M.S. Menon, J.
1. The order impugned, Ex. E, reads as follows:
With reference to his appeal petition dated 18 January 1956 Sri N.T. Antony, Nellikal House, Palace Ward, Alwaye, is informed that his petition is time-barred as per Rule 9(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Shops and Establishments Rules and hence rejected.
The order of discharge (Ex. B.) is dated 21 December 1955 and the appeal under Section 41 of the Travancore-Cochin Shops and Establishments Act, 1125, was filed on 20 January 1956 as can be seen from Ex. D. The relevant rule [Rule 9(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Shops and Establishments Rules, 1950] reads as follows:
The Deputy Commissioner of Labour shall be the appellate authority for the purpose of hearing appeals under Sub-section (2) of Section 41 and any such appeal shall be preferred by the person employed within thirty days from the date on and from which his services are dispensed with.
2. Section 8 of the Travancore-Cochin Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125, provides:
In any Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word 'from,1 and for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time to use the word 'to'.
and Section 49(4) of the Travancore-Cochin Shops and Establishments Act, 1125:
All rules made under this section shall be published in the Gazette and on such publication shall have effect as if enacted in this Act.
3. Even on the assumption that Sub-section (4) of Section 49 is not sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 8 of the Travancore-Cochin Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1126, for the interpretation of Rule 9(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Shops and Establishments Rules, 1950, there can be no doubt that as stated in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 2, p. 1182:
'from' is much akin to 'after' and when used in reference to the computation of time, e.g., 'from' a stated date, prima facie excludes the day of that date.
One of the cases cited in support of this proposition is (1891) 1 Q.B. 402 in which the Court held that the effect of 'from' in the expression 'for twelve calendar months from November 24,1887,' in a policy of insurance 'was to exclude November 24, 1887, and to include November 24, 1888, in the period of the insurance.'
4. In the light of what is stated above the' appeal was filed by the petitioner within time and should have been heard and disposed of on the merits. Exhibit E has hence to be quashed and the Deputy Commissioner of Labour directed to hear and dispose of the appeal according to law. Order accordingly.
5. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.