P.T. Raman Nayar, J.
1. The decree on which this claim is based had become barred by time even before the presentation of the winding up petition on 8-8-1960 and hence this claim must be dismissed. The decree was passed by the District Court, Kottayam on 23-10-1951, and, so far as the respondents are concerned it was confirmed in appeal on 3-2-1956. The latter date is therefore the starting point for limitation under Article 182 of the Act of 1908. The decree was transferred to the District Court, Parur for execution, and an application for a execution made to that court wasdismissed on 13-8-1956 for failure to prosecute. That was more than three years before the presentation of the winding up petition.
The liquidator relies on an application for execution made to the sub-Court, Parur on 12-8-1969 and which was dismissed on 14-11-1969 to give him a fresh starting point, the District Court, Parur having been abolished on 1-11-1956. But the Sub-Court, Parur was neither the court which passed the decree within the meaning of Section 37 of the Civil Procedure Code nor a court to which it had been sent for executive so as to enable it to execution the decree under Section 39 of the Code. On the abolition of the District Court, Parur its jurisdiction was added to that of the District Court, Trichur and later on the establishment of the District Court, Ernakulam, it was transferred in the jurisdiction of that court. The transfer of business under Section 150 of the Code could therefore have been only to the District Court. Trichur and no attempt has been made by the liquidator to show that there was a transfer of business to the Sub-Court, Parur so as to make that court the court to which the decree had been sent for execution. The application for execution made on 12-8-1959 was not made to a proper court and is therefore of no avail to furnish a fresh starting point under Article 182 (6). The last application made to a proper court was as we have seen dismissed on 13-8-1956 more than three years before the date of the presentation of the winding up petition. The decree was therefore barred on that date and the subsequent application made on 30-3-1982 even if it be to the proper court was barred by lime, Section 450 of the Banking Regulation Act notwithstanding.
2. I dismiss this claim as against all the respondents.