1. The successor of the landlord widow has filed these two petitions as all the three competent authorities have come to the conclusion that, under the amended S. 31(4)(b)(iii), the successor-in-interest had no right to terminate the tenancy in question. The revenue tribunal has rightly construed this relevant provision which has been enacted.
2. S. 31, while dealing with the question of right of the landlord to terminate the tenancy on the grounds specified in terms provides in sub-clause (4) (b) as under:
'(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (3),
(a) ... ... ... ... ...
(b) the right conferred under the said sub-s. (3) on a landlord who was a widow on the first day of April 1957 shall, after the specified date -
(i) be exercisable by the widow within a period of six months from the specified date;
(ii) be exercisable, in a case where the interest of the widow in the land has ceased to exist, by reason of her death or otherwise, before the specified date but the period of one year within which her successor-in-title is entitled to exercise the right under S. 31 has not expired, by the successor-in-title of the widow within a period of one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceased or, within a period of three months from the specified date, whichever period expires earlier;
(iii) in a case where the interest of the widow in the land ceases to exist on or after the specified date, expire on the date on which her interest so ceases to exist.
3. The whole intention of this new amendment was to get over the difficulties created by the old law under which during the lifetime of widow landlord the tenant's right to purchase remained in abeyance. That is why, even a living widow could terminate the tenancy under sub-clause (4) (b) (i), only within a period of six months from the specified date 3rd March 1973. If that right was not exercised by the widow, who was living landlord, the tenant would become deemed purchaser within one year of the expiry of the period during which this living widow landlord was entitled to terminate the tenancy. Even for the successor-in-interest, two specific provisions have been made. In S. 31 (4) (b) (ii), where the interest of widow in the land ceased to exist by reason of her death or otherwise on 3rd March 1973, the specified date, the exercise of right under S. 31 to terminate the tenancy, had been recognized by providing that such successor-in-title had to exercise his right within one year from the date on which the widow's interest ceased or within three months' period from the specified date, that is to say, before 3rd June 1973, whichever period expires earlier. Therefore, even the right of successor-in-interest where the widow died prior to the specified date 3rd March 1973, had been substantially curtailed by this outward limit of three months from the specified date. That is why, in the relevant sub-clause (4) (b) (iii), the right of the successor-in-title had not been recognised to terminate the tenancy in terms enacting that where the interest of the widow ceases to exist on or after the specified date, the right conferred on this widow landlord shall expire on the date on which her interest so ceases to exist. Therefore, in case where the widow died after the specified date 3rd March 1973, the very right of the widow has abated by this statutory provision itself and the successor-in-interest could never claim any such right to terminate the tenancy when such right of the deceased landlord itself came to an end. Therefore, the attempt of Mr. Shaikh to marshal-in-aid the provisions of S. 31 (4) (b) (i) was absolutely futile. The right to terminate tenancy has to be spelt out from this specific provision which is now enacted by the Legislature after its experience of the difficulties in the earlier law. That is why, Mr. Shaikh cannot also marshal-in-aid the decision in Bai Ganga v. Bai Kamla, (1974) 15 Guj 345,under the old scheme. Besides, the successor can make no grievance on the so-called principle enunciated in that decision because the provision applies only where the widow died after the specified date 3rd March 1973 and in case of such successor only the right of the widow has come to an end, and along with it the right of the successor. Therefore, the interpretation put by the Revenue Tribunal is correct and as per the salutary scheme of the tenancy law to expedite the purchase of the tenants. The Legislature has intended to achieve this result by new amendment and the Revenue Tribunal has given effect to the intention of the Legislature, Therefore, such a judgment of the Revenue Tribunal, which is the competent forum, cannot be said to be perverse so as to be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. There is, therefore, no substance on these two petitions and the petitions are summarily rejected.
4. Petitions dismissed.