N.G. Shelat, J.
1. * * * *
2. Mr. Vin, the learned advocate for the appellants, urged that the respondent No. 1 Reva had in his own evidence admitted about the falsity of the material statements made in his complaint Ex. 17 and that the same were even actually found by the learned Sessions Judge to be false and imaginary. He, therefore, contended that as a result of such a false information given to the Police Patel they had to face a trial in the Court of Sessions and that too in regard to a very serious charge such as of robbery punishable under Section 392 read with Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code. In those circumstances, there would not arise any question of pity on the mere ground that he was an illiterate and stupid person acting under the guidance of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 as observed by the learned Sessions Judge. He also contended that in the interest of justice such a person should have been brought to book and that the learned Sessions Judge was wrong in not taking any action whatever against him. So far as respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned, he contended that they knew full well about the falsity of the complaint for the reason that respondent No. 1 accompanied by respondent No. 2 had gone to give information about the incident to respondent No. 3 on the previous day and that though respondent No. 1 was asked not to file any such complaint on the trivial grounds, on the next day the complaint came to be recorded in respect of the same incident and that way they are said to have abetted the commission of the crime said to have been committed by respondent No. 1. He, therefore, urged that action should be taken against them as well and the interests of justice demand the same.
3. Now in the first place it was pointed out by Mr. Desai, the learned advocate for the respondents that of the three charges sought to be levelled against the respondents, the question of prosecuting them for offences under Sections 182 and 195 of the Indian Penal Code would not arise in view of Sub-section (6) of Section 479-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. In support thereof he invited a reference to the decision in the case of Shabir Hussain Bholu v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1963SC816 , and that the matter would then require to be considered only in relation to the offence under Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code. Apart from authority, it appears clear from Section 479-A and Sub-section (6) thereof that no proceedings can be taken under Section 476 against a person for giving or fabricating false evidence, if in respect of such a person proceedings can be taken under Section 479-A of the Code. Section 195 of the Indian Penal Code relates to a person giving or fabricating false evidence intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, any person to be convicted of an offence. Thus, in respect of an offence falling under Section 195 of the Indian Penal Code, no proceeding can be taken under Section 476 since the learned Sessions Judge has declined to take any action under Section 479-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. The case referred to by Mr. Desai lays down that bearing in mind the non-obstante clause at the commencement of Section 479-A and the provisions of Sub-section (6) it would follow that only the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 479-A must be resorted to by the Court for the purpose of making a complaint against a person for intentionally giving false evidence or for intentionally fabricating false evidence at any stage of the proceeding before it. Besides, it has been observed that the provisions of Section 476 to Section 479 are totally excluded where an offence is of the kind specified in Section 479-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, It is, therefore, clear that the application under Section 476 for taking any proceeding against the respondents in regard to an offence falling under Section 195 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be availed of. The same view has been repeated by the Supreme Court in a subsequent decision in the case of Babu Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh : 1964CriLJ555 , except in respect of an offence falling under Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code.
5. As to the other offence under Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code, it would be necessary to refer to Section 476 and Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides:
476. (1) When any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court is whether on application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in Section 195, Sub-section (1), clause (b) or clause (c), which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, record a finding to that effect and make a complaint thereof in writing signed by the presiding officer of that Court ...
In other words, the action contemplated under Section 476(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code is in relation to offences referred to in Section 195, Sub-section (1), clause (b) or clause (c). If we then turn to Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it appears that, as provided in Sub-section (1), clause (a), no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. Then come clauses (b) and (c) which have been referred to in Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 476 does not refer to an offence contemplated in Section 195(1)(a) of the Code and it follows therefrom that the offences such as under Sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code are excluded from any such inquiry to be made under Section 476 of the Code. No application can, therefore, lie under Section 476(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code for taking any action in regard to any offence falling under Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code.
6. That leaves the offence under Section 211 of Indian Penal Code said to have been committed by respondent No. 1, inasmuch as he caused any criminal proceeding being instituted with intent to cause injury to the applicants, or about having falsely charged them for having committed an offence of robbery, by lodging a first information report Ex. 17 before the Police Patel, and in that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are said to have abetted the commission thereof and that way liable under Section 211 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. There is obviously no bar in law to proceed against them. Before sanctioning any such prosecution by any Court under Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code, two conditions are essential to be established. The first is that the Court should be satisfied that there is a reasonable probability of establishing the charge sought to be levelled against these persons and secondly, that it should be of the opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to grant any such sanction. In this respect, Mr. Desai invited a reference to certain observations made in the case of Jadu Nandan Singh v. Emperor ILR 37 Cal. 250. They run thus:
The principle which should guide Courts in taking action under Section 195 or 476 is now well settled. No sanction should be granted unless there is a reasonable probability of conviction. It would be an abuse of the powers vested in a Court of Justice if sanction were given or upheld on the principle that, though the conviction of the party complained against is a mere possibility, it is desirable that the matter should be thrashed out, so that it may be decided whether or not an offence has been committed. No doubt the authority which is called upon to grant a sanction under Section 195, or to take action under Section 476, need not, and should not, decide the question of guilt or innocence of the party against whom proceedings are to be instituted; but great care and caution are required before the Criminal law is set in motion, and there must be reasonable foundation for the charge in respect of which prosecution is sanctioned or directed.
In other words, not only it should feel that an offence has been committed, but that there exists a reasonable probability and not a mere possibility of his conviction. While considering the question of expediency of interests of justice, the Court should always see that it does not become a handle in the hands of the parties who move in the matter out of spite or grudge that they bear against the other persons. With these principles we have to consider in the first place as to whether there is a reasonable probability of having the respondents convicted in respect of the offence for which they are sought to be made liable, and secondly, as to whether interests of justice require the action to be taken against all or any of them.