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K.M. Thomas Vs. State Transport Authority, Kerala and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectMotor Vehicles
CourtKerala High Court
Decided On
Case NumberO.P. No. 615 of 1959
Judge
Reported inAIR1960Ker111
ActsMotor Vehicles Act, 1939 - Sections 46, 48, 64 and 64A; Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956
AppellantK.M. Thomas
RespondentState Transport Authority, Kerala and ors.
Appellant Advocate P. Govindan Nair,; G. Balagangadharan Nair and; K. Sukum
Respondent Advocate Govt. Pleader (for Nos. 1 and 3) and; Mathew Muricken, Adv. (for No. 2)
DispositionPetition allowed
Cases ReferredP. Salyanarana v. State of Andhra Pradesh
Excerpt:
motor vehicles - jurisdiction - sections 46, 48, 64 and 64a of motor vehicles act, 1939 - petitioner applied for stage carriage permit - petitioner granted permit with timings - respondent no 2 filed revision before state transport authority challenging grant of permit - sta (respondent no. 1) granted stay on permit - whether respondent no. 2 had jurisdiction to invoke revisional powers of respondent no. 1 (sta) - right accrued to applicant on basis of permit to run bus at least within kottayam district - fixation of timings condition to grant of permit - such condition appealable under section 64 (f) - respondent no. 2 did not challenge proceedings before regional transport authority - respondent no. 2 not allowed to invoke revisional jurisdiction - respondent no.1 had no jurisdiction to.....orderc.a. vaidialingam, j.1. this is an application under article 226 of the constitution for quashing the order of the first respondent dated 2-54959 and marked as ex. p-1 in these proceedings. though several points have been raised in this application, this original petition can be disposed of on a very short point, namely, as to whether the first respondent has got jurisdiction to entertain a revision at the instance of the second respondent to pass the order complained of.2. the petitioner applied on 3-5-1956 for a stage carriage permit for the route, thiruvella-periyar. as it was in inter-district route, the matter was referred by the regional transport authority, kottayam, to the c. r. t. b. trivendrum. after the necessary formalities, the application was transmitted to the r. t......
Judgment:
ORDER

C.A. Vaidialingam, J.

1. This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the first respondent dated 2-54959 and marked as Ex. P-1 in these proceedings. Though several points have been raised in this application, this original petition can be disposed of on a very short point, namely, as to whether the first respondent has got jurisdiction to entertain a revision at the instance of the second respondent to pass the order complained of.

2. The petitioner applied on 3-5-1956 for a stage carriage permit for the route, Thiruvella-Periyar. As it was in inter-district route, the matter was referred by the Regional Transport Authority, Kottayam, to the C. R. T. B. Trivendrum. After the necessary formalities, the application was transmitted to the R. T. B., Kottayam, for consideration and disposal.

3. The application is stated to have been heard on 20-2-1959 in the presence of the petitioner, and also the other objectors and the R. T. B. sanctioned the grant of a permit for the route in question in favour of the petitioner on 20-2-1959. The actual permit with the timings was granted on 25-4-1959.

4. It is also alleged that against this order of granting the permit in favour of the petitioner, an appeal was filed by one Ilaji T. M. Hassan Khan Rawther, before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, and pending that appeal the said party applied for a stay of the operation of the grant of permit in favour of the applicant. But the said application for stay was rejected by the Appellate Tribunal.

5. In accordance with the direction of the R.T.A., Kottayam, the petitioner is stated to have produced the necessary records of his vehicle, K.L.K. 3287--1938 Model Fargo Bus--and the necessary permit was issued on 25-4-1959. Along with the said permit, the Authority also fixed tentative timings, for the running by the petitioner of his bus. But as a part of the route about three miles Thiruvella to Idinjilam lay in the Alleppey District, the petitioner was also required to take the endorsement of the Alleppey Authority.

6. It is further stated by the petitioner that the R.T.A., Kottayam, at the instigation of some of the rival operators, prohibited the petitioner from operating the bus in the Alleppey District route, Thiruvella-Idinjilam. But this order was challenged by the petitioner before this Court in O. P. 607 of 1959 and it is stated that this Court, by its order dated 5-5-1959, stayed the operation of the order of the R.T.A., Kottayam, regarding the restriction, imposed.

7. It is further alleged that the second respondent herein, who was never in the picture at all when the question of the grant of permit in favour of the petitioner was being considered by the Authority, is stated to have fifed a revision before the first respondent, the State Transport Authority, Trivandrum, against the finding of the timings of the petitioner's bus by the K.T.A. The first respondent, after entertaining that revision, has also passed an order on 2-5-1959, namely, Ex. P-1, without notice to the petitioner. By virtue of that order the State Transport Authority has stayed the operation of the permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority, Kottayam, in favour of the petitioner herein for the Thiruvella-Periyar route till the Regional Transport Authority, Alleppey, countersigns the said permit. An attempt to have this order vacaled by the petitioner proved of no avail.

8. According to the petitioner, the second respondent has no right to invoke the revisional powers of the first respondent and the first respondent has also no jurisdiction to entertain such a revision. In consequence, the order, Ex. P-1, is wholly without jurisdiction. It is stated that the timings now issued in favour of the petitioner are purely tentative and they formed part and parcel of the permit itself. According to the petitioner, the order granting the permit in his favour is now pending appeal by another party before the Appellate Tribunal.

An application for stay has been rejected by that Tribunal, and, therefore, the petitioner even attributes mala fides to the State Transport Authority in passing this order. There are also certain other points raised based upon Rule 148 of the Motor Vehicles Rides of Travancore-Cochin. In particular, it is also stated that the second respondent has no right to file a revision under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Reference is also made to Section 134, Clause (ii) of the Act. As stated earlier, the main point on which the order Ex. P-1 is challenged, is that the first respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision at the instance of the second respondent and, therefore, the order Ex. P-1 is one passed without jurisdiction.

9. The first respondent, the State Transport Authority, has filed a counter-affidavit sworn to by its Superintendent. The grant of a permit in favour of the petitioner by the Regional Transport Authority, Kottayam, is admitted. It is also admitted that by certain subsequent proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority, Kottayam certain timings were tentatively granted for the operation of the petitioner's bus. The said order directed the petitioner to get his permit countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority, Alleppey. But the petitioner began operating the bus without complying with the direction contained in the said permit, and, according to Section 63 of the Act, the petitioner ought not to have operated the bus beyond Kottayam District even if the R.T.A., Kottayam has not expressly prohibited it.

10. It is further stated by the first respondent that the second respondent aggrieved by the order of the Regional Transport Authority, Kottayam, in fixing the timings of the petitioner's 1ms, moved the first respondent by a revision petition under Section 64-A of the Act. The first respondent, acting within its powers under Section 64-A, granted a stay of operation of the petitioner's service pending the final disposal of the revision. According to the first respondent it has got jurisdiction to entertain the revision and the second respondent also could not challenge the grant of timings, except by way of a revision under Section 64-A and therefore, according to the first respondent:

'The order sought to be revised was the order granting the timings and not an order granting the permit. Therefore there was no question of the State Transport Authority circumventing the order of the Appellate Tribunal in appeal No. 75 of 1959.'

The interpretation sought to be made by the petitioner on Rule 148 (ii) of the rules framed under the Act was also controverted by the first respondent. It is further stated that the impugned order, Ex. P-1, is only an interim order and final orders are yet to be passed and there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice. The first respondent has acted perfectly bona fide. In fact, it would have disposed of the main revision itself but for the pendency of this Original Petition in this Court.

11. The second respondent has also filed a counter-affidavit contesting the allegations contained in the petitioner's affidavit. But the second respondent accepts the grant of a permit by the R.T.A., Kottayam, in favour of the petitioner on 25-4-1959, but it is only a conditional grant dependent upon the endorsement by the R.T.A., Alleppey, The petitioner has no right to run the service before getting the endorsement from the Alleppey Officer. The petitioner has made an application to the R.T.A., Alleppey, on 29-4-1959 for making the, necessary endorsement on his permit. The second respondent has entered appearance before that officer and is contending that the second respondent also should be heard before the R.T.A., Alleppey passes final orders and the matter is pending before the R.T.A., Alleppey.

12. The second respondent further states that she is aggrieved by the order of the R.T.A., Kottayam, fixing the timings for the petitioner's bus and therefore she has filed a revision before the State Transport Authority, Trivandrum, challenging the legality of the grant of the permit to the petitioner. The permit does not become valid till St is countersigned by the R.T.A., Alleppey.

13. It is further stated by the second respondent that her revision to the first respondent was perfectly competent and the order Ex. P-1 has been passed by the first respondent and it is an order which it has ample jurisdiction to pass. It is again stated that the second respondent is entitled to take any objection before the R.T.A., Alleppey by virtue of the provisions in Section 63, Clause (iii) of the Act. It is finally stated that the timings issued to the petitioner, though tentative, are highly prejudicial to her interests. The petitioner has got other rights provided under the Act and he should have pursued the same before coming to this Court under Article 226. The order, Ex. P-1, is supported in its entirety by the second respondent,

14. Therefore, it will be seen from the statement of facts mentioned above that the main question that arises for consideration in this original petition is as to whether the second respondent has got a right to move the first respondent by way of revision under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, and whether the first respondent has got jurisdiction to entertain the same. If the first respondent has got jurisdiction to entertain a revision in circumstances like these, the interim order, Ex. P-1, cannot be interfered with by this court, ordinarily. But if the first respondent has no jurisdiction at all to entertain a revision, then Ex. P-1 which itself is passed pending the final adjudication on the revision, though interlocutory, can be interfered with by this Court, because it will also be an order passed without jurisdiction,

15. The question as to whether the first respondent has got jurisdiction to entertain a revision at the instance of the second respondent, will in turn, depend upon the question whether the grant of timings to the petitioner at the time of the issue of a permit is a condition of the permit. According to Mr. P. Govindan Nair, learned counsel for the petitioner, there was controversy under the relevant old sections of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 as to whether the grant of timings was a condition of the permit or not. But the amendments effected by the Indian Act 100/1956 has placed the matter beyond all controversy. According to the learned counsel, under the Act of 1939, as amended by Act 100/1956, fixation of timings on the grant of the original permit, is a condition attached to the permit and it could be the subject of an appeal under Section 64(f) of the Act.

But even to entitle a party to file an appeal under Section 64(f), such party must have opposed the grant of the permit itself. The second respondent herein did not at all oppose the grant of a permit to the petitioner and therefore, though it was an appealable order, she could not have maintained even an appeal. Therefore, it was not open to her to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the first respondent under Section 64-A of the Act. Mr. Govindan Nair has also referred me to the changes effected by the Amending Act of 1956 and I will deal with them later in the judgment.

16. On the other hand, Mr. Mathew Muricken, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, followed by the learned Government Pleader appearingfor the first respondent, contended that the fixation of timings by the R.T.A.. Kottayam, is not a condition of the permit issued in favour of the petitioner. The learned Government Pleader, in particular, also stated that the fixation of timings on 25-4-1959 by the R.T.A.. Kottayam, was really on an application filed by the petitioner on 21-4-1959 and therefore, it is an independent order against which an appeal is not provided.

Such an order could only be the subject of a revision and there is ample jurisdiction in the first respondent to entertain a revision under Section 64-A. The second respondent is a person aggrieved by the order of the R.T.A., Kottayam fixing the timings of the petitioner's bus and therefore, the second respondent had every right to challenge the said order by invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the first respondent under Section 64-A.

17. It has nowhere been stated in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent, the State Transport Authority, Trivandrum, that the grant of timings by the R.T.A. Kottyam, to the applicant on 25-4-1959 was on the basis of an application by the petitioner dated 21-4-1959. Even the certified copy of the proceedings of the R.T.A. Kottayam, dated 25-4-1959 fixing the timings of the petitioner's bus, and placed before me, does not make any reference to an application by the petitioner on 21-4-59. It only makes a reference to proceedings No. 2208/B2/59 dated 20-2-1959 communicated on 2-3-1959. But in the view that I am taking about the revisional jurisdiction of the first respondent, the fact that the fixation of timings on 25-4-1959 was also on the basis of an application if any, by the petitioner, does not at all make any difference so long as there is no controversy that the permit and the timings were issued by the R.T.A. Kottayam, to the applicant on 25-4-1959.

18. Before I deal with the contentions raised by the learned counsel on all sides, it is desirable to advert once again to one or two statements appearing in the counter-affidavits of the first and second respondents. The first respondent, in paragraph 4 of its affidavit has stated :

'In fact, in view of Section 63, the petitioner ought not to have operated the bus beyond Kottayam District even if the Regional Transport Authority Kottayam, has not prohibited it'.

The inference from this statement appears to be that the applicant has got a right, on the basis of the permit issued in his favour, to run the bus at least within the Kottayam District. But what the first respondent has now done by its order, Ex. P1 is to completely stay the operation of the permit issued by the R.T.A. Kottayam, in the route, Thiruvella-Periyar till the R.T.A. Alleppey countersigned the permit. Again the second respondent states in paragraph 8 of her counter-affidavit that aggrieved by the orders of the R.T.A. Kottayam, she has filed a revision before the State Transport Authority, Trivandrum, impeaching the legality of the grant of the permit to the petitioner.

Surely the first respondent has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment in revision over the grant of a permit in favour of the petitioner, because it is covered by Section 64 of the Act and an appeal is provided under certain circumstances. Again in the same paragraph, the second respondent states that in view of the provisions contained in Section 63(3) of the Act, it is open to her to plead and agitate her cause against the petitioner when the permit is transmitted to the R.T.A., Alleppey for counter-signature. Further, in paragraph 10 of her counter-affidavit, the second respondent again states :

'The timings in the permit issued to the petitioner, though tentative are highly prejudicial to this respondent's interest. The controversy with respect to the timings is pending consideration before the R.T.A. Alleppey'.

19. After hearing the contentions of the learned counsel on both sides and after a consideration of the changes effected by the Amending Act 100/ 1956, in my view, the fixation of timings, at the time of the grant of the permit, is now treated as a condition of the permit. Whatever controversy there was prior to the Amending Act 100/1956, the position now is that fixation of timings if a condition to the permit and such a condition attached to a permit will be appealable under Section 64(f) of the Act, provided that a party challenging it comes within the ambit of Clause (f) of Section 64. The second respondent admittedly is not a person who satisfies the requirements of Clause (f) of Section 64.

A condition of the permit, being an appealable order by the persons mentioned under Section P4(f), it is not open to the second respondent to circumvent those provisions by treating the grant of timings as a separate order, and carry the matter in revision under Section 64-A. Section 64-A gives jurisdiction to the first respondent to interfere in revision against an order of an R.T.A, only when no appeal lies. In my opinion, an appeal is specifically provided under Section 64(f), as the timings are now treated by the Act, as amended, as a condition attached to the permit.

Therefore, the reliance by Mr. Mathew Muricken appearing for the second respondent, and the learned Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent on the decision of the Madras High Court in Kali Mudaliar v. Vedachala, AIR 1952 Mad 543 and my decision reported in Oommen v. Road Traffic Board, 195S Ker LT 110 : (AIR 1958 Ker 339) is not helpful, The Madras decision was concerned only with the Act prior to its amendment in 1956, The position was also the same in my decision referred to. As stated earlier, the Amending Act has introduced certain important changes in the sections. Those amendments could not have been the subject of discussion in those judgments.

The relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act prior to its amendment by Act 100/1956 and on the basis of which it was held that fixation of timings is not a condition of the permit and Sections 45, 46, 47, 48 & 57 as those sections then stood. The corresponding sections as they now stand, after the Amending Act 100/1956, are substantially different. Old Section 45 was to the effect that an application for permit is to be made to the R.T.A. of the region or of one of the regions in which it is proposed to use the vehicle. It also provided that if the applicant resides, or has his principal place of business in any one of those regions, the application is to be made to the Regional Transport Authority of that Region.

20. On the other hand Section 45 as it now stands, provides for an application for a permit being made to the R.T.A. of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles. There is a proviso to the effect that if it is proposed to use the vehicle in two or more regions lying within the same State, the application is to be made to the R.T.A. of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route lies and there are certain other provisions which it is not necessary to consider.

21. Old Section 46 provided for certain particulars to be mentioned in an application for the issue of a permit as a stage carriage. Under Clause (c) of the said section one of the particulars to be given was 'the time-table, if any, of the service to be provided'. Under Clause (c) of the corresponding new Section 16, the particulars to be given an

'the minimum and maximum number of daily services proposed to be provided in relation to each route or area and the time-table of the normal services'.

22. Old Section 47 provided for the Regional Transport Authority taking into consideration any representations made by persons already providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed route or routes etc. Clause (2) of the said section gave power to the R.T.A. to refuse to grant a Stage Carriage permit, if it appeared from the time-table furnished that the provisions of the Act relating to speed are likely to be contravened.

Clause (1) of the new Section 47 also enjoins on the R.T.A. to take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area etc.

Clause (2) of this section also gives power to the R.T.A. to refuse to grant a permit if it appears from the time-table furnished that the provisions of the Act relating to the speed are likely to be contravened.

23. The more important changes are in the new Section 48 substituted by Act 100/1956. Old Section 48 dealt with the power of the R.T.A. to restrict the number of stage carriages and impose conditions on stage carriage permits. Clause (c) of this old Section 48 dealt with the power of the R.T.A. to 'regulate timings of arrival or departure of stage carriages whether they belong to a single or more owners'. Clause (d) of this old Section 48 dealt with the power of the R.T.A. to 'attach to a stage carriage permit any prescribed condition or any one or more of the following conditions'. Sub-clauses (i) and (vi) of Clause (d) of old Section 48 enumerated various conditions that could be attached. In particular, Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of old Section 48 enumerated one of the conditions as :

'that copies of the fare-table and time-table shall be exhibited on the stage carriage and that the fare-table and the time-table so exhibited shall be observed'.

24. It was really on the provisions contained in Clause (c) and Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of old Section 48 that the controversy was raised as to whether the time-table or the timings can be considered to he conditions of the permit. Some of the decisions based upon old Section 48 took the view that Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of old Section 48 gave power to the R.T.A. to regulate timings. Such regulation will not be a condition of the permit because it is only Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Setion 48 that deals with the conditions to be attached to a permit.

The only condition enumerated in the said Clause(d) is mentioned as item No. 3 therein that copies of the fare-table and time-table are to be exhibited. Therefore, what was considered to be a condition, was only the exhibition of the fare-table and the time-table and not the timings as such. It was because of the different manner in which regulation of timing and exhibition of time-table were dealt with by the old Section 48, it was laid down by decisions that regulation of timings of arrival or departure will not be a condition of a permit. This was the view that was taken by the decision of the Madras High Court and in my decision already referred to.

25. But the position is now entirely altered by the new Section 48 substituted by Act 100/1956. The new Section 48(1) states that subject to the provisions of Section 47, an R.T.A. may on an application under Section 46, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit. Section 48(1) refers to application made under Section 46. New Section 46 provides for certain particulars being given in the application for stage carriage permit and Clause (c) of Section 46, as already mentioned, relates to the particulars about the minimum and maximum number of services and the time-table of the normal services.

Section 48(1) authorises the R.T.A. to grant a permit in accordance with the application itself or with such modifications as he deems fit. Power also is given to refuse to grant a permit. Sub-section (3) of the new Section 48 gives power to the Transport Authority to attach to the permit any one or more of the conditions enumerated as Sub-clauses 1 to 23 mentioned therein. In particular, Sub-clauses 3, 4, 20, 21 and 23 require special attention. Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (3) of Section 48 is analogous to Clause (3) of Sub-clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of old Section 48. That only relates to a condition of the copies of the time-table to be exhibited on the stage carriage. But there is one small difference namely, that the new sub-clause refers to the time-table us 'Approved by the Regional Transport Authority', whereas such a provision was not in the old sub-clause of old Section 48. But Sub-clauses 4, 20, 21 and 23 of Sub-section (3) of new Section 48 are entirely new. Sub-clause (4) states as a condition that the service shall be operated within such margins of deviation from the approved time-table as the R.T.A. from time to time specify. Again, new Sub-clause 20 states that the conditions of the permit shall not be departed from says with the approval of the R.T.A. Therefore, the timings given by the R.T.A, have been made a condition of the permit by these sub-clauses.

26. Again, Sub-clause 21 gives power to the R.T.A. to vary the conditions of the permit and to attach further conditions to the permit. Sub-clause 23 authorises the R.T.A. to attach any other conditions which may be prescribed. In my opinion, the Sub-clauses referred to above, coming under the head of conditions in Sub-section 3 of Section 48, clearly put the timings fixed by the R.T.A. at the time of the grant of a permit as conditions of the permit. Therefore, Section 48 completely alters the entire scheme of the grant of a permit and also the conditions that are to be attached in the grant of a permit. That these clauses in Sub-section 3 of the new Section 48 has the effect of making the fixation of timings at the time of the grant of permit as conditions of the permit is also the view in the latest decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in P. Salyanarana v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1959 Andh Pra 429 consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Mohd. Ahamed Ansari. After referring to Sub-clauses 4, 20, 21 of Sub-section 3 of the new Section 48, the learned Judges observe at page 431 as follows:

'It is therefore clear that under the new provisions the time table for stage carriages has assumed importance and now forms part of the permit.'

27. With respect, I am in entire agreement with this reasoning of the learned Judges based upon the new sub-clauses contained in Sub-section 3 of now Section 48.

28. I may also refer to certain other sections of the Act as they stand. Under Section 37(3), the R.T.A. has to make the application for a stage carriage permit available for inspection and also publish tile application or a substance thereof calling for representations in connection with the same. Sub-section (4) of Section 57 is to the effect that no representation in connection with an application shall be considered by the R.T.A. unless it is made in writing and the other conditions are satisfied.

Sub-section (8) of Section 57 also states that an application to vary the conditions of a permit in the circumstances mentioned therein is to be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit. Section 59A which has been introduced by the Amending Act 100/1956 is to the effect that every permit issued under Section 62 is to consist of two parts, Part 'A' to contain all necessary particulars and conditions attached thereto and Part 'B' to be a summary of the permit containing such particulars as may be prescribed. Section 59 of the Act provides for general conditions attaching to all permits.

29. Section 63, which relates to the validation of permits for use outside the region in which it is granted, states that a permit granted by the R.T.A. of any one region shall not be valid in any other region unless the permit has been countersigned by the R.T.A. of that other region. The other matters mentioned therein are not necessary for our purpose. Sub-section 2 of Section 63 is to the effect that an R.T.A. when counter-signing the permit, may attach to the permit any condition which it might have imposed if it had granted the permit by the authority by which the permit was granted, I have already mentioned that the second respondent has stated in her counter-affidavit that she has intervened in the proceedings now pending before the R.T.A. at Alleppey and she has also stated that the controversy regarding timings is now before the R.T.A. Alleppey.

This sub-section gives power in this case to the R.T.A. at Alleppey to attach to the permit any condition that it thinks necessary or to vary any condition attached to the permit by the R.T.A., Kottayam. Sub-section 3 of Section 63 also provides that the provisions of that chapter, relating to the grant, revocation and suspension of counter-signatures of permit (sic) Therefore in my opinion, by virtue of this sub-clause, Section 64 which is in that chapter 4, is also attracted to the grant, revocation or suspension of counter-signatures by the R.T.A. at Alleppey.

30. As stated earlier even according to the second respondent, there is keen controversy rowed regarding the timings before the R.T.A. at Alleppey and that R.T.A. has all the powers given to him under Sub-section 2 of Section 63 of the Act and Sub-section 3 attracts all the provisions of that chapter, including Section 64 relating to appeals in respect of grant, revocation and suspension of counter-signatures of permits.

31. Therefore, from what is stated above, it follows that the fixation of timings granted to the applicant at the time of the grant of permit is a condition of the permit under the Motor Vehciles Act, as it now stands, amended by Act 100/1956. An appeal lies under the provisions of Section 64(f) The second respondent could have filed an appeal under that sub-clause if she had opposed the grant of a permit. It may be that she has still got some of those remedies in consequence of orders passed by tile R.T.A. at Alleppey under Section 63(2) of the Act.

Not having challenged the proceedings before the R.T.A., it is not open to the second respondent to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the first respondent under Section 64-A. The first respondent will nave jurisdiction, only if the order is not appealable. In this case, as stated earlier, the order fixing timings at the time of the grant of permit is a condition of the permit and as such, it is an appealable order and therefore the first respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision against this order at the instance of the second respondent.

32. Therefore, it follows that the first respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision at the instance of the second respondent regarding the fixation of timings by the R.T.A. at Kottayam when granting the permit in favour of the petitioner. As the first respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision itself under Section 64-A, it follows that the interim order, Ex P1. dated 2-5-1959, is also equally without jurisdiction.

33. Before leaving this case. I may mention that in my decision reported in 1958 Ker LT 110 : (AIR 1958 Kerala 339) relied upon by Mr. Mathrew Muricken, I had no occasion to consider the full scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, as amended by Act 100 of 1956. The points that arose in that case are entirely different.

34. I may also state that in this case, there is no question of a submission to jurisdiction by the petitioner before the R.T.A. The petitioner has raised the question of jurisdiction of the first respondent to entertain a revision.

35. In the result, the order dated 2-5-1859 ofthe first respondent. No. 163/P3/59. Ex. P1 in theseproceedings is quashed. The second respondent willnay the costs of the petitioner in this Original Petition.


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