Sultan Singh, J.
1. This is a petition under Section 25B(S) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called 'the Act') on behalf of the tenant challenging the order of eviction dated 4th August, 1978 passed by the Additional Controller in favor of the respondent-landlord. The respondent on 21st January 1977 filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act alleging that he is the owner of the suit property at B-16, Greater Kailash, New Delhi that the property was let to the petitioner for residential purposes, that he bonafide requires the premises as a residence for himself, his wife and his two children dependent on him and that he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. He further says that he has been residing with his father at 30, Chatra Marg, Delhi in a single room measuring 17 x 15' 19' . He is the Zonal Manager of a public limited company, namely, Motor & General Finance Limited and he is also Director of other public limited companies drawing a salary of Rs. 3350/-. This petition was tried under Section 25B of the Act The tenant was granted leave to contest and after recording evidence, the Additional Controller held that the respondent-landlord was entitled to an order for recovery of possession from the petitioner-tenant. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the eviction order passed by the Controller is not in accordance with law and thereforee the same is liable to be set aside by this court in exercise of revisional powers under Section 25B(b) of the Act. The petitioner raises the following questions :
1. That the eviction notice dated 17th September, 1976 Ex. AW2/5 was served upon the petitioner on 20th September, 1976 which purported to terminate his tenancy on the expiry of 31st October, 1976. The petitioner says that in terms of the memo of lease dated 6th February, 1970 the contractual tenancy was liable to be terminated only by two months notice ;
2. That the respondent-landlord has reasonably suitable residential accommodation at 30, Chatra Marg, Delhi as he has been residing with his father and that he docs not bonafide require the suit premises for the residence of himself or any member of his family ;
3. That the premises in suit were let to the petitioner for residence-cum-commercial purposes ; and
4. That the requirement of the respondent-landlord, if any, can be satisfied if he gets possession of the first floor and second floor of the suit premises for which a rent of Rs. 2000/- per month was fixed at the time of lease.
2.Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contends that the memo, of lease dated 6th February, 1970 is not admissible in evidence as the same is not duly stamped and is unregistered. He further says that the findings regarding purpose of letting and the bonafide requirement of the respondent-landlord are ringing of fact and are not liable to be reversed in revision under Section 25B of the Act. He further says that the tenancy of the entire building is composite and the same cannot be spilt and that partial decree for eviction cannot be passed.
3. To appropriates the contentions of the parties the relevant facts of the case are :
The entire property consisting of ground floor, first floor and second floor at B-16, Greater Kailash, New Delhi was let out to the petitioner from 1st May, 1969. This was oral tenancy accompanied by delivery of possession. It was a tenancy for a fixed period of 11 months. The agreed rent was Rs. 4000/- per month i.e. Rs. 600/- as property taxes and Rs. 3400/- as rent. The petitioner further state that the rent of the ground floor was fixed at Rs. 2000/- and the rent for the upper floors i.e. first and second floors was fixed at Rs. 2000/-. On 6th February, 1970 a memo, of lease was executed between the parties. It was signed by the petitioner and the respondent. The ground floor of the suit property was let for residence of the Managing Director of the petitioner while the first floor and Barsati floor of the property were to be used as Guest House of the petitioner-company for the residence of its guests. The father of the respondent is the owner of the property at 30, Chatar Marg, Delhi wherein the respondent is in occupation of only one room as alleged by him. The respondent examined himself and his father in support of his case. On behalf of the petitioner its Secretary Mr. B.K. Talwar was examined. Ved parkash Gupta, father of the respondent states that the respondent is in occupation of one room in property No. 30, Chatra Marg, Delhi, that he is married and has two children, that he is the Chairman of Goodwill India Ltd., National Product Ltd., Vijay Finance & Investment Ltd., Janta Traders and many others. He further states that he asked the respondent to shift to his own house, that the respondent is the owner of the suit property, that his relations with the respondent are cordial, that the entire house is not meant for his use, that they are having a common mess and that the respondent uses dinning room for his meals and sometimes sitting, room when he entertains friends. The respondent appearing as AW 2 states that he is in occupation of one room, his family consists of himself, his wife and two children and that the accommodation with him is not sufficient for his requirements. The photo copy of the lease deed dated 6th February, 1970 is marked 'A', his date of birth is 13th August, 1946. He further states that the premises were let on 1st May, 1969 and the terms of tenancy which were settled subsequently were incorporated in the lease agreement dated 6th February, 1970. The property at 30, Chatra Marg, Delhi owned by the respondent's father is a huge property consisting of two verandahs measuring 30'x8' and 20'x8', on sitting room 20'x 18', one dinning room 16'x 10', two bed rooms 20'x 20' each, third bed room 14' x 14', fourth bed room 16' x 16', Pantry, four bath rooms, one kitchen, one Puja Room measuring 12'x12', four rooms under ACC roof measuring 10' x 10', six servant quartersmeasuring 10' x 8' one tin shed and one cow shed. This accommodation is detailed in house tax assessment record in Ex. R.I. Mr. B.K.Talwar, R.W.1 Secretary of the petitioner company stales that the terms of tenancy were settled orally with him by the respondent that notice of termination was agreed to be given by either party for two months, the premises were let for residence-cum-commercial purposes, the ground floor was for the residence of the Managing Director of the Company while the first and Barsati floor were to be used as Guest House of the customers of the company. He further says that the respondent-landlord does not require the suit premises for residence that he has sufficient accommodation and he wants to increase rent and to sell the property after getting it vacated. He admits that the petitioner-company does not run business of Guest-house. He also says that the suit properly on the ground floor has live rooms besides kitchen, servant quarters, open lawns, garages and similar accommodation is available on the first floor of the suit property and Barsati floor on the second floor. He further says that the oral terms of tenancy were settled initially and the lease agreement marked 'A' was executed on 6th February, 1970 and that no oral terms were settled after its execution. The receipt of notice dated 17th September, 1976 is admitted by him.
Section 25B(8) of the Act reads as under :
'(8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this section :
Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this Section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit'.
4. This provision is similar to Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 which reads as under :
'The High Court may, at any time, call for the record of any case under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decision made therein is according to law and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit.'
5. The Supreme Court in Hari Shankar and Ors. v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury AIR 1963 S.C. 698 while interpreting Section 35 of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 held as follows:
' The phrase 'according to law' refers to the decision as a whole, and is not to be equated to error of law or of fact simpliciter. Itrefers to the overall decision, which must be according to law which it would not be, if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. The section is thus framed to confer larger powers than the power to correct error of jurisdiction to which Section 115 is limited, But it must not be overlooked that the section- in spite of its apparent width of language where it confers a power on the High Court to pass such order as the High Court might think fit, is controlled by the opening words, where it says that the High Court may send for the record of the case to satisfy itself that the decision is 'according to law'. It stands to reason that if it was considered necessary that there should be a re-hearing, a right of appeal would be a more appropriate remedy, but the Act says that there is to be no further appeal'.
6. The Supreme Court in Pooran Chand vs. Motilal and others. : AIR1964SC461 while dealing with Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 referred to its earlier judgment Had Shankar & Other (Supra) and observed, 'It is neither possible nor advisable to define with precision the scope and ambit of section 35 of the Act, but it should be left to the High Court to consider in each case whether the impugned judgment is according to law or not, as explained by this court in the said judgment'. Recently the Supreme Court dealing with Section 25B of the act in Kewal Singh vs. Mrt. Lajwanti, : 1SCR854 observed, 'the highest Court of the State has been given a wide power of revision where the said Court can examine the case of the tenant and the landlord and the validity of the order passed by the Controller. The right of the tenant, thereforee, is sufficiently safeguarded by the proviso to Sub-section (8) of Section 25B of the Act referred to above. In order to give relief to the tenant against any apparent error of law or fact where no revision has been filed in the High Court the statute confers power of review on the Controller'. The High Court under Section 25B(8) of the Act exercises only revisional and not appellate jurisdiction. The High Court has to examine the records in order to satisfy itself that the decision of the Controller is 'according to law', This revisional jurisdiction, it is well settled, is wider than that under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court must thus interfere under Section 25B(8) of the Act where in the order of the Controller is without jurisdiction, or contrary to law or to the express provision of the Act; where he has arrived at findings which are wholly perverse or contrary to evidence or based on no evidence or where some procedural irregularity has been committed resulting in miscarriage of justice. It appears that the High Court, however, will not re-appreciate the evidence and sit in judgment over finding of fact arrived at by the controller on the evidence before him. The High Court cannot interfere with the finding of the controller merely because on the same evidence, it is likely that this court may come to a different conclusion. In other words, it appears that the High Court will not be justified in interfering with the plain finding of fact.
7. With this background of the powers under Section 25B(8) of the Act it is to be seen whether the impugned order of the Controller is not according to law.
8. The first contention of the petitioner tenant is that he was entitled to twomonths notice of eviction on the basis of term No.2 of the lease agreement dated 6th February, 1970 marked 'A'. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that oral tenancy was created for a period of 11 months with effect from 1st May, 1969 and possession was delivered to the petitioner-company, that rent was agreed at Rs.4000/-per month, he says that oral lease for less than one year was validly created by delivery of possession within him the meaning of Section 107 of the Transfer of property Act. He further says that the leave deed dated 6th February, 1970 is a memo of agreement corroborating the oral terms of tenancy settled between the parties on or about 1st May, 1969. The contention of the respondent's counsel is that the lease dated 6th February, 1970 itself creates the lease, that it bears the signatures of the petitioner and the respondent and thereforee under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act this document requires registration and as it is not registered under the Indian Registration Act the same cannot be looked into in view of Section 49 of the Registration Act,1908. The question thereforee is whether the lease dated 6th February, 1970 is a memorandum of agreement Corporation the oral terms of tenancy agreed to previously or it is a lease deed itself creating the lease. From the various terms of the lease deed such as terms 3,4,5,7,8,9,10,11,12 & 13, it appears that the parties used the future tense while agreeing to various terms meaning thereby that these terms were not agreed at the time of initial letting on 1st May, 1969.
9. These terms do not refer to any previous oral agreement between the par-ties. As a matter of fact the lease deed itself does not mention about any previous oral tenancy agreement between the parties. It however mentions that the period of lease for 11 months started with retrospective effect from 1st May, 1969. The oral terms of the lease as pleaded in para 14 of the written statement are, 'the promises were taken on lease with effect from 1st May, 1969 under oral agreement of lease accompanied with possession. It was agreed that it would be leased for a period of 11 months with effect from 1st May, 1969. It was also agreed that the lease could be terminated or extended by giving two months notice by either side after expiry of lease. The respondent agreed to pay Rs 3400/- as rent and Rs.600/- as property or house tax, total Rs. 4000/- per month besides electricity charges. The rent for ground floor was agreed to be Rs.2000/- per month and for upper floors to be Rs.2000/- per month. The premises were let out for residential and commercial purposes', some of these term find place in the lease deed dated 6th February, 1970. The new terms incorporated in this lease deed are to the effect that the leases shall pay for the filtered water and for power and light charges directly to the local authorities, that the lessee shall not sublet the provision part or whole without the written consent that he had checked the various fittings as per list attached, that he shall comply with the rules and regulations of the local authorities, that he shall not make any additions or alterations in the premises but can install air-conditioners, A coolars, cooking ranges etc , that he shall carry out at his own costs all major repairs and that the painting of the building shall be carried out by the less after every two years at his own cost. It thus appears that this is a new lease deed which creates the tenancy agreement between the parties. It may be sail that it is in supersession of the original lease created on 1st May,1969. This possible. Under Section 111(f) of the transfer of Property Act it may be that be execution of this lease deed the previous oral lease was impliedly surrendered but before the previous lease can be said to have come to an end, it must bedetermined whether the new lease deed executed between the parties is validly executed in accordance with law. This new lease deed 6thFebruary, 1970 creates rights between the parties. As it is not registered as required by Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act the same is not admissible in evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in fact lease of the suit premises was created under the oral agreement on 1st May, 1969 and as the lease had already been created there remained nothing for creation of another lease. He says that agreement of lease must be a document which affects an actual demise and operates as a lease. His contention is that this document does not affect actual demise and thereforee does not operate as a lease. This is correct that an agreement to lease must be a document which effects an actual demise and operates as a lease (See Trivenibai and another v. Smt. Lilabai : AIR1959SC620 ) But reading the document i.e. lease deed dated 6th February, 1970 as a whole the irresistible conclusion is that this document created a lease between the parties effective from 1st May, 1969. The Full Bench of this Court in Chief Controlling Revenue Authority vs. Smt. Satyawati Sood and others. : AIR1972Delhi171 observed, ' It is well known that parties enter into oral agreements or informal agreements. But even if all the terms are so agreed, the parties intend to reduce the agreement to a formal document. If such is the intention of the parties then it is the formal document and not the anterior oral or informal agreements which would constitute ihe legal transaction or act-in-law. This again is to be found from the intention of the parties in a particular case (Union of India vs. N.K. (P) Ltd., 2nd (1971) 1 Del 355. In view of the numerous complicated perceis terms of the lease with legal implications in the present case, we are of the view that the transaction of lease was entered into only by the letters in question and not by the previous oral agreement, if any.' In the full Bench case this court come to the conclusion that there was never any oral agreement and the lease was created only under the letters written by the parties.
10. In the present case, It is true, that the oral tenancy is admitted but it appears that some oral terms were settled between the parties in May, 1969 and subsequently other terms were settled and thereforee the lease need dated 6.2. 1970 was executed by the parties. This lease deed may be called as a new lease in supersession of the previous oral tenancy or it may be said that the oral negotiations for the creation of lease started in May, 1969 when possession was delivered and finally concluded on 6th Feb, 1970 when this lease deed was executed.
11. I, thereforee, hold that the lease dated 6th February, 1970 marked 'A' executed between the petitioner and the respondent is a lease deed requiring registration under section 107 of the transfer of property Act. This lease deed bears non-judicial stamp of Rs. 2.50. The stamp duty has not been paid in accordance with Article 35 of the Stamp Act and thereforee I am also of the view that this deed is not dully stamped in accordance with law As the document is not duly stamped it cannot be looked into at all. Section 35 of the Stamp Act,1889 provides that any instrument not duly stamped is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose. Thus I am of the view that the lease deed cannot be referred to at all.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that even if this document enquires registration and as it has not been registered, the same can be read asevidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. It is true that under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act an unregistered document affecting immovable property can be received as evidence of any collateral transaction. The question is what is the collateral transaction in the present case. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon term No. 2 of the lease deed. This terms is as under:
'That the lease is for a period of 11 months with retrospective effect from 1st May, 1969 with two years option with the lessee. The lease can be terminated or extended by giving two months notice by either side after expiry of lease or option period, if exercised'.
13. He says that the lease can be terminated by giving two months notice by either side after expiry of lease i.e. after the expiry of the initial fixed period of 11 months, He says that such a term can be looked at two find out the period of notice to determine the tenancy. He relies up on Lala Patch Chand v. Mst. Radha Rani and Ors., 1956 Allahabad Law Journal 625. With respect to the learned Judge. I do not agree. The term regarding notice of exactions is a term which effects immovable property and thereforee it cannot be said to be a collateral transaction. Further this authority was held to be not good law by Allahabad High Court itself in Sallomal vs. Smt. Naina Bai and others, : AIR1979All32 . Under Section 49 of the Registration Act a document compulsorily registerable, if unregistered, is inadmissible in evidence of a transaction affecting immovable property. The term regarding notice of eviction is a term which affects the immoveable property. The main purpose of this term is as to when the tenant; can be required to deliver possession of the tenancy premises. Assuming for the sake of argument, that this term No. 2 is admissible in evidence being a collateral transaction as alleged by the petitioner tenant, I am still of the view that the petitioner cannot derive any advantage out of it. According to this term tenancy is for a fixed period of 11 months After the expiry of fixed period of 11 months the tenancy stands determined under Section 111(a) of the Transfer of property Act by efflux of time. In Firm Sardari Lal Vishwa Nath and Ors. v. Pritam Singh, : 1SCR111 it has been held that a tenant is not entitled to a notice of eviction is he is holding over by efflux of time. Learned counsel for the respondent relying upon vs. Dhannapal Chettiar v. Yesoda Ammel, : 1SCR334 contends that in order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant under any State Rent Control Act it is not necessary to give notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand contends that this judgment of Supreme Court refers to the statutory notice as required by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in the absence of contract between the parties. He contends that there if a contract for giving two months notice to the petitioner and thereforee such contractual notice must have been given by the respondent. The purpose of giving contractual notice of eviction is merely to terminate the contract but what is the effect of it when the premises are governed by the Rent Control Act. Even after the terminate on of contractual tenancy a landlord is not entitled to obtain an order of eviction unless he proves one or more grounds mentioned in the Rent Control Act. I am thereforee of the view that giving of a contractual notice of eviction is also not necessary. I times hold that lease dated 6th February, 1970 being not duly stamped, is inadmissible inevidence under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, and that the same is also inadmissible in evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act. I further held that no notice of eviction was necessary to be served by the respondent upon the petitioner-tenant before the institution of the present eviction proceedings.
14. The next question is whether the respondent/landlord bonafide requires the premises and he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. These two requirements are inter-linked with each other. If landlord is in possession of suitable accommodation it can be said that he does not require the premises for his residence and if he is not in possession of suitable residence it may be said that he need ; the premises for his residence, then the only question remains whether his requirement is bonafide or he is seeking eviction with some ulterior motives. In the present case the respondent admittedly is residing with his father. The respondent has no right, title in the property at 30, Chatar Marg, Delhi. This property belongs to his father. The respondent at best can be said to be a licenses of his father while in occupation of any portion of the suit property. He cannot claim, as his legal right, to continue in occupation of the said premises. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the respondent with his wife and two children has been comfortably accommodated with his parents at 30, Chatra Marg, Delhi and that his parents in Hindu society would not turn him out from the residential house. This may be so but the question is when a father desires his son to shift to his own property, is it advisable for a son to say, 'No' or to come in conflict with his father by refusing to vacate the premises. If the son has no right to occupy the property of his father it cannot be said that he has get suitable accommodation for his residence. Before determining whether a landlord has accommodation for h's residence it must be determined whether he has a right to remain in occupation of the existing premises, ff he has no right it cannot be said that he has suitable accommodation with him. The Supreme Court in Ihirose Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and Ors., : 3SCR267 observed, 'If a person is in occupation of the other premises on leave and license, they are obviously not available to the landlord for occupation and cannot be taken into account for negativing the need of the landlord for the premises in question'. In the present case before me the respondent-landlord is at best in occupation of the premises of his father on leave and license basis. If the respondent himself is on leave and license basis, the tenant cannot resist the respondent's claim for eviction. Prakash Chandra v. Nirpendra Kumar Aggarwal 1971 R.C.J. 474 it has been held by this court that a landlord has only to prove a negation of the fact that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation. The evidence of the landlord and his father, stating that the landlord has no right to stay in the house of his father and thereforee he has no suitable accommodation apart from the premises in question for his own use, is sufficient. No mala fide act has been pleaded against the respondent-landlord. The respondent in evidence no doubt stated that the landlord wants to enhance the rent and wants to sell the property. These facts were not pleaded, and hence this evidence cannot be looked into. The word 'require' means that there must be an element of need and not mere desire that the landlord requires the premises for his residence. The respondent-landlord has no accommodation for his residence and thereforee it can be held without any hesitation that he bona fide requires the suit premises for the residence of himself and for his family member i.e. his wife and two children.
15.The suit premises admittedly were let to the petitioner-company for the residence of the Managing Director and for the guest of the company. The argument of the petitioner's counsel is that when the guest of the petitioner-occupied the suit premises for their residence, it means that the premises were let for commercial purposes. I do not agree. The entire suit property h is been let out for residential purposes. The property may be used either by the Managing Director or by the guests of the petitioner company. The crucial question is for what purpose the property was let and was being used since the date of the tenancy. The property admittedly has always been used for the residence of the Managing Director and the guests of the petitioner-company. The petitioner company does not run Guest House thereforee it cannot be said that the property is being used for commercial purposes. No business or industry was ever carried on in the suit property. Thus the additional Controller was right in holding that the premises were let for residential purposes.
16. Lastly it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the rent of the ground floor was fixed at Rs. 2000/- and the rent of the upper floors was fixed at Rs. 2000/-. Id other words his contention is that these were two oral tenancies created at the time of initial letting. But there is no evidence on record on the point except the lease deed marked 'A' which as already held cannot be looked into. The argument is that the landlord's requirement can be satisfied if he is allowed to have possession of the upper floors, It may be correct because the family of the respondent consists of himself, his wife and two children while the accommodation on the first floor of the suit property consists of four bed rooms drawing own dinning etc. besides barsati floor. The accommodation on the first and second floor in the suit property will no doubt be sufficient and suitable for the respondent and his family. But the question is, when there is a composite tenancy of the entire property, can it be divided into two tanancies? In Miss S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand, : 1SCR536 it has been held, ' The contract of tenancy is a single and indivisible contract, and in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect it is not open to the court to divide it into two contracts'. No law has been brought to my notice under which the tenancy in question can be divided into two contracts. Although the requirement of the respondent can be satisfied by passing an eviction order with respect to first floor and the second floor of the suit property but in law it is not possible to divide the tenancy contract. In the result the respondent landlord is entitled to an order of eviction with respect to the entire property.
17. I, thereforee, hold that the order of eviction passed by the Additional Controller is in accordance with law. It is passed on evidence. I do not find any infirmity. The revision petition in dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 500/-