1. This is an appeal from an order dismissing writ application 2500 of 1966. The petitioner in that writ application challenged an order marked Ext. P-3 in the proceeding by which temporary permits were granted to respondents 1 to 8 in the writ application pending their applications for variation of the permits held by each of them. The said three respondents held three different permits and those enabled the respondents to operate services on three routes which all ended at one place, called Pulikkeezhu, on the Thiruvalla-Thattarambalam route on which route the appellant was operating. The prayers in the applications for variation of the permits held by those respondents were that their services be extended from Pulikkeezhu to Thattarambalam.
2. The Regional Transport Authority ob-served in Ext. P-3.
'Decided that Secretary may issue temporary permits in those cases.'
3. The Secretary then passed the following order:
'As per the above decision, I, the Secretary, R. T. A. find that applications for the grant of pucca variation of the permits by extension of the existing services terminating at Pulikkeezhu to Thattarambajam were received as called under Section 57(2) of M. V. Act by notification No. 13779/C4/65 dated 6-8-65 published in the Gazette dated 31-8-65 and that there exists temporary need to be met during the interim period 'till the pucca extension of permits is effected. I am also convinced of the temporary need for about for 4 (four) months and grant the applications (three in number) for the issue of temporary permits for 4 months from the date of issue.'
4. The main point urged before the learned Judge who passed the order under appeal was that this grant was without jurisdiction because of the proviso to Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act reading as follows:
'Provided that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the grant of a new permit under section 46 or Section 54 during the pendency of the application:'
5. The argument is that Section 57(8) has provided that when an application for variation is by the inclusion of new route or routes that application shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit and that therefore the applications made by the three respondents 1 to 3 were applications for new permits and BO during the pendency of those applications, no temporary permits canbe granted on the route. What Section 57(8) says is that such application 'shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit'. We do not think that would make an application for variation an application for the grant of a new permit. This is the view that has been taken in the decision V. G.K. Bus Service Ltd. v. Kerala State Transport Appellate Tribunal, 1961 Ker LT 478 which confirmed the decision in V. G. K. Bus Service Ltd. v. Kerala State Transport Appellate Tribunal, 1959 Ker LT 561: (AIR 1960 Ker 18) and the learned Judge who passed the order under appeal has followed the 1959 Ker LT 661: (AIR 1960 Ker 18) decision. We do not see any reason to differ from that view. No doubt one of us observed in the decision in Gopalan v. Regional Transport Authority, 1965 Ker LJ 887 that the ruling in 1961 Ker LT 473 'may require reconsideration on an appropriate occasion'. This was in connection with the question as to whether an order varying a permit in a manner that will have the effect of the grant of a new permit, is appealable or not. We do not think that the question of appealabillty on the basis whether there is a grant of a new permit or not has anything to do with the interpretation of Section 57(8) and the proviso to Section 62.
6. It was then urged that the applications for temporary permits stated the temporary needs as follows:
'to cater the pressing need of Traffic especially in connection with the Onam festival September examination, etc., till pucca permit is issued.'
and that the grants of the permits have been for periods commencing from 23rd and 24th September. 1965 when both Onam festival and September examinations were over. This, it is said, indicated that the permit has been granted for purposes other than the one stated in the application. It is also urged that the application itself is vague because of the use of the expression 'etc'. These points have been dealt with by the learned Judge in the order under appeal and we are in agreement with the conclusion reached therein. The application was to cater to the 'pressing need of traffic till pucca permit is issued'. The other purposes mentioned are only additional grounds in support of the prayer. That is how the application was understood by the learned Judge and we are in respectful agreement with that.
7. Three other points were urged before us which have not been dealt with by the learned Judge but, it is said were urged before him. The first of these is that the order Ext. P-3 is on the face of it unsustainable because the Regional Transport Authority has not stated any reason for granting it though he directed that temporary permits may be Issued by the Secretary. This, according to counsel, is a direction that the Secretary is bound to obey. The order devoid of any reasons Is bad and cannot be saved by reasons having been stated by the Secretary. We do not understand the order passed by the Regional Trans-port Authority to mean that the Secretary must issue the permits. The earlier part of the order is only a delegation of the exercise of functions by the Regional Transport Authority to the Secretary, which they are competent to do, and the Secretary has stated the reasons for the grant. These reasons cannot be said to be so patently erroneous or irrelevant and must therefore sustain the issue.
8. Secondly, relying on the decision in G. B. Transports Guruvayoor v. R. T. A. Tri-chur, 1959 Ker LT 1176: (AIR 1960 Ker 239) It is urged that Exhibits P-4 and P-4(a) which purported to grant temporary permits on the routes Vaippoor to Thattarambalam, and Vrin-davanam to Thattarambalam, in any case, are unsustainable for the reasons stated in the decision quoted. There is no prayer in the writ application for setting aside Exhibits P-4 and P-4(a) orders and the point has not been dealt with in the order under appeal. The two permits are to expire on the 22nd and 23rd of this month. We are not therefore inclined to consider this question at this stage. Finally relying on Rule 242 of the Motor Vehicles Rules and on the decision in original petition, 1058 of 1966, it was urged that the change in the timings of the regular permits held by the three respondents, of which extensions were sought, without notice being issued to the other operators like the appellant, is volatile of the principles of natural justice and that therefore the change in the timings effected should be set aside. We are not inclined to enter into this question either, for the timings for these permits will cease to have effect in a day or two. It will be open to the appellant to raise any objection in regard to the timings, which he is entitled to raise, if fresh timings similar to the one are continued even after the expiry of the periods of the temporary permit now issued and challeged before this court.
9. We dismiss this appeal but without any order as to costs.