M.S. Menon, J.
1. The petitioner is a professor in the Government College at Chittur. According to him the promotion of the 2nd respondent as a first grade professor of languages and the ranking of the petitioner as the 9th among the second grade professors constitute a violation of the Service Regulations and Standing Orders of the Government of Cochin. His contention is that he is senior to the 2nd respondent and the eight second grade professors ranked above him and that the Government's decision in that behalf violates the provisions of the said Regulations and Standing Orders. Of the eight persons ranked above the petitioner, three have retired and respondents 5 to 8 are the five who still remain in service.
2. The first question for determination is whether a violation of the Service Regulations and Standing Orders, even if proved, is amenable to correction by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The answer will depend on whether they can be considered as 'an existing law' as defined in Article 365 of the Constitution or 'law in force' as defined in Article 372 of the Constitution or 'existing law of Cochin' as defined in Section 2 of the Travancore-Cochin Administration and Application of Laws Act, 1125.
3. In Edward Mills Co. v. State of Ajmer, (S) AIR 1955 SC 25 (A), the Supreme Court said that 'an order must be a legislative and not an executive order before it can come within the definition of law' and in Krishnadas v State of T. C., ILR (1955) Trav-Co 404 (B), this Court said that it is impossible to consider executive orders passed in the exercise of the executive-functions of the Cochin State as
''an existing law' as defined in Article 366 of the Constitution or 'law in force' as defined in Article 372 of the Constitution or 'existing law of Cochin' as defined in Section 2 of the Travancore-Co-chin Administration and Application of Laws Act, 1125'
4. in Krishna Pillai v State of T. C., ILR (1956) Trav-Co 1339 (C), this Court had to deal with the character of the Travancore Service Regulations and it was held that they constitute no more than executive order, a violation of which cannot be corrected under An. 226 of the Constitution. We are in agreement with that decision and by parity of reasoning the same view must be taken as regards the Service Regulations and Standing Orders of Cochin as well.
5. It follows that it is unnecessary to enter Into the merits of the case and that the petition should be dismissed. Order accordingly. No costs.