Varadaraja Iyengar, J.
1. This is an application by the PulikalEstates, who are assiganees of particular properties of the Respondent Company for deterring its dissolution for reasons mentioned. On earner occasions such relief had been granted for periods limited but the necessity arose for further deterring of the dissotution and hence this application. The Registrar of joint Stock Companies to whom notice was issued on the earlier applications had no objection to the allowing of the petitions but latterly he objected on ground that the court had no jurisdiction to consider the petition because more than 3 months had elapsed since the registration by him of the accounts and returns submitted by the Liquidator and the Company must be deemed to have become dissolved long before the application for deferring dissolution was ever made.
This objection was however overruled by orderof the Kotiayam District Court--vide Order dated 8-6-1956 particularly in view of the previous stand taken by the Registrar and the order of the Court following it. The present application has since then been riled for further extension of the period and the learned Government Pleader, appearing for the Registrar, reiterates the objection as to the jurisdiction. According to him, the matter is one ot jurisdiction and any prior order in the case cannot be said to conclude the matter.
2. Now Section 497 (5) proviso gives power to the court to extend the period of three months provided tor in Clause 5 after the expiration of which from the date of the registration by the Registrar, the dissolution is to operate. There is no doubt in this case that the earliest application for the exercise of the court's discretion was made after the three months. But does it mean that no application can be entertained, if made after the three months' period has elapsed. Or again, if the court has once exercised its jurisdiction and wiped out the effect of the registration by specific order, such order is merely otiose.
I have not been referred to any decision which has gone to that extent. Of course there are decisions which have held that the fact that the court passes the order after the period dots not matter. See In re Crookhaven Mining Co., (1866) 3 Eq. 69 (A). Lord Romilly M. R. was not called upon there to decide that the court's jurisdiction was limited to consideration of petitions filed within three months only. But nevertheless he expressed himself in favour of the jurisdiction even after the periodhad lapsed. There appears therefore to be no question of jurisdiction involved in this case and the prior orders overruling the Registrar's contention must prevail. Even otherwise the court has always jurisdiction under Section 559 to declare a dissolution void, and the prior orders could, in any event, be deemed to have been passed in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
3. On the whole I am inclined to allow thepetition. I do so and extend the time of dissolutionfor a period of six months from 8-2-1957, the dateof this petition. There will be no order for costsin the circumstances.