B.K. Mehta, J.
1. Since we are not inclined to grant leave to the applicants herein for preferring Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the learned single Judge (Coram: A. M Ahmadi, J.) dated September 24, 1984, in Civil Revision Application No. 808 of 1984 directing, inter alia, the respondent No. 1 to convene a meeting of the Sthanakvasi Jain Mota Sangh of Rajkot latest by the end of October, 1984, after giving a fortnight's notice of the meeting to the members concerned by public advertisement in the newspaper, a few relevant facts need be noticed in order to appreciate the reliefs which have been claimed by the applicants in the present civil application, before we state our reasons in support of our view.
2. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are the President and Secretary respectively of the said Sangh. It appears that by letter of December 24, 1981, some members of the Sangh served a requisition on respondent No.1 for calling a meeting of the Sangh and the items of the agenda for the proposed meeting, inter alia, included the topic of election of the new Managing Committee as well as the vote of no confidence against the said respondents. It appears that in light of this requisition letter a number of legal proceedings ensued between the parties. It is not necessary to refer to all the legal proceedings which have ensued which are as many as twenty two but it would be pertinent to refer shortly to three suits and the proceedings arising therefrom for purposes of appreciating the reliefs of this application. Respondent No. 1, on behalf of himself and for and on behalf of the Sangh filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.) Rajkot praying amongst other reliefs for injunction restraining the requisitionists to convene the meeting in case the President fails to convene the meeting as required in the requisition. This suit, being Regular Civil Suit No. 106of 1982 was filed on January 25, 1982. In course of the hearing of the suit, the trial court made the Rule of injunction absolute restraining the requisitionists from holding the meeting. The matter was taken in appeal before the District Court, Rajkot by way of Civil Appeal No. 140 of 1982 by the requisitionists where the District Court confirmed the injunction on the condition that the President shall convene a special general meeting within a period of three months from the date of the order failing which the injunction shall stand vacated and the requisitionists shall have right to assemble and discuss the items of the agenda as per the requisition letter and in the event of the paid meeting passing any resolution affecting the constitution of the Trust, the said resolution shall not take effect till the same is r6gisteired as changes as per the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act.
3. The second important legal proceeding was the suit filed by the present applicants Nos. 1 and 2, who are the members of the Sangh being Regular Civil Suits Nos. 839 of 1983 and 712 of 1983, in the Court of learned Civil Judge (J.D.) Rajkot for injunction restraining the President from acting upon the order of the District Court in the aforesaid appeal. It appears that in Civil Suit No. 712 of 1983 which is at the instance of Applicant No.2 notice as to why injunction as prayed for should not be granted has been issued and is still to be heard while in Civil Suit No. 839of 1983 which is at the instance of Applicant No. 1, the trial Court granted injunction restraining the President from acting upon the aforesaid order. It appears further that the President Respondent No. 1 herein has meanwhile preferred Civil Revision Application being Civil Revision Application No. 1079 of 1983 in this Court, against the conditional order of injunction granted by the District Judge, Rajkot as aforesaid. The learned single judge while disposing of the said revision application has by his order date 6th February, 1984 directed the President to convene the meeting of the Sangh latest by April. 30.1984. The learned single Judge, however, partially allowed the revision application by deleting part of the permission which the learned District Judge granted to the requisitionists to convene the meeting and discuss the resolutions and adopt them. The period for convening the meeting we are told has been extended from time to time though it is not clear from the record as it stands before us as to up to what date it has been extended.
4. The third proceeding which is to be referred to in the suit, being regular Civil Suit No. 497 of 1984 Mod by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in the Court of Civil Judge (J. D.) Rajkot Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are the members of the Sangh. The reason for them to file the aforesaid suit was that on 22nd April, 1484 the President had convened the meeting in which as intimated by Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 to the President, they, intended to move a resolution for expressing a vote of noconfidence in him apprehending that the President may not allow such a resolution to be taken on hand, the third suit was filed by them praying, inter alia, for injunction restraining the President from ruling out the said resolution from consideration. The learned Civil Judge granted the injunction restraining the President from ruling out such a resolution, if moved That order of injunction was confirmed by the District Court in appeal being Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1984 preferred by President and the Secretary with the result that they preferred revision application, being Civil Revision Application No. 808 of 1984 in this Court. The learned Single Judge ( Coram A. M. Ahmadi,J.) by an interim order directed the President to convene the meeting before October, 31, 1984 by his order dated 24th September, 1984. It appears that a review application was preferred by the President and the Secratary for reviewing the aforesaid order of 24th September, 1984, being Civil Application No. 4426 of 1984 which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by his order dated October 16, 1984. It is this order of the learned single Judge of 24th September 1084 which has aggrieved the present applicants who were not parties to the said revision application No.808 of 1984 and, therefore since they are aggrieved, they intend to prefer an appeal and seek permission to file the appeal as stated above.
5. It is only in order to understand the entire backdrop of the present proceedings before us that we have traced briefly the relevant history of the relevant part of the litigations which have ensued between the parties. We are of the opinion that since the Letters Patent, Appeal is not competent from the order made by the learned Single Judge in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction, we do not think that we would be Justified in granting the leave as prayed for. The reasons are obvious. It cannot be a matter of debate that Letters Patent Appeal is not competent from an order made in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Clause 15 of the Letters patent. This position is not capable of being seriously contested. The contention urged oil behalf of the applicants is that the impugned order is an interim order not made in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. According to the learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the applicants, the order in question is an order made in exercise of the original jurisdiction though of course, in. revision proceedings and, therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal is competent. We are afraid this is too specious a contention with which we can agree. In. the first place, the contention amounts to saying that the exception carved our in clause 15 applies only to a final order made in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction and not an interim order made in revisional proceedings. In our opinion, this interpretation would lead to such an absurd position Letters Patent Appeal would not be competent from final order though it would be competent from interim orders made in course of revisional proceedings. It is no doubt true that revisional jurisdiction is ultimately, a part of the general appellate jurisdiction (see:Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra De and Shankar Ramchandra, v. Krishnaji Dattatraya : 1SCR322 ). It would not, however, follow from this settled position of law that a Letters Patent Appeal is competent from an order made in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction because the revisional jurisdiction is ultimately a part of the larger appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. Even examining this contention, it would amount to an order made in proceedings with would be tantamount to numerically a second appeal and, therefore, also Letters Patent Appeal would not be competent. The learned Advocate General, however, urged that the point which is being canvassed is that the impugned order which has been made is one made in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the learned single Judge who was seized of the revisional proceedings. The contention. though appears to be attractive on the face of it, would with respect to the learned Advocate General, not stand the scrutiny. Admittedly this is not the case of exercise of extraordinary original jurisdiction. The ordinary original jurisdiction embraces all such as is exercised in the ordinary course of law and without any special steps being necessary to assume it (see: Navivahoo, v. Turnar (1889) 16 Ind App 156 at p. 162 and A. Das Gupta v. Nath Bank : AIR1971SC218 ). The crux of the problem, in order to determine as to whether what is the nature of the problem which the learned single Judge was exercising in the present case, is that could he have made this order dehors the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction in substantive proceeding which might have been moved before him independent of the revisional proceedings of which he was seized. If the answer is in the negative, then it cannot be gainsaid that the impugned order is an order made in exercise of the revisional proceedings notwithstanding the fact that he was not finally disposing of the revision before him. Even assuming that this is an order made in exercise of the original jurisdiction, all orders made in exercise of the original jurisdiction are not appealable and in as much as the Civil Procedure Code does not provide for an appeal from an order of the nature as the one with which we are concerned in the present proceedings, Letters Patent Appeal would not be competent. If a specific enactment makes an order of the teamed single Judge not capable of being appealed against, the appeal provided by Letters Patent will not prevail. (see: South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S. B. Sarup Singh : 2SCR756 ). In the circumstances; therefore, we do not think that we would be justifed in granting the leave which has been asked for.
6. The result is that Civil Application No. 4287 of 1984 fails and it stands dismissed and the leave refused. Notice discharged with no order as to costs. Letters Patent Appeal therefore does not survive.
7. The learned Advocate General on behalf of the applicants urged that this Court should extend the time for convening the meeting so as to enable the applicants to carry the matter to the Supreme Court and obtain appropriate orders from the said Court. On behalf of respondents Nos.3 and 4. who are effectively contesting this application this prayer is opposed and it is urged that no time should be granted to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 who are the President and Secretary of the Committee bound under the order of the learned Single Judge to convene the meeting and to comply with certain preliminaries in that behalf, namely of inserting the public notice etc. for which the learned single Judge has prescribed a fortnight's time and respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have failed to carry out the directions of the Court for which respondents Nos. 3and 4 reserve right to take appropriate action against the him but under no circumstances any tune should be granted to respondents Nos. 1 and 2. We do see some force in this opposition on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4. However, in order to give justice to the applicants, we think that if we extend the time and direct respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to hold the meeting by 2nd December, 1984 with prior notice of afortnight to the members concerned, it would meet with the ends of justice and will also serve the interest of all the parties. We accordingly extend the time for convening the meetings directed by the learned Single Judge up to December 1984 subject to the other directions issued by the learned Single Judge under the said order in appeal. Interim relief in, Civil Application No. 4286 of 1984 shall, therefore, stand vacated on 2nd December. 1984.
8. Ordered accordingly.