T. Chandrasekhara Menon, J.
1. An order of termination of service of a constable in the service of Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau is questioned in this O. P. It is not disputed that the order concerned marked as Ex. P-3 in the case was passed by the Asst. Director, Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau, Kohima, Nagaland and served on the petitioner in Nagaland. But the amount due to the petitioner, viz., the sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of notice, which is one month as per Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules is paid to him only in Rerala.
2. A preliminary objection was taken to the maintainability of the petition by the learned Central Government Pleader contending that the whole cause of action for the petition has arisen out of the State and, therefore, the O. P. is not maintainable in this court. As per the amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, the power conferred by the said Article to issue directions, orders or writs to any government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such powers notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
3. In this case the seat of the authority who issued the order is not within the territory over which this court has jurisdiction. But then if the cause of action has arisen at least in part in this territory over which this court has jurisdiction, then certainly the writ petition would be maintainable.
4. What is contended for on behalf of the respondents by Sri Prabha-karan, learned counsel for the Central Government is that it cannot be said that in this case the cause of action wholly or in part arises in any place in the jurisdiction of this court. On the other hand, Sri Abraham Vakkanal, learned counsel for the petitioner points out that as the petitioner has received the amount due to him consequent on the impugned order, in Kerala State it has to be said that part of the cause of action has arisen here and therefore this court could well proceed with the O. P. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decisions reported in Dammomal Kausomal Ratehighani v. Union of India (AIR 1967 Bom 355); W.W. Joshi v. State of Bombay (AIR 1959 Bom 363) and Veeri Chettiar v. Sales Tax Officer, Bombay (AIR 1971 Mad 155). In all these cases the order impugned though passed outside the jurisdiction of the particular court concerned, was served on the petitioners in these cases in a place within the jurisdiction of the courts in which the writ petitions had been filed. Therefore the effect of the order by Governmental authority fell on the petitioners at places where the courts had jurisdiction. On the basis of that fact the courts held in these cases that they can exercise jurisdiction in respect of such matters as part of the cause of action had arisen within the territories over which they could exercise jurisdiction. It is Mr. Abraham's case that the receipt of the amount by the petitioner in Kerala was then necessary consequence of the order of termination. In one sense it is certainly the consequence of the order of termination; but one cannot say that the effect of the order really fell on the petitioner in Kerala. The order took effect in Nagaland itself and on the basis of the order the petitioner received the amount in Kerala. By the receipt of the amount it cannot be said that part of the cause of action had arisen in Kerala. The cause of action as the Madras High Court pointed out in the decision referred to, has always been understood as referable to the bundle of facts in a legal proceeding and if a limb of that bundle of facts is available, seen or discernible in one particular place which is within the jurisdiction of the High Court, then the High Court has the power to exercise all the powers conferred on it under Article 226(1) notwithstanding the fact that the authority against whom the ultimate rule has to be issued and whose act has created a cause of action as a whole or in part, is situate outside its territorial limits. Can it be said on the basis of this principle that the receipt of the amount due to the petitioner as per the impugned order is a limb of the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action? According to me it cannot be so said; because the order of termination became complete with the service of the order on the petitioner in Nagaland. In questioning that order of termination the petitioner's receipt of the amount based on the order of termination cannot be said to be an ingredient in the cause of action.
5. Therefore, I dismiss this O. P., but in the circumstances without costs. Certainly this will not prevent the petitioner from questioning the order in the court which has got jurisdiction in the matter in accordance with law.