N.M. Miabhoy, C.J.
1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging two notifications under the Land Acquisition Act (hereafter called the Act), to be presently mentioned. Petitioners are owners of two fields bearing survey numbers 1025/1 and 1025/2 situated at Balasinor, District Kaira. First respondent is the State of Gujarat. It published, on 15th February 1962, a notification dated 1st February 1962 under Section 4 of the Act, stating that the above lands were likely to be needed for a public purpose, namely, 'for establishing a market yard for the Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Balasinor. ' After the objections under Section 5A of the Act were decided, first respondent published, on 4th October 1962, a notification dated 20th September 1962 under Section 6 of the Act, declaring that the above two fields were needed 'for establishing market yard for the Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Balasinor. ' Petitioners thereafter filed the present petition on 31st October 1962, praying that the two notifications aforesaid be quashed and that, the Prant Officer, Anand, who was appointed as the Special Land Acquisition Officer for the purposes of the aforesaid acquisition, be restrained by an order of this Court from taking any proceedings under the two notifications. The petition is based, mainly, on two grounds. The first ground is that, the Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Balasinor, (hereafter called the Market Committee), for which acquisition is being made, has not been legally constituted. The second ground is that, in any case, the acquisition is bad, because, the proviso to Section 6 of the Act is not satisfied on the facts of the present case. In the second notification, dated 4th October 1962, it has been stated that the lands are needed to be acquired 'at the expense of a local body. ' It is common ground that the local body referred to in this notification is the Market Committee. Section 6(1) of the Act says that, when the appropriate Government is satisfied that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders. It is common ground that the impugned acquisition is for a public purpose. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 6, on which the second objection is based, runs as follows:
Provided that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid...wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.
One of the contentions which has been raised by respondents is that, in the present case, respondent No. 1 had made a contribution of Re. 1/- from out of public revenues and, therefore, the above proviso is satisfied. After some discussion on this aspect of the matter, the learned acting Advocate General gave up this contention of respondents. Therefore, for the purposes of the present petition, the second objection has to be dealt with on the footing that no contribution is to come out from the public revenues. Therefore, it is common ground that, in order that the acquisition may be valid, it is necessary that the contribution should be from, as the proviso states, 'some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. ' The second objection of petitioners is that, the Market Committee is not 'a local authority' within the meaning of the above proviso and, therefore, the acquisition is bad and void. On the other hand, respondents contend that the Market Committee is such a local authority and, therefore, the proviso aforesaid is satisfied.
2. Mr. Vakil, Learned Counsel for petitioners, after formulating the first objection and arguing it for some time, distinctly gave the same up and said that he was not in a position to press the same. Therefore, the only point which arises for decision in the present petition, and on which the fact of this petition depends, is, whether, the Market Committee is a local authority within the meaning of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act.
3. Now, the expression 'local authority' has not been defined in the Act. The same has, however, been defined in the General Clauses Act X of 1897 (hereafter called the Clauses Act). The definition is in Clause (31) of Section 3. That expression is also defined in Clause (26) of Section 3 of the Bombay General Clauses Act. The definitions contained in the two above enactments-the Clauses Act and the Bombay General Clauses Act-are not exactly identical. Respondents have also placed reliance upon the definition contained in the Bombay General Clauses Act. However, the Act being a central enactment, the Bombay General Clauses Act is not applicable for construing the Act. Therefore, the learned acting Advocate General rightly did not place any reliance upon the definition of the expression 'local authority' contained in the Bombay General Clauses Act. But, fortunately, that part of the definition contained in the General Clauses Act, on which alone reliance can be placed by respondents, is in the same terms as the relevant part of the definition in the Bombay General Clauses Act, on which respondents could have placed reliance. That being so, Mr. Vakil, Learned Counsel for petitioners, did not object to, and in fact cited available authorities, which have construed Clause (26) of Section 3 of the Bombay General Clauses Act and an allied definition which, though different in some' respects, is also identical on the relevant part of the definition of the same expression in the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act. Respondent have also relied upon Sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963. That sub-section enacts-'A Market Committee shall be deemed to be a local authority within the meaning of Clause (26) of Section 3 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904. ' However, the learned acting Advocate General, after reading that sub-section, also rightly did not place any reliance upon this sub-section too. That sub-section came into force after the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made and after the present petition was presented. Therefore, that sub-section cannot apply to the facts of the present case, unless, it has retrospective operation. But, even assuming that the sub-section has such an operation, that sub-section cannot help respondents for the main reason that it would make the Market Committee a local authority only for the purposes of the Bombay General Clauses Act and, as already stated, the learned acting Advocate General does not dispute that the definition as contained in the Bombay General Clauses Act can be of no avail for construing the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act. Therefore, in the ultimate analysis, the fate of this petition depends on the simple question as to whether, the Market Committee is a local authority within the meaning of Clause (31) of Section 3 of the Clauses Act.
4. The definition of that expression is as follows:
'local authority' shall mean a Municipal Committee, district board, body of port commissioners or other authority legally entitled to. or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund.
The expression 'Government', used in the definition, is defined in Clause (23) of Section 3 of the Clauses Act as including 'any State Government. ' Now, the definition is an exhaustive one. It may be divided into two parts. The first part comprises of three specified authorities, namely, (1) a municipal committee, (2) a district board, and (3) a body of port commissioners. Respondents do not contend that, the Market Committee comes within the purview of any of these three specified authorites. Therefore, those authorities need not detain us, except that, we may have to revert to them for the purpose of construing some of the expressions used in the second part of the definition. The second part of the definition says that, a local authority shall mean 'or other authority legally entitled to, or entrusted by the Government with, the control or management of a municipal or local fund. ' Respondents contend that, the Market Committee falls within this part of the definition. Therefore, the crucial question which falls to be decided in the present petition is, whether, the Market Committee falls within the purview of the second part of the definition. Now, in order that that definition may apply, it is quite clear that, firstly, the Market Committee must be an authority. Secondly that, that authority must be in control or management of a fund. Thirdly, the control or management of the fund must be by virtue of a legal right or must have been entrusted to it by Government. Fourthly, the fund of which the authority must have control or management, must be 'a municipal or local fund. ' It is only when all the aforesaid ingredients are satisfied that an authority would be a local authority within the meaning of Clause (31) aforesaid. Now, as we shall presently show, there is no doubt that the Market Committee is legally entitled to the control or management of a fund. The Market Committee was constituted under the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939, and is deemed to be continued under Section 64, Sub-section (3), Clause (ii) of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 after the repeal of the Bombay Agricultural Procuce Markets Act, 1939, (hereafter called the Markets Acts). It is not disputed that, at the relevant time, under Sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Markets Act, the Market Committee was in charge of a fund called the Market Committee fund. But, the controversy in the present petition is whether, that fund was a municipal or a local fund within the meaning of the definition. The learned acting Advocate General concedes that the Market Committee fund is not a municipal fund. But, he contends that, that fund is a 'local fund' within the meaning of that definition. On the other hand, Mr. Vakil, Learned Counsel for petitioners, contends that the Market Committee is not a local authority for two reasons, firstly that, it is not an authority within the meaning of the above definition and, secondly, that the fund, of which it is in charge, is not a local fund within the meaning of the same definition. Therefore, in order to dispose of the present petition, the two key expressions which require construction and on the application of which the present controversy needs to be resolved, are 'other authority' and 'local fund. '
5. Therefore, the first question for decision is, whether, the Market Committee is an authority within the meaning of the above definition. Before we deal with the facts of the case, it is necessary to resolve the controversy which has been raised by Mr. Vakil regarding the interpretation of the expression 'other authority'. Mr. Vakil's contention is that the expression 'other authority' must be construed ejusdem generis with the three expressions which precede that expression. Mr. Vakil contends that this matter is no longer res Integra and has been finally and authoritatively decided in a judgment which is binding on this Court. Mr. Vakil relies upon the judgment of Chagla C. J. in Baburao Shantaram More v. The Bombay Housing Board, which is quoted in 56 B. L. R., page 286, whilst reporting the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the same case. In that case, a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay consisting of Chagla C. J. and Gajendragadker J. (as he then was) had to deal with the question as to whether the Bombay Housing Board, constituted under the Bombay Housing Board Act, was a local authority within the meaning of Clause (26) of Section 3 of the Bombay General Clauses Act. Chagla C. J., after quoting the definition of the expression 'local authority' in the latter Act, proceeded to make the following observations at page 287:
Now, certain difficulties present themselves in applying this definition to a Housing Board. In the first place, the authority contemplated by this definition must be an authority which must be ejusdem generis with a Municipal Corporation, Municipality, local Board, Body of Port Trustees or Commissioners; and, as we shall presently point out, looking to the scheme of the Housing Board Act a housing board is not an authority in that sense.
The specified authorities which have been mentioned in this part of the judgment contain some additional bodies. This is due to the fact that the Bombay definition of the expression 'local authority' contains some other specified bodies also. Now, in our judgment, Mr. Vakil is not right in contending that the aforesaid passage records the decision of the Court on the interpretation of the expression 'other authority' in the definition. In the first place, the above passage does not say so in terms. The passage only enumerates one of the several difficulties which the learned Chief Justice felt the Bench would have to face in order to decide whether the housing board is or is not a local authority. Secondly, it is noteworthy that the actual decision in the case is not based upon the aforesaid passage. In that case, as the later part of the judgment shows, the decision was arrived at on the ground that, under Section 34 of the Housing Board Act, the exemption under Section 4 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, was deemed to have been extended to the housing board retrospectively. Therefore, we cannot agree with Mr. Vakil's contention that the point is no longer res Integra on the ground that the case authoritatively construes the expression 'authority' as ejusdem generis with the preceding specified bodies. Dealing with the question on its own merits, when we asked Mr. Vakil to point out to us whether the three specified bodies constitute a genus, of which such was a species, Mr. Vakil fairly conceded that, whilst he would be able show that the first two specified bodies a Municipal Committee and a District Local Board-were species of a single genus, he would not be in a position to say something about the third specified body, namely, a body of Port Commissioners. It is well settled that unless there is a genus or category, there is no room for the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine (vide Maxwell, Eleventh Edition, page 327). But, Mr. Vakil, alternatively, contends that, even if he is not able to satisfy that the previously mentioned expressions constitute together a genus or a category, in any case, the general expression 'other authority' should not be construed in a general sense, but, must take its colour from the expressions preceding it. Mr. Vakil has in mind the maxim Noscitur a Sociis. According to that maxim, when two or more words, which are susceptible of analogous meaning, are coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. Mr. Vakil's contention is that, whilst definitely a Municipal Committee and a District Local Board are units of local administration, even if it is dubious whether Port Commissioners are not so, that body is certainly analogous to a body administering a local unit. In our judgment, there is a great deal of force in this contention of Mr. Vakil and that is considerably reinforced by the fact that the expression 'authority' is qualified by the further fact that that authority must be in control or management of a municipal or local fund. As we have already pointed out, it is not every kind of authority which will come within the expression used in the last part of the definition. In order that such on authority may be a local authority, it is necessary that it must have control or management of a municipal or a local fund. Broadly speaking, it is not likely that an authority which is in control or management of a municipal or a local fund will not be a unit of local administration. Under the circumstances, in our judgment, in order that an authority may be a local authority, it is not enough that it should exercise some power or perform a duty, but, it is necessary that it should administer some governmental functions in a local area. In other words, in order that an authority may be a local authority, it is necessary that it should operate within a pre-determined or defined locality and must discharge functions which are exercisable by the State and which functions would naturally come to be assigned or delegated to it by a statute or some other legal instrument. In other words, the expression 'authority' means a legally constituted body which discharges the functions of a local government a body which is authorised to perform the whole or part of the governmental functions in regard to a specified, pre-determined or defined locality. Therefore, in order that the Market Committee may be an authority within the meaning of the expression 'local authority', it is necessary that it should have authority to perform all or some of the governmental functions in regard to a specified locality. In other words, the expression 'the other authority' means a local administrative unit and is a species of local government.
6. Therefore, the question for consideration is, whether, the Market Committee answers the aforesaid discription of a local authority. Now, a Market Committee is, under Section 7 of the Market Act, a body corporate, having perpetual succession, a common seal, a right to sue, a liability to be sued in its corporate name and competent to acquire, hold, lease, sell or otherwise transfer any property and having a right to contract and to do all other things necessary for the purposes for which it is established. The duties which are performable by such a Committee are mentioned in Section 5AA of the Markets Act. The duties are (1) to enforce the provisions of the Act, (2) the conditions of a licence granted under Sub-section (2) of Section 4 and rules and bye-laws made under the Markets Act in the area of its operation, and (3) when a market is established therein, a duty to provide for such facilities in the market as the State Government may from time to time direct in connection with the purchase and sale of the agricultural produce with which it is concerned. The Market Act has been enacted to provide 'for the better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural produce' and for 'the establishment of markets of agricultural produce. ' Under Section 5A, where a market is established under Section 4A, the Market Committee has the power to issue licences in accordance with the rules to traders, commission agents, brokers, weighmen, measurers, surveyors, warehousemen and other persons to operate in the market area or any part thereof. Under Section 12, power is conferred upon the Market Committee to resolve any difference that may arise between an interested person and an officer appointed under Section 19 of the Weights and Measures Act, 1932, 'as to the meaning or construction of any rule or regulation or as to the method of verifying, adjusting or stamping any weight or measure or weighing or measuring instrument in any market area. ' Under Section 11, the Market Committee has the power 'to levy fees on the agricultural produce bought and sold by licencees in the market area. ' Under Section 27, the Market Committee has the power to make bye-laws for the regulation of the business and the conditions of trading in respect of the market area under its management, including the power to make a bye-law which provides for punishment with a fine which may exceed one hundred rupees for any contravention of any of the bye-laws. Section 27 empowers the State Government to make, inter alia, a rule regarding the manner of control and supervision to be exercised by the Market Committee over inspectors appointed under Section 19 of the Bombay Weights and Measures Act, 1932. A Market Committee comes to be constituted after the Commissioner first declares his intention of regulating the purchase and sale of such agricultural produce and in such area as may be specified in the notification. ' After the Commissioner has considered the objections which may be raised to the entertainment of his intention, the Commissioner declares a specified area to be a market area 'for the purpose of the Act in respect of all or any of the kinds of agricultural products specified in the notification' issued under Section 3 aforesaid. Under Sub-section (2B), with effect from the date on which an area is declared to be a market area under Sub-section (1), the authority of a municipality or other local body is displaced to establish or to authorise or allow to be established any place in its own area 'for the purchase and sale of any agricultural produce specified in the notification issued under Sub-section (1). ' Sub-section (4A) directs that there shall be a market for each market area, and empowers the Commissioner to declare any enclosure, building or locality in any market area to be a principal market yard. Thus, the Market Committee has regulatory functions and, on the declaration of an area to be a market area, the authority of the municipality or any local body is displaced to establish its own market area, and the authority of any such municipality or local authority to regulate the transactions of purchase and sale in regard to the specified agricultural products is completely taken away. In our judgment, all these provisions show that the Market Committee is entrusted with important functions in the market area which may be described as, (1) executive, (2) administrative, (3) quasi judicial, (4) legislative, and (5) taxing. These functions are governmental functions-functions which the soveign authority performs over its citizens. In our judgment, therefore, a Market Committee performs a few governmental functions which are usually performed by a local authority like a municipality or a district board. Therefore, we have no doubt that a Market Committee satisfies the ingredients of the expression 'other authority' used in the ulterior part of the definition of 'local authority. '
7. The second point for consideration is, whether, the ingredient that the Market Committee must be in control or management of a local fund, has been satisfied. The first point that requires to be considered is as to the true interpretation of the expression 'local fund.' Now, that expression has not been defined in the General Clauses Act. In Baburao Shantaram's case, already referred to, Chagla C. J. has referred to the definitions of that expression given in two Bombay enactments. -The Bombay Local Boards Act, Sections 74 and 75, and the Local Fund Audit Act, 1930. Section 74 of the Bombay Local Boards Act says that, in each district there shall be a fund which shall be called a local fund, and Section 75 enumerates the various sources from which the fund shall be constituted. As pointed out in Baburao Shantaram's case by Chagla C. J., these two sections are of no assistance in determining the scope and ambit of the expression 'local fund'. In the Local Fund Audit Act, 1930, actually a definition of that expression is given which is much wider than the definition which is given in the Bombay Local Boards Act. But, there also, as pointed out in the same judgment, no help can be derived, because, in order that a fund may be a local fund, it must vest in a local authority, and that is exactly the point which we have to decide. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the expressions which are used in the Bombay enactments can be used at all for the purpose of construing a definition contained in a central enactment, specially when the latter was enacted long before the Bombay statutes were enacted. The learned acting Advocate General referred to the definition of 'municipal fund' in two Bombay enactments- The Bombay Boroughs Act and the Bombay Corporations Act. Section 82 of the Bombay Corporations Act defines a 'municipal fund' with reference to its receipts and says that such receipts are held in trust for the purposes of the Act. Section 65 of the Bombay Boroughs Act defines that expression also in the same manner, and Section 63 of that Act says that such funds are to be held and applied by the municipality as a trustee. For the same reasons for which the definitions of the expression 'local fund' are not of any assistance, the aforesaid two definitions also cannot be of any assistance whatsoever. But, though this is so, in our judgment the connotation of the general expression 'municipal fund' is easily ascertainable. That expression can assist us in construing the expression 'local fund'. The adjectives 'municipal', according to Black's Law Dictionary, has both a narrow and a broad sense. At page 1168, Black states as follows:
In narrower sense, it means presenting to a local governmental unit, commonly, a city or town or other governmental unit. In its broader sense, it means pertaining to the public or governmental affairs of a State or nation or of a people Some times, pertaining to a county.... local, particular, independent;.... also pertaining to local self-government in general.
It is quite clear that, in the context of the definition, the expression 'municipal' is used in the narrower sense as pertaining to a local government unit. 'Municipal fund' would, therefore, mean a fund which vests in or belongs to or is earmarked or available for the affairs of a municipality. Under the circumstances, in our judgment, the expression 'local fund' must be also construed in a sense analogous to the expression 'municipal fund. ' It would mean a fund which pertains to a local governmental unit-a fund which vests in or belongs to or is earmarked or available or is to be utilized for the affairs of a body which is a local governmental unit. In our judgment, in order to satisfy the above definition, the authority, mentioned in the later part of the definition must have control or management of fund which is set apart or is available and is to be utilized, either under the law of the land or by virtue of government entrustment, for the purpose of administering the affairs of that authority in its capacity as a local governmental unit.
8. In our judgment, therefore, in order that the latter part of the definition in Clause (31) of Section 3 of the Clauses Act may apply, it is necessary that two tests must be satisfied; firstly, the authority must be a local administrative unit, entrusted by law with the authority of discharging whole or part of governmental functions, and secondly that it must be, either by virtue of law or governmental entrustment, in control of a fund which is to be utilized for the purposes of discharging such functions.
9. In addition to the case of Baburao Shantaram, Mr. Vakil has cited two other cases at the Bar which may now be noted. The first case is Official Assignee, Madras, v. Trustees of Port Trust, Madras reported in : AIR1936Mad789 . In that case, the question for consideration was whether the Port Trust was or was not a local authority within the meaning of Clause (28) of Section 3 of the Clauses Act (Probably Madras Act). Mocket J. had taken the view that it was not so, because, the Port Trust were not in control or management of any municipal or local fund. The Division Bench reversed this view on a construction of the aforesaid clause. Their Lordships took the view that the clause 'legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a municipal or local fund' did not qualify the three specified authorities including Port Trust, but, qualified only the expression 'other authority' in the definition. In our judgment, this case is of no assistance in deciding the present case for the simple reason that, the facts of the present case fall within the expression 'other authority', and there cannot be any dispute that the above clause does qualify the expression 'other authority'. The second case relied upon by Mr. Vakil is the case of Daudayal Onkarlal v. Gulabchand Shankerlal and Ors. reported in : AIR1962MP47 . In that case, a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court had to consider whether the Life Insurance Corporation was or was not a local authority within the meaning of the relevant clause of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act. The District Judge took the view that it was a local authority on the ground that the Corporation had certain powers of issuing rules, bye-laws or regulations having the force of law and that, it had control over its funds. This view was rejected by their Lordships. They accepted the test which was formulated at the Bar by Mr. Sanghi which has been reproduced in the judgment at page 48 in the following words:
According to him (Mr. Sanghi) an authority in order that it can be called local authority, must be one which performs functions not dissimilar to functions performed either by a Municipal Committee, District Board, Port Commissioners or the like, such authorities must be meant to serve a locality. Such authorities must derive its funds from the authority of Government by resort to some kind of taxation which they are required to utilize for the benefit of the locality in the matter of health, sanitation, education and the like. The functions which they performed must in the absence of entrustment to them by the Government be those of the Government to be carried out with Government fund.
10. With respect, we agree broadly with the test accepted by their Lordships, though we may be permitted to make two observations. The first is that, the power of a body for issuing rules, bye-laws or regulations, though not conclusive, is a relevant factor which has to be taken into account in determining whether that body is an authority or not, and that the functions which such body has to perform are not merely functions not dissimilar to the functions of the specified authorities, but, must be all or some of the functions which are to be performed by a local administrative unit.
11. In our judgment, the fund constituted under Section 13 of the Market Act answers the description of a local fund within the meaning of the expression 'local authority' as defined in Clause (31) of Section 3 of the Clauses Act. That fund has to be spent under Section 13, Sub-section (1), for incurring all expenditure 'by the Market Committee under or for the purposes of this Act. ' Section 14 enumerates the various purposes for which the fund can be spent. That section does not leave any doubt that the fund is to be used for the affairs of the Market Committee in its own locality for administering its affairs in the matter of regulating the sale and purchase transactions in regard to specified agricultural products. In that view of the matter, in our judgment, the fund at the disposal of the Market Committee is a local fund within the meaning of the definition given in Clauses (31) of Section 3 of the Clauses Act.
12. In our judgment, for the aforesaid reasons, both the aforesaid conditions have been satisfied in regard to the Market Committee for which the acquisition is being made and, therefore, contribution is to come from the fund of a local authority within the meaning of the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act. Under the circumstances, the challenge based upon the above proviso must fail. Therefore, the petition fails and must be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
13. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.