Gopalan Nambiyar, C. J.
1. This writ appeal is against the judgment of a learned Judge who dismissed the writ petition filed to quash the order (Ext. PI) of the Land Tribunal, Vaikom, directing the shifting of the kudikidappu on deposit of the price of the homestead and the shift-in 2 charges, and on satisfying the other conditions provided for by the Act. An ingenious point was raised by way of defence to the application. As that is the only point now argued before us, we need not concern ourselves with the rest of the proceedings, or the contentions raised. The point was that the appellant-kudikidappukaran had put up a building on the property which he was occupying, that this was 'a work of a permanent character' within the meaning of Section 60 Clause (b) of the Indian Easements Act, and that therefore. the licence or the permission granted to the kudikidappukaran was not liable to be revoked. In consequence, it was contended that the proceedings which commenced by way of a suit to shift the kudikidappukaran had to be dismissed, as shifting would amount to revocation of the licence. The learned Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that the provisions of the Easements Act cannot prevail over the provisions of the Land Reforms Act and that the relationship between a kudikidappukaran and his landlord and their respective rights and liabilities are now completely governed by the provisions contained in the Land Reforms Act. The learned Judge was of the view that Section 60 of the Easements Act cannot, therefore, be availed of by the kudikidappukaran.
2. We doubt whether the ground stated by the learned Judge would really justify the conclusion, or be taken advantage of. for the purpose of defeating the plea raised by the kudikidappukaran. Even granting that in proceedings for shifting the kudikidappu it is open to the kudikidappukaran to raise a plea based on Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, we do not think that the said contention can be accepted on the facts disclosed in the present case. Section 60 reads as follows:
'60. A license may be revoked by the grantor, unless:--
(a) it is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force;
(b) the licensee, acting upon the licence has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution.'
Before the provisions of Clause (b) can be availed of, it must be shown that the execution of the work of a permanent character had been done by the licensee 'acting upon the license'. That apart, Clause (b) can be pleaded by the licensee only against a revocation of the license by the grantor. On both these aspects, we think the kudikidappukaran's contention that he is entitled to rely on the section must fail. We do not think that on the pleadings to which our attention was drawn, the execution of the work of a permanent character by the kudikidappukaran was done 'acting upon the license' within the meaning of the section. The contention of the landlord who instituted the proceedings to shift the kudikidappukaran was that the work was executed against his wishes and for the purpose of putting him to difficulty. Whatever be the position in regard to this aspect of the matter, we are clearly of the view that where what is sought to be done is to shift the kudikidappukaran from the premises which he was permitted to occupy, to different premises where the same right of enjoyment in practically the same conditions, is guaranteed to him, there is no revocation of the license or of the permission to occupy the kudikidappu. Particularly is this so, when the shifting of the premises is occasioned in pursuance of astatutory right conceded by the Land Reforms Act to the landlord to shift the kudikidappu and a statutory obligation cast on the kudikidappukaran to shift, if the conditions for shifting stand established. We are, therefore, of the view that on the position disclosed in this case, it cannot be said that there has been any revocation of the license within the meaning of Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act. The question of pleading irrevocability under Clause (b) of the said section, therefore, would not, and cannot, arise.
For these reasons, we dismiss this writ appeal with no order as to costs.