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Bai Lalita Vs. Shardaben and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtGujarat High Court
Decided On
Case NumberFirst Appeal No. 4 of 1964
Judge
Reported inAIR1970Guj37
ActsLand Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 3, 26, 30 and 54; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 - Sections 2(2) and 96; Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 - Sections 8, 21, 24 and 26
AppellantBai Lalita
RespondentShardaben and ors.
Appellant Advocate M.M. Patel, Adv.
Respondent Advocate J.J. Shah, Adv. for S.J. Shah, Adv. and; G.N. Desai, Govt. Pleader
Cases ReferredBrahmeswara Devaru v. Rudriah
Excerpt:
property - value - sections 3, 26, 30 and 54 of land acquisition act, 1894, sections 2 (2) and 96 of code of civil procedure, 1908 and sections 8, 21, 24 and 26 of bombay civil courts act, 1869 - whether decision under section 30 appealable under section 54 - decree becomes appealable under section 96 - decision given by lower court under section 30 is in no way an award or part of award as contemplated under section 54 - right of appeal cannot be invoked - amount of subject matter less than rs.10000 - forum of appeal not governed by section 54 - appeal lies to district court and not to high court - appeal returned for proper presentation in competent court. - - section 26 of the act may well be set out as under: this is clearly a decision of the court under section 30 of the act and.....shelat, j.1. this appeal raises a short, yet an important point as to whether the decision of the court of the civil judge (s.d.) passed under section 30 of the land acquisition act, is appealable to the high court under section 54 of the act, and if not, whether any such decision (where the amount or subject-matter involved is less than rs. 10,000) is appealable, and if so, only to the high court or to the court of the district judge, under whom it is subordinate. the lands bearing s. nos. 120, 243, 163, 170, 236, 237, 228 and 227 came to be acquired by the government for the purpose of widening the national highway no. 8 from bareja to ahmedabad. the claim for compensation was made before the special lenad acquisition officer at ahmedabad and the compensation was awarded to the.....
Judgment:

Shelat, J.

1. This appeal raises a short, yet an important point as to whether the decision of the Court of the Civil Judge (S.D.) passed under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, is appealable to the High Court under Section 54 of the Act, and if not, whether any such decision (where the amount or subject-matter involved is less than Rs. 10,000) is appealable, and if so, only to the High Court or to the Court of the District Judge, under whom it is subordinate. The lands bearing S. Nos. 120, 243, 163, 170, 236, 237, 228 and 227 came to be acquired by the Government for the purpose of widening the National Highway No. 8 from Bareja to Ahmedabad. The claim for compensation was made before the Special Lenad Acquisition Officer at Ahmedabad and the compensation was awarded to the claimants as per the award Ex. 2 produced in the case. Of the various claimants Nos. 1, 4, 6, 10, 12 and 14 were the landlords, while the others were tenants. There arose a dispute amongst the landlords and tenants, only in regard to the apportionment of the amount of compensation awarded for the lands under acquisition. The Land Acquisition Officer, therefore, referred the dispute for apportionment of the compensation amongst the claimants under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act' to the District Court at Narol. The Compensation Case No. 70/62 on the file of the District Court, Narol, then came to be transferred for disposal in accordance with law to the Court of the Civil Judge (S.D.) at Ahmedabad under Section 3(d) of the Act. The learned Judge found that the claimants who were the tenants in respect of the lands under acquisition were entitled to get 5 annas share in a rupee as against the landlords-claimants getting 11 annas share in a rupee. In the result, he passed an order directing the amount of compensation to be so apportioned. Feeling dissatisfied with that order passed on 24th June, 1963 by Mr. D.B. Naik, Civil Judge (S.D.) Narol, only Bai Lalita, daughter of Chhotalal, the owner of S. Nos. 236, 237 and 238, who was claimant No. 12 before the Court has come in appeal. The respondent No. 1 Shardaben, widow of Manibhai Channabhai, the claimant No. 13 before the Court below, claimed compensation on the ground of her being a tenant in respect of those lands.

2. Before this appeal could be heard on merits, a preliminary point was raised by Mr. Shah, the learned advocate for the respondent No. 1, that since this appeal is directed only against a decision of the Court under Section 30 of the Act, as contemplated under the provisions of the Act no appeal is competent before this Court under Section 54 of the Act. According to him, even if such a decision amounts to a decree and is appealable under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, the appeal would lie to the District Court, at Narol, it being a Court competent to hear an appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, read with Section 8 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act as applied to this State,- the claim being or even the amount to be apportioned being only Rs. 2722.37 nP., and that way less than Rs. 10,000/-. Now, it is common ground that the learned Civil Judge (S.D.) was competent to hear such references as also references under Section 18 of the Act, in view of the expression 'Court' defined in Section 3(d) of the Act as including the Court of Civil Judges (S.D.) to which the matter under this Act is transferred by the 'Principal Court of the original jurisdiction in the acre.' The only provision under which an appeal lies to the High Court against any decision of such a 'court' contemplated in Section 3(d) in the proceedings under this Act, in Section 54 of the Act. It runs thus:-

'54. Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award, of the Court.....'

It follows therefrom that an appeal can only lie to the High Court provided it is against an award or from any part of the award of the Court in any proceedings under this Act. One has, therefore, to find out as to whether the order passed in the present case is an award or any part of the award of the Court so as to entitle her to come in appeal before this Court under Section 54 of the Act. The term 'award' has not been specifically defined under the Act, but it has been referred to under Section 26 which relates to the form of an award. Section 26 of the Act may well be set out as under:-

'26. (1) Every award under this part shall be in writing signed by the Judge and shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of sub-section (1) of Section 23, and also the amounts (if any) respectively awarded under each of other clauses of the same sub-section, together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts.

(2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2, Clause (2), and Section 2, Clause (9) respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.' The material words to be noted in sub-section (1) of Section 26 are 'every award under this part' and then the amount awarded under any such award by the Court has to be on the basis of various clauses in Section 23(1) of the Act. The final decision becomes the award which shall be deemed to be a decree as contemplated in Section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, and the grounds given for such a decision are taken to be a judgment under Section 2(9) of the Civil Procedure Code, and the grounds given for such a decision are taken to be a judgment under Section 2(9) of the Code. 'This part' referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 26 covers part III only which relates to Sections 18 to 28 of the Act. The award has thus to be on the basis of a reference made to the Court under Section 18 of the Act. The proceedings then commence in the Court and the decision given on any such reference becomes an award under Section 26 of the Act. Such an award specifies the amount awarded under Section 23(1), clause (i) a also the amounts, if any, awarded under different clauses of that sub-section. It is only such an award which is contemplated under Section 54 of the Act, and therefore, only a party to that award gets a right to prefer an appeal against any such award or a part of an award, to the High court under Section 54 of the Act. It is, thus, obvious that since decision under this appeal given by the Court below does not fall under any of the provisions of Part III of the Act, it cannot be called an award in the proceedings under the Act and that way not falling within Section 54 of the Act. This is clearly a decision of the court under Section 30 of the Act and it falls not in Part III but in Part IV of the Act. The reference was made for only the apportionment of the amount settled under Section 1 of the Act, and it was only under Section 30 of the Act which provides that when the amount of compensation has been settled under Section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. That being so, any such decision would not come within the purview of Section 54 of the Ac inasmuch as it cannot be called an award under Part III of the Act so as to entitle any person affected thereby to claim a right of appeal only to the High Court under Section 54 of the Act. This appeal is, therefore, not competent under Section 54 of the Act.

3. Now it is true that there is no other provisions in the Act which permits an appeal against an order or decision of the Court passed under Section 30 of the Act. But we cannot lose sight of the fact, that by reason of Section 53 of the Act, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are made applicable to any proceedings before the Court under this Act. As contemplated therein, they apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act 'save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act.' Section 54 of the Act also proceeds by saying that an appeal under Section 54 shall be subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to appeals from original decrees. Thus the right of appeal against any other order or decision which is not inconsistent with the provisions contained in Section 54 remains under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. That is not taken away and on the contrary one has to avail of the provisions relating to appeal in the Civil Procedure Code, in matters under the Act provided there is a decision or order of the Court not falling under Section 54 of the Act. As stated in Section 30 of the Act, reference is for a decision of the Court and a decision given by that Court determines the rights of the parties in respect of their disputes. It is in the nature of a decree as contemplated in Section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, and thus, in our view, it becomes appealable under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code.

4. In this connection, we may refer to some of the decisions to which reference was made before us. In a case of Ramchandra Rao, v. Ramchandra Rao, 24 Bom. LR 963= (AIR 1922 PC 80), it was held as under:-

'The award as constituted by statute is nothing but an award which states the area of the land, the compensation to be allowed and the apportionment among the persons interested in the land of whose claims the Collector has information, meaning thereby people whose interests are not in dispute, but from the moment when the sum has been deposited in Court under S. 31(2) the functions of the award have ceased; and all that is left is a dispute between interested people as to the extent of their interest. Such dispute forms no part of the award.......'. It is further observed that 'the order determining the apportionment of the compensation is not an award within the meaning of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act'. This decision came to be considered in the case of Raghunath Das Harjivandas v. District Superintendent of Police, Nasik, AIR 1933 Bom, 187, and it was held that though the order determining the apportionment of the compensation is not an award within the meaning of S. 54 it is certainly a decree or of the nature of a decree and an appeal lies against it. A similar view was taken in the case of Mahalinga Kudumban v. Theetharappa Mudaliar, AIR 1929 Mad 223. There it was clearly laid down that the decision in reference under Section 30 is not an award within the meaning of Section 54, and hence no appeal would lie against it under that section. But the decision is appealable under Section 96, Civil Procedure Code. It was further observed in that case that the decision in reference under Section 30 being one on rights of contending parties, is a decree within Section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code and is appealable under Section 96 of the Code. Similarly in Hanumanthappa v. Korisetty Sivalingappa. AIR 1960 Mys 139, it was held that a decision under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act is a 'decree' and as such the aggrieved party has a right of appeal. There the contention was that an order passed under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition act was not a decree and that, therefore, no appeal was competent. In that case, however, no further question arose as to whether the appeal was one maintainable under Section 54 of the Act or under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. In our view, therefore, it is clear that the decision given by the Court below under Section 30 of the Act is in no way an award or part of an award as contemplated under Section 54 of the Act and therefore, it cannot be invoked for the purpose of claiming a right of appeal only to the High Court. It is at the same time clear as observed above that such a decision under Section 30 of the Act, amounts to a decree as contemplated under Section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code and it becomes appealable under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. Such a right of appeal is not only not taken away by any of the provisions under this Act, but it stands strengthened by the opening words of Section 54 of the Act.

5. That takes us to a further question as to whether an appeal against the decision of the Court below would still lie in the High Court under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code provides for an appeal from the original decree. It runs thus:-

'96(1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. x x x x x'

if, therefore, the Court of the Civil Judge (S.D.) passes any such decision which amounts to a decree as contemplated under Section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code while exercising his jurisdiction, the proper Court to which an appeal lies against any such decision would be a Court authorised to hear appeal from the decision of that Court. That would require us to turn to the provisions contained in the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 applied to the State of Gujarat, since they govern the same. Section 7 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act says that the District Court shall be the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in the district, within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. Then comes the important Section 8 which says that except as provided in Section 16, 17 and 26, the District Court shall be the Court of Appeal from all decrees and orders passed by the subordinate Courts from which an appeal lies under any law for the time being in fore. Thus except cases covered by Section 16, 17 & 26, the appeal would lie to the District Court from any decision of the subordinate Court such as the Courts of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) as also of Civil Judge (Senior Division). Section 16 refers to the powers of the District Judge to refer to any Assistant Judge Subordinate to him original suits of which the subject-matter does not amount to fifteen thousand rupees in amount or value, applications or references under Special Acts, and miscellaneous applications. The Assistant Judge shall have jurisdiction to try such suits and to dispose of such applications or references. Then it further, provides that where the Assistant Judge's decrees and orders in such cases are appealable, the appeal shall lie to the District Judge or to the High Court according to the amount or value of the subject-matter does not exceed or exceed ten thousand rupees. Then comes Section 17, it provides for appellate jurisdiction of an Assistant Judge with which we are not concerned. The other Section 26 referred to in Section 8 provides for appeals from the decision given by a Civil Judge. As provided therein, in all suits decided by a Civil Judge of which the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds ten thousand rupees, the appeal from his decision shall be direct to the High Court. Thus, in a suit or in a civil proceeding as the case may be, if the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds ten thousand rupees, the appeal would lie not to the District Court but direct to the High Court even though the Court of Civil Judge is subordinate to the District Judge under Section 24 of the Act. Section 24 of the Act refers to two classes of Civil Judges. The jurisdiction of a Civil Judge (Senior Division) extends to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature and that of a Civil Judge (Junior Division) extends to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature wherein the subject-matter does not exceed in amount or value ten thousand rupees. It follows therefrom that all appeals against the decisions given by the Civil Judge (Junior Division) in his District wherein the subject-matter does not exceed in amount or value ten thousand rupees, the appeal would lie to the District Judge and in case where it exceeds ten thousand rupees, the appeal would lie to the High Court. Thus, the District Court is authorised to hear appeals not only from the decisions of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), but also from those of Civil Judge (Senior Division) provided the subject-matter or value in that decision does not exceed ten thousand rupees. It has similarly an authority to hear appeals from decisions of the Assistant Judge provided the subject-matter or value in the decision does not so exceed ten thousand rupees. If that exceeds ten thousand rupees, the appeal would no doubt lie to the High Court. This view finds support from a decision in the case of Mangatram Gangadas v. Hundomal Hassomal, AIR 1941 Sind 100, where it was held that where an order of apportionment is passed by the Assistant Judge in land acquisition proceedings relating to a dispute as to compensation deposited by the Collector under Section 30 and the dispute is referred by the Collector to the Court for its decision, the appeal, if the subject matter of the order did not exceed Rs. 5000, lies to the District Court and not to the High Court. Now the same jurisdiction to hear references under the Land Acquisition Act has been also extended to the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) under Section 3(d) of the Act, and therefore its decision also would be governed accordingly for purposes of appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code read with the provisions of the Bombay Civil Courts Act. It is thus clear that since the decision under appeal is one under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act and as it relates to the value or subject-mater which has been below ten thousand rupees, the appeal against any such decision could lie to the District Judge of the District to which the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) was subordinate as contemplated under Section 24 of the Act.

6. The contention on the other hand was that the term 'Court' has been defined under Section 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act as meaning a principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed (as it is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under this Act. Then come the words 'and shall, in relation to any proceedings under this Act, include the Court of a Civil Judge (Senior Division) to which the principal Civil Court may transfer any such proceedings.' These words were inserted in the Act by Section 2 of the Bombay Amendment Act (Bombay Act No. XXXV of 1953). On the basis of that clause, it was urged that once any proceeding under this Act has been transferred by the principal Civil Court such as the District Court in the present case, the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) gets jurisdiction of the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction and, therefore, since the appeal lies against the decision of any such principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction to the High Court, an appeal against the decision of any such Civil Judge (Senior Division) should also lie direct to the High Court, Now, in the first instance, having regard to the provisions contained in the Bombay Civil Courts Act and more particularly by reason of section 7 of that Act it is only the District Court which has been made the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in the District within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no other provision in that Act which makes any such Court of a Civil Judge (Senior Division) a District Court in the District. In fact there is a provision contained in Section 19 of the Act whereby the Government can invest an Assistant Judge with powers of a District Judge in a particular part of a district. Section 19 contemplates that whenever any such powers are invested in an Assistant Judge, the jurisdiction of the District Judge within those limits becomes pro tanto excluded. In other words, such an Assistant Judge can well exercise the powers of a District Judge in that particular area. Against his decision in those circumstances, even if it relates to an amount or value not exceeding ten thousand rupees, the appeal will lie to the High Court and not to the District Court. There is no such power or authority which is invested by such a definition of the Court under Section 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act in so far as any Civil Judge (Senior Division) in the District is concerned. He remains subordinate to the District Judge in that District and the District Judge's jurisdiction is not excluded. He cannot, therefore, by reason of this definition be taken as a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction such as the District Court. All that one can say is that his jurisdiction stands expanded or enlarged, the same being given to that Court for deciding cases arising under the provisions of that Act. That becomes all the more clear if the last words of that clause are taken note of. The Civil Judges (Senior Division) gets his jurisdiction in relation to any proceedings under this Act expanded or enlarged provided those proceedings which have been instituted in the principal Civil Court of the District are transferred to that Court. In other words, what he has to deal with are proceedings under this Act provided they are transferred or referred to him. He does not thereby become the principal court such as the District Court so that the decision given by him in those cases may become appealable only to the High Court. The powers to hear appeals against these decisions are as contemplated under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code and they would be with those Courts which are authorised to hear the same. The authority, therefore, to hear any such appeal against the decision of any such Civil Judge (Senior Division) would arise having regard to Section 8 read with Sections 21, 24 and 26 of the Act. Whether, therefore, the amount or value of the subject-matter decided by him exceeds ten thousand rupees, the appeal from his decision would go direct to the High Court and when the amount or value of the subject-matter in respect of any such decision does not exceed ten thousand rupees, the appeal against that decision can only lie to the District Court, it being a subordinate Court to the District Court in the District. In our view, therefore, the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) does not become the principal Court of Original Jurisdiction in view of the position arising under the Act and he retains the same position as of a Civil Judge (Senior Division) just as an Assistant Judge to whom cases are referred by the District Judge as contemplated under Sections 16 and 17 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act.

7. In this connection, Mr. Desai, the learned Govt. Pleader, invited a reference to two decisions which by analogy can well support the view we have taken. Both of them arise under the provisions contained in the Hindu Marriage Act. The first case referred to by him is of Gangadhar Rakhmaji v. Manjulal Gangadhar, AIR 1960 Bom 42. In that case, a petition for a decree for divorce or judicial separation under the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was filed in the Court of the Civil Judge (S.D.) at Ahmednagar. That was opposed by the opponent. That petition come to be dismissed holding that the allegations on which the petition was founded were not proved. The petitioner had, therefore, filed the appeal against that decision under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act in the Bombay High Court. The point raised before the High Court was as to whether the appeal in that Court was competent. While considering that question they referred to Section 28 and held that where in a petition under the Hindu Marriage Act a decree is passed by the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, of Ahmednagar, which Court was notified by the State Govt. As having jurisdiction in respect of matters dealt with in the Act, the appeal lies to the District Court of Ahmednagar and not to the High court. Then it was observed that the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, which is notified by the State Government as having jurisdiction in matter dealt with under the Hindu Marriage Act, is a 'District Court' within the definition of Section 3(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, but it is not principal Civil court of original jurisdiction, nor does it exercise its jurisdiction as such principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act leaves the forum of appeal to be determined under the law for the time being in force, which, in the present case, is the Bombay Civil Courts Act. The forum of appeal from the order or decree of the Court of the civil Judge, Senior Division, under the Bombay Civil Courts Act is the Court of the District Judge of the District. In those circumstances, it was held that the appeal lies to the court of the District Judge and not to the High Court. This view of the High Court of Bombay came to be followed in the case of Mallappa v. Mallava, AIR 1960 Mys 292. These two decisions cover by analogy the point involved in the appeal before us. In our view, therefore, it is clear that the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) does not become the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction and it does not exercise its jurisdiction as such so that an appeal can directly lie to the High Court. Besides, the present appeal against any such decision under Section 30 of the Act is one not contemplated under Section 54 of the Act but by the provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code. When this is so, the forum of appeal has to be determined under the law for the time being in force viz., the provisions contained in the Bombay Civil Courts Act. The appeal, therefore, against the decision relating to apportionment of the compensation awarded to the claimants under Section 30 of the Act would lie to the District Court in case the amount or value of compensation does not exceed ten thousand rupees and if it exceeds ten thousand rupees, the appeal would lie to the High Court.

8. Since the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer which required to be apportioned amongst the claimants under the reference under Section 30 of the Act, was Rs. 2728.37 nP. And that way less than Rs. 10,000/-, the appeal against any such decision, therefore, would lie to the District Court and not to the High Court directly as the forum of appeal would be governed not by Section 54 of the Act but by reason of the provisions contained in Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code read with Section 8, 21, 24 and 26 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act.

9. An attempt was made to suggest that this being a composite award given by the Land Acquisition Officer, an appeal would lie under Section 54 of the Act. According to him, both the questions viz., of fixing the compensation as also of apportionment arose before the Land Acquisition Officer and therefore his award was of a composite character. We are not concerned with the award of the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 54 of the Act. It refers to award of the 'Court'. Before the Court, the reference was under Section 30 of the Act only as it was only for the apportionment of the amount of compensation amongst the persons who claimed the same as landlord as against the tenants in respect of those lands. There is therefore no question of any composite award inasmuch as there was no reference as to the claim for compensation for the lands under acquisition under Section 18 of the Act. The reference was one made only under Section 30 of the Act. The decision of the Court was thus only under Section 30 of the Act. The case of Brahmeswara Devaru v. Rudriah, AIR 1956 Mys 28, has consequently no application since in that case the reference was both under Sections 18 and 30 of the Act and thus a composite reference - the decision that way falling under Section 54 of the Act.

10. It was lastly urged by Mr. Patel that this Court has ample powers to hear and decide this appeal and that it should do so. Even if the High Court had any authority to decide the appeal. It would not be proper to usurp the jurisdiction of the Court of the District Judge to hear the appeal against any such decision passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) in the case. It involves the authority of the Court to hear appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. No Court, howsoever superior it may be, can allow itself to take over any such jurisdiction invested in any other Court in accordance with law. It may well be that parties affected by any such decision may have a further right of revision or appeal, as the case may be, before this Court. Such a request cannot, therefore, be accepted.

11. In the result, therefore, we hold that the appeal is not competent before this Court and the appeal is, therefore, directed to be returned to the appellant for presentation to the proper Court in the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs in this Court.

12. Order accordingly.


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