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Motibhai Vithalbhai Patel and anr. Vs. the State of Gujarat and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtGujarat High Court
Decided On
Case NumberSpecial Civil Appln. No. 346 of 1960
Judge
Reported inAIR1961Guj93; (1961)2GLR1
ActsLand Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 4, 6, 38, 41 and 41(5); Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951
AppellantMotibhai Vithalbhai Patel and anr.
RespondentThe State of Gujarat and anr.
Appellant Advocate C.K. Shah and; S.C. Shah, Advs.
Respondent Advocate J.M. Thakore, Adv. General,; B.R. Sompura, Asst. Govt. Pleader and;
Disposition Petition dismissed
Cases ReferredState of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh
Excerpt:
(i) property - notification - sections 4, 6, 38, 40 and 41 of land acquisition act, 1894 - valid notification can be made under section 6 in order to acquire land for any company only with previous consent of government and after company has executed agreement mentioned in section 41 - before issuing such notification government must make necessary inquiry as stated in section 40 - government must satisfy itself that proposed acquisition is to obtain land for erection of dwelling houses for workmen or for provision of amenities directly connected therewith or for construction of some work which is likely to prove useful to public. (ii) right of public - section 41 of land acquisition act, 1894 - section 41 makes government sole judge of manner in which public are to have use of land being.....desai, c.j. 1. this is a rule taken out at the instance of the petitioner who is the owner of certain lands against the respondents, the state of gujarat and messrs karamchand premchand (private) ltd., to show cause why the two notifications dated 13-6-1958 and 3-6-1960 issued by the state under sections 4 and 6 respectively of the land acquisition act, 1894, should not be declared to be ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction or authority and the respondents directed to forbear from exercising any rights over those lands. the petition raises some questions of considerable importance and consequence. as identical questions were raised in a number of other petitions relating to adjoining lands in respect of which, similar notifications have been issued and the respondents in all the.....
Judgment:

Desai, C.J.

1. This is a Rule taken out at the instance of the Petitioner who is the owner of certain lands against the Respondents, the State of Gujarat and Messrs Karamchand Premchand (Private) Ltd., to show cause why the two Notifications dated 13-6-1958 and 3-6-1960 issued by the State under Sections 4 and 6 respectively of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, should not be declared to be ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction or authority and the Respondents directed to forbear from exercising any rights over those lands. The petition raises some questions of considerable importance and consequence. As identical questions were raised in a number of other petitions relating to adjoining lands in respect of which, similar notifications have been issued and the respondents in all the petitions are the same we directed that they should all be heard together.

2. The facts require to be stated with some fullness. Of some facts we shall however give only a resume and avoid certain details. The Petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 346 of 1960 is the owner of survey numbers 126/2 and 127 admeasuring 9 acres and 6 gunthas and 1 acre and 36 gunthas situate within the municipal limits of the Baroda Borough Municipality. He has built 31 houses on these lands which are in the area known as Nandanvan Colony. The property touches the National Highway. Respondent No. 2, a Private Limited Company, is the sole proprietor of a factory known as Sarabhai Chemicals which manufactures drugs, medicines, pharmaceuticals and antibiotics. On 7-12-1957, Respondent No. 2 wrote to the Collector of Baroda inter alia as under:

'We have now taken a big development programme on hand, which includes both the expansion of the existing installed capacities of the products currently manufactured by us and starting the manufacture of some new important products. Our Development Programme includes the starting of manufacture of (1) Procaine Hydrochloride (2) Saccharin (3) Vitamin B12 Yeast (4) Nicotinic Acid and Nicoti-namide and (5) Nikethamide etc. We have already received the approval of the Government of India for the manufacture of the aforesaid products as required under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951. Our expansion programme also includes manufacturing Citric Acid, for which we are awaiting permission from Government of India.

For a proper and efficient execution of our above referred Development Programme, we require more land for constructing new factory buildings, new warehouse building for storing raw materials and finished Products and also for constructing Administrative Offices, Canteen etc. etc. We, therefore, request you to acquire for us the lands which are situated in our vicinity and which are at present included in Survey Nos. 124, 125, 126, 127, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140 and 87 of Subhanpura Village'. On 25th December -1957 Respondent No. 2 wrote to the same Authority as under;

'In our above application we have stated that we want some more tends for constructing Factory Building for the expansion of our concern. We now inform you that we require lands for constructing residential quarters and for providing recreation facilities to our employees. Please, therefore, consider the above two objects (namely for constructing residential quarters and for providing recreation facilities) as also the objects of acquiring lands for us, among other objects stated earlier'.

3. On the representation of respondent No. 2 the then State of Bombay issued a Notification under Section 4 of the Act on 13-6-1958 the relevant and material part of which is as follows:

'Whereas it appears to the Government of Bombay that the lands specified in the schedule hereto are likely to be needed for the purpose of the company viz., for expansion of the Sarabhai Chemical works of Karamchand Premchand Ltd. at Baroda.

It is hereby notified, under the provisions of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894), that the said lands are likely to be needed for the purpose specified above.

If the Government of Bombay is satisfied that the said lands are needed for the aforesaid purpose, a final notification to that effect, under Section 6 of the said Act, will be published in the Bombay Government Gazette, in due course'.

The Schedule to the Notification includes inter alia Survey Numbers 126/2 and 127.

4. The petitioner thereupon filed his objections to the proposed acquisition and also addressed some letters to Respondent No. 1 contending inter alia that the acquisition would not be for a public purpose and that the proceedings should be dropped.

5. Respondent No. 2 executed an agreement in favour of Respondent No. 1 on 25-4-1960. Good deal of comment has been directed before us on the contents of that agreement for the purpose of showing that the order of acquisition made by the Notification under Section 6 of the Act made on 3-6-1960, and on which the Respondents in the main rest their case, was not made for any public purpose but only for a 'company' and the contention, which we shall examine later in our judgment, is that the order of acquisition is bad and inoperative as the require ments of Chapter VII of the Act relating to Acquisition of Land for Companies have been materially disregarded The relevant part of that agreement may be stated:

'Whereas the principal objects for which the Company is established are inter alia manufacture of medicinal and pharmaceutical products, fine chemicals and other chemicals, manufacture of glass vials etc. which are likely to prove useful to the public.

And whereas the Company has applied to the Government of Bombay (hereinafter referred to as the Government) that certain lands comprising Survey Nos. 124, 125, 126/1, 126/2, 127, 132 and 133 of Subhanpura village, Taluka Baroda, which are more particularly described in the schedule hereto annexed (hereinafter referred to as the said lands) should be acquired under the provision of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894), (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) for the following purposes namely:

For expansion of the Sarabhai Chemicals Works (Karamchand Premchand Private Limited) at Baroda.

And whereas the Government having caused inquiry made in conformity with the provisions of the said Act and being satisfied as a result of such inquiry that the acquisition of the said land is needed for the said purposes i.e. for expanding the factory of Sarabhai Chemicals or for the factories established by any of their associate or for providing residential quarters for its employees or for providing welfare and recreation facilities for its employees or for the employees of any of its associate concerns, has consented to the provisions of the said Act being put in force in order to acquire the said land for the Company and has pursuant to Section 41 of the said Act required the Company to enter Into an agreement hereinafter contained with the Government.

Now, these presents witness and It is hereby agreed that the Government shall put in force, the provisions of the said Act in order to acquire the said land for the Company on the following conditions namely:

(1) The Company shall pay to the Government the entire cost as determined by the Government ofthe Acquisition of the said land, including all compensation, damages, costs, charges and other expenses whatsoever which have been or may be paid orincurred in respect of or on account of such acquisition or in connection with any litigation arising outof such acquisition

X X XX 4. The Company shall-

(i) not use the said land for any purpose other than that for which it is acquired,

(ii) undertake the work of construction of thebuilding or buildings required for the purpose of expansion of the factory within six months from the date on which the possession of the land is handedto the Company and complete the same within twoyears from the aforesaid date.XXXXX

6. A Notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued by Respondent No. 1 on 3-6-1960, and It was published in the Gujarat Government Gazette on 16-6-1960. The relevant and material part of that Notification is as follows:

'Whereas by Government Notification in the Revenue Department It was notified that lands specified in the schedule hereto (hereinafter referred to as the said lands) were likely to be needed for the public purpose specified in column 4 of the schedule hereto.

And whereas the Government of Gujarat is satisfied after considering the report of the Collector under Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894), that the said lands are needed to be acquired at the expense of company for the purpose specified in column 4 of the schedule hereto.

It is hereby declared under the provision of Section 6 of the said Act, that the lands are required for the public purpose specified in the schedule hereto.

SCHEDULEDistrict, taluka. village.

Survey No.

Apropriate areaof the lands required.

Public purpose for which thelands are needed.

1

2

3

4

Baroda.

126/2

0

6

0

For expansion of Sarabhai Chemicals of Karamchand Premchand Private Ltd., at Baroda.

Baroda.

127

0

36

0

Subhanpure.

132.

1

34

0

X X X1 X X X X X XX X'

Similar Notifications were issued by Respondent No. 1 about the same time in respect of various other parcels of land in the same area and they are the subject matter of the other petitions before us. The Notification quoted above, it will be noticed, includes Survey Numbers 126/2 and 127.

7. The petitioner in his petition has challenged both the Notifications and particularly the latter issued under Section 8 of the Act on various grounds. They need not all be summarised here. We shall be referring to them when we examine the arguments urged on behalf of the petitioner and we shall do so in the order in which they were presented and with necessary factual details. His primary contention, as we have already indicated, is dial the acquisition is not for a public purpose but for a 'company' and the order of acquisition is bad and inoperative as the requirements of Chapter VII have been materially disregarded. It is also the contention of the petitioner that the acquisition cannot be regarded as made for a public purpose and is in any case, therefore, bad and inoperative. One point for decision in this case rests upon the true nature and import of this Notification issued under Section 6 of the Act. It is founded on the content of the declaration in it 'lands are required for the public purpose specified in column 4 of the schedule....' and column 4 of the schedule which describes the public purpose for which the lands are needed as 'expansion of Sarabhai Chemicals of Karamchand Premchand Private Ltd., at Baroda.' An argument has been raised, not because this latter Notification leaves anything in dubio, but, from the particular phraseology which the earlier Notification under Section 4 has assumed. Of this more hereafter.

8. In opposition to the Rule, the Prant Officer, Baroda, has filed an affidavit on behalf of Respondent No. 1. The main contention there set out is as under:

'The expansion of Sarabhai Chemicals is fora public purpose in that the manufacture of essential Chemicals and Medical preparations is for thegood of the general public. Such manufacture inIndia saves a considerable amount of foreign exchange and increases the employment potential andtherefore the expansion of this Company will be forthe economic good of the Nation and the purpose istherefore a public purpose'.XXXXX

'The purpose for which the land was needed is shown in the. Notification. The acquisition for a Registered Company was for a public purpose as stated in .....above.'

9. In opposition to the Rule the 2nd Respondent Company filed an affidavit of one of its officers who inter alia stated:

'I say that the said Sarabhai Chemicals manufacture drugs, medicines, pharmaceuticals, anti-bio-tics, etc., which would not otherwise be available tothe public generally and that the public directlybenefits from the manufacture of the said medicines,drugs, pharmaceuticals, anti-bio tics, etc. X X XX X

I say that the 'Sarabhai Chemicals' manufactures among other goods, medicines, drugs, pharmaceuticals, anti-biotics in collaboration with or otherwise of the well-known foreign manufacturers of drugs, medicines, pharmaceuticals, anti-biotics, etc. I say that this country is passing through a very critical stage so far as the availability of foreign exchange is concerned. It is an avowed policy of the Government of India that there should be a saving of expenditure of foreign exchange in every possible manner. I say that medicines worth crores of Rupees were being imported into the country be-fore concerns like the Sarabhai Chemicals started manufacturing medicines, drugs, pharmaceuticals, anti-biotics, etc. I say that even today medicines, drugs, pharmaceuticals, anti-biotics etc. worth crores of rupees are being imported into India. I say that if 'Sarabhai Chemicals' expends its activities and increases its production it will directly result jn saving of a huge amount of foreign exchange which can otherwise be utilised for building up the nation. I say that it is the declared policy of the Government of India as evidenced in the Second and Third Five-Year Plans that so far as possible, drugs, medicines, pharmaceuticals, anti-biotics, etc., should be manufactured in India. I say that the public stands to be directly benefited by such drugs being manufactured in India, as the same become available to them easily and cheaply'.

10. The correctness of the contentions raised by the Respondents in opposition to the Rule has been challenged by the petitioner. In his affidavit in Rejoinder he has denied that the medicines manufactured by the 2nd Respondent Company are of great use and help to the public and asserted that the 2nd Respondent Company conducts a business enterprise for its own benefit and that business has nothing to do with public interest either directly or indirectly. He has contended that the consideration of saving foreign exchange is not germane to the issue as to the existence of public purpose and is irrelevant. He has denied, that the expansion of the activity of the 2nd Respondent Company and increase in its production of medicines, drugs, pharmaceuticals and anti-biotics will result in saving of foreign exchange. He has mentioned in that affidavit that a number of other concerns in India manufacture medicines, drugs, pharmaceuticals aud antibiotics. He has also denied the correctness of the contention of the Respondents that the public stands to be directly benefited by such preparations being manufactured in India. His principal contention as wo have already indicated, is that the two Notifications and the material on record show that the acquisition is for the purpose of a 'company' and that the mandatory requirements of Sections 39 and 41 of the Act have not been complied with. His case, primarily, therefore, is that the Notification issued under Section 6 is invalid and inoperative.

11. In the course of the arguments at the bar a point was sought to be made on behalf of the petitioners that even if the acquisition be regarded as made for a 'public purpose' and as one not for a 'company' simpliciter the averments in the two affidavits filed in reply did not bring out facts sufficient to establish any public purpose. The suggestion was that these facts were not informative and not specific but were rather vague and general and it was not possible for the petitioner to challenge them with any exhaustiveness or with certitude. On application by the parties We allowed further affidavits to be filed on either side. The 2nd Respondent Company has in its further affidavit given a more detailed account of its preparations and the expansion it proposes to make in its activity. We shall be referring to the further affidavits filed on either side when we turn to examine the arguments founded on the same.

12. On behalf of the petitioner it was strenuously contended that a plain reading of the notification under Section 4 reveals that the acquisition is not for any public purpose but is virtually for the sole purpose of enabling the 2nd Respondent Company to expand its business and make large profits. Stripped of details the argument is that the Notification under Section 4 is invalid because it makes no reference to 'public purpose' and in terms states that the lands-specified in the schedule to it 'are likely to be needed for the purpose of the Company viz. for expansion of the Sarabhai Chemicals Works of Karamchand Premchand Ltd. at Baroda'. We were asked to read Section 4 with Section 38 of the Act.

13. Section 38 of the Act must for certain cases be read with S, 4. The publication of a notification under Section 4 is compulsory and therefore necessary in all cases of acquisition including cases of urgency and even emergency and there must be substantial compliance with the provisions of these sections. The notification is a public announcement by the Government that the land is likely to be needed for acquisition in the stated locality. It lays the foundation for preliminary investigation by officers duly authorised to survey the land and do other acts necessary in the course of such investigation. The date at the notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 is also of importance for it has the effect of fixing the relevant date for the purpose of ascertainment and assessment of the market value of the land under acquisition. The relevant and material parts of Section 4 and Section 33 are as under:

'4(1). Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality.

38. (1) The appropriate Government may authorise any officer of any Company desiring to acquire land for its purposes to exercise the powers conferred by Section 4.

(2) In every such case Section 4 shall be construed as if for the words 'for such purpose' the words 'for the purposes of the company' were substituted; and Section 5 shall be construed as if after the words 'the ofiicer' the words 'of the Company' were inserted.'

14. Now it is true that Section 4(1) does not in express terms speak of any acquisition for a company and rules that a notification to the effect that it appears to the Government that 'land in any locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose' shall be published. This does not, however, mean that there is a peremptory requirement that the notification under that section must in terms use the words 'public purpose'. The requirement of law would be substantially complied with if the purpose is stated as for instance in the case of the present notification that the lands are 'likely to be needed for the purpose of the company viz., for expansion of the Sarabhai Chemicals...' Whether this stated purpose is a public purpose or not can raise an issue but that would be a wholly different ground to be examined on its own merits and the facts and circumstances relating to that purpose. We shall consider that question later on in our judgment. It has no bearing on the instant contention challenging the validity itself of the notification under Section 4. The notification under Section 4, it has to be noticed, is an introductory measure. It is tentative in its nature and there is no finality or immutability about it. It is of an exploratory character and it does not proprio motu result in acquisition. The contention grounded simply on the absence of the words 'public purpose' in the first notification must therefore be negatived.

15. After the arguments in this case concluded and we reserved judgment our attention was drawn to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay is Writ Petn. No. 134 of 1959 delivered on 8th August 1960 : [1961]1SCR128 . A copy of the judgment was obiained and we have heard additional argument from Mr. C. K. Shah, learned advocate for the petitioner. (Before we turn to examine that argument, which is supplementary to his larger argument that the acquisition under Section 6 does not satisfy the mandatory requirements of Section 39 and is therefore invalid and inoperative it will be convenient to quote some observations of their Lordships in the abovementioned case which though made in a somewhat different context lend support to the view expressed by us above. Their Lordships have observed:

'The purpose of the notification under Section 4 is to carry on a preliminary investigation with a view to finding out after necessary survey and taking of levels, and, if necessary, digging or boring into the sub-soil whether the land was adopted for the purpose for which it was sought to be acquired. It is only under Section 6 that a firm declaration has to be made by Government that land with proper description and area so as to be identifiable is needed for a public purpose or for a company. What was a mere proposal under Section 4 becomes the subject mat-ter of a definite proceeding for acquisition under the Act. Hence, it is not correct to say that any defect in the notification under Section 4 is fatal to the validity of the proceedings, particularly when the acquisition is for a Company and the purpose has to be investigated under Section 5-A or Section 40 necessarily after the notification under Section 4 of the Act'.

16. It was next contended by Mr. Shah that the Notification under Section 6 also reveals that the acquisition is not for a public purpose but for the sole purpose of enabling the 2nd respondent Company to expand its business and make large profits. It was said that the purpose of acquisition is expressly stated as 'for the expansion of Sarabhai Chemicals of Karamchand Premchand Private Ltd. at Baroda' and the purpose thus stated cannot be read as public purpose but must be read only as purpose of a company. The second, premise was that the mandatory requirements of Section 39 relating to the necessary agreement have not been fulfilled. The conclusion, therefore, must be reached, so the argument proceeded, that the Notification under Section 6 cannot be enforced.

17. The contention hera was really twofold; Firstly, that the Notification under Section 6 dated 3-6-1960 must be read as a declaration not for a public purpose but as one made only for the purpose of a company. Secondly, that if it be so read the acquisition being solely for the purpose of a company it can be valid only if there is compliance of the necessary requirements of Part VII and particularly those of Section 39. Section 39 requires as one of the prescribed conditions that the agreement with the company must be in accordance with the provisions of Sections 41 and 42. The agreement executed by Respondent No. 2 Company in favour of Respondent No. 1 does not mention the terms on which the 'public shall be entitled to use the work' as required by Section 41(5) and therefore the Notification under Section 6 must be held as invalid and illegal.

18. The first and the limited contention may immediately be disposed of. The way we read Section 6 is that the declaration to be made thereunder must be to the effect that any particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company. It must indicate that the acquisition is for a public purpose and where the acquisition is for a company simplici-ter the declaration must indicate that it is in substance for a company. The Notification under consideration in terms declares that 'the lands are required for the public purpose specified in column 4 of the schedule hereto'. It also states that the public purpose for which lands are being acquired is the 'expansion of Sarabhai Chemicals...' In terms express and explicit the Notification states that the lands are being acquired for a public purpose and for the purposes of a company. The limited contention that the declaration made by the Notification under Section 6 can be read as made only for the purposes of a company and not for a public purpose, must therefore be negatived.

19. This is another aspect of the same contention which is the major premise of the syllogism of Mr. Shah. The argument here was that the meaning and effect of Section 6 read with Part VII of the Act which relates to acquisition for a company is that an acquisition can be either for a public purpose or for a company. If it is for the purpose of a company the provisions of Part VII must inevitably apply. If the declaration in a notification under Section 6 speaks of acquisition for a company it would not be enough to show that the purpose is a public purpose but it must bo shown that there is the fullest compliance with the requirements of Part VII relating to the agreement to be executed by the company and as the agreement executed by respondent No. 2 Company in favour of respondent No. 1 does not fulfil the requirements of Section 41 the acquisition under Section 6 must be held as invalid and illegal.

20. In order to appreciate this argument it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act. Part VII of the Act is intituled 'Acquisition of the land for companies' and contains a fasciculus of sections applicable to cases where the acquisition fs for a company. Sections 39 to 42 are as under:

'39. Previous consent of appropriate Government and execution of agreement necessary: The provisions of Sections 6 to 37 (both inclusive) shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any Company, unless with the previous consent of the appropriate Government, nor unless the Company shall have executed the agreement hereinafter mentioned.

40. Previous enquiry: (1) Such consent shall not be given unless the appropriate Government be satisfied, either on the report of the Collector under Section 5A, Sub-section (2), or by an enquiry held as hereinafter provided,--

(a) that the purpose of the acquisition Is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for workers employed by the company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith, or

(b) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some work, and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public.

(2) Such enquiry shall be held by such officer and at such time and place as the appropriate Government shall appoint.

(3) Such officer may summon and enforce the attendence of witnesses and compel the production of documents by the same means and, as far as possible, in the same manner as is provided By the Code of Civil Procedure (14 of 1882) in the case of a Civil Court.

41. Agreement with appropriate Government.--If the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, of the Collector under Section 5A, subjection (2), or on the report of the officer making an inquiry under Section 40 that the purpose of the proposed acquisition is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the Company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith, or that the proposed acquisition is needed for the Construction of a work, and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public, it shall require the Company to enter into an agreement with the appropriate Government, providing to the satisfaction of the appropriate Government for the following matters, namely:--

(1) the payment to the appropriate Government of the cost of the acquisition;

(2) the transfer, on such payment, of the land to the Company;

(3) the terms on which the land shall be held by the Company;

(4) where the acquisition is for the purpose of erecting dwelling houses or the provision of amenities connected therewith, the time within which, the conditions on which and the manner in which the dwelling houses or amenities shall be erected or provided; and

(5) where the acquisition is for the construction of any other work, the time within which and the conditions on which the work shall be executed and maintained, and the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work.

42. Publication of agreement. -- Every such agreement, as soon as may be after its execution, be published in the Official Gazette, and shall thereupon so far as regards the terms which the public shall be entitled to use the work have the same effect as if it had formed part of this Act'.

21. It was strenuously contended that Section 39 requires inter alia that if land is to be acquired for a Company, a notification under Section 6 can only be made if the Company has executed an agreement with the Provincial Government in accordance with the provisions of Section 41. It was urged that the present case did not fall under Sub-section (4) of Section 41 and the only provision of that section under which it can and must fall is Sub-section (5) of that section. An examination of the agreement, it was said, clearly shows that there is no mention whatever of 'the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work'. Reference was made to Section 42 for the purpose of showing that the effect of that section is to render the agreement a part of the Act so that the public though itself not a contracting party to the agreement can yet in law become entitled as of right to use the work for the construction of which the land was acquired. Founded on Sections 41 and 42, the argument was that where the acquisition of land is for a Company it can only be 'for the purpose of erecting dewelling bouses or the provision of amenities connected therewith' and where the acquisition is for the construction of any other work, the express requirement of Sub-section (5) of that section is that the work must be likely to prove useful to the public. Where the acquisition of land is for the latter purpose the agreement must contain express terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work. The agreement between the State Government and the Company mentioned in the Notification under Section 6 dated 3-6-1960, so the argument ran, does not contain any such term or terms and only states that the Company undertakes 'the work of construction of the building or buildings required for the purpose of expansion of the factory....' This does not fulfil in any manner the mandatory requirement of Section 41. and therefore the acquisition is invalid and illegal. The effect of Section 39, it was argued, is that a Notification under Section 6 cannot be made unless an agreement is executed as required by Section 41 and as the agreement in question does not comply with the provisions of Section 41 the Notification under Section 8 is invalid and inoperative.

22. The argument of learned counsel for the Company and the State Government on the other hand was that the Notification under Section 6 is not invalid as there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 41. It was said that the Notification under Section 6 in terms states that the acquisition was for a public purpose and therefore if the purpose of the acquisition was in fact a public purpose the mere absence in the agreement of any term on which the public shall be entitled to use the work for the construction of which land was being acquired cannot render the Notification invalid in law. No attempt was made to support the Notification on tha ground that the acquisition, was for the purpose of erecting dwelling houses for workmen or the provision of amenities connected therewith uuder subsection (4) of Section 41. The argument was that even it the case fell under Sub-section (5) of Section 41 the undertaking by the Company mentioned in the agreement, that the work of construction was of 'building or buildings required for the expansion of the factory', was sufficient compliance with the requirement of that sub-section. It was said that it would be enough if the construction work was likely to prove useful to the public and the use need not be physical use. The public need not actually use the work not need it have the right to use it. It would suffice if the public derived some benefit in consequence of the construction of the work envisaged by Section 41(5). It was further said that it did not matter if one of the conditions or requirements of Section 41 was left out of the agreement. That would not have the effect of rendering the acquisition invalid in law. In support of the argument that incorporation in the agreement with the company of the terms on which the public was to be entitled to use the work was not absolutely necessary in a case of the nature before us, the learned Advocate-General relied on the following observations of Mehrotra, J., in R. L. Aurora v. State of Uttar Pradesh : AIR1958All126

'In this connection it was lastly contended that the agreement is to provide for the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work and no such provision has been made in the agreement. There is fallacy in this argument also.

The agreement does provide the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work in as much as it provides that the public can use this factory for doing business in connection with the production of textile machines. Whether these terms are good or bad is not the requirement of Section 41. The agreement thus provides the terms on which the public is entitled to use the work and as such the agreement itself cannot be regarded as contrary to the provisions of Section 41'.

It may be pointed out that in this case the agreement contained the following clause: 'that the public will have such right of access to and use of the land-works hereinbefore specified as may be necessary for the transaction of their business with the firm'. The existence of this clause in the agreement with the Company was regarded by the Court of first instance and by the Appellate Court in the same case (R. L. Aurora v. State of Uttar Pradesh) reported in : AIR1958All872 as sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 41(5). It is not possible to read this case as lending support to the present argument urged by counsel on behalf of the State.

23. It is abundantly clear from Section 39 that a valid notification can be made under Section 6 in order to acquire land for any Company only with the previous consent of the Government and after the Company has executed the agreement mentioned in Section 41. It is equally clear that before issuing a notification in any such case the Government must make necessary inquiry as stated in Section 40 and satisfy itself that the proposed acquisition is to obtain land:

for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the Company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith; or

for the construction of some work which is likely to prove useful to the public. When the Government is so satisfied 'it shall require the Company to enter into an agreement' with it relating to the matters specified in Clauses (1) and (5) of Section 41. Then Section 42 requires that every such agreement should be published in the Official Gazette and the terms of the agreement relating to the right of the public to use the work in a case falling under Clause (5) are to have the same effect as if the agreement had formed part of the Act. Considerable stress has been laid by Mr. Shah on Clause (5) of Section 41 for the purpose of showing that the incorporation in the requisite agreement of the terms relating to the right of the public to use the work in a case falling under Clause (5) of Section 41 is a mandatory requirement the nonfulfilment of which would render the notification under Section 6 invalid in law.

24. That was the argument: it is an argument which involves the question of construction of Section 39 and also of the import and effect of the other relevant sections of Part VII of the Act and particularly of Section 41. Is the requirement of Section 41(5) relating to the insertion in the agreement of the terms relating to the right of the public to use the work so absolute and imperative that the consequence of its non-compliance is to be of such a serious character as substantially to attach to such non-compliance the consequence of invalidity of the notification made under Section 6.

25. Now, if there is one rule of interpretation clearer than any other, it is this, that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled substantially and that every mandatory enactment is not necessarily absolute. I have often had occasion to say before that one guiding principle of the matter is what was stated by Lord Campbell:

'No universal rule can be laid down tor the construction of statutes, as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory, with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature, by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed'.

26. This celebrated dictum of Lord Campbell has been often cited. To this dictum Lord Penzance added his oft-quoted observations:

'I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject-matter; consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded, and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the enactment is what is called imperative or only directory...'.

Authorities abound but as has so often been rehearsed you cannot glean a great deal that is very decisive from a perusal of those cases for they are on all sorts of subjects and do not permit of any logical grouping of them together nor do they afford any fixed rule that will serve as a yardstick for an exact answer to the question whether a particular provision is so absolute that its obedience must be regarded as obligatory with an implied nullification lor disobedience. It is not easy to rationalise when on the one hand it is necessary to remember that the Court will not sanction the evasion or disregard of a statutory provision by readily treating it as merely directory and in the process carrying it beyond the line of sound interpretation and when on the other hand it is equally necessary to note that insistence upon strict and rigid compliance of a provision may result in the very defeasance of the primary and) real object of the statute. Any doctrinaire approach to the matter is apt to be misleading and a realistic approach to the same with the principal object of the statute in mind, and with fullest regard to such intrinsic evidence as is afforded by the relevant provisions having bearing on the subject matter, would be the safest guide.

27. A realistic test for the interpretation of any such provision, when question arises whether it is absolute and imperative or not is to consider the importance of the exact and literal observance of it having regard to the purpose and object of the statute, the end sought to be achieved and the consequences that must follow upon preferring one meaning to another bearing in mind the subject matter and the relation of the provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act as also the scheme of the Act. The presence or absence of negative words in the provision at times serves as a useful test of the character of it. An inference may be drawn from the negative language used in laying down the requirement of a provision which prescribes something to be done under it as for instance when it is enacted that it shall be done in a particular manner and in no other manner. In such a case the requirement is regarded as absolute. There is no general rule, however, that an enactment expressed in negative and prohibitory language must be considered as absolute. Nor on the other hand is there any general rule that an enactment expressed in affirmative language must not be considered as absolute.

28. Difficulty arises at times when the Court has to interprete affirmative provisions in a statute prescribed for public benefit. As a general rule a provision which enacts a rule of public policy or a condition precedent for the purpose of benefiting thepublic would be regarded as, indispensable. But this also is a rule of construction useful to a limited degree and one though helpful at times is not to be applied with blind obedience and must operate in harmony with the other broad general rules of interpretation. Every provision and every condition in a statute of the nature under consideration will not be read as imperative and absolute. The Court will closely scrutinise the provision and draw a distinction between that which goes to the root of the matter and cannot be permitted to be violated with impunity and that which does not affect the basis and essence of the matter. It often happens that the statute does not consist of one provision or one condition but a number of different provisions some of which are of the nature of antecedent conditions and some regulating the mode or manner in which something is to be done. In any such case the provision relating to the condition precedent must, as a general rule, compel an imperative construction whereas that which relates to the mode or manner of fulfilling that condition may be considered as requiring only, a directory construction. An affirmative provision which relates to the mode or manner of exercising jurisdiction or authority and is not limitative of the jurisdiction or authority should, in our opinion, be given directory construction. These are, however, nebulous concepts and in the ultimate analysis the meaning of each provision turns pretty much on the particular aspects attending it and the language employed and the essence of it and the broad general considerations which we have endeavoured to recall. (29) To apply these considerations to the present case. Where the Notification under Section 6 is for a company the requisite declaration can be made only after the Government is satisfied that the particular land is needed for the company and such declaration is to be 'subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act'. Section 39 postulates two antecedent conditions of which the Legislature intended to exact strict compliance. They are both conditions precedent to the validity of the notification under Section 6. As already indicated there must be the previous consent of the Government to be given after the inquiry contemplated by Section 40 is made and the Government is satisfied as to the purpose or the need for the acquisition. There must also be executed an agreement by the Company providing to the satisfaction of the Government for the matters enumerated in Section 41. The agreement to be executed is the agreement mentioned in Section 41. The agreement with respondent No. 2 Company the material and relevant part of which we have set out in the earlier part of our judgment makes provision for the payment by the Company for the cost of the acquisition; for transfer of the land to the Company; and the terms on which the land would be held by the Company. The agreement also states that as a result of the requisite enquiry the Government is satisfied that the acquisition of the land is needed inter alia for expanding the factory of Sarabhai Chemicals or for providing residential quarters for its employees or for providing welfare and recreation facilities for its employees. It also states that the Company shall not use the land for any purposes other than that for which the land is required. In clause 4 of the agreement the purpose is referred to in a general manner and It is stated that the company undertakes to carry out the work of construction of the building or buildings required for the purpose of expansion of the factory Within six months. It is true that apart from this there is no express mention of any term on which the public is entitled to use the work. At the same time it is clear that the acquisition is expressly stated to be for the expansion of the factory of the Company. Can it be said that in case of acquisition lor any such purpose and if such purpose is proved to be a public purpose the absence in the agreement of any express term on which the public is entitled to use the work must render the acquisition invalid and bad in law?

30. It has to be noticed that Section 41 makes the Government the sole judge of the manner in which the public are to have the use of the land which is being taken up for the Company. The right of the public to use the building or buildings or the work to be constructed in order to expand the factory must obviously be considered in the context of the nature and purpose of that construction and not in the abstract. Such being the position it is difficult to see how the sheer circumstance that there is no express term as to the use of the work by the public can be regarded as non-compliance with any absolute and imperative provision of law.

31. It has also to be noticed that the conditions antecedent are laid down only in Section 39. The provision contained in Section 41(5) relating to insertion in the agreement with the Company of the terms on which the public is to be entitled to use the work apart from its inapplicability or otherwise to the case of a purpose of the nature before us -- is an affir-mative enactment which does not relate to the jurisdiction or authority to acquire land but obviously relates only to the mode or manner in which that jurisdiction or authority is to be exercised. It is not limitative of the same. It is not of the essence of the whole matter of acquisition and the notification to be issued under Section 6. We have to consider the importance of this provision in relation to the general object intended to be secured by the Act and we do not think we would be justified in holding that the Legislature has demanded such punctilious observance of it that failure to do so must result in the break-down of the whole process of acquisition and the illegality of the notification made for that acquisition. It is pertinent to stress in the present context that the requirement in Section 41(5) about insertion in the agreement of the terms on which the public is to be entitled to use the work relates to a matter which is left by the legislature to the subjective satisfaction of the Government. After considering the matter in the light of the observations which we have made and the facts which we have set out above we ore of the opinion that the absence of any express term relating to the use of the building or buildings or work to be constructed by the Company is not such disregard of the provisions of Section 41 as must invite the consequence of invalidity of the notification under Section 6.

32. In support of the contention of the State Government that the notification under Section 6 is not invalid it was urged by counsel that the mere absence in the agreement of any term on which the public shall be entitled to use the work would not render the agreement with the Company invalid and would not render the acquisition invalid because the acquisition, though ior a Company, was tor a public purpose and in any view of the matter as to the meaning and effect of Section 41 the notification must be upheld if the public purpose was established. The argument on behalf of the petitioner on the other hand was that if the declaration in a notification under Section 6 speaks of acquisition for a company it would not be enough to show that the purpose is a public purpose but it must be shown that there is the fullest compliance with the requirements of Sections 39 and 41. The foundation of the argument on behalf of the petitioner is that acquisition under the Act can be either for a public purpose or for a company and that these two purposes must be regarded as wholly distinct and there can be no overlapping of the two purposes. And the whole structure of the argument founded on this binary classification is that once it appears that land is intended to be acquired for a company the case must inevitably and absolutely be governed by Chapter VII and if ail the requirements of that Chapter are not fulfilled the intended acquisition would be invalid and cannot be sustained.

33. In our judgment, Section 6 and the provisions of Chapter VII do not insist upon any such rigid dichi-tomy. A notification under Section 6 may be in respect of an acquisition which is for a public purpose and at the same time for a company. In such a case since the land is being acquired also for a company the provisions of Chapter VII would of course apply but there would be little scope for the contention that there is no compliance with the provisions contained in Section 41(5), where the public purpose for which land is acquired for the company is of such a nature that Section 41(5) may have no bearing on the same. A public purpose can be of such a nature that it would not be appropriate in the context of it to say that 'the public shall be entitied to use the work'. The contention of the petitioner which rests upon an insistence that a public purpose and purpose of a company are matters wholly distinct and so mutually exclusive that they cannot overlap must, therefore, be negatived.

34. Then it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the purpose specified in the schedule to the Notification under Section 6 viz., 'For expansion of Sarabhai Chemicals of Karamchand Fremchand Private Ltd., at Baroda' is not a public purpose and therefore in any case the Notification is invalid and inoperative. It was urged that the purpose of the acquisition must be stated in the declaration and can be gadiered only from the notilication containing such declaration made under Section 6. We agree that when land is to be acquired for a public purpose it must appear from the declaration itself tbat the land is needed for a public purpose. It is not necessary, however, that the declaration must contain the particulars of the public purpose. It is enough if the declaration sufficiendy discloses the purpose of the acquisition as public purpose and conforms to the provisions prescribed under the Act. It would be permissible to the State Government and the Company, if any dispute arises whether the purpose stated in the declaration is a public purpose or not and If it is necessary for the Court to decide the same, to show by affidavits and evidence alionde that the acquisition is for a public purpose.

35. Having arrived at the conclusion that the notification under is. 4 is not defective and also the conclusion that the notification under Section 6 is not invalid on any of the grounds on which It is challenged and which we have already examined we should have thought it unnecessary to examine the factual aspect of the argument that the acquisition is not for a public purpose. Section 6(3) in terms express and explicit rules inter alia that the declaration made uuder the section shall be conclusive that the land is needed for a public purpose. One contention urged on behalf of the respondents is that the declaration under Section 6 is conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a com-pany and the court would not go into the merits of the case for deciding whether the purpose of acquisition is in fact a public purpose. In our opinion that must be so unless the declaration in that behalf is defective or made in fraud of the powers of the Government or invalid or illegal on any other ground. That Section 6(3) renders the declaration conclusive evidence is not seriously disputed by Mr. G. K. Shah, learned advocate for the petitioner and we need not burden this judgment with an examination of the decisions on the subject to which some reference was made in the course of the arguments at the bar. But the argument on behalf of the petitioner in the present petition and the petitioners in the other petitions on our list, where substantially the same contentions have been raised, is that the declaration is defective on various grounds which we have already considered. In Special Civil Application No. 406 of 1960 the declaration under Section 6 states that the lands are needed for a company and in the body of the declaration in the form of a schedule it is stated that the purpose for which the lands are needed is 'Sarabhai Chemicals for Karamchand Premchand(Private) Ltd'. The argument was that in any event the declaration in that case is defective and cannot be regarded as for a public purpose. Considerable argument has been advanced before us and it seems desirable that we should examine the same on the assumption that the declarations made in the petitions before us are indefinite as to the public purpose and that the question is a justiciable issue. We have already set out in the earlier part of this judgment the material averments on which the respondents rely in order to show that the acquisition is for a public purpose and also referred to the various affidavits made on either side. Before we discuss that factual aspect of the case it will be convenient to examine the legal submissions urged before us on this question of public purpose and refer to the decisions on the subject to which our attention has been drawn by learned counsel appearing for the parties.

36. The argument on behalf of the petitioner under this head was that where acquisition of land is for a private concern whose sole aim is to make profits it cannot be regarded as for a public purpose find that the acquisition must directly advance the general interest of the public. It was urged that the circumstance that the Respondent No. 2 Company would manufacture inter alia preparations like anti-biotics said to be indispensable to the public or the circumstance that considerable foreign exchange could be saved are matters which can have no bearing on the question of the general interest of the public because that would not be the direct result of the acquisition. The direct result of the acquisition would be to enable Respondent No. 2 Company to make large profits.

37. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner on the following observations of Batchelor j. which were quoted with approval by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Hamabal Petit v. Secy. of State, 42 Ind App 44: (AIR 1914 PC 20):

'It is enough to say that, in my opinion, the phrase (public purpose) whatever else it may mean, must include a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly a

38. Considerable reliance has been placed in support of the case of the petitioner on the decision of the High Court of Orissa in Satrughna Sahu v. State of Orissa : AIR1958Ori187 . There the lands of the petitioner were acquired by a notification issued under the provisions of the Orissa Development of Industries, Irrigation, Agriculture, Capital Construction and Resettlement of Displaced Persona (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948, for the project of 'establishment of a paper mill' by a company, It was held that acquisition of the land for a private concern whose sole aim was to make profits could not be regarded as for a 'public purpose'. It was pointed out in the judgment in that case that there was no 'direct and vital concern' of the public with the paper mill.

39. Authorities abound and our attention baa been drawn to a number of decisions and dicta but we shall refer only to some of them and that with a view to showing how the expression 'public purpose' has been understood by the Courts in similar though not identical contexts. In State of Bombay v. R. S. Nanji : [1956]1SCR18 the expression came up for consideration in the context of Section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act 1948 A close analysis of the decision would show that the test approved of by the Privy Council in Hamabai's case. 42 Ind App 44: (AIR 1914 PC 20) was accepted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. At the same time care was taken to point out at pages 25-26 of the Report in examining certain cases cited at the bar that in each of those cases primarily the person directly and vitally concerned would be the person to whom residential accommodation, the subject matter of the order of requisition for a public purpose, would be allotted and with such allotment prima facie the general interest of the community would not be directly concerned at all. Even so the order of requisition could be regarded as made for a public purpose if it would further the general interest of the community. It is of some significance to note that in the opinion of the Supreme Court 'each case would have to be decided upon the facts and circumstances appearing therein'.. The observations made in the context of an order of requisition hy the State Government in that case if properly applied can afford guidance where the Court has to consider the broad general concept underlying the expression 'public purpose' in Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.

40. General interest of the community as a basic concept underlying the expression 'public purpose' was given prominence in some of the judgments of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh : [1952]1SCR1020 , in examining the vires of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, in the context of Article 31 of the Constitution. At page 290 of the Report, S. R. Das J. (as he then was) observed

'From what I have stated so far, it follows that whatever furthers the general interests of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individual must be regarded as a public purpose. With the onward march of civilisation our notions as to the scope of the general interest of the community are fast changing and widening with the result that our old and narrower notions as to the sanctity oi the private interest of the individual can no longer stem the forward flowing tide of time and must necessarily give way to the broader notions of the general interest of the community. The emphasis is unmistakably shifting from the individual to the community. This modern trend in the social and political philosophy is well reflected and given expression to in our Constitution,'

At page 311 Of the Report, Mahajan J. (as he then was) observed ;

'The expression 'public purpose' is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. In other words, the definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its needs. The point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is in the general interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual'.

41. No more than the terms public welfare or public policy does the term public purpose possess absolute conceptual clarity. Both in theory and application its underlying vagueness is reflected by the variations as to types of activities and spheres of action which may advance the health, education and Well-being, economic or social, of the public in general or a section of it and redound to public benefit. The Act does not define 'public purpose'. The so-called definition in Section 3(f) is of little assistance, for it touches only a segment of the whole pattern viz., provision of village-sites. Nor is there anything in the decided cases to show that, beyond stating a standard or pointer which has been applied by the Court as flowing from the broad but rather indeterminable legal concept underlying the term public purpose, any comprehensive definition has been laid down.

42. This is just as well. So diverse and varied can he the activities, engagements and operations which may redound to the general benefit of the public and in which the general interest of the public can be said to he really involved that it is Impossible to expect a definition exclusive or inclusive which will aptly meet every particular objective within the matrix of public purpose and not fail in some circurmstances. The expression is of convenient vagueness and the court can at best give temporary defi-niteness but not definitiveness to the undefined and shifting boundaries of a field which now seems like-ly to raise some frequent and fighting issues and give rise to different problems for adjudication,

43. Public purpose is not a constant The scope of an expression which conjugates general interest of the public must necessarily depend inter alia on social and economic needs and broad interpretation of the democratic ideal. It must alter as social and economic conditions alter. The social and economic theorist may contend for an extremely wida application of this concept of public purpose and over-emphasise the element of the general interest of the public. The reactionary on the other hand may strive for stringent restraints on its shifting boundaries and oppose any shift in emphasis. The true rule of the matter would seem to lie midway. The Court will not attach too much weight to the apparent character of the activity or agency but would prefer to lean in favour of an application of the rule which has regard to the substance of the matter and embraces activities, engagements and operations which would serve the common good as being affected with public interest. The application of the rule must rest on the modem economic system of a welfare state having its own require-ments and problems. The application of the rule would not be governed by right distinctions nor would the economic principle be allnwed to be blurred by the blending of forms and interests.

44. In the field of economic progress and in-terest of the public the application of the rule would include operations which are more or less indispen-sable to the community. The very lack of definitiveness of the expression public purpose, somewhat paradoxical though it may seem requires that the field of its coverage must extend to concerns which are fit to serve the common welfare. That coverage can include activities open to the initiative of both private enterprise and public administration for private enterprise is certainly amenable to public control and can be an efficient instrument of economic benefit.

45. We have deemed it expedient to state these broad considerations which, are more than prolegomena since they bear on the ambit and operation of Section 6. They are relevant to many disputes affecting the limits of the powers of the Government particularly where the element of some duality is present and underlies the purpose of acquisition and where a justiciable issue as to the same may arise for determination.

46. It was argued by counsel for the Respondents that it is very much in public interest that it Respondent No. 2 Company is allowed to expand its activities and manufacturing operations it wilt be able to supply to the country many indispensabte anti-biotics and other preparations and help the country to be self-sufficient in the matter of production of the same. Reliance has been placed on the details furnished in the further affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent No. 2 Company and it is pointed out that the antibiotics mentioned at items 17 to 20 are exclusively supplied and marketed by the Company and that 70 per cent of the business of the Company is confined to preparation and marketing of anti-biotics. Reference was also made in the course of the arguments to the manufacture by the Company of saccharine and also to procaine hydrochloride which was so far being imported from foreign countries and which when processed with other drugs is used in the manufacture of Procaine Penicillin and also of anaesthetic products. The argument here was that if the lands in question are acquired for the purposes of expansion of Sarabhai Chemicals of Respondent No. 2 Company, the Company will be able to make the country self-sufficient in the matter of production of Procaine Hydrochloride. It was stressed that at present a large part of the requirement of the same has to be imported from foreign countries. Reference was also made by counsel to other preparations such as Nicotinic acid, Niacinamide, Nydraxid tablet and injections, Calcium Lactate, Hydro Quinolin, Raudixin tablets, Sequil, and Micostatin. It was also pointed out that the University of Gujarat, the Benaras University and the Department of Chemical Technology send students for practical experience in the various fields of pharmaceutical manufacturing to the factory of Respondent No. 2. It was also urged that Respondent No. 2 Company is a scheduled industry controlled by the provisions of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951. Considerable stress was laid on the fact that large and valuable foreign exchange would be saved if the lands are acquired to enable the Company to expand its activities and operations in the matter of manufacture and marketing of the large number of preparations details of which were given in the further affidavit filed on behalf of the Company and also on the fact that the Central Government has the power to fix the price at which drugs, medicines, pharmaceutical and anti-biotics manufactured by the Company can be sold to the public.

47. It was on the other hand argued by counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had denied in his affidavits that the preparations and anti-biotics mentioned in the affidavits of the Respondent No. 2 Company were of great use and help to the public and that the petitioner had denied that the expansion of the activities and operations of the Company by increase in its production of medicines, drugs, pharmaceuticals and anti-biotics would result in saving of foreign exchange to the country. It was urged that in any case the public would not directly benefit by the manufacture of the same by the Company. Little could be seriously urged in respect of the various items of preparations mentioned jn the further affidavit of the Company except that the petitioner had questioned the correctness of the particulars of the preparations there mentioned and also of the importance attached to them by the Respondents. It was argued that even if considerable foreign exchange could be saved as stated by the Respondents that was not a factor germane to the issue as to the existence of public purpose and that any consideration of the same was irrelevant. The greatest stress was laid on the contention of the petitioner that the expansion of the activities of Respondent No. 2 Company was for the benefit of the Company alone and had nothing to do with public interest directly or indirectly. It was asserted that the purpose of the acquisition was not one in which the general interest of the community could be said to be directly and vitally concerned.

48. On a careful scrutiny of all the affidavits before us we are satisfied that the land in dispute is needed for a public purpose when we bear in mind that the old and narrow notions as to the sanctity of the private interest of the individual have at times to give way to the broader notions of general interest of the community and also bear in mind the broad general concept underlying the expression public purpose. We need not rehearse the details of the preparations for the manufacture of which the Company wants the land in dispute along with the lands the subject matter of the other similar petitions on our list which we have heard together. We ate satisfied that a number of the items and anti-biotics on which reliance is placed by the Company are indispensable products and the public is concerned with their preparation and ready availability in India. It cannot be ignored that Respondent No. 2 Company is a scheduled industry controlled by the provision of the Industries Development and Regulation Act,. 1951. The price of its products is subject to these controls. We are also satisfied that the public is vitally concerned in the saving of foreign exchange in our present economic situation and that this is an aspect of the matter which has to be borne in mind. We are satisfied that the respondents are correct in their submission that the intended acquisition of lands in dispute would materially help in the saving of such exchange. We have to consider together all the aspects of the case which redound to and result in the benefit of the public and on an assessment of all the facts and circumstances of the case and the cumulative effect of the same we are of the opinion that the land in dispute is needed for a public purpose as contended by the respondents. We may add that the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 are not defective on any of the grounds urged before us on behalf of the petitioner as held by us and the declaration under Section 6 is conclusive evidence that the land in dispute is needed for a public purpose.

49. In the result the petition fails and will be dismissed with costs. Rule will be discharged.

50. We have heard counsel on the question of costs. As we have already mentioned, there are five other petitions which were heard along with this petition. In effect only the arguments were presented in the present petition. In our opinion, the fair order for costs would be that in Special Civil Application No. 346 of 1960, the petitioner should be ordered to pay Rs. 250/- as fees for the advocate of Respondent No. 1 and Rs. 250/- as fees for advocate of Respondent No. 2. In each of the other petitions the petitioner will pay Rs. 150/- as costs of the advocate for the State and Rs. 150/- as advocate's fees for the advocate of the Company.


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