Bhaskaran, Ag. C.J.
1. The appellant's writ petition, O.P. No. 4784 of 1984, having been dismissed in limine on the ground that he has an alternative remedy under the Payment of Wages Act, this writ appeal has been filed. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant may not strictly come under the Payment of Wages Act, as his wages would be well above the maximum prescribed under the Act for being eligible for the benefit of the Act. That contention, on facts of the case, did not find favour with the learned Judge who dismissed the writ petition. We too have no reason to differ from that conclusion. Assuming that the position is as contended for by the appellant-petitioner, he is not without remedy inasmuch as it is open to him to approach the civil Court for the relief to which he is entitled.
2. The counsel for the appellant-petitioner submitted that under Section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act, suits in civil courts are barred. This argument is clearly fallacious. Section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act bars civil courts only with reference to matters governed by the provisions of that Act. The appellant-petitioner could not be heard to say at one breath that he was not governed by the said Act; and yet, at the next breath that a civil suit for enforcing his claim was barred by Section 22 of the Act. The true and indisputable position is that in either case the appellant-petitioner has a statutory remedy -- in case he is governed by the Payment of Wages Act, before the Authority under that Act; and in case he is not governed by the provisions of that Act, in a civil court by virtue of Section 9 of the Civil P.C.
3. We are not prepared to accept the further submission of the counsel for the appellant-petitioner that these statutory remedies were illusory, not effective or efficacious; and, therefore, the appellant-petitioner was entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for relief, as theacceptance of such a position would run counter to the legislative policy, and would render the relevant provisions of the Act and the Code meaningless and redundant.
For the above reasons, the Writ Appeal is dismissed.