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Prajapati Chaku Virji and ors. Vs. Patel Amba Ganpatram and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLimitation
CourtGujarat High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1971)12GLR650
AppellantPrajapati Chaku Virji and ors.
RespondentPatel Amba Ganpatram and ors.
Cases ReferredSitaram Dada Sawant and Anr. v. Ramu Dada Sawant
Excerpt:
- - 1. this civil revision application raises a short but interesting question as to the computation of period of limitation and exclusion of time requisite for obtaining certified copies within the meaning of section 12 of the limitation act, 1963. 2. a few facts leading to the present civil revision application are as follows: in computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded. while determining the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order within the meaning of sub-section (2) it.....s.h. sheth, j.1. this civil revision application raises a short but interesting question as to the computation of period of limitation and exclusion of time requisite for obtaining certified copies within the meaning of section 12 of the limitation act, 1963.2. a few facts leading to the present civil revision application are as follows:the plaintiff filed in the court of the civil judge (junior division) at morvi regular civil suit no. 56 of 1963 for dissolution of partnership and accounts. in that suit the trial court passed the decree but directed that the decree shall be drawn up only after the necessary amount of court-fees was paid thereon by the plaintiff in respect of the claittl decreed in his favour and by the defendants in respect of that portion of the decree which was passed.....
Judgment:

S.H. Sheth, J.

1. This Civil Revision Application raises a short but interesting question as to the computation of period of limitation and exclusion of time requisite for obtaining certified copies within the meaning of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

2. A few facts leading to the present Civil Revision Application are as follows:

The plaintiff filed in the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Morvi Regular Civil Suit No. 56 of 1963 for dissolution of partnership and accounts. In that suit the Trial Court passed the decree but directed that the decree shall be drawn up only after the necessary amount of Court-fees was paid thereon by the plaintiff in respect of the claittl decreed in his favour and by the defendants in respect of that portion of the decree which was passed in their favour. The Trial Court pronounced its judgment on 30th July 1968. The decree could not be drawn up because time was granted for payment of Court-fees. Ultimately the necessary amount of Court-fees was paid on 17th September 1968 which the Trial Court accepted and the decree was drawn up on 18th September 1968. On the very day on which the decree was drawn up, the defendants made an application for certified copies of the judgment and decree. The certified copies were ready on 2nd November 1968 after which the defendants took delivery of the said copies. They filed the appeal before the District Court on 22nd November 1968. An objection was raised before the District Court that the appeal was beyond time. Appeal to the District Court is governed by Article 116(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963. It prescribes a period of 30 days from the date of the decree or order within which the appeal should be filed. If the period of limitation is computed from the date of judgment which is ordinarily the date of decree under Order 20, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, then the appeal filed before the District Court on 22nd November 1968 was barred by time even after the exclusion of time taken by the Trial Court for furnishing the certified copies, that is to say, from 18th September 1968 to 2nd November 1968. If, however, the period of limitation is computed from 18th September 1968 on which date the decree was drawn up and before which it could not be drawn up on account of non-payment of necessary Court-fees, then upon the exclusion of time taken by the Trial Court for furnishing the certified copies from 18th September 1968 to 2nd November 1968 the appeal was within time.

3. Before the District Court an objection was raised that the appeal was beyond time. Out of abundant caution, therefore, the defendants who were the appellants in the District Court made an application wherein they contended that the appeal was within time. They also contended in the alternative that if the District Court found that the appeal was beyond time, delay in filing the appeal might be condoned. The learned District Judge who heard that application recorded the finding that within the meaning of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the appeal was beyond time. He also recorded the finding that there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay. In that view of the matter he dismissed the application which the defendants who were the appellants had made.

4.It is against that order that this Civil Revision Application has been filed.

5.Mr. Shah, appearing for the defendants (petitioners in this Civil Revision Application), has contended before us that upon the proper construction of Section 12, Sub-section (2) and Explanation to Section 12 the appeal before the District Court was within time, in order to appreciate the contention which he has raised it is necessary to turn to Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12 provides for exclusion of time in legal proceedings. For the purpose of the present Civil Revision Application we are concerned with Sub-section (2) and the Explanation to Section 12. It may be noted that the four sub-sections of which Section 12 consists provide for exclusion of the first day or time in computing the period of limitation. Sub-section (1) provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, that is to say, the day on which the period of limitation commences to run shall be excluded. Sub-section (3) deals with exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree or order is founded from the period of limitation to be computed in cases specified therein. Sub-section (4) deals also with exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award from the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award. So also Sub-section (2) provides for exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree from the period of limitation while computing it for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment. Sub-section (2) is in the following terms:

In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded.

On scanning Sub-section (2) we find that it incorporates two concepts which, in our opinion, are distinct. One relates to the period of limitation and another relates to the time requisite for obtaining a copy, inter alia, of the decree appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed. While computing the period of limitation for the appeal what is to be excluded is the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is in pan materia with Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 except for the fact that Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has also been made applicable to revision applications. This addition made to Sub-section (2) of Section 12 in the Limitation Act, 1963 does not make any difference for the purpose of our decision in the instant case. Therefore, for the purpose of the instant case, except for the Explanation added to Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 Sub-section (2) remains the same as it was in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.

6. Sub-section (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was differently construed by different High Courts. It appears that there was a cleavage of opinion on the true connotation and amplitude of the expression 'time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree'. The Bombay, Calcutta and Patna High Courts took one view while the other High Courts, in particular, the Nagpur High Court took a different view. It came up for construction in Jayashankar Mulshankar and Anr. v. Mayabhai Lalbhai : AIR1952Bom122 . The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court which decided that case laid down certain principles and tried to determine the connotation and amplitude of Sub-section (2) on the basis of those principles. They held that the expressions 'requisite' and 'obtaining' used in Sub-section (2) must receive equal emphasis and, that therefore, what has got to be excluded is the time which is properly required and the time which has got to be so excluded is the time which is necessary for obtaining a copy of the decree. They further observed that the action on the part of the appellant in applying for a copy of the decree is not a decisive factor in considering whether time should be excluded under that sub-section or not. According to them, it is futile on the part of the appellant to apply for a copy when in fact the original is not ready and when in fact no copy of the original can be given to him. If, however, the preparation of the decree is entirely left to the Court and if the intervention of the parties is not at all necessary, and all the time is spent for the preparation of the decree, then that entire time must be excluded. But there may be cases where the intervention of the parties is necessary in order to prepare the decree. The parties may have to take steps before the decree can be ready and before it can be signed. In such cases the Court has to consider whether any of the time taken for the preparation of the decree can be attributed to the fault or negligence of the appellant. If any of the time can be so attributed, then that time cannot be excluded under Section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Having thus observed the Full Bench laid down that the time properly taken for the preparation of the decree and the time which elapses between the pronouncement of the judgment and the signing of the decree should be excluded under Section 12(2). If Explanation to Section 12 was not added in the Limitation Act, 1963 we would have been bound by this judgment of the Full Bench and the case before us could not have presented any difficulty. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court it can be said that so far as the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree is concerned, it not only consists of the time taken by the Court in preparing the certified copy of the decree after the application for it is made by a party but it also consists of the time taken by the Court in preparing the original. In the instant case, the Trial Court had directed the decree to be drawn up only on payment of necessary amounts of Court fees by the parties concerned. Even if the Trial Court had thought of preparing the decree, it could not have done so before the necessary amounts of Court-fees were paid by the parties concerned. This was, therefore, a real handicap in the way of the Trial Court in preparing the original decree. The necessary amount of Court-fees was paid on 17th September 1968 and the Trial Court accepted it. Therefore, in light of the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court the time allowed by the Court to the parties to pay the necessary amounts of Court-fees before which the original decree could not have been prepared and the time taken by the Court in preparing the certified copy of the original decree would have been required to be excluded under Sub-section (2) of Section 12 if the Explanation to Section 12 was not there. The question, therefore, which arises for our consideration is this: What is the effect of Explanation to Section 12 on Sub-section (2) thereof? In order to arrive at a correct construction of the Explanation to Section 12 it is necessary to repeat that Sub-section (2) of Section 12 provides for two distinct concepts. One relates to the period of limitation. Another relates to the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order. The latter is to be excluded while computing the former for an appeal. The Explanation to Section 12 is in the following terms:

In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded.

Whereas Sub-section (1) to (4) provide for exclusion, the Explanation provides for non-exclusion. Secondly, the Explanation refers only to one concept, viz., the concept of time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order. It does not refer to the concept of period of limitation and its computation. The latter part of the Explanation provides that 'any time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded.' If we read the latter part of this Explanation which we have reproduced above, in the first instance, independently of the first part, one thing which prominently strikes us is that any time which the Court has taken to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made is not to be excluded. The decree or order referred to in the latter part of the Explanation is necessarily the original decree or the order because the preparation of a certified copy of any such decree or order follows upon application made in that behalf by a party. The latter part of the Explanation in terms refers to the preparation of the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made. It is clear, therefore, that it refers to the preparation of the original decree or order. The narrow question which, in the aforesaid premises, arises for our consideration is this: From what is this time taken by the Court to prepare the original decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made is not to be excluded? Is it not to be excluded from the period of limitation contemplated by Sub-section (2) or is it not to be excluded from the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or the order, which expression occurs in the first part of the Explanation? We cannot overlook that whereas Sub-section (2) refers to two distinct concepts relating to period of limitation and time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order, the Explanation refers only to one of them, viz. the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order. The Explanation no where refers to the concept of period of limitation. The non-exclusion referred to in the subsequent part of the Explanation which must be read in light of the earlier part of the Explanation must necessarily have reference to computation of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order. It cannot have reference to something which is not in the Explanation but which is in Sub-section (2). In our opinion, it will not be a correct canon of construction to relate the non-exclusion contemplated by the Explanation to period of limitation referred to in Sub-section (2) arid hot to the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order referred to in the Explanation. In our opinion, the way in which we are trying to look at the Explanation in light of Sub-section (2) is logical. If we do so, then it is clear to us that the non-exclusion of time taken by the Court to prepare the original decree or order has reference or relation to the computation of time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order. When, therefore, the Explanation is read along with Sub-section (2) the stages in the matter of computing the period of limitation which a Court has to bear in mind are as follows. Firstly, while computing the period of limitation the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order must be excluded. While determining the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order within the meaning of Sub-section (2) it must not exclude any time taken by the Court in preparing the original decree or the order within the meaning of the Explanation to Section 12. If the Court is required not to exclude the time taken by the Court in preparing the original decree or order from the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order, obviously the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order consists distinctly of two parts, or the time taken by the Court in preparing the original decree or the order before an application for a certified copy thereof is made and the time taken by the Court in preparing a certified copy of the decree or the order after the application for copy is made. In our opinion, therefore, the Explanation to Section 12 gives statutory recognition to the construction placed by the High Court of Bombay in the aforesaid Full Bench case upon Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.

7. Our attention has been invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawaharlal Lal Bhargava and Ors. : [1961]2SCR918 . This decision of the Supreme Court has been differently read by the Patna and the Orissa High Courts to whose decisions we are shortly referring. In our opinion, on reading the decision as a whole and, in particular, paragraph 10 thereof, it is clear beyond doubt that the Supreme Court did not resolve the cleavage of opinion between the different High Courts in the matter of construction of Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. If the Supreme Court had not approved the view taken by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jayashankar's case (supra), different considerations would have prevailed. In that case the Supreme Court was able to decide the question which arose before it without expressing its opinion one way or the other on the conflict of opinions amongst different High Courts on the true and correct connotation of Sub-section (2) of Section 12. Therein an application was already made by the party concerned long before the original decree was drawn up. It was not a case of the party having applied for a certified copy of the decree after the original was drawn up Therefore, that decision of the Supreme Court has no application to the facts of the present case nor does it disapprove the decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jayashanker's case (supra).

8. So far as Explanation to Section 12 is concerned, it has also been differently interpreted by different High Courts. The Patna, Orissa and Calcutta High Courts have taken the view which we are taking. The Bombay High Court has taken a different view. In the State of Bihar v. Mohmad Ismail and Ors. : AIR1966Pat1 the question which has arisen before us arose before the Full Bench of that High Court. The majority view of Mr. Justice Mahapatra and Mr. Justice A.B.N. Sinha is similar to the view which we are taking. No doubt, the majority view was that the expression 'shall not be excluded' used in the Explanation to Section 12 means 'shall be included'. That seems to be the point on which Mr. Justice U.N. Sinha has differed from the majority view. Even if we do not go to the extend of saying that the expression shall not be excluded' means 'shall be included', once the non-exclusion referred to in the Explanation to Section 12 is related to the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order to which, in our opinion, it undoubtedly relates the non-exclusion, is from the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy of the decree or order and it is not from the period of limitation to: which the Explanation makes no reference. The conclusion which Mr. Justice Mahapatra, in his judgment, has recorded is in the following words:

To remove all those doubts, the explanation has now, clearly and in simple language, provided that while computing the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order, that period shall not be excluded; in other words, that period will be included within the time requisite for obtaining a copy.

He then proceeds further and states as follows:

Both on an analysis of the section and the explanation and on the construction of the sentence in the explanation, this conclusion is inescapable.

While construing the Explanation Mr. Justice A.B.N. Sinha, in his concurring judgment, has observed as follows-

The plain meaning of the Explanation to my mind is that in calculating 'time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order' any time that may have been taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order in question before an application for a copy thereof has been made has not to be excluded, that is, has to be included.

Proceeding further, he has observed that if there was no Explanation, the meaning of the expression 'time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order' was, in his opinion, circumscribed by two words : 'requisite' and 'obtaining'. 'Requisite', in his opinion, means something much more than required. It means 'properly required', and the word 'obtaining' connotes an element of effort on the part of the suitor or the applicant. In his opinion, the restricted or circumscribed meaning of the expression requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order' has been extended by insertion of the Explanation to include the time taken by the Court to prepare the original decree before an application for copy of the decree is made. In his opinion, whatever might have been the motive or the logic which persuaded the Legislature to insert the Explanation to Section 12, the language of the Explanation itself was clear and it must prevail.

9. A similar view of the Explanation has been taken by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Kouluki Sabatani v. Raghu Sethi : AIR1970Ori116 . The Orissa High Court in the aforesaid decision considered the Explanation to Section 12 suggested by the Law Commission and having compared it with the Explanation which the Legislature has enacted it has observed that the Explanation which has been actually added to Section 12 of the Act means just contrary to the suggestion of the Law Commission and that the meaning to be given to an Explanation must depend upon its terms and that no theory of its purpose can be entertained unless it has to be inferred from the language used. Having considered the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Mohmad Ismail (supra), the Orissa High Court after referring to the minority opinion of Mr. Justice U.N. Sinha has observed as follows:

With great respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to accept this reasoning. If the expression 'shall not be excluded' does not mean 'shall be included,' we fail to see how else the time taken by the Court to prepare a decree or order before an application for copy thereof is made is to be treated. In computing the time requisite for obtaining the copy, we cannot exclude the period because the statute says definitely that it shall not be excluded. If we are to follow the above reasoning of the learned Judge, we cannot also include it in the time requisite. An interpretation which leads to such a situation cannot be accepted.

After having thus dealt with the minority view of Mr. Justice U.N. Sinha it has accepted the majority view of the Patna High Court in the case of Mohmad Ismail (supra).

10. The third decision on the point is of the Calcutta High Court in Dungarmall Sarewalla Jain and Ors. v. Rukma Kumar Jalal : AIR1970Cal443 . An identical question arose before the Division Bench consisting of Mr. Justice S.K. Chakravarti and Mr. Justice S.K. Dutta in the aforesaid case. After having considered the aforesaid Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court the Calcutta High Court has expressed its view in the following terms.

In other words, the time so taken, as contemplated in the said Explanation, shall be included in computing the period for obtaining certified copy and thus of limitation for an appeal or application and an appellant or applicant will be entitled to the benefit of the time so taken for preparing the decree or order. In the view we have taken, we respectfully follow the decisions of Chatterjee J. and of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court referred to above.

According to the Calcutta High Court, if after the decree or order is prepared, an application is made for copy, then under the Explanation the time required for preparation of the decree or order, shall not be excluded from the time required for obtaining a certified copy. In other words, it will be included in the time for copy and thus necessarily for limitation. Again, if application is made before the preparation of the decree or order, then proceeds the Calcutta High Court to observe, time requisite for copy, will include the time between the pronouncement of the judgment and the date of application for copy, and the rest of the period as may be taken by the Court to prepare decree or order will be the time required for obtaining the copy as provided in Sub-sections (2) to (4) of Section 12. In its opinion, the Explanation is clear and there is no ambiguity if one remembers that while Sub-sections (2) to (4) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provide for exclusion of time for obtaining certified copy of relevant judgment, decree or order, the Explanation concerns not with the limitation for appeal or application, but with the computation of time required for copy.

11. Mr. Hathi has invited our attention to the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Sitaram Dada Sawant and Anr. v. Ramu Dada Sawant : AIR1968Bom204 . The construction which Mr. Justice Chandrachud has placed upon the Explanation to Section 12 in the aforesaid decision is contrary to the construction placed upon it by the Patna, Orissa and the Calcutta High Courts. After having considered the arguments and the Full Bench decision of the High Court of Bombay in Jayashankar's case (supra) the learned Judge has observed as under:

The object of the Explanation is to require the appellant to apply for a copy of the decree even if the decree is not ready. That is why the Explanation says in terms that the time taken by the Court to prepare the decree before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded. In other words, the Explanation contemplates that the period between the date of the application for a certified copy of the decree and the date when the copy is ready can alone be excluded. If a party applies for a certified copy of the decree after the decree is drawn up, the time between the date of judgment and the date on which the decree was drawn up can not be excluded, because under the Explanation the time taken by the Court to prepare the decree before the application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded. In my opinion, therefore, the appellants will not be entitled to the exclusion of the entire period between the date of judgment and the date when certified copies of the judgment and decree were ready for delivery. They are entitled only to the exclusion of the time between the date on which they applied for certified copies and the date on which those copies were ready for delivery.

The learned Judge, in the aforesaid decision, has emphasised the aspect of non-exclusion but it appears to us that he has over-looked the first part of the Explanation to which the non-exclusion is related. We are in full agreement with the construction placed upon the Explanation by the Patna, Calcutta and Orissa High Courts. Mr. Hathi has strenuously relied upon the aforesaid decision of the High Court of Bombay and upon the minority view of Mr. Justice U.N. Sinha in the aforesaid Patna Full Bench case. We are unable to accept his submission in that behalf because if the non-exclusion of time contemplated by the Explanation to Section 12 related to period of limitation contemplated by Sub-section (2) of Section 12, the language of the Explanation would have been different from what it is, Instead of using the expression 'In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order' the Legislature would have used 'In computing under this section the period of limitation' 'or the Legislature would have added at the end of the Explanation the words 'from the period of limitation'. In that view of the matter we are unable to uphold the order made by the learned District Judge in this case.

11.1 Assuming that the minority view of Mr. Justice U.N. Sinha in the aforesaid Patna Full Bench decision and the view of Mr. Justice Chandrachud in the aforesaid Bombay decision are correct, even then so far as this case is concerned, no difficulty will arise for its decision. The expression used in the Explanation is 'any time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded.' Preparation of a decree or order presupposes the capacity to prepare. If the Court for a certain period of time does not have the capacity to prepare the original decree or the order, it cannot be said that the lapse of time arising out of its incapacity to prepare the original decree or order is equivalent to time taken by it to prepare the original or decree order, in the instant case, the Trial Court had directed the decree to be drawn up only upon the payment of Court-fees. Law permits a party in cases of suits of this type to pay the Court-fees after the suit is decided and before the decree is drawn up. Law also permits the Court to extend time for payment of Court-fees. If in exercise of those powers the Court permitted the extension of time or if in exercise of its right if the party concerned took time, with the permission of the Court, to pay up the Court-fees prior to which the decree could not be drawn up, the only inference which we can draw is that the Court, during the period during which Court-fees were not paid, was incapable of preparing the original decree. Unless the Court-fees were paid, the original decree could not have been drawn up. It is on account of that reason, therefore, that we say that until 17th September 1968 the Trial Court was incapable or did not have the capacity to prepare the original decree. If that is so, the time allowed by the Court to a party to pay up the Court-fees as a condition precedent to the drawing up of the original decree cannot be said to be the time taken by the Court to prepare the original decree. If that is so, the Explanation has no application to the present case. If the explanation has no application to the present case, then it is Sub-section (2) alone of Section 12 which governs the computation of period of limitation for an appeal. In that view of the matter, Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which is in pari materia with Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, when read in light of the construction placed upon it by the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Jayashankar's case (supra) rendered the appeal to the District Court within time. We have been basing our decision on the first aspect of the case though we have stated the alternate aspect thereof as well. In our opinion, therefore, for the reasons stated above, the Full Bench decision of the High Court of Bombay in Jayashankar's case (supra) having received the statutory recognition by the enactment of the Explanation to Section 12 governs the present case. It has not ceased to be good law as Mr. Justice Chandrachud has observed in the aforesaid Bombay decision. Applying the Explanation as construed by us to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the time taken by the Court to prepare the original decree is not to be excluded from the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree. Therefore, while computing the period of limitation, the time from the date of the pronouncement of judgment until the original decree was ready must be excluded. So also the time taken by the Court for furnishing a certified copy of the decree to the defendants from the date on which they made an application for certified copies until the date when they were ready must be excluded. Excluding these two sets of time from the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal before the District Court under Article 116(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 we are of the opinion that the appeal filed before the District Court was within time.

12. We, therefore, set aside the order made by the learned District Judge and make Rule absolute and direct the District Court to proceed to decide the appeal according to law on the footing that it has been filed within time. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.


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