P. Govindan Nair, J.
1. The question is whether the petitioner who was appointed as a probationer in the Indian Police Service by Ex. P. 1 order dated 20 February 1964 was discharged from service by Ex. R. 1 order (R. 1 produced along with the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent 1, the Government of India) dated 31 January 1966 or whether he has been punished in the manner stated in Article 311 of the Constitution of India.
2. After the petitioner was appointed as a probationer with effect from 10 January 1964, he apparently continued as a probationer till the order Ex. R. 1 referred to was passed by the President of India and communicated to the petitioner. According to the petitioner what has been done is not merely to terminate the probation of the petitioner but for extraneous reasons to terminate his services in the Indian Police Service amounting to dismissal from service.
3. It has not been disputed before me by counsel on behalf of the petitioner, who stated his case I think most fairly, without detracting from the emphasis that is required in matters such as this, that the mere discharge of a probationer is not justiciable and invited my attention to a passage in the judgment in Ranendra Chandra Banerjee v. Union of India and Anr. 1963 S.C. 1552 reading as follows:
Further it is equally well-settled that a Government servant who is on probation can be discharged and such discharge would not amount to dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311(2) and would not attract the protection of that article where the services of a probationer are terminated in accordance with the rules and not by way of punishment. A probationer has no right to the post held by him and under the terms of his appointment he is liable to be discharged at any time during the period of his probation subject to the rules governing such cases.
4. This has been ruled in more than one case by the Supreme Court and I may refer to another passage from the decision in Sukhbans Singh (S) v. State of Punjab 1963-I L.L.J. 671 brought to my notice by counsel appearing on behalf of the Central Government (at p. 675):
This argument assumes that a probationer who continues to be such without being reverted after the expiry of the period of probation has a legal right to be confirmed or to be treated as if he were confirmed. The rule in question says no more than this that at the end of the probationary period the probationer, unless reverted or absorbed in a substantive post, will be eligible for being made permanent. In other words, it means that he will continue to be a probationer unless he is reverted or absorbed in a permanent post. But the very fact that a person is a probationer implies that he has to prove his worth, his suitability for the higher post in which he is officiating. If his work is not found to be satisfactory, he will be liable to be reverted to his original post even without assigning any reason. It would, therefore, not be correct to say that a probationer has any right to the higher post in which he is officiating or a right to be confirmed. A probationer being merely made eligible for being absorbed in a permanent post is in no better position.
(13) Even though that is so, a probationer cannot be, as pointed out in Parshotarn Lal Dhingra case 1958-I L.L.J. 544 punished for misconduct without complying with the requirements of Article 311(2)
5. The order Ex. R. 1 and the communication Ex. P. 3 all purport to exercise a power admittedly vested with the authorities to discharge a probationer. These apparently stem under Rule 12 of the Indian Police Service (Probation) Rules, 1954. Clause (bb) of that rule reads:
A probationer shall be liable to be discharged from the service or as the case may be, reverted to his post in the State service from which he was recruited if he is found lacking in qualities of mind and character needed for the service or in constructive outlook and human sympathy needed in the public services generally.
6. As I understand the averments made in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Government and the State Government the petitioner was not found suitable for the post for which he was officiating and I discern nothing from the orders that would imply or suggest that anything else than an assessment of the qualities of the petitioner for the post for which he was officiating has been made by the authorities.
7. The only question that remains then is whether these orders concealed the real motive of punishing the petitioner. This question arises only because of tne allegations made in ground 8 of the grounds mentioned in support of the petition wherein specific allegations are made against an officer tinder whom the petitioner was working. Though this has been totally denied and even an affidavit has been filed by the officer concerned I thought that I should peruse all the confidential records in this case in order to satisfy myself whether it was merely the judgment of this particular officer, or of others, against whom the petitioner had no complaint who evaluated the merits of the petitioner. On perusing the records that are made available to me I find there was material on the basis of which it was possible to come to the conclusion that the petitioner was lacking in qualities of mind and character for the post for which he was officiating.
8. I am not satisfied that grounds exist which would entitle this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with what has been done.
9. I dismiss this petition but I make no order as to costs.