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Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation Vs. the State Transport Authority and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectMotor Vehicles
CourtGujarat High Court
Decided On
Case NumberSpl. Civil Application Nos. 76, 77, 78 and 79 of 1963
Judge
Reported inAIR1965Guj248
ActsRoad Transport Corporations Act, 1950 - Sections 47-A and 48
AppellantGujarat State Road Transport Corporation
RespondentThe State Transport Authority and ors.
Appellant Advocate I.M. Nanavati and; B.H. Shah, Advs.
Respondent Advocate S.A. Hegde,; J.P. Patel,; V.G. Hathi and;
Excerpt:
motor vehicles - interpretation - sections 47-a and 48 of road transport corporations act, 1950 - petition raises question of interpretation of notification issued by central government in exercise of powers conferred upon it by section 47 a read with 48 - dispute related to grant of permit for plying stage carriages - statute prescribes that license has to be applied for and would be granted to applicant in respect of vehicles which he proposes to ply on public road or route - application for permit does not amount to right or liability. - - prior thereto, the saurashtra state road transport corporation (hereinafter referred to as the saurashtra) had already applied on february 27, 1958 for a permit for that route, but that corporation withdrew its application its application at a.....shelat, c.j.(1) this petition raises a question of interpretation of the notification no.s.o.1077 dated april 29, 1960, issued by the central government in exercise of powers conferred upon it by section 47a read with section 48 of the road transport corporations act, 64 of 1950, whereby the central government approved the scheme forwarded by the government of bombay relating to the re-organization on the bombay state road transport corporation and the dissolution of the kutch state road transport corporation and saurashtra state road transport corporation.(2) the petitioner corporation under section 47a(3)(b) of the road transport corporations act, 1950. the bombay road transport corporation and saurashtra state road transport corporation were constituted under section 3 of the said act......
Judgment:

Shelat, C.J.

(1) This petition raises a question of interpretation of the notification No.S.O.1077 dated April 29, 1960, issued by the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred upon it by section 47A read with section 48 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 64 of 1950, whereby the Central Government approved the scheme forwarded by the Government of Bombay relating to the re-organization on the Bombay State Road Transport Corporation and the dissolution of the Kutch State Road Transport Corporation and Saurashtra State Road Transport Corporation.

(2) The petitioner corporation under section 47A(3)(b) of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. The Bombay Road Transport Corporation and Saurashtra State Road Transport Corporation were constituted under section 3 of the said Act. The third respondents held a permit under section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act, IV of 1939, for plying stage carriages in respect of a route known Vallabhipur-Dhola Route. That permit was to expire on May 31, 1958. On April 10, 1958 the third respondent applied for the removal of that permit in respect of the said route. On April 18, 1958, the Bombay State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Corporation, also applied for a permit for that route. Prior thereto, the Saurashtra State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Saurashtra) had already applied on February 27, 1958 for a permit for that route, but that corporation withdrew its application its application at a meeting of the second respondent held on July 4, 958. The fourth respondent also applied had applied for a permit for the same route, but since it failed to attend the meeting held on 4, July 1958,its application was not considered by the second respondent. Therefore, the applicant of the third respondent for renewal and the application of the Bombay Corporation for a fresh permit were the only two applications pending before the second respondent for consideration.

(2a) By its order dated July 15, 1958, the second respondent granted the permit to the Bombay Corporation. Thereupon the aforesaid respondent filed an appeal against the aforesaid order, being Appeal No., 241 of 1958,bbefore the first respondent under section o64 of the Motor vehicles Act. By its order dated June 23, 1959 the first respondent dismissed the appeal of the third respondent and confirmed the order passed by the second respondent in favour of the Bombay Corporation, The third respondent therefore, filed a special civil application, Nos., 962 of 1959, in the High Court at Bombay where, by consent of the parties, the order passed by the Appellate Committee, i.e, the second respondent was set aside and the second respondent was directed to hear the aforesaid appeal, i.e., Appeal No. 241 of 1958, afresh. That order was passed without prejudice tot he rights and contentions of the parties and it also directed that status quo should be maintained in the mean time. That order was passed on March 23, 1960. In the meantime, the Bombay Reorganization Act, XI of Gujarat came into being. Under the provisions of section 47A of the Road Corporation was constituted as from May 1,1960. The aforesaid appeal No. 241 of 1958 came up for hearing before the second respondent on November 5, 1960. By its order dated December 3, 1960 the first respondent remanded the matter to the second respondent. On the matter being so remanded, the second respondent by its order being so remanded the second respondent, by its order dated July 26,m 1961, granted the permit to the fourth respondent and requested and rejected the application for permit by the Bombay Corporation. Against the aforesaid order, two appeals were filed before the first respondent. Appeal No. 24 of 1961 by the petitioner corporation and Appeal No. 19 by the third respondent. The first respondent allowed by the appeal of the third respondent, directing that permit should be granted to the third respondent, and dismissed the appeal field by the petitioner corporation. While dismissing the appeal filed by the Bombay Corporation, the first respondent observed that one of the issues raised by the learned advocate for the third respondent was that the Gujarat Corporation had no locus standi was that appeal and was not entitled to continue the proceeding initiated by the Bombay Corporation, as it had by then become defunct. The first respondent accepted that contention and held that the petitioner corporation was not entitled to continue that proceeding as

'the application for the grant of permit is neither property nor right and therefore in view of clause (22) of that notification GS. T R C, has no right to be substituted as successor to SS. RTC. We therefore, reject th4 appeal against the Gariadhar M.V.V.S M. Ltd'. By same order, the first respondent set aside the order of the second respondent under which permit was granted to the fourth respondent and, allowing the appeal of the third respondent, directed that permit should be granted to the third respondent. It is against the order of dismissal of Appeal No. 24 of 1961 and the finding by the first respondent that the Gujarat Corporation was not entitled to continue the said proceeding and had no locus standi in respect thereof that the present petition has been filed.

(3)Mr. Nanavati appearing for the petitioner corporation has mainly relied upon paragraphs 5 and 14 in Part II of the said application, and his contention was that under paragraph 114, since the Bombay Corporation was a party to the said proceeding immediately before the appointed day, i.e., May 1, 1960 and that the proceeding arising from the aforesaid application was with property, i.e., motor vehicles, situate in Gujarat area immediately before the appointed day and which stood transferred to the petitioner corporation under paragraph 7 of the notification, the petitioner corporation was dismissed to be substituted for the Bombay Corporation as a party to the aforesaid proceeding, or added as a party thereto, as the case may be, and that under paragraph 14 the first respondent was bound to treat the said proceeding as having continued accordingly. He also argued that as the second respondent had granted the permit to the Bombay Corporation which, immediately before the appointed day, was valid and effective, that permit was deemed to have been granted to the petitioner corporation and that being so, and an appeal having been filed against that order, the Gujarat Corporation must be deemed to be a party to that appeal and consequently it was not correct for the first respondent to hold that the petitioner corporation had no locus standi or no right to appear in the said appeal. In either events, argued Mr. Nanavati, the order of dismissal of the appeal passed by the first respondent was incorrect and contrary to the provisions of paragraph 5 and 114 of that notification.

(4) Before we deal with these contentions, it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Motor vehicles Act. Section 42 deals with the necessity for permits in the case of transport vehicles and provides that now owner of a transport vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle in any public place, save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or a Transport Authority authorising the use of the vehicle in such place. Section 46 provides that an application for a permit in respect of a service of stage carriages shall as far as may be, contain the particulars therein set out. The particulars to be set out in such application are inter alia the route or routes or the area or areas to which the application relates, the number of vehicles that is proposed to operate in relation to each route or area, the type of vehicles intended to be provide for in serve to maintain the service and to provide for special occasions and certain other particulars set out therein. Thus, a licence has to be applied for and would be granted to an applicant in respect of a vehicle or vehicles which he proposes to ply on a public road or a route or an area assigned to him for that purpose, and therefore an application for a licence would be in respect of such vehicle or vehicles.

(5) The Road Transport Corporations Act, 64 of 1950 was passed with the object of enabling State Governments, who may desire, to set up transport corporations to provide an efficient and properly co-ordinated system of road transport services. Section 3 of the Act provided that the State Government, having regard to the factors set out therein, may by notification in the Official Gazette, establish a Road Transport for the whole or any part of the State under such name as may be specified in the notification. Sections 4 and 5 of the Act deal with the Corporations or constitution of such corporations and sections 18 and 17 provide for the duties and power of such corporations. Consequent upon passing of the States-Reorganisation Act, 1958 the Legislature passed the Road Transport Corporations (Amendment) Act, 87 of 1956, whereby section 47A was introduced into the Act. When the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, was passed, section 71 was introduced into that Act, whereby section 47A was amended and a new section, section 48, was added to the Act. Section 47A, as amended, inter alia provides that where on account of reorganisation of States, the whole or any part of a State in respect of which a Corporation was, immediately before the day on which the reorganisation takes place, functioning and operating, is transferred on that day to another State and by reason of such transfer, it appears to the State Government necessary or expedient that the Corporation should be reconstituted or reorganised in any manner whatsoever or that it should be dissolved, the State Government may frame a scheme for the reconstitution, reorganisation or dissolution of the Corporation including proposals regarding the formulation of new Corporations the amalgamations of the Corporations, the amalgamations of the Corporation with any other Corporation, the transfer of the assets, rights and liabilities of the Corporation in whole or in part to any other Corporation, etc., and the State Government may forward a scheme to the Central Government for approval. Under sub-section (2), the Central Government was empowered to approve the scheme with without modifications and to make such other in relation thereto as it though fit. Under sub-section (3) such order was to provide inter alia for the dissolution of the Corporation, reconstitution or reorganisation in any manner, whatsoever, of the Corporations including the establishment where necessary of more than one Corporation in any State, the transfer in whole or in part of the assets, rights and liabilities of the Corporation including the transfer of any licences or permits granted to the Corporation, to any other Corporation, and the terms and conditions of such transfer. Under clause (g) of sub-section (3), such an order had to provide for such incidental consequential matters as may be necessary to give effect to the approved scheme. Under section 48, notwithstanding any contained in section 47A, the Government of the State of Bombay was empowered to frame a scheme and forward the same to the Central Government even before the 1st of May, 1960,and in that event power was conferred upon the Central Government to make an order under sub-section (2) of section 47A before the 1st May, 1960, though the order so made was not to take effect until the 1st of May, 1960.

(6) In pursuance of the proceedings of sections 47A and 48 of the Road Transp9rt Corporation Act, the Government of Bombay submitted a scheme relating to the reorganisation of the Bombay Corporation and the dissolution of the Kutch and Saurashtra Corporations. The scheme was approved by the Central Government under powers conferred upon it by section 47A, and for giving effect to the scheme, the Central Government promulgated an order by notification No. S.O. 1077, dated April 29, 1960, and published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, dated April 29, 1960.

(6a) On May 1, 1960 the State of Gujarat, as aforesaid, came into being and the petitioner Corporation was established. The aforesaid order cane into force on May 1, 1960, that the appointed day. Paragraph 3 of the order provided that as from the 1st of May, 1960 the Bombay Corporation would cease to function in the Gujarat area and that there shall be established on that day a new Corporation for the whole of the State of Gujarat under the name of the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation. Under Clause (d0 of paragraph 2, Gujarat area meant the territories referred to in sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, but excluding the Saurashtra area and the Kutch area. Under paragraph 4, the Saurashtra and Kutch Corporation were dissolved. Paragraph 5 of the order provided that the asset any property or licence granted to the Bombay Corporation which, immediately before the appointed day, was valid and effective, if the permit on the licence related exclusively to the Gujarat area. Should deed to have been granted to the Gujarat Corporation. Paragraph 7 provided for the transfer of assets and funds of the existing Bombay Corporation and laid down that subject to the other provisions of Part II of the Order, all land and all motor vehicles machinery, stores, articles and other goods belonging to the existing Bombay Corporation on the 31st March 1959 shall, if situated within the Gujarat area, passes to the Gujarat Corporation and if situate within the Maharashtra area, remain within the existing Bombay Corporation. Clause (2) of that paragraph provided that all land, motor vehicles, machinery stores, articles and other goods acquired and allocated after the 31st March 1959 and before the appointed day for specific schemes or purposes provided in the budget estimate of 1959-60 under proper sanction of the Board of the existing Bombay Corporation or any of its committee, shall pass to the Gujarat Corporation, if the said scheme or purposes were r3elatable to the Gujarat area and to the existing Bombay Corporation if the said scheme or purposes were relatable to the Maharashtra area. Clause (3) of paragraph 7 provided that all other goods belonging to the Bombay Corporation on the appointed day but not covered by the provisions of clauses (1) and (2) were to be divided between the two Corporations in the ratio of capital asserts. Paragraph 14 of the order then provided that where immediately before the 1st of May 1960 the Bombay Corporation was a party to any legal proceedings 'with respect to the any property, rights or liabilities transferred to the Gujarat Corporation under this Part', the Gujarat Corporation shall be deemed to be substituted for the existing Bombay Corporation as a party to those proceedings or added as a party thereto, as the case may be, and the proceedings should continue accordingly. Thus, under paragraph 7of this Order, motor vehicles situate in the Gujarat area, which wee until 1st May, 1960 the property of the Bombay Corporation became liable to be transferred and became vested in the Gujarat Corporation.

(6b) As aforesaid, the Bombay c has filed an application for the permit before the second respondent for the route in question. if that application can be said to be legal proceeding with respect to property transferred under para 7 of the order to the Gujarat Corporation, such proceeding must be held to have consisted and not come to an end only for the reason that the Bombay Corporation was reorganised and its jurisdiction over the Gujarat area was abolished when the Gujarat Corporation was set up for the Gujarat area. The effect, therefore, of paragraphs 7 and 14 of the Order will be that from the appointed day when the Gujarat Corporation was set up the Gujarat Corporation, by the fiction created in paragraph 14, must be deemed to be substituted for the Bombay Corporation as a party to the said proceeding or must be deemed to have been added as a party thereto, and the said proceeding must be allowed to continue accordingly, i.e., on the footing that the Gujarat Corporation was substituted for the Bombay Corporation or added as a party to that proceeding. The question is whether the application made by the Bombay Corporation for permit can be said to be (1) a legal proceeding, and (2) if so, whether it would be a proceeding with respect to property transferred to the Gujarat Corporation under paragraph 7 of the Order.

(6c) The expression 'with respect to any property' would mean in relation to or with reference to a property. Since the motor vehicles are undoubtedly property, an application for permit in respect of motor vehicles would mean an application with respect to such property and if such an application amounts to or is a legal proceeding, then since such an application to property transferred tot the Gujarat Corporation under paragraph 7, the Gujarat Corporation, by virtue of paragraph 14, must be deemed to have been substituted in place of the Bombay Corporation and the proceedings initiated by the Bombay Corporation for permit had to be allowed to be continued accordingly, i.e., with the Gujarat Corporation having been substituted for the original applicant, namely, the Bombay Corporation. An application is a proceeding and if such a proceeding is instituted under a statutory provision requiring it to be instituted, it would, without any doubt, be a legal proceeding and in respect of which, by the procedure provided for under the Motor Vehicles Act, the statutory authority had to adjudge as between the rival parties and the rival claims whether the applicant should be granted the permit or not.

(7) As will be seen, the order of the first respondent dismissing the appeal simply stated that the Gujarat Corporation was not entitled to continue the application filed by the Bombay Corporation as the application for permit was neither property nor a right transferable under paragraph 7 of the order. The first respondent, however, was oblivious of the fact that under paragraph 14 of the Order, a fiction is created whereby, if it is established that the application was in respect of property transferred to the Gujarat Corporation under paragraph 7, the Gujarat Corporation would become entitled to and would become entitled to and would be deemed to have been substituted for the original applicant. Whether that application was in respect of the very motor vehicles which were transferred to and which passed to the Gujarat Corporation on the appointed day would be a matter of evidence, if in the course of the enquiry an objection were to be taken that the application was not in respect of such vehicles and therefore, was not with respect to property transferred to the Gujarat Corporation under paragraph 7. But such an issue was not in fact raised before the first respondent, and it appears from the order itself that the first respondent dismissed the appeal on the sole ground that the Gujarat Corporation was not entitled to continue the application as it had no locus standi. In our view, that order was contrary to the provisions of paragraph 14 of the order and was passed without taking into consideration the express provisions thereof.

(7a) Mr.Hegde, who appeared for the third respondent, however, contended that in order that paragraph 14 of the order may apply, it had first to be shown that immediately before the appointed day, the Bombay Corporation was a party to a legal proceeding with respect to any property, rights or liabilities transferred to the Gujarat Corporation under part II of the order and that it would be then only that the Gujarat Corporation can be deemed to have been substituted for the Bombay Corporation as a party to those proceedings or added as a party thereto. The argument was that though the application made by the Bombay Corporation was a legal proceeding, it was not in the first instance a proceeding with respect to any right or liability, for, an application for a permit would not amount to either a right or a liability. Secondly, he argued, it was not a proceeding with respect to any property, for, an application for a permit is not property and therefore, paragraph 14 would have no application as there was no transfer under paragraph 7 of any right to apply for a permit. The permit not having in fact been issued to the Bombay Corporation there was also no question of such a permit being transferred to the Gujarat Corporation and therefore, the Gujarat Corporation cannot be deemed to have been substituted in the place of the Bombay Corporation in the application or in the appeal filed by the Bombay Corporation against the order of the second respondent.

(8) It is true that an application for permit does not amount to a right or a liability. Even if a permit is granted to an applicant, such permit is at best a licence and a personal privilege or franchise. But there can be no doubt that such an application required to be made under Motor Vehicles Act is a legal proceeding. Though the permit itself may not be property ort a right in property, nevertheless it is in respect of a motor vehicle which is property. An owner of an immovable property may grant a licence to another person to occupy it. Though such a licence does not confer any right to or in the immovable property, the licence is in respect of that immovable property. Similarly, a permit, though not a right, is in respect of property, namely, motor vehicles. It is not disputed that immediately before the appointed day, the Bombay Corporation was plying stage carriages in the Gujarat area and had, therefore, stage carriages situate in that area. It also cannot be disputed that like any other owner of stage carriages, the Bombay Corporation was entitled to apply for a permit for the route in question although that route was situate in Saurashtra and outside the Gujarat area as defined by the order. An application for permit for such a route was a legal proceeding and that proceeding was in respect of property, i.e., stage carriage or carriages which being sanctioned in the Gujarat area, were liable to be transferred to the Gujarat Corporation under paragraph 7 of the order. That being so, the provisions of paragraph 14 in our view would apply and the Gujarat Corporation was entitled to be treated as having been substituted for the Bombay Corporation in the aforesaid proceeding.

(9) Mr.Hegde then argued that there was nothing to show that the application of the Bombay Corporation for permit was with respect to the very vehicles which, immediately before the appointed day were stationed in the Gujarat area. It might be, he argued, that the Bombay Corporation might have thought of not using those vehicles and might have thought of having new or other vehicles to be used for the route in question. In that event it would not be possible to say that the proceeding was in respect of vehicles which, not being stationed in the Gujarat area were transferable under paragraph 7. That undoubtedly would be correct, but it would be seem that the first respondent did not dismiss the appeal upon the footing that it was not shown that the application was with respect to vehicles which were not stationed in the Gujarat area immediately before the appointed day and therefore, were not transferred under paragraph 7. That was not so and could not be so because the objection raised before the first respondent by Mr.Hegde merely was that the Bombay Corporation had become defunct on the appointed day so far as the Gujarat area was concerned and the order did not contain any provision whereunder the Gujarat Corporation was entitled to continue the appeal filed against the Bombay Corporation. It is possible that if Mr.Hegde had raised an objection that the appeal could not be continued by the Gujarat Corporation because there was nothing to show that it was in respect of vehicles transferred under paragraph 7 to the Gujarat Corporation, the Gujarat Corporation might have led evidence to show that the application for permit was with respect to motor vehicles situate in the Gujarat area immediately prior to the appointed day. In any event, as we have already observed such a question would be one of evidence. The first respondent, therefore, was not correct in dismissing the appeal merely upon the ground that there was no provision in the order for the transfer of a right to apply for a permit and without considering the provisions of paragraph 14 read with paragraph 7 of the order.

(10) The next argument of Mr.Hegde was that the notification in question was beyond the scope of section 47A of the Road Transport Corporation s Act 1950. As far as we could see, the contention was that whereas section 47A of the Act dealt with only the transfer of assets and liabilities and the making up of the scheme, this notification went further and provided for things which were not strictly in relation to such transfer of assets or were directly connected with such transfers. Frankly, we find it difficult to appreciate this argument, for, section 47A itself provides in clause (g) that the order which the Central Government may pass under sub-section (2) may include which may be incidental, consequential and supplemental for giving effect to the approved scheme. The right to be substituted for the Bombay Corporation in a proceeding started by the Bombay Corporation prior to the appointed day must be regarded as either incidental or consequential or supplemental to the reorganisation of that Corporation and the transfer of assets and liabilities to the new Corporation and therefore, the provisions of paragraph 14 cannot be said to be alien to the scheme of such reorganisation and the transfer of assets and liabilities. The contention, therefore, cannot be accepted.

(11) Besides relying upon paragraph 14 of the order, Mr. Nanavati sought to rely upon paragraph 5 of the order and contended that since the second respondent had passed an order granting permit to the Bombay Corporation and though that order was subject to an appeal, the order to grant permit was not aside when the High Court of Bombay disposed of the aforesaid special civil application. The order to grant permit not having been set aside, it must regarded as having been passed in favor of the Gujarat Corporation and, therefore, the Gujarat Corporation must be deemed to be a party to the appeal. In our view, this contention is not correct. The permit that is contemplated by paragraph 5 is a permit which must be valid and effective immediately before the appointed day, i.e., a permit which would have enabled the Bombay Corporation to ply its vehicles on the route in question. An order to grant permit passed by the second respondent without a permit having issued to the Bombay Corporation would not have entitled that Corporation to ply stage carriages on the route in question. It is also clear from paragraph 5 itself that such a permit must relate exclusively to the Gujarat area as defined by the order. Though the second respondent had passed the order to grant permit to the Bombay Corporation, no permit was actually issued presumably because of the appeal having been filed against that order by the third respondent. The route in question also being outside the Gujarat area or a route which was an inter-state route. Therefore, paragraph 5 would not apply not it cannot be said either that a permit was issued to the Bombay Corporation or that it would be taken to have been granted to the Gujarat Corporation or that the Gujarat Corporation must be deemed for that reason to have been a party to the appeal.

(11a) Though para 5, thus would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case, paragraph 14 would in our view, be applicable. There was, in our opinion, a legal proceeding pending before the authorities in the sense that there was pending on the appointed day an appeal field against the Bombay Corporation. That appeal arose from the application for permit and though it was in relation to a route outside Gujarat area, the Bombay Corporation was entitled to file such an application. The Gujarat Corporation was entitled to establish, if such objection had been raised, that that application was with respect to motor vehicles situate in the Gujarat area immediately before the appointed day and was therefore, the property which was transferred under para7 of the order and therefore, the Gujarat Corporation was deemed to have been substituted for the existing Bombay Corporation. If an objection was raised that the application for permit was not with respect to vehicles which were transferred under para 7 and the Gujarat Corporation had failed to connect that appeal with the motor vehicles transferred to it under para 7 the matter would perhaps have been different. But there was no justification for the first respondent to dismiss the appeal on the mere ground that the order did not contain any provision for the transfer of a right to apply or appeal. There is, therefore, an ex facie error of the law, in the order of dismissal and the order, therefore, is liable to be set aside. We are conscious that the application for permit made by the parties has had to go through a chequered career in the sense that it has remained ending for a long time owing to there being at least three remand orders. But on that ground alone we were to decline to interfere, that would be doing injustice to the petitioner Corporation, for, that would mean that the case of the petitioner Corporation would not be considered as an application by the authority. We, therefore, se aside the impugned order and allow the petition. The rule is made absolute with costs.

No. 77 of 1963.

(12) The question involved in this petition are the same and the reasons given by previous Petition No. 77 of 1963 would apply with the equal force to them, except that in this case, it would be part II of the order that would apply.

(12a) Paragraph 17 in Part III provides for the transfer of assets and lays down that subject to the other provisions of this Part, all land and all motor vehicles, machinery, stores articles and other goods belonging to the Kutch and Saurahstra Corporation shall, as from the appointed day, pass to the Gujarat Corporation. Unlike para 7 Part II of the order, under this paragraph all the assets including motor vehicles belonging to the Saurashtra and Kutch Corporation s are transferred tot he Gujarat Corporation as from the appointed day. Under para.22 of the order, it is provided that where, immediately before the 1st May 1960, the Kutch or the Saurashtra Corporation was a party to a legal proceeding with respect to any property transferred to the Gujarat Corporation under Part III, the latter has to be deemed to substituted for the Kutch or the Saurashtra Corporation, as the case may be, and the Saurahstra is thereafter to continue accordingly. There is thus no distinction, as under Part II, between property situate in the Gujarat area and the rest of the property. Under Part III, the entire property belonging to the Saurashstra and the Kutch Corporation s is transferred to the Gujarat Corporation. Since the Saurashtra Corporation had applied for a permit for the routes in question and that application was to ply its vehicles on those routes, the application must be held to be with respect to those vehicles. Therefore, the application by the Saurashtra Corporation and the appeal filed by it against the order granting the permit to the second respondent were legal proceedings with respect to property transferred under this Part of the order to the Gujarat Corporation, and for the reasons given in the earlier petition, under para 22 the Gujarat Corporation had t be deemed to be substituted for the Saurashtra Corporation, as a party to the proceedings. Consequently the order allowing appeal filed by the second respondent on the mere ground that the Gujarat Corporation had no locus standi vis--vis that appeal, was incorrect and contrary to the express provisions of para 22 and must be set aside. The first respondent is directed to hear the appeal on the footing that the Gujarat Corporation was substituted as a respondent to the appeal petition, therefore, is allowed and rule made absolute with costs.

Nos. 78 and 79 of 1963.

(13) The facts in those two special civil applications correspond with the facts in Special Civil Application No. 77 of 1963. The question arising in these applications are also identical as those in Special Civil Application No 77 of 1963. For the reasons set out in our judgment in Special Applications Nos, 76 and 77 of 1963, we set aside the impugned orders and direct that the first respondent to treat the petitioner Corporation as having been substituted under the provisions of paragraph 22 of the order for the Saurahstra Corporation. Rule in each of these two petitions made absolute with costs.

(14) Petitions allowed.


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