Velu Pillai, J.
1. We do not entertain the first contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, that the proceedings instituted against him under Section 10-A for an offence under Section 10(d) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 are barred by the earlier proceedings against him for an offence under Section 10(b). The contention was based, firstly on Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code and secondly on Article 20(2) of the Constitution. The gist of the offence under Section 10(b) is a false representation made to the outside dealer at the time of the purchase that the goods intended to be purchased are or the class covered by the certificate of registration, whereas the gist of the offence under Section 10(d) is that after purchasing goods for any of the purposes specified in Clause (b) of Sub-section (8) of Section 8, the purchaser (ailed to make use of the goods for any such purpose.
Thus the facts, which if true were saidto constitute the former offence, are not the facts which are said to constitute the latter offence. That certain facts relevant to the latter offence were also alleged in the charge for the former offence, is immaterial and does not attract either Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code or Article 20(2) of the Constitution. On this ground itself, there is no bar to the present proceedings, as contended.
2. Section 10(d) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, provides, that if any person after purchasing any goods for any of the purposesspecified in Clause (b) of Sub-section (3) of section 8 fails; without reasonable excuse, to make use of the goods for any such purpose, be shall, be punishable with simple imprison-ment which may extend to six months, orwith fine, or with both. The first of the purposes specified in Clause (b) of Sub-section (sic) of Section 8 is resale; and the second, use in the manufacture or processing of goods for sale. The commodity with which we are concerned is raw films. The Certificate of registration granted to the petitioner as well as the charge delivered to him speaks, not of use in the processing of goods for sale, but of use in the processing or goods for resale.
The impact of this difference in wording between the Act and the Rules on the one hand and the certificate of registration and the charge delivered on the other, has not been considered in the order impugned before us.. Apparently the word 'resale' means, the sale of the commodity purchased in the form in which it was purchased, that is without any change in its identity or composition. Use in the manufacture or processing of goods would normally change the identity or composition of the goods and that must be the reason for the use of the word sale and not of the word resale in the Act and the Rules, when they speak of use is the manufacture or processing of goods. The reason for the authority concerned using the word resale instead of the word sale, in the context of this case is not clear to us.
Even if the wording of the Act and the Rules and of the registration certificate and the charge delivered are identical there is a further question to be considered, that is, whether the use of raw films for the shooting of motion pictures can be considered as a processing of the raw films for sale. Can the painting of a picture on a piece of canvas be called a processing of that piece of canvas? This is certainly a point which requires consideration.
3. The next point is whether if there has been a processing of goods by a registered dealer with the intention of selling the goods, a subsequent change of intention will not affect the question. There is no finding in this case that the processing of the raw films by the petitioner -- if the making of a motion picture can be called a processing of the raw films --which has admittedly taken place in this case was not with the intention of selling the same.
4. The last submission of counsel for the petitioner is that the motion pictures were as a matter of fact eventually sold by the petitioner, though only after permitting their exhibition for a time under licences granted by him, and such sales are the normal sales in the industry with which we are concerned.
5. Shrivastava in his commentary to the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, deals with cases of sale of goods purchased even before they were used in any manufacture or processing as contemplated by the Section. He says:
'Clause (d) makes it an offence the failure to use the goods for the purposes specified as Clause (b) of Sub-section (3) of Section 8 for which they have been purchased. No time limit is set out for making the use of 'the goods and it would be vain to suggest that the goods must be so used during the year of purchase.if there is a reasonable excuse, the goods can be used for purposes other than for which they have been obtained e. g. if the raw material likely to deteriorate is in stock much in excess of the present requirement of the dealer, he can sell it 'without the fear of being booked for offence under this clause. Even if the dealer resells the goods which affords him a good margin of profit, he will come within mis clause. Business expediencies must be acknowledged and due allowance given for the conduct of the business.' (1964 Edition, page 176).
6. In the light of all that is stated above,we feel that the interests of justice requirethat there should be a further consideration ofthe matter before any penalty is imposed onthe petitioner, and for that purpose, we quashthe orders impugned before us and direct afresh disposal in accordance with the law. Weneed hardly add that we express no opinionon the controversy and that the authority concerned should reach its conclusion untrammelledby any observation, that we may have madein this judgment