Gopalan Nambiyar, C.J. - For the assessment year 1970-71, the assessee who is the revision petitioner before us claimed exemption from his turnover in respect of tapioca. The nature of his business was shown as cattle feed.' The total returned turnover as Rs. 6,31,608,23, on which exemption claimed was Rs. 92,349.00. The exemption was claimed in respect of the taxable turnover under S. 9 of the Sales Tax Act read with Entry 10 of the Third Schedule, as it stood at the relevant time. S. 9 enacts that a dealer who deals in the goods specified in the Third Schedule shall not be liable to pay tax under this Act in respect of the sale or purchase of such goods. Entry 10 of the Third Schedule reads :
'10. Vegetables (other than green ginger), whether roots, green fruits or leaves, used for human consumption including tapioca, yam, potatoes, lime, sabola and tomatoes, except their manufactured products.
Explanation :- The term 'vegetables' shall not include any goods of the description specified in the First or Second Schedule.'
2. The Sales Tax Officer found in favour of the assessee and granted the exemption claimed. The Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax re-opened the assessment under S. 35 of the Act and held that the exemption was wrongly allowed, and added the turnover in respect of tapioca for the assessment. This was sustained on appeal by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. The assessee has come up in revision.
3. We think that on the terms of the Entry as it stands, the assessee must succeed. The exemption granted is -leaving out the unnecessary words - for 'vegetables used for human consumption'. By the inclusive part of the Entry, tapioca, among other things, is also brought within the main part of the provision, viz., vegetables used for human consumption. To limit it and qualify it further, with the requirement of human consumption, seems unjustified. The words 'used for human consumption' qualify 'vegetables'; and the commodities such as topioca, yam, potatoes, lime etc. which are all shepherded into the main part of definition by the inclusive part fall within the ambit of the definition irrespective of their use for human consumption. One of the purposes of an inclusive definition, as is well known, is to bring into the main part of it, things, which, but for such inclusion, would stand outside its fold. So understood, we do not think that the Tribunal was justified in limiting the scope of the expression 'topioca' by including the limitation that it must be 'used for human consumption' and in denying the benefit of the exemption in this case on the ground that the tapioca in question was used as 'cattle feed' and not for human consumption. The scope and the purpose of an inclusive definition has often enough come up for judicial notice. It is enough to refer to the recent judgment of both of us in T.R.C. No. 63 of 1975 wherein the relevant authorities have been surveyed. In the light of the principles discussed in the decisions referred to in that judgment of ours, we are of opinion that by reason of the inclusive definition tapioca qualifies for exemption irrespective of its use for human consumption.
4. There is another aspect of the matter. Even assuming that the words 'used for human consumption' are to be tacked on to tapioca and the other things brought in by the inclusive part, we think that what is denoted or required by those words as that the commodities are put ordinarily to use for human consumption and nothing more. In other words, the test seems to be not the actual use, but the potentiality of use and capability for use for human consumption. Not infrequently, vegetable purchased for use for human consumption are diverted for feeding cattle or dogs or other pet animals do have a go at vegetables stored and meant for human consumption. We do not think that the quantum of exemption for vegetables must depend on the proportion in which they are used for human consumption or for feeding cattle or animals. The test of ordinary user for human consumption and potentiality and capacity for such user, must determine the issue. On this ground again, we think the assessee must succeed.
We allow this revision petition, set aside the order of the Sales-tax Appellate Tribunal and also of the Deputy Commissioner and restore the order of the Sales Tax Officer. There will be no order as to costs.