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Patel Jaikrishna Motibhai Vs. Patel Ishwarbhai Fakirbhai and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtGujarat High Court
Decided On
Case NumberFirst Appeal No. 926 of 1973
Judge
Reported inAIR1980Guj34; (1979)2GLR70
ActsBombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 - Sections 32G and 85
AppellantPatel Jaikrishna Motibhai
RespondentPatel Ishwarbhai Fakirbhai and ors.
Appellant Advocate B.H. Mehta, Adv.
Respondent Advocate V.P. Shah, Adv.
Cases ReferredBabubhai Lunvir v. R. B. Mehta
Excerpt:
- .....the partition effected by the plaintiffs father defendant no. 2 on 10th july, 1956 under which the suit land came to the share of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff, therefore became the landlord of the suit land on and from 10th july, 1956 and for a further declaration that defendant no. i tenant was not a deemed purchaser of the suit land and the award passed in the proceeding under s. 32g of the bombay tenancv and agricultural lands art, 1948 ('the said act') is illegal and without jurisdiction was is dismissed by the learned second joint civil judge (senior division) baroda the suit being special civil suit no 184 of 1071.paras 2 to 4 f [x x x x]5. mr. b. h. mehta, the learned advocate appearing for the appellant-plaintiff submits that the lower court erred in dismissing the suit.....
Judgment:

M.K. Shah, J.

1. The appellant is the original plaintiff whose suit for a declaration that the partition effected by the plaintiffs father defendant No. 2 on 10th July, 1956 under which the suit land came to the share of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff, therefore became the landlord of the suit land on and from 10th July, 1956 and for a further declaration that defendant No. I tenant was not a deemed purchaser of the suit land and the award passed in the proceeding under S. 32G of the Bombay Tenancv and Agricultural Lands Art, 1948 ('the said Act') is illegal and without jurisdiction was is dismissed by the learned Second Joint Civil Judge (Senior Division) Baroda the suit being special civil suit No 184 of 1071.

Paras 2 to 4 f [x x x x]

5. Mr. B. H. Mehta, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant-plaintiff submits that the lower court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. In the submission of Mr. Mehta, the jurisdiction of the civil court with regard to the decision of title between the parties is not barred by the provisions of the Tenancy Act. It is true, concedes Mr. Mehta, that by Section 32-G of the said Act, /the question with regard to determination of the price of land to be paid by the tenants who are deemed to have purchased the lands by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 32 of the said Act is left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under the said Act and that by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 85 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal. Manager, Collector, Gujarat Revenue Tribunal or the State Government in appeal or revision or the State Government in exercise of the power of control is barred and as provided in sub-section (2), no order of the Mamlatdar, Tribunal, Collector or Gujarat Revenue Tribunal or the State Government made under the Act can be questioned in any civil court or criminal court. But urges Mr. Mphta that bar would not apply to the questions concerning title to properties and the civil court's jurisdiction therefore so far as it relates to the disputed questions of title between the parties with regard to properties remains unaffected by this provision. In our opinion, when the Tribunal has been conferred with the exclusive powers and authority to determine price of land to be paid by tenants who have become the deemed purchasers under Section 32 the said Act and when machinery is provided for deciding such questions, the Tribunal will have the authority and jurisdiction to go into an questions which are required to be decided for resolving the controversy on the main question viz. determination of the price to be paid by the tenant who has become a deemed purchaser. It may be noted at this stage that in the instant case, the plaintiff wanted to take shelter under the provisions of Section 32F of the said Act on the ground that by virtue of the partition, he had become the landlord and as he was a minor, the tenant's right to purchase land tinder Section 32 was in abeyance for the period prescribed by Section 32-F viz. one year from the expiry of the period during which the landlord was entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31. In face of this controversy, it was absolutely necessary for the Tribunal to enter into and decide the question as to whether the plaintiff was the landlord of the land on which admittedly the first respondent (defendant No. 1) was a tenant or as to whether the plaintiff's father, that is defendant No. 2, was the landlord thereof. Unless this question is decided, the main question arising under Section 32-G of fixing the price cannot be decided. The Tribunal has to take all steps necessary for the purpose of deciding the main question and, therefore, the bar with regard to the jurisdiction of the civil court would operate in the instant case.

6. Mr. Mehta cited a couple of authorities in support of his contention that the jurisdiction of the civil court has not to be lightly excluded and that the same was not affected so far as the decision with regard to the question of title was concerned with regard to the first part of Mr. Mehta's submission,, there cannot be any dispute. With regard to the second part, the provisions themselves have to be looked into to see if the bar is absolute or partial. There is no universal rule that there cannot be statutory enactment affecting civil court's jurisdiction to try questions relating to title. The decisions cited by Mr. Mehta do not apply to the facts of the present case. They refer to cases arising under provisions which are not similar to the provisions with which we are concerned in the instant case. They said cases do not deal with the scone and ambit of the Tribunal's jurisdiction under the said Act and the nature of exclusion of civil courts' jurisdiction thereunder. The ratio, therefore, does not apply to the facts of the present case. We will, therefore, merely mention the decisions cited by Mr. Mehta, They are Bhagwan Dayal v. Mt. Reoti Devi, AIR 1962 SC 287 and Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi AIR 1962 SC 547. Some other authorities dealing with other Acts where the revenue authorities concerned were not clothed with exclusive powers were also cited. But they being not applicable in the instant case, it is not necessary-to refer to them.

7. As against this, Min Shah, the learned Advocate for the respondent No. I has drawn our attention to Babubhai Lunvir v. R. B. Mehta, (1967) 8 GuJ L'R 110. This is a decision which aptly applies to the facts of the Present case because the same arises under the very Act with which we are presently concerned. The following pertinent observations from the said decision are quoted below -

'When an authority has been given power to decide or determine something it has implied power to decide not only that something but also incidental and subsidiary matter which will enable it to decide the principal matter in regard to which authority is conferred - '.

8. It will be thus seen that the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide not only the main or the principal question but it has also to take all necessary steps in order to decide the duties cast upon it by law. In the instant case also, the Tribunal had the implied power to decide not only the question with regard to the determination of the purchase price but also incidental and subsidiary matter with regard to the person who was the landlord of the suit land on which deft. No. I was admittedly a tenant. This therefore, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the jurisdiction of the civil court, therefore, is completely barred with regard to the said question which was required to be decided by the Tribunal and which has in fact also been decided by the Tribunal. There is, therefore, no substance or merit in Mr. Melita's contentions urged in support of the appeal of the appellant. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.

9. Appeal dismissed.


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