M.S. Menon, J.
1. These are petitions under Sub-section (2) of Section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The petitioner is the same in all the five petitions. O. P. No. 57 relates to the assessment year 1122, O. P. No. 56 to the assessment year 1123. O. P. No. 59 to the assessment year 1124 and O. P. No. 55 to the assessment-year 1952-53, and O. P. No. 58 to the assessment year 1953-54.
2. The question in respect of which the reference-is sought is worded as follows :
'Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal had sufficient material to hold that the payment of a moiety of the sale proceeds of ilmenite sand supplied by Sri Pulimana S. Chellappan Pillai to Messrs. Hop-kins and Williams (Travaucore) Ltd., Chavara, was bribe to Mr. Declase and is income assessable in his hands and that the receipts were not on behalf of Mrs. Hilda Declase.'
3. The sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence available is not a matter for our determination. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Shree Meenak-shi Mills Ltd. Madurai v. Commr. of Income-tax,Madras, (S) AIR 1957 SC 49 :
'It has been held on the corresponding provisions in the English Income-tax statutes that a finding on a question of fact is open to attack as erroneous in law only if it is not supported by any evidence, or if it is unreasonable and perverse, but that where there is evidence to consider, the decision of the tribunal is final even though the Court might not, on the materials, have come to the same conclusion if it had the power to substitute its own judgment.'
4. In the above-mentioned decision the following observation of Lord Atkinson in G.W. Rly. Co. v. Baler, (1922) S Tax Cas 231 was quoted with approval :
'Their (Commissioners') determinations of questions of pure fact are not to be disturbed, any more than are the findings of a jury unless it should appear that there was no evidence before them upon which they, as reasonable men, could come to the conclusion to which they have come; and this, even though the Court of Review would on the evidence have come to a conclusion entirely different from their's.'
This is certainly not a case of 'no evidence', and we are unable to detect any unreasonableness or perversity in the conclusion reached. It follows that these petitions have to be dismissed, and we decide accordingly.
5. The petitioner complains that for the samereceipts both he and his wife have been assessed.Counsel for the Department submitted that we maymake it clear that in respect of the receipts fromChellappan Pillai during the accounting years concerned in these petitions, namely, 1121 1122, 1123,1126 and 1127, M. E. the effect of the AppellateTribunal's order is that the wife of the petitioner isnot liable to any assessment and that any orders inthat behalf will stand cancelled. We record the submission.