Skip to content


Abdul Aziz Umarbhai Karkoon and anr. Vs. the State of Gujarat and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtGujarat High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1965)6GLR730
AppellantAbdul Aziz Umarbhai Karkoon and anr.
RespondentThe State of Gujarat and ors.
Cases ReferredMadhaji v. Mashrubhai
Excerpt:
- - 1000/ and that of a well situate therein at rs. 800/-.not satisfied with this decision, the petitioners filed an appeal, being appeal no. two things emerge clearly from section 32j: there being no appeal provided under section 74 against orders passed under section 32g by the agricultural lands tribunal, the collector had no power to pass any order against an order or decision under section 32g and therefore obviously, there could be no revision before the revenue tribunal under section 76. 6. this was clearly the position when, by gujarat act, xvi of 1960, the state legislature amended the principal act and inter alia added in section 74(1) clause (mb) by section 20 thereof. it is well-settled that it is only when there is such repugnancy or conflict between the two provisions.....j.m. shelat, c.j.1. the question arising in this petition is a short one and involves the construction of section 20 of the bombay tenancy and agricultural lands (gujarat amendment) act, xvi of 1960, whereby the state legislature of gujarat added clause (mb) in section 74(1) of the bombay tenancy and agricultural lands act, 1948. since the question arising in this petition also arises in other petitions pending in this court, we thought it advisable to hear, besides mr. parghi who appears for the petitioners in the present petition, messrs m.h. chhatrapati, p.d. desai, v.j. desai and r.m. vin, who are the advocates interested in those other allied petitions.2. the petitioners in this petition are the owners of and landlords in respect of survey no. 45 of village aminpur, district.....
Judgment:

J.M. Shelat, C.J.

1. The question arising in this petition is a short one and involves the construction of Section 20 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act, XVI of 1960, whereby the State Legislature of Gujarat added Clause (mb) in Section 74(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Since the question arising in this petition also arises in other petitions pending in this Court, we thought it advisable to hear, besides Mr. Parghi who appears for the petitioners in the present petition, Messrs M.H. Chhatrapati, P.D. Desai, V.J. Desai and R.M. Vin, who are the advocates interested in those other allied petitions.

2. The petitioners in this petition are the owners of and landlords in respect of survey No. 45 of village Aminpur, District Sabarkantha, admeasuring 2 acres and 19 gunthas. In an enquiry held under Section 32G of the Act, the Agricultural Lands Tribunal by an order dated September 21,1959, determined the price of the said land at Rs. 1000/ and that of a well situate therein at Rs. 800/-. Not satisfied with this decision, the petitioners filed an appeal, being Appeal No. 8 of 1959 under Section 32J. The Collector of Sabarkantha District heard the appeal and dismissed it by his order dated February 1, 1960. Thereupon the petitioners filed a revision application, being Revision Application No. 452 of 1960, before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, which, along with several other such revision applications, rejected it by its order dated July 13, 1961 on the ground that no such revision lay before that Tribunal under Section 76 of the Act against an order in appeal passed under Section 32J. The instant petition challenges the correctness of that order.

3. In order to appreciate the rival contentions urged before us, it is necessary to appreciate first the relevant provisions of the Act as also Clause (mb) of Section 74(1) inserted therein by Gujarat Act XVI of 1960. Section 32(1) provides that on the first day of April 1957, therein called the tillers' day, every tenant, subject to certain other provisions of the Act, is deemed to have purchased from his landlord the land held by him as tenant. Sub-section (3) of Section 32 provides that in respect of the land so deemed to have been purchased by a tenant, the tenant shall continue to be liable to pay to the landlord the rent of such land and the landlord shall continue to be liable to pay to the State Government the dues, if any, referred to in Clauses (a),(b),(c) and (d) of Section 10A(1), where the tenant is not liable to pay such dues under Sub-section (3) of that section until the amount of the purchase price payable by the tenant to the land lord is determined under Section 32H. Section 32G then provides for the procedure for determining the purchase price. Under Sub-section (1) thereof, it is provided that the Tribunal shall, as soon as may be after the tillers' day, publish or cause to be published a public notice in each village within its jurisdiction, calling upon all tenants, who, under Section 32 are deemed to have purchased the lands, all landlords of such land and all other persons interested therein, to appear before it on the date specified in the notice. It also provided that the Tribunal shall issue a notice individually to each tenant, landlord and also other persons calling upon each of them to appear before it on the date specified in the public notice. The Tribunal referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 32G is the Agricultural Lands Tribunal constituted under Section 67 and as defined by Section 2(19). Under Sub-section (2), the Tribunal has to record the statement of the tenant whether he is or he is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. Sub-section (3) provides that if a tenant fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal shall by an order in writing declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective. But the proviso to that subsection provides that if such an order is passed the Tribunal shall communicate such order to the parties and any party on whose default the order has been passed may within sixty days from the date on which such order was communicated to him, apply for the review of the same. Sub-section (4) provides that if a tenant is willing to purchase, the tribunal shall, after giving an opportunity to the tenant and the landlord and all other persons interested in such land to be heard and after holding an enquiry, determine the purchase price of such land in accordance with the provisions of Section 32H and of Sub-section (3) of Section 63A the proviso to that sub-section nays down that where the purchase price in accordance with the provisions of Section 32H is mutually agreed upon by the landlord and the tenant, the Tribunal, after satisfying itself that the tenant's consent to the agreement was voluntary, may make an order determining the purchase price and providing for its payment in accordance with such agreement. Section 32H lays down the basis for reckoning the purchase price. Section 32J, with which we are immediately concerned in this petition along with Section 74(1)(mb), provided that any person aggrieved by the decision of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal determining the amount of the purchase price may appeal to the State Government against such decision and the State Government shall, after giving an Opportunity to the parties to be heard, decide such an appeal. Sub-section (2) of Section 32J makes the decision of the Tribunal subject to an appeal to the State Government and the decision of the State Government on appeal final. Two things emerge clearly from Section 32J: (1) that the right of appeal against the Tribunal's decision determining the purchase price under Section 32G lies to the State Government only, and (2) there is no appeal provided under Section 32J except an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal determining the purchase price. In other words, no appeal is provided for in Section 32J in respect of orders or decisions of the Tribunal other than those determining the purchase price under Section 32G. Chapter VI of the Act deals inter alia with the procedure and jurisdiction of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal and appeals from its orders. As aforesaid, Section 67 in that Chapter provides for the constitution of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal. Section 68 provides for the duties of such Tribunals and Clause (b) thereof lays down the duty to determine the purchase price of lands under Section 32G, Section 63A and Section 64. The section further provides that the Tribunal has also to decide any dispute arising under Sections 32 to 32R (both inclusive) and to perform such other functions in carrying out the provisions of the Act as may be prescribed or directed by the State Government. Section 74 provides for appeals before the Collector against orders therein enumerated passed by the Mamlatdar and the Agricultural Lands Tribunal.

4. It is clear from the section that before Clause (mb) was inserted therein by the Gujarat Amendment Act, XVI of 1960, which came into force on December 13, 1960, no appeal lay before the Collector in respect of an order passed under Section 32G by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal. As aforesaid, it is also clear that the only order in respect of which an appeal was provided for was the order passed under Section 32G regarding the determination of the purchase price and such appeal lay, not under Section 74 before the Collector, but under Section 32J before the State Government. Section 76 provides for the revisional jurisdiction of the Revenue Tribunal against any order of the Collector on the grounds set out therein. There fore, as the law stood prior to the enactment of the Amendment Act, XVI of 1960, no revision lay before the Revenue Tribunal in respect of orders passed by the State Government under Section 32J. Lastly, Section 83 enables the State Government to delegate to any of its officers not below the rank of an Assistant or a Deputy Collector all or any of the powers conferred on it by the Act.

5. It is not in dispute that the State Government, by notifications issued in pursuance of Section 83 dated December 15, 1956 and January 27, 1959, delegated its appellate power under Section 32J first to Divisional Officers and thereafter to Collectors, who included Additional Collectors. It is obvious that the appeal which was heard and disposed of in the present case by the Collector, Sabarkantha District, was an appeal filed by the petitioners under Section 325 and not under Section 74, as there was no provision in Section 74, as it stood then, for an appeal under Section 32G except an appeal under Section 32J and consequently, the appeal that was heard and decided by the Collector was so heard and decided by him under the provisions of Section 32J as an appeal before the State Government and as a delegate of the State Government. Therefore, the order passed by the Collector in that appeal was an order passed by him not in his capacity as the Collector, but as a delegate of the Government and the order disposing of that appeal, therefore, must be deemed to be the order of the State Government under Section 32J and not under Section 74 and therefore such an order was not subject to revision under Section 76 by the Revenue Tribunal as Section 76 provides for revisions only against orders passed by the Collector under powers conferred by the Act. There being no appeal provided under Section 74 against orders passed under Section 32G by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, the Collector had no power to pass any order against an order or decision under Section 32G and therefore obviously, there could be no revision before the Revenue Tribunal under Section 76.

6. This was clearly the position when, by Gujarat Act, XVI of 1960, the State Legislature amended the principal Act and inter alia added in Section 74(1) Clause (mb) by Section 20 thereof. Section 20 of the Amendment Act, XVI of 1960 provided that in Section 74(1) of the Act, Clause (mb) shall be inserted after Clause (ma) and shall be deemed to have been inserted with effect on and from August 1, 1956, namely, (mb) a decision under Section 31 or 32F, or an order under Section 32G. By Section 22 of the Amendment Act, the State Legislature further provided by an additional proviso that an appeal against an order by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under Section 32G before the commencement of Act, XVI of 1960 may be filed within a period of six months from the date of such commencement.

7. The effect of these two sections was, three-fold: (1) that under Section 74 an appeal would lie before the Collector against an order passed by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under Section 32G, (2) that Clause (mb), though having been brought into operation as from December 13, 1960, was to have retrospective effect so as to be deemed to be there in Section 74(1) as from August 1, 1956, i.e. the tillers' day under the Act and there fore an appeal would lie before the Collector against an order passed by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under Section 32G even though such an order was passed prior to December 13, 1960 as if such an appeal lay right from August 1, 1956, and (3) that though no appeal lay before the Collector and therefore an appeal might not have been filed, a person aggrieved by an order of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under Section 32G though passed prior to December 13, can file an appeal under Section 74(1) before the Collector if it is filed within six months from December 13, 1960. It is thus clear that a new right of appeal was provided by these two sections under Section 74(1) and the provision giving such a right was given retrospective effect as from, August 1, 1956 by creating a fiction as if such a provision was there in Section 74(1) right from the tillers' day. Having done that, the legislature, as a corollary to the retrospective nature of Clause (mb) in Section 74(1), went a step further and extended the period of Limitation for such an appeal by enacting that an appeal would be competent if it was filed within six months from December 13, 1960. It should be observed that though the Legislature amended Section 74(1) by inserting therein Clause (mb), it did not touch Section 32J and left it intact. Apparently, therefore, though an appeal lay before the State Government under Section 32J against an order passed by the Tribunal under Section 32G determining the purchase price and an order passed under Section 32G subject to an appeal under Section 32J and the order passed in such appeal under Section 32J by the State Government were final and no revision under Section 76 lay before the Revenue Tribunal against such an order, Clause (mb) of Section 74(1) provided for an appeal before the Collector in respect of an order passed under Section 32G by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal. It should also be observed that while an appellate order passed under Section 32J from an order determining the purchase price under Section 32G would be an order passed by the State Government, the appellate order passed under Section 74(1) (mb) against an order passed by the Tribunal under Section 32G would be an order of the Collector as such and whereas there would be no revision before the Revenue Tribunal under Section 76 against the former order, there would be a revision under Section 76 against the latter order.

8. The question, therefore, is, what is the true construction of Clause (mb) of Section 74(1) and whether there is any real conflict between the provisions of that Clause and the provisions of Section 32J and if so, which of them should prevail?

9. On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended:

(1) that by inserting Clause (mb) in Section 74(1) and giving it a retrospective effect as and from the tillers' day, namely, August 1, 1956, the Legis lature has made its intention clear to provide for appeals before the Collector against all orders passed under Section 32G and also for providing a right of revision before the Revenue Tribunal;

(2) that the restrospective nature of Clause(mb) must be given full effect and if so done, it would mean as if Clause(mb) was there in Section 74(1) right from August 1, 1956;

(3) that therefore, there was a conflict and repugnancy between Section 32J and Clause (mb) in Section 74(1) right from August 1, 1956;

(4) that Clause (mb) in Section 74(1) being of a later date, it must be presumed that the intention of the Legislature was to substitute the Collector in place of the State Government as the appellate authority in respect of orders passed under Section 32G and to invest thereby the Revenue Tribunal with power of revision against the appellate orders passed by the Collector under Clause(mb) of Section 74(1) in the same manner as it had against other orders passed under Section 74(1);

(5) that Clause(mb) of Section 74(1) being of retrospective character, it must be presumed that the intention of the Legislature was to invest revisional jurisdiction in the Revenue Tribunal even in cases where the appeals filed under Section 32J were disposed of before December 13, 1960;

(6) that there being a conflict between Section 32J and Clause(mb) of Section 74(1), the latter should prevail as it is a later enactment in respect of the same subject matter as the one dealt with by Section 32J; and

(7) that though Section 32J was not touched by the Legislature when it enacted Act, XVI of 1960 and was left intact, it must be presumed that Section 32J remained unrepealed or unamended through legislative inadvertence.

10. On behalf of the petitioners, reliance was placed on a judgment of the President of the Revenue Tribunal in a group of revision applications Nos. TEN.A. 262 and others, dated December 22, 1961, wherein the learned President held that once the Legislature added Clause (mb) in Section 74(1) by Section 20 of the Gujarat Act, XVI of 1960 making the orders or decisions passed by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under Section 32G appealable before the Collector, the provisions of Section 32J, under which appeals would lie to the State Government from an order or decision made under Section 32G(4) became repugnant on the principle that when a later provision alters an earlier provision upon the same subject matter the earlier provision of law must stand repealed or superseded. He concluded on this basis that as the appeals against the orders of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal from which revision before him were filed were pending at the date when Section 20 of Act, XVI of 1960 came into force, those appeals would only be maintainable before and heard by the Collector and would, therefore, be subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the Revenue Tribunal under Section 76 of the Act. In an earlier judgment dated July 13, 1961, however, the very same learned President of the Revenue Tribunal in Revision Applications Nos. T.E.N.A. 550 and others, had taken a different view and had held that orders passed in appeals under Section 32J by the State Government or a Collector to whom the Government had delegated its appellate powers under Section 83 were final and were not, therefore, subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the Revenue Tribunal under Section 76. In that group of revision applications, no doubt, the position was that the appeals from the orders passed under Section 32G by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal were already disposed of under Section 32J and were not pending on December 13, 1960 when Section 20 of Act, XVI of 1960 came into operation, and the President in these two judgments made a distinction between appeals pending and not pending on December 13, 1960 when Section 74 was amended by the insertion of Clause (mb) therein. But, in both the judgments, the learned President held that the subject matter of Section 32J and Clause (mb) in Section 74(1) was the same and the field occupied by both the provisions was identical.

11. The question, therefore, is whether it is so and whether the provisions of Section 32J and Clause (mb) of Section 74(1) are repugnant therefore to each other. It is well-settled that it is only when there is such repugnancy or conflict between the two provisions that the principle relied upon by the learned President that a latter provision has the effect of impliedly repealing or superseding an earlier provision would apply. It is also only in such a case of repugnancy and conflict that the question of a special provision superseding a general provision would arise. Both the aforesaid judgments were delivered by the then President of the Revenue Tribunal sitting singly. In a latter judgment dated February 27, 1962 in Ramanlal Tapidas Tolat and others v. Devjibhai Anopbhai and others, reported in (1962) 2 Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Law Reporter, 114, a Division Bench of the Revenue Tribunal took a different view holding that the subject matter dealt with by Section 32J was different from that of Clause (mb) in Section 74(1) and that, in any view, Clause (mb) of Section 74(1) was a general provision and, therefore, must yield to Section 32J which was a special provision. The Division Bench of the Revenue Tribunal held on this basis that Clause(mb) did not apply to orders passed under Section 32(g) determining the purchase price against which an appeal would lie to the State Government under Section 32J and that, therefore, the appellate order under Section 32J being an order, not of the Collector as contemplated by Section 74(1), but of or on behalf of the State Government, was final and not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the Revenue Tribunal under Section 76. In this view, there would be no distinction between orders passed in appeals which were pending and those which were not pending at the time when Section 20 of Act, XVI of 1960 came into operation. There is thus a conflict of views in these three judgments, and the question that arises before us is, which of these conflicting views is correct.

12. Considering the various amendments made in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, from time to time, there is no doubt that the Legislature has been following a pattern of land reforms since 1948, the object of such reforms being to eliminate the middle man between the State and the actual tiller and establishing thereby direct relationsbetween the tiller and the State. In pursuance of this legislative policy, the Legislature introduced in 1956 and 1957 drastic reforms by introducing; several provisions in the Act of 1948 whereby, under the new Section 32, it provided that as from April 1, 1957, i.e. the tillers' day, every tenant should be deemed to have purchased from his landlord the land held by him as a tenant. Under Section 32G, the Legislature provided the method and the procedure of payment of compensation to such landlords in respect of whose lands the tenants were to be considered as deemed purchasers. As already stated, under Sub-section (1) of Section 32G, the Agricultural Lands Tribunal has to publish or cause to be published a public notice in each village within its jurisdiction, calling upon tenants who are deemed purchasers under Section 32(1) and all landlords of such land and all other persons interested in such land to appear before it on the date specified therein. The sub-section also directs the Tribunal to issue individual notices to these three categories of persons, calling upon each of them to appear before it on the specified date. Under Sub-section (2), the Tribunal has to record the statement of the tenant whether he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant, and under Sub-section(3) if a tenant were to fail to appear or to state that he is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal has to pass an order in writing declaring that such a tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective. Under the proviso to that sub-section, if such an order is passed in default of appearance of any party, the Tribunal has to communicate such order to the parties and any party on whose default such an order was passed may within the prescribed period apply for a review of such order. Sub-section (4) provides that if a tenant is willing to purchase, the Tribunal, after giving an opportunity to the parties interested in the land to be heard and after holding an enquiry, has to determine the purchase price of such land. Tile proviso to Sub-section (4) provides that where the pur chase price is agreed upon between the parties themselves, the Tribunal,on being satisfied that the tenant's consent to the agreement was voluntary, may pass an order determining the purchase price so agreed upon and providing for its payment in accordance with the agreement. Sub-section(5) deals with the postponed date of a deemed purchase and enjoins upon the Tribunal to determine the purchase price of such land. Section 32J provides for appeal to the State Government by a person aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal determining the amount of the purchase price and Subsection (2) thereof makes the decision of the Tribunal subject to such appeal and the decision of the State Government on such appeal final.

13. As held by this Court in Dahyaji Parmar v. Dahiben (1960) 1 G.L.R., 1 and in Madhaji v. Mashrubhai (1962) 3 G.L.R. 438 (F.B.), when the Legislature uses the expression final, it lays down the rule that the subject matter of the decision is to terminate with such decision and in case an appeal is provided therefrom, then the subject matter of the appellate decision is to terminate and that, therefore, the matter is no more to be agitated before any authority constituted under the Act and the Revenue Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to revise such decision. It is thus clear that under Section 32J, the decision of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, subject to an appeal therefrom to the State Government and the appellate decision of the State Government are made final and therefore they are not subject to any revision before the Revenue Tribunal. This position is also clear from Section 76 which sets out the revisional jurisdiction of the Revenue Tribunal. The revisional jurisdiction of the Revenue Tribunal under Section 76 is confined to orders passed by a Collector and does not include juris diction over orders passed by the State Government under Section 32J. Therefore, looking at the provisions of Section 76 also, it is clear that the Revenue Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to revise any order passed by the State Government under Section 32J. As we have already stated, this was clearly the position prior to the introduction of Clause (mb) in Section 74(1) by Gujarat Act XVI of 1960.

14. Has the insertion of Clause (mb) made any difference to this position? It was contended that it has The contention was that the Legislature, realising that it had left so vital a question as the determination of the purchase price to the executive under Section 32J, changed its policy and decided to make such determination subject to an appeal before the Collector under Section 74(1) and thereby making the Collector's decision subject to the revisional jurisdiction of an independent judicial body such as the Revenue Tribunal under Section 76. The contention further was that such a change in the policy was presumably thought proper as the only order or decision to be made or passed under Section 32G was as regards the determination of the purchase price, and the Legislature must have thought when it enacted Act XVI of 1960, that it was not proper to leave the entire Section 32G beyond the pale of jurisdiction of a judicial tribunal like the Revenue Tribunal by leaving the decision under Section 32G to the appellate jurisdiction of the executive, and letting the decision of the State Government remain final. It was argued that when the Legis lature effected this change of policy by the insertion of Clause (mb) in Section 74(1), it left Section 32J intact through mistake, causing unwittingly a conflict between the two provisions. We must confess that the argument is attractive, especially in view of the fact that Clause (mb) in Section 74(1) has been made retrospective as from the tiller's day as prescribed by Section 32(1), and also in view of the language of Clause (mb) which apparently includes all orders passed by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under Section 32G. Notwithstanding such a position, is it possible to say that when the Legislature enacted Clause (mb), it was unaware of Section 32J and caused, by leaving that section intact, a repugnancy between the two provisions?

15. It is true that Clause (mb) in Section 74(1) is a later provision of law and by using the expression an order under Section 32G the Legislature makes it possible to contend that an order under Section 32G would include an order made by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under Sub-section(4) of that section, i.e. an order determining the purchase price. It is further possible to argue that the Legislature intended to after its policy and make all orders under Section 32G not only subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Collector but also to make an order under Section 32G determining the purchase price appealable before the Collector and not before the State Government, thereby making all such orders also revisable by the Revenue Tribunal under Section 76. But it is equally possible to contend, as was done by the learned Assistant Government Pleader, that it cannot be lightly presumed that the Legislature through inadvertence left Section 32J unrepealed while enacting Clause (mb) in Section 74(1) and thus caused a conflict between the two provisions. A closer examination of the two provisions, in our view, shows that there is in fact no conflict between the two provisions, and what was done by the Legislature was to provide, by means of Clause (mb), a right of appeal before the Collector in respect of orders other than those under Section 32G determining the purchase price, which right was not existent before the enactment of Clause (mb) in Section 74(1).

16. As is seen from Section 32G, the Agricultural Lands Tribunal has to go through various stages necessitating the making of different orders before passing an order as to the purchase price. Under Section (1), it has first to issue a public notice, calling upon tenants, who, under Section 32(1) are deemed to have purchased the land, and all landlords and other persons interested in such land. It has also to give individual notices to such persons. It is possible that a landlord might challenge that a particular person claiming to be his tenant is not his tenant and therefore not entitled to be treated as a deemed purchaser. In that event, the Tribunal would have to direct such a landlord to obtain the necessary decision from the Mamlatdar under Section 70 and pass the necessary order when such a decision is obtained. If, inspite of such direction, no application is made by such a landlord and no such decision under Section 70 is obtained, the Tribunal would have to pass an order that a particular person is a tenant who has to be included in the public notice and to whom an individual notice has to be addressed under Section 32G(1). After such notices are issued, if the tenant fails to appear or he appears but states that he is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal under Sub-section (3) has to make an order in writing declaring that such a tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the deemed purchase is therefore ineffective. Even after such an order is made, in a case where it is made on account of the default of a tenant, such an order is made subject to a review and in the event of an application for review an order has to be made confirming or not confirming the above order. Under Sub-section (4), where a tenant appears and states that he is willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal has to hold an enquiry and determine the purchase price in accordance with the provisions of Section 32H and Section 63A(3). There may, however, be cases where a landlord and a tenant agree to the quantum of the purchase price and the manner of payment. Even in such a case, the Tribunal has to satisfy itself in the prescribed manner whether such an agreement is voluntary. That would be a finding of fact which the Tribunal would have to arrive at and such a finding of fact would have to be recorded in an order before passing an order in such a case determining the purchase price. Thus, it is clear that Section 32G does not contemplate only one order, as was contended before us, namely, the one determining the purchase price, but several other orders before the stage of determining the purchase price is reached. A reading of Section 32J and Section 74(1), as it stood before the Gujarat Act XVI of 1960 was enacted, shows that no order under Section 32G except the one determining the purchase price was subject to an appeal, and the appeal provided even in respect of an order determining the purchase price was before the State Government under Section 32J and not before the Collector under Section 74. It is possible to say, therefore, that when the Legislature enacted Act XVI of 1960, it felt that it was necessary in fairness to the parties that orders other than the one which was appealable under Section 32J should not be left final without any right of appeal to the parties concerned and that an appeal in respect of them should also be provided for and therefore inserted Clause (mb) in Section 74(1) whereby those orders were made appealable before the Collector. It is further possible to say that sinCe such orders were not appealable till then, the Legislature a so considered it expedient to give retrospective effect to the provision as to appeals therefrom under Clause (mb) so as to enable persons aggrieved thereby to file appeals, provided that they did so within six months from the commencement of the Amendment Act.

17. It is true that the expression an order under Section 32G in Clause (mb) of Section 74(1) is a wide expression used by the Legislature, giving scope for a contention that it includes also an order determining the purchase price and that there is, therefore, a conflict between that Clause and Section 32J. But where such apparent conflict arises, it is the duty of the Court construing such provisions to bear in mind the well-settled principle of harmonious construction and the equally well-settled principle that the Legislature inserts every part of a statute for a purpose and its intention is that every part of it should have effect. In construing such provisions the Court cannot lightly jump to the conclusion that when the Legislature enacted Clause (mb), it left out of consideration the provisions of Section 32J or that it inadvertently left Section 32J unrepealed and provided two parallel appellate tribunals. It is also not proper to reach the conclusion that the Legislature all of a sudden changed its previous policy of leaving the appellate jurisdiction to the State Government and making the Government's order final as provided in Section 32J and making the order of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal determining the purchase price the subject of an appeal by the Collector and revisable by the Revenue Tribunal. There is no indication of such a change of policy and none was pointed out to us from Act XVI of 1950. If the construction suggested on behalf of the landlords were to be accepted, even those matters in which appeals under Section 32J were not pending at the commence ment of the Amendment Act and were disposed of under Section 32J would have to be opened up on the ground that Clause (mb) in Section 74(1) has been given retrospective effect as from August 1, 1956 Surely such an extreme result could not have been contemplated by the Legislature.

18. We are, therefore, of the view that the construction given to these two provisions by the Division Bench of the Revenue Tribunal in Ramanlal Tolat's case reported in (1962) 2 Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Law Reporter, 114 is the correct construction and that therefore inspite of the insertion of Clause (mb) in Section 74(1), the orders of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal determining the purchase price under Section 32G are and continue to be subject to an appeal before the State Government and not before the Collector under Section 74(1) and therefore not subject to revision under Section 76 before the Revenue Tribunal. The fact that the appellate order in the present case was passed by the Collector makes no difference and does not mean that it was passed by him in his capacity as the Collector under Section 74, for he passed the order in appeal under Section 32J as the delegate of and for and on behalf of the State Government which under Section 83 had delegated its appellate power under Section 32J to him.

19. For the reasons aforesaid-we are of the view that the Revenue Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the revisional application under Section 76 of the Act against the order passed under Section 32J and the Revenue Tribunal was, therefore, correct in the order under challenge in this petition. The petition, therefore, fails and must be dismissed. Rule discharged with costs.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //