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Vijaysinh Mohansinh Solanki Vs. the Transport Manager, Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectContract
CourtGujarat High Court
Decided On
Case NumberFirst Appeal No. 821 of 1974
Judge
Reported inAIR1982Guj307; (1982)1GLR639
ActsIndian Contract Act, 1872 - Sections 14
AppellantVijaysinh Mohansinh Solanki
RespondentThe Transport Manager, Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service and anr.
Appellant Advocate Party in person,; V.M. Solanki and; N.V. Solanki, Ad
Respondent Advocate Dipak K. Trivedi, Adv. for; G.N. Desai, Adv.
Excerpt:
- - when a particular effect is said to be caused by a particular factor, it must be clearly and cogently established that the effect is the direct outcome of that particular cause. in my view, this is too well entrenched a proposition of law to be elaborated any further......section 14 of the contract act, a consent is said to be not free if it is caused by coercion, undue influence, etc. and it has been provided there that consent can be said to be so caused when it would not have been given but for the existence of such coercion, undue influence, etc. in my view, the word 'cause' is highly connotative. even if there be undue influence or coercion, but if it does not appear that it was instrumental in making the promisor to do the act in question, the existence of coercion, etc. would be of no avail. the word 'cause' is not a term of art, but it is a term of science. nothing can be said to be the cause of a particular effect, unless it is the proximate and immediate cause of that effect. when a particular effect is said to be caused by a particular.....
Judgment:

1. to 6. x x x

7. In order to appreciate this contention, the legal aspect of the problem deserves to be noted. Under Section 14 of the Contract Act, a consent is said to be not free if it is caused by coercion, undue influence, etc. and it has been provided there that consent can be said to be so caused when it would not have been given but for the existence of such coercion, undue influence, etc. In my view, the word 'cause' is highly connotative. Even if there be undue influence or coercion, but if it does not appear that it was instrumental in making the promisor to do the act in question, the existence of coercion, etc. would be of no avail. The word 'cause' is not a term of art, but it is a term of science. Nothing can be said to be the cause of a particular effect, unless it is the proximate and immediate cause of that effect. When a particular effect is said to be caused by a particular factor, it must be clearly and cogently established that the effect is the direct outcome of that particular cause. If the alleged cause is remote and not proximate, is distant and not immediate, such a cause cannot be said to be the cause in legal parlance. What I have observed above is made clear by the words quoted from S. 14 above. I would reiterate that the consent can be said to be so caused only if it could be shown that but for these factors of the alleged causes, the effect would not have ensued. In my view, this is too well entrenched a proposition of law to be elaborated any further. It is also to be elaborated any further. It is also to be noted that a factor that would case of another man. In other words, the causal relationship can be said to be established, only if it is proved that in the facts and circumstances of a particular case the said factors had weighed with the promisor and that but for those factors, the said promisor would not have acted in the manner he is found to have acted. Thus the totality of circumstances is required to be viewed before a decision one way or the other is reached in this regard. I propose to examine the evidence on record in this light.

8. to 33. X X X X

34. Appeal dismissed.


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