1. This review application has been filed by the State of Gujarat in respect of the orders passed by this Court on 9th June, 10th June, and 11th June, 1981 in Special Civil Application No. 748 of 1981.* On 9th June, 1981 we issued an ex parte ad interim mandatory injunction directing the State Government to issue a notification under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, extending the life of the Commission up to 24th June, 1981, and that notification was accordingly issued on 9th June, 1981. On 10th June, 1981 Mr. Vakil appearing for the State Government, urged arguments before us to persuade us to vacate the ad interim mandatory injunction which had been issued by us on 9th June, 1981. At the end of the hearing on 10th June, 1981 we indicated the order that we proposed to pass and we stated that reasons for the judgment would be pronounced on the next day, that is, 11th June, 1981 and on 11th June, 1981 we set out the reasons for rejecting the application of the State Government that the ex parte ad interim mandatory injunction issued on 9th June, 1981 should be vacated. It is against these three order of 9th June, 10th June and 11th June, 1981 that this review application has been filed by the State Government and the State Government has asked us to review our orders, and particularly the order of l1th June, 1981, and the main ground on which Mr. Vakil on behalf of the State Government has pressed for review is that of error apparent on the face of the record. In this connection it may be pointed out that Mr. Vakil has cited a number of authorities on the scope of the review, on the power of review when the High Court is exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and under what circumstances review can be exercised and has been exercised by some of the High Courts. In connection with the power of review in matters arising under Article 226 of the Constitution, he drew our attention to decision of the Supreme Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 1909, and we pointed out to him that this decision of the Supreme Court has been considered by the Supreme Court itself in the subsequent decision in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v.Aribam Pishak Sharma, : 1979CriLJ908 . Mr. Vakil has also relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in J. G. Sinkar v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1981Bom184 and the decisions in P. N. Eswara Iyer v.The Registrar, Supreme Court of India , Sellaya Pillai v. Devaraya Pillai : AIR1972Mad309 ,HeadNotes (A) and (B), The Punjabi University v. Manmohan , Animalu v. Kothambari Vellachi : AIR1974Ker116 , Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd.v, Union of India : 1SCR956 , Sir Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter and North West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand and Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D. N. Mehta : 3SCR748 . Now as regards all these authorities it may be pointed out that though according to the Supreme Court decision in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 1909 (supra) the High Court as a Court of plenary jurisdiction as very wide powers in reviewing its own orders under Art. 226, the decision in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma's case, : 1979CriLJ908 (supra) echoing the decision in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v.Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526, says that there are definitive limits to the exercise of this power of review under Art. 226. But even under those definitive limits, it is clear that the High Court can exercise its power of review in matters under Art. 226 if there is an error apparent on the face of the record. However, we must point out that an error apparent on the face of the record must be such as can be seen by one who runs and reads, that is an obvious and patent mistake and not something which can be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may conceivably be two opinions. If an elaborate process of reasoning is necessary to arrive at the conclusion that there is an error apparent on the face of the record, it cannot be said that there is an error apparent on the face of the record. In this case Mr. Vakil has taken nearly three hours in order to convince us at the stage of admission of this review application that there is an error apparent on the face of the record. He has drawn our attention on five different heads, namely, averments in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17 & 18 of this miscellaneous civil application for the purpose of convincing us that there is an error apparent on the face of the record.
2. It may be pointed out that yesterday when the matter was called out or within a minute or so of the matter being called out, we asked Mr. Vakil as to how long he was likely to take to argue the matter of admission and he indicated that he would take about two hours i. e. from 11.00 A. M. to 1.00 P. M. The matter was heard and the hearing could not be completed, The question of putting a time limit on the arguments to be advanced by counsel was discussed but no definite ruling was given one way or the other regarding putting a time limit. Today when we resumed the hearing at 10.DO A. M. of this review application, we indicated to Mr. Vakil that he should complete his arguments by 11.15 A. M. Mr. Vakil's immediate reaction was to stop all arguments and to invite us to deliver judgment on the miscellaneous civil application, but subsequently he said that he would argue and complete his arguments subject to a protest against the time limit being imposed. He said that if it had been indicated yesterday that time limit was going to be imposed, he would have kept his written submissions ready on the contentions arising in this miscellaneous civil application for review.
3. As regards the error apparent on the face of the record, Mr. Vakil's attempt has been more or less to reargue the matter which was heard on 10th June and some of the authorities which he cited then have been cited again today. Be that as it may, it must be pointed out that so far as the grounds set out in paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the review application are concerned, they have been dealt with in the contentions with which they are concerned in our judgment delivered on Il th June 1981. One of the grievances about which Mr. Vakil was rather vehement was that the application for amendment of the special civil application having been rejected so far as insertion of the prayer for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to extend the life of the Commission, was concerned, the Court had not indicated its mind as to what would be ancillary or incidental relief that the Court was inclined to grant in respect of the main relief for quashing the notification of March 17, 1981. We had, in the course of the hearing of the main Special Civil Application No. 748 of 1981, called upon Mr. Vakil to argue the question of moulding the relief and how far incidental and ancillary relief could be granted. The whole question that the entire petition had become in fructuous or not and whether the Court could grant any ancillary or incidental relief and if so under what circumstances, had been discussed threadbare at the hearing of the special civil application. An interesting case of a similar nature about counsel's argument arose before the Supreme Court in Smt, Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, : AIR1977SC69 . Beg, J. delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court on the review application pointed out that if an indication had been given by the Court, it was for counsel arguing at the Bar to consider all the ramifications of the indication given and to address arguments on that point. It is not for the Court to give reasons or to say on what lines it would decide the case at the end of the matter. Under these circumstances, it' cannot be said that there is error apparent on the face of the record because the Government counsel was not heard on the exact ancillary and incidental relief which the Court proposed to give on the main special civil application.
4. Another ground which Mr. Vakil urged before us for reviewing, apart from the ground of error apparent on the face of the record, was that observations have been made in our judgment of June 11, 1981 regarding the impression that we had got about the time being taken by counsel for the Government. We adhere to what we have stated in our observations in our judgment of June 11, 1981. That was the definite impression, which we had got and we do not want to say anything, which would detract from that impression, or to say anything further regarding that impression. Mr. Vakil urged that time was taken because of the vacation time and because the normal time of five hours every day was not devoted to the hearing of the matter. But the impression that we have clearly indicated in our order of 11th June, 1981 was very much present to our mind and that is why we gave expression to that impression. It cannot be said that there was error apparent on the face of the record because we expressed our opinion or gave expression to our impression in that regard. As regards the question of exercise of power under Section 148 or the inherent power of the Court, Mr. Vakil had relied on the decisions in Obla R, Narasimha Aiyar v. Gunia V. Rangachari, AIR 1926 Mad 689; Kalipada Mukherji v. Basanta Kumar Dutta : AIR1932Cal126 ; Manilal Mohanlal Shah v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad : 1SCR108 ; Nand Lal v. Mt. Siddiquan : AIR1957All558 ; and Thayyan Padayachi v. Veluswami, : AIR1961Mad407 . But these arguments relate to the merits of the matter which is in controversy in the special civil application and not regarding powers of review of the Court. It was also contended that all the arguments which were advanced at the Bar as noted in our judgment of June 11, 1981 have not been fully dealt with and therefore there is an . error apparent on the face of the record. If the reason which appealed to us takes care of all the arguments advanced and: indicates fully the result that is 'to follow, it is not necessary that all the arguments advanced at the Bar should have been specifically dealt with in terms. For example, it is urged that though relief had not been asked for in the petition of directing the State Government to extend the time for the Commission to function by issuing a notification under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, we have in our judgment indicated that, according to the Supreme Court, even on a post-card the Court could take cognizance and grant relief once palpable injustice had been pointed out to the Court. If that is the power of the Court, all these questions of the form of the relief or the procedure of the relief or the terms of the relief, fade into background. The Court's powers of moulding the relief, as will be indicated by us in our judgment in the special civil application and as was indicated in our order of llth June 1981 are very wide and once the existence of those wide powers is recognised, then the form in which the relief has been prayed for or the f act that one or the other of the reliefs has not been prayed for, is totally irrelevant and there is no error apparent on the face of the record of the case on that score. We will conclude this portion of the discussion by' referring to the observations in Aribarm Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribarn Pishak Sharma, : 1979CriLJ908 , speaking for the Supreme Court, Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed:
'It is true, as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1963 SC 1909) 4 here is nothing in Article 226 of the constitution to preclude a High Court from, exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction, to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province. of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court.'
If any errors have been committed by us in our orders of which review is sought, the remedy is by way of appeal rather than. a review because, in our opinion looking to the well settled principles, since a long and elaborate inquiry into aspects of the facts as well as law is necessary in order even to argue that there is error apparent on the face of the record, it cannot be said that there is an error apparent on the face of the record.
5. This application for review is therefore summarily rejected at the admission stage.
6. Application dismissed.