesh Chander has done higher study in Denmark in dairy technology and is working as a partner with his elder brother Subhash Chander. Petitioner has a third son Mahesh Chander who is working in a textile Mill. He is B.Sc. in textile from Bhiwani and at the time when the petition was filed he was working as an Assistant Spinning Master with Swatantra Bharat Mills, Delhi. The petitioner had a daughter namely, Dr. Lalita Chopra who is M.D. and is working at Bombay in a hospital. The petitioner had let out the premises in dispute to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents on or about 1st February, 1961 at a rent of Rs. 225.00 per month. The landlord filed this petition for eviction on or about 14th September, 1976 for the bona fide requirement of himself and members of his family dependent upon him.

(4) The case of the petitioner in the ejectment application was that he is the owner of the premises in dispute and is occupying the premises shown as yellow in the plan attached with the ejectment application. The plan which is not disputed shows the accommodation as under :

'THERE are four rooms of the sizes 10' 10' x 12' 11', 13' X 10', 10'Xl4'-3' and 10'-4' x 14'-3'. Besides these four rooms, there is another room and appears to have been made into one room by removing the intervening wall. This room is 23 feet long and on one side it is 9'' wide and on the other side it is 14''. Besides this the petitioner has two kitchens of the sizes 7'-4'' x 7'-7' and two bath rooms of the sizes 5' x 4'. There are two WCs attached to these bath rooms and between the living rooms and the kitchen, there is a verandah. If, I may say the living rooms are on the front and the Wc and kitchen are at the back. There is some accommodation but that appears to be for sewage pipes and is not living accommodation and is also of very small size. There are two dichotic in the kitchens (.Miane with height of only 5 feet).'

(5) It was further case of the petitioner that the tenant is occupying a portion of accommodation on the first floor and a Barsati as shown red in the plan.

(6) In the application for ejectment, the petitioner has stated that the premises in occupation of the tenant were let out for residential purposes and are required bona fide by the petitioner for occupation as a residence for himself and his family members dependant upon him and he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation with him ; that the size of the family has increased and the present accommodation is too small and insufficient for his needs. It was further stated that the petitioner's family consists of himself and his wife who is M.A., BT. and Ex Municipal Councillor. He also stated that all the three sons are residing with him ; they are Subhash Chander, Yogesh Chander and Mahesh Chander; that Yogesh Chander and Mahesh Chander are married whereas Subhash Chander, Doctor of Science is going to be married soon ; that Yogesh Chander has a son aged 21 years and Mahesh Chander has a daughter. It was further stated by the petitioner that the petitioner retired as Technical Adviser, D.C.M., and was drawing Rs. 3,500.00 p.m. and now he is drawing a pension of about Rs. 1.400.00 and his total income is about Rs. 2.250/' p.m. and is paying income tax.

(7) One written statement was filed on behalf of Smt. Parbati Haryani wife of the deceased tenant and another written statement wai filed on the same lines on behalf of respondents 2,5,6,8 and 9.

(8) In the written statement, it was pleaded that the petitioner has no bona fide requirement of the premises ; that in fact the petitioner wants to increase the rent by coercive measures ; that the petitioner has got accommodation which is reasonably sufficient for his requirements and that of bids family members dependant on him; that he has got one big hall, used as drawing room; four big bed rooms, two big mezzanine floor rooms, one glazed ultra modern dining rooms, two kitchens, two bath rooms with attached W.Cs, one small room connected with bed rooms, lawn and open courtyard. It was also stated that the petitioner has got wife, two sons Mahesh Chander and Subhash Chander : that only Mahesh Chander is married and has got a wife and an infant son ; that these are only dependants on the petitioner; that another son of the petitioner Yogesh Chander is carrying on his Petrol Pump business and is living at Mathura ; he is not dependant for residence on the petitioner; that the wife of Yogesh Chander is living separately from her husband for the last more than 5 years.

(9) It was further pleaded by the tenant that the greed for enhanced rent of the petitioner is manifest from the fact that the petitioner let out the first floor portion at the back of the premises in dispute which was previously in occupation of one Sh. Poddar at a rent of Rs. 200.00 to one Sh. R.K. Bhatia in August, 1968 at an enhanced rate of rent of Rs. 400.00 p.m. that if the petitioner bona fide needed the premises and who has been serving the respondent with notices of bona fide necessity for a very long time, he would not have let out the said premises during this period. It was averred that the petitioner's eviction petition is motivated by ill-designs to enhance the monthly rent at par with the monthly rent of Rs. 400.00 which the petitioner is Realizing from other tenant, Mr. R.K. Bhatia. It was further stated that the petitioner got served a notice dated 15-12-1961 on Shri Bhagwan Dass deceased (Predecessor-in-interest of the respondents) stated therein that the premises were bona fide required for residence of himself and his family members dependant on him ; that again the landlord by letter dated 12-8-1968 called upon the tenant to vacate the premises on the same plea and again the petitioner served a legal notice dated 7-7-1973 through his counsel on the tenant calling upon them to vacate the premises on the same plea of bona fide necessity ; that another notice was also served dated 9-6-1976 calling upon the respondents to vacate the premises.

(10) Petitioner filed replication and in the replication, the petitioner stated that the accommodation in possession of the petitioner is correctly shown in the plan and the entire ground floor is with the petitioner ; that the petitioner has with him three rooms, one dining room, one drawing-cum-office with two kitchens, two baths, two WCs and a verandah which is a passage for going to the rooms, kitchen and Wc ; that the sizes of the rooms are given in the plan ; that the family of the petitioner is dependent on him. It was stated that the aforesaid accommodation is with the petitioner for the last 9 years and since then the following additions in the family has been made :

(1)Two sons who were studying abroad have come back, one of them Sh. Yogesh Chander Malik Dairy Technologist was married on 5th December, 1970 and has a son of about 5 years.

(2)Sh. Mahesh Chander Malik who was working as Assistant Spinning Master at Hissar was transferred to Delhi in Swatantra Bharat Mill. Delhi on 1st July, 1973 and he was married on 22nd May, 1975 and he has a daughter aged about a year.

That all these 7 additions have been made during the last 9 years but the accommodation is the same. It was denied that wife of Yogesh Chander is living separately from Yogesh Chander. It was stated that both were living with the landlord.

(11) It was also stated in the replication that Mr. Poddar vacated the first floor portion in the year 1965 and this portion remained with the landlord for about three years and at that time two sons of the petitioner were abroad and it was in these circumstances that that the portion which was vacated by Mr. Poddar was let out by the landlord to Mr. R.K Bhatia along with barsati and terrace ; that the trouble regarding additional accommodation arose when two sons of the petitioner came back from abroad in about 1970 and Yogesh Chander was married on 5th December, 1970, be got a son in 1971 and Mahesh Chander was transferred from Hissar to Delhi and was married. It was stated that the petitioner had retired and needs separate room for bids study and devotion. It was denied that the petition for eviction is motivated by ill-designs to enhance the rent. The harassing to the respondents was also denied.

(12) It was also stated that in 1961, the petitioner had been serving in Delhi Cloth & General Mills as in charge of Weaving Department and the authorities asked the employees who owned their houses to shift from the Mill's accommodation, so the petitioner served the notice to his tenants and be got the ground floor and he shifted there. It was denied that vide letter dated 12th August, 1968, the petitioner called upon the respondents to vacate the premises ; that a notice was served on respondent No. 1 which was illegal as it was not issued to all the heirs of the deceased tenant. It was further stated that as notice was required to be served on all the heirs of the deceased tenant which was not done and then in November, 1975 another notice was issued to 8 of the 9 present respondents and notice to Mrs. Nanki Haryani was not issued as her husband died and notice due to a bona fide mistake was not issued to all the heirs, the present notice has been issued and the suit has beep filed.

(13) After the application for leave to defend the ejectment application was allowed and thereafter written statement and replication were filed an stated above, the parties went on trial. The landlord got the plan filed with the petition for eviction exhibited as A-2. The petitioner examined himself as bids own witness.

(14) The learned Additional Rent Controller, however, dismissed the ejectment petition as stated earlier. In the impugned judgment the learned Additional Rent Controller, inter alia, held :

'THE petitioner has admitted that be has 3 bed rooms, one drawing room, dining room, one room cum office and the respondents have been able to prove that only six adult members including the petitioner are residing in the premises which is with the petitioner and this accommodation of the petitioner is more than sufficient for bids residence and for the members of his family.'

Learned Additional Rent Controller also held :

'LD.counsel for the petitioner submitted that the wife of the petitioner had been a Municipal Councillor and she require one room as office for meeting her social obligation and the petitioner also requires one room for having his office as be has retired. This contention is without any merit u/s. 14(i)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The premises can be required only for residential purposes and it cannot be got vacated on the plea that the premises are to be used for any comn.ercial activity or for having an office in the same. The petitioner has sufficient accommodation with him for accommodation himself and for all the members of his family and it cannot be said that be require any additional accommodation for his residence or for the members of his family.'

Learned Additional Rent Controller also held that :

'IT appears that the intention of the petitioner is to increase the rate of rent and there is no bona fide requirements of the petitioner. The contention of the petitioner that the need for the accommodation arose in the year 1971 when his son came back from abroad is not convensing. Even, at that time, the petitioner had more then sufficient accommodation with him and even now accommodation with the petitioner consisting of 5 rooms is sufficient.' ' For finding that the need of the petitioner is not bona fide) the discussion in the findings is in these terms :

'LD.Counsel for the respondents has submitted the petitioner does not require any accommodation and this petition has been filed with view to put pressure on the respondents to increase the rent as the petitioner has been doing earlier. The respondent has also placed on record the notices and the respondents namely 'Asoka Haryani and Smt. Parbati Haryani have categorically stated that the back portion on the first floor which was in possession of one Sh. Poddar at the rate of Rs. 200.00 p.m. was got vacated in the year 1965 on the ground of bona fide necessity and after the expiry of 3 years it was let out to Sh. R.K. Bhatia at a rate of Rs. 400.00 p.m. and Mr. Bhatia is still residing in the said premises. This contention has not been denied by the petitioner. The notice Ex. D-1 which is dated 16-12-1961 shows that the petitioner required the suit premises to be vacated on the ground of bona fide requirements for himself and for the members of his family, but, even after a portion of the premises was vacated in the year 1965, the same was not occupied by the petitioner, either himself or by any member of his family and the portion was again let out to Mr. Bhatia at an enhanced rate of Rs. 400.00 .'

(15) Mr, Makhija, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the findings both as to mala fides and as to bona fide requirement for the purposes of extent of accommodation is vitiated. Learned counsel submitted that the finding as to extent of accommodation is based on admission which is nonexisting. It was also submitted that the circumstances in which the petitioner shifted to a portion of his own house in 1961 and again the circumstances in which Mr. Poddar vacated the premises in 1965, the circumstances in which the petitioner got the other portion of the ground floor made available to him in 1968 and consequent circumstance of letting out the portion vacated by Mr. Poddar, again the circumstances that two sons of the petitioner were abroad when the premises vacated by Mr. Poddar was let out to Mr. Bhatia, have not been considered at all. It was submitted that before coming to the findings of mala fides, it was the duty of the trial court to consider the facts brought on record and also consider them in some chronological order. It was submitted that as soon as the petitioner received notice from his employer to vacate the Mill's premises, the petitioner naturally served notices to the tenants as the petitioner was not sure which tenant will vacate and which will not vacate and it so happened that one of the tenants in the portion of the ground floor vacated and the petitioner occupied the two bed rooms set (front portion of the ground floor) ; that the petitioner had to take eviction proceedings only against Mr. Poddar. He filed no ejectment petition against predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. A decree for eviction was passed against Mr. Poddar in 1963 and he vacated in 1965 and the landlord kept that portion with him till 1968. That when the back portion of the ground floor was vacated by another tenant, the petitioner occupied whole of the ground floor and since then first floor portion which was vacated by Mr. Poddar become surplus and the petitioner was not aware when his grown up children will come, he thought it fit to let out the same to Mr. Bhatia at a nominal rent of Rs, 400.00 per month. Again even at that stage no proceedings were taken by the petitioner against the respondents-tenant right till the present petition for eviction was filed in 1976.

(16) It was, thus, submitted that as the learned Additional Rent Controller has not even seen the circumstances in which the petitioner had occupied the ground floor nor did the Additional Rent Controller examine the facts in chronological order, the finding of fact is vitiated.

(17) It was submitted that the finding as to mala fides is really based on two reasons:

(I)That a notice to vacate the premises was given soon after induction of the tenant.

(II)That the back portion of the first floor was vacated by Mr. Poddar in 1965 after litigation but the same was let out in 1968 at higher rent.

(18) It was submitted that both these grounds do not show any mala fides.

(19) Regarding the extent of accommodation, Mr. Makhija, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that finding of fact is vitiated as the entire approach of the trial court in this respect is wrong. It was submitted that the trial court assumed that the connection of the landlord was that the wife of the landlord had been a Municipal Councillor and requires one room as office for meeting her social obligation and the landlord also requires one room as his office as he has retired and regarding the finding, 'This contention is without any merit u/s. 14(i)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The premises can be required only residential purposes and it cannot be got vacated on the plea that the premises are to be used for any commercial activity or for having an office in the same,' it was submitted that it was not the contention of the petitioner. The contention was that the wife of the petitioner has been a Municipal Councillor right from 1962 onwards till 1972 and was again re-elected as Municipal Councillor in 1977 for five years and the submission was that the front hall is used by the wife for receiving visitors on account of her public life when lot of people of her constituency visits her for various grievances and the front ball is used for that purpose, for that office and as sitting room for the visitors and thus, the accommodation available for residence is only 4 rooms, out of which one room is used as a dining room and the petitioner is left with only three bed rooms with no drawing room or any accommodation for his office and for purposes of devotion (Probably petitioner's meant for Pooja). It is not that the petitioner wants the accommodation in occupation of the tenant to be vacated for running a office of his wife or for his office but the accommodation already available with the landlord is partly being used for those purposes and, thereforee, the accommodation available with him is not sufficient for his residential needs.

(20) Mr. Watwani, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand submitted that the finding as to requirement of the learned trial court is pure finding of fact and cannot be interfered with in a revision under the proviso to sub-section (8) of section 25-B of the Act. In this connection be brought to my notice the decision of Avadh Behari Rohtagi, J. in the case of Krishan Kumar v. Vimla Sehgal, 1976 Rcr 249 He also brought to my notice a decision of Sultan Singh, J. in the case of Bal Krishan Julak v. K.L. Verma : AIR1982Delhi19 and a decision of T.P.S. Chawla, J. in the case of Sat Pal v. Nand Kishore, 1983 Rlr 19 (Paras 18 and 19). He also brought to my notice a decision of Prakash Narain, C.J. in the case of Kasturi Lal Nandraj v. Bakshi Ram, 1981 Rlr 380 and a decision of Sachar, J. in the case of Sh. Harbhajan Das v. Sh. Tilak Raj Mehta : 19(1981)DLT77 . Learned counsel has also brought to my notice a decision of M.L. Jain, J. in the case of Man Mohan Mehra v. J.S. Butalia : AIR1984Delhi32 . He also brought to my notice a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Shankar and others v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, Air 1963 Sc 698 regarding scope of the powers of the High Court for interference. He also brought to my notice a decision of Sultan Singh, J. in the case of M/s Jagatjit Industries Ltd. New Delhi v. Rajiv Gupta : AIR1981Delhi359 and two decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and others : [1974]3SCR267 and Mattulal v. Radhey Lal : [1975]1SCR127 . Learned counsel also brought to my notice a decision of Full Bench of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. Tirath Ram Chopra and another : AIR1982Delhi405 .

(21) SUB-SECTION (8) of section 25-B of the Act reads as under :

'(8)No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this section : Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.'

(22) Proviso to sub-section (8) of section 25-B of the Act is in pari materia with section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. Section 35 of the Act of 1932 reads as under :

'35.Revision and review: (1) The High Court may, at any time, call for the record of any case under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decision made therein is according to law and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit.'

(23) I may state at the out set that learned counsel for the respondents is having very wrong idea and his submission that finding of bona fide requirement is always a finding of fact and can never be interfered with in revision is totally erroneous.

(24) In the case of Pooran Chand v. Moti Lal and others : AIR1964SC461 Subba Rao, J. while dealing with the case under section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (xxxvII of 1952) held :

'THAT the power of the High Court under section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act (38 of 1952), is wider than that under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, though it cannot be equated to that of its jurisdiction in an appeal.'

and yet Subba Rao, J. observed :

'IT is neither possible nor advisable to define with precision the scope and ambit of section 35 of the Act, but it should be left to the High Court to consider in each case whether the impugned judgment is according to law or not, as explained by the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal, Air 1963 Sc 698

(25) Again the findings, particularly, in relation to the bona fide requirement on admitted facts have been repeatedly held to be a mixed question of law and fact. If any reference is required, reference may be made with advantage to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case Kamla Soni v. RupLal Mehra, 1970 Rcj 34 and Madan Lal Puri v. Sain Dass Berry, 1971 Rcj 749

(26) In the first case Shah, J. speaking for the Supreme Court while dealing with the scope of appeal under section 39(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 held:

'THAT the argument that the Judges of the High Court exceeded their jurisdiction under section 39(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act when they reversed the finding of bona fide requirement of the landlord has no substance. Whether on the facts proved the requirement of the landlord is bona fide within the meaning of section 14(1)(e), is a finding on a mixed question of law and fact.'

(27) The same view was followed by Vaidialingam, J. in the case of Madan Lal Puri (supra). A finding of fact is not vitiated nor become subject matter of revision under section 115 or section 33 of the Act or 1952 or under the proviso to sub-section (8) of section 25-B of the Act when it is a question of re-appreciation of evidence. It is totally different where the entire approach in understanding the requirement of the landlord is erroneous. Here was the case where landlord was using this house in a particular fashion. When the landlord deposed in examination-in-chief that the hall is used by his wife for receiving visitors of her constituency, there was no challenge to it in the crossexamination. thereforee, the existing user of the hall for official use of the wife of the landlord was not disputed. If that be the position, that accommodation ceases to be available to ihe landlord for his bona fide use as residence. To say that landlord cannot file a petition for asking the tenant to vacate the premises for private office for his wife or office for himself is wholly erroneous approach. This was not the plea of the landlord. Plea of the landlord, I may be guilty of repeating, is that the hall is not available for residential purpose and when the court judges bona fide requirement, it also looks into the question as to what is the accommodation available with the landlord. thereforee, once admitted user of the hall is there, we are left with just four living rooms. May be at odd hours when the visitors from the constituency are not there, the family may be able to use it but by and large that hall ceases to be in normal use of the family. Thus, we are left only with four rooms of which I have given the details earlier besides the two kitchens, bath and W.Cs. Surely, the bath rooms and the WCs cannot be converted into living rooms ; living rooms are only four. The family of this size certainly requires living rooms for the family. There are four educated persons living in the premises. They certainly require living rooms and each must also requires a bed room. Where is the bed room to be provided for the two couples Learned counsel for the tenant submitted that the verandah in between the rooms and the kitchen on one side of living room can be used as dining room. We cannot force the landlord to use it as dining room. It is really a passage from the bed rooms to the two bath rooms and the kitchen at the back. How the landlord should live is surely not going to be as per the thinking of the tenant.

(28) The premises were let out in 1961 i.e. 24 years back. Things are likely to change. To my mind, none of the authorities cited on behalf of the tenant have any applicability to the facts of the present case. Whether a finding is vitiated or can be interfered with depends on individual finding of fact. There is no hard and fast rule. Finding as to bona fide requirement is not always a finding of fact.

(29) Another way looking at the finding of learned trial court being vitiated is that the landlord nowhere admitted that he has got three bed rooms, one drawing room, one dining room and one drawing room-cum-office. There is no such admission. In fact, the plan filed by the landlord was never disputed. A finding based on non-existing admission is itself vitiated.

(30) A finding of fact based on erroneous approach to the case of landlord, when it was not his case and also based on non-existing admission is surely vitiated and can be interfered with within the scope of interference as laid down by the Supreme Court in all these decisions mentioned earlier.

(31) As I have stated, the entire approach of the learned trial court is erroneous and whole finding gets vitiated. The decision of Chawla, J. in the case of Satpal (supra) has nothing to do with the controversy before us. The observations of the Full Bench in the case of Mohan Lal (supra) do not come in the way for interference with the present case. (I may state that the words of section 35 of the 1952 Act and the proviso to sub-section (8) of section 25-B of the Act are practically the same). Again the decision of Sachar, J. in the case of Harbhajan Dass (supra) has no application to the findings and the manner in which the finding has been arrived here. There is no dispute of the scope of revision as defined in either in the case of Hari Shankar and others (supra) or as explained in the case of Pooran Chand (supra) or again as explained in the case of Phiroze Bamanji Desai (supra) and Mattulal (supra). The court has to see that over all decision is according to law as opposed to individual error here and there and manifest injustice.

(32) Coming to the finding as to mala fides, it will be noticed that none of the two factors on which learned trial court relied have any bearing individually or collectively. A notice to vacate being issued in 1961 and then proceedings for eviction being filed in 1976 does not show that the notice issued in 1961 was mala fide. The landlord has explained in the statement in court that he had been called upon by his employer to vacate the premises occupied by him as be owns a house in Delhi. It was in these circumstances that the premises in disputed which are situated in double storeyed house having four sets, the landlord was forced to issue notices to tenants to vacate the premises. For one thing he was not sure who will vacate by merely serving notice. Fact remains that the respondents remained in the suit premises and thereafter no proceedings were filed against them for eviction right uptil 1976. Again, the drawing of inference of mala fides from the fact that the portion which was got vacated from Mr. Poddar in 1965 after litigation and the same was let out in 1968 is wrong. In fact, the learned trial court never considered the sequence of events in which the premises were got vacated from Mr. Poddar and what were the premises available to the landlord when the portion which was got vacated was let out to Mr. Bhatia and who were the family members living with the landlord at that time. It came out in evidence that initially after he received notice from the Mill (landlord's employers), only one tenant in the portion of the ground floor vacated the premises and the landlord shifted therein. Since that portion was not sufficient to meet the requirement of the landlord, he instituted proceedings for eviction against Mr. Poddar who was occupying the back portion on the first floor and after litigation the court found his requirement to be bona fide and an order for eviction was passed against Mr. Poddar. After Mr. Poddar vacated that portion in 1965 the petitioner occupied it and continued to occupy till 1968 when the remaining portion of the ground floor of the house fell vacant and the petitioner at that stage occupied whole of the ground floor in 1968. At that time two sons of the petitioned namely, Subhash Chander and Yogesh Chander were abroad. The landlord was not sure when they would come back and it was pointless to keep the portion vacated by Mr. Poddar remaining unoccupied for indefinite period and thereforee, the premises were let out to Mr. Bhatia. The premises let out to Mr. Bhatia were more than the premises which were let out to Mr. Poddar and the rent charged was nominal. By no standard it can be called that even at that time the rent was exorbitant. Even at that stage no proceedings were taken against the respondents. It is only when the two eldest sons of the petitioner came back somewhere in 1970, one of them gets married and the third son who was at Hissar gets posted in Delhi and he also was married in 1975 and has a child, that the landlord felt necessaryof more accommodation and requested the respondents to vacate the premises. There was some mistake in serving one notice, thereforee, more than one notices have been served. Though no notice was required, still the landlord thought it fit to give notice when the petition was filed in 1976. The fact remains that at that time all the three sons of the petitioner were in Delhi, two of them were married. Both the sons had a child each. The marriage of Yogesh Chander, however, was broken but he was re-married in 1984 and he with his wife along with two other sons of the petitioner and the wife of the landlord are living on the ground floor of the house. In these circumstances, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that letting or portion in 1968 when none of the sons of the petitioner were living with him was mala fide. Surely, it is not expected that landlord should keep surplus accommodation available to him, locked up indefinitely for some future use at an unknown time. Learned trial court, even if I repeat, completely lost sight of the fact as to what was the circumstance in which the premises were got vacated and what was the circumstance when the premises were let out. Merely getting the premises vacated is not mala fide. Again merely letting that vacated portion Is not again mala fide. Learned trial court completely lost sight of the fact that the landlord after giving notice to the tenant (predecessor-in-interest of the respondents) never filed eviction proceedings against them right till 1976 i.e. for 15 years. There was never any mala fide. I am surprised, how the tenant took the plea of mala fide. There is no evidence worth the name of mala fide. I could have understood if the landlord had made extraordinary claims soon after letting with a view to put pressure on the tenant to increase rent but we find that no proceedings whatsoever were taken against the respondents right till 1976, by the time 15 years have gone by. There was never any demand of increase in rent apart from ipsi dixit of the tenant. It is not the function of the tenant to tell the landlord as to how he should conduct his affairs nor is it the duty of the landlord to arrange his affairs for the convenience of the tenant only. To my mind, the landlord has specifically explained the circumstances in which the notice was given to the respondents to vacate and yet no action was taken. The landlord has also specifically explained as to why the premises were got vacated in 1965 from Mr. Poddar which were let out again in 1968. There is no allegation that he charged pugree from his tenant or the rent charged from Mr. Bhatia was exorbitant. Mr. Bhatia never made any grievance. It appears to me that the finding of the learned trial court of the mala fide has been arrived at by ignoring all the relevant facts. Finding of mala fide is, thus, vitiated in law. It appears to me that the finding as to mala fide has been arrived at by the learned trial court with undue haste by shutting his eyes to the sequence of events which led to the vacation of the premises by the other tenant and thereafter letting out by the petitioner.

(33) To my mind, there is nothing whatsoever mala fide in filing of the petition against the respondents.

(34) I am, thus, of the firm view that in the present case the findings of the learned Additional Rent Controller both as to mala fide and as to bona fide requirement and as to extent of accommodation call for interference within the limited scope of the proviso to sub-section (8) of section 25-B of the Act. I also find that the petition for ejectment was bona fide and the landlord does require additional accommodation and the requirement is bona fide and the demand for additional accommodation is neither mala fide nor extravagant. I am constrained to set aside the judgment of the learned Additional Rent Controller and accept the revision petition. The ejectment application filed by the petitioner against the respondents is accepted. An order of eviction is, accordingly, passed in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents under clause (e) to the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act. It is directed that the order of eviction will not be executable for a period of six months from today as provided in sub-section (7) of section 14 of the Act. Petitioner would also be entitled to the costs of the present proceedings and the proceedings in the trial court.


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