Kochu Thommen, J.
1. The only contention urged before me against the impugned orders, Exs. P-1, P-2, P-5 and P-8, is that those orders were made outside the period of limitation prescribed under Section 41(4) of the Agrl. I.T. Act, 1950. The impugned orders have been made under the Revenue Recovery Act on the basis of a certificate issued under Section 41(3) of the Agrl. I.T. Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 41 says that no proceeding for recovery of any sum due under the Act shall be commenced after the expiry of three years from the latest day fixed for payment in the notice of demand served under Section 30. The notice of demand was served subsequent to the assessment order dated December 10, 1963, for the years 1959-60 and 1960-61. The certificate under Sub-section (3) of Section 41 was issued on June 2, 1964. Accordingly, the certificate was issued well within the time mentioned under Sub-section (4) of Section 41. There is no dispute about these dates. However, the petitioner's counsel contends that the impugned orders which were made under the Revenue Recovery Act were made long past the period of limitation prescribed under the Agrl. I.T, Act. It is true. But the limitation prescribed under Sub-section (4) of Section 41 is attracted only by the order commencing proceedings for recovery. That order is the certificate issued under sub-s, (3) of Section 41. It is that certificate which commences recovery proceedings, although the recovery as such is made by recourse to the machinery under the Revenue Recovery Act. Consequently if, as in the instant case, the certificate was issued within the three years prescribed tinder Section 41(4) of the Agrl. I.T. Act, proceedings for recovery can thereafter continue even beyond three years. In the present case, proceedings were delayed and protracted owing to proceedings in court. It was for that reason that recovery could not be had for many years. The recovery has still not been made owing to the present proceedings. All this delay could have been avoided if the petitioner had not caused the delay by contentions based on technicalities. I see no merit in the petitioner's contentions. The O.P. is dismissed. No costs.