A.P. Ravani, J.
1. Rule. Mr. M.B. Gandhi appears and waives service of Rule on behalf of the opponents. By consent of the parties, the revision application is ordered to be heard today.
2. The petitioner is the original plaintiff, who filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge (JD), Petlad challenging the decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No. 119 of 1973. That suit was filed by deceased Shambhubhai Tulsidas, the landlord. The suit was iled for eviction of the suit premises on the ground of personal bona fide requirement. The suit was compromised and consent decree was passed. As per the consent decree, the petitioner was required to handover the possession on or before February 1, 1979. It so happened that before the aforesaid date, the original landlord Shambhubhai died on April 4, 1975. On this basis, the petitioner contended that the decree was passed on the ground of personal requirement and since the landlord has died, the requirement has also evaporated with him and decree passed on the basis of personal requirement cannot be executed after the death of the landlord. Reliance was placed on a decision of this High Court in the case of Jamna Mangaji v. Vaktavarmal reported in 20 GLR 664. This is the only contention raised by the petitioner plaintiff. The observations made by this High Court in the aforesaid decision read as follows:
It is settled legal position that a decree under Section 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act is a personal decree. If a person dies or gets rid of the property, his personal requirement comes to an end. In the instant case, when landlord the respondent No. 2, washed his hands of the property once for all, it follows that there is no possibility of his keeping the premises in exercise of the right of the decree which has been transferred by him to the respondent No. 1. In this view of the matter-an indefatigable right of the tenant under Section 17 would arise and would make the decree non-executable.
3. Both the lower courts held that, in the aforesaid case before this High Court, the landlord had transferred the premises by sale after getting the decree on the ground of personal requirement. Therefore, in the background of the facts and circumstances of that case, the Court held that, if the landlord ceases to be landlord after the decree for eviction passed on the basis of the personal requirement, such a decree cannot be executed by the transferee of the property. It appears that both the lower courts were right in not applying the aforesaid case to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The landlord deceased Shambhubhai died after obtaining the decree. He had not transferred the premises to anyone. The requirement of his family members continued. In this connection the relevant provisions of law may be looked at. Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act reads as follows:
13(i) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of Section 15, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied.
(g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purpose of the trust.
4. The important words are 'by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held.' In the instant case, when the landlord prayed for decree for eviction, he did say that he wanted the premises for his son to carry on the business. Now his son and other persons, as heirs and legal representatives, have been joined in these proceedings right from the beginning. In the facts and circumstances of the present case it cannot be said that the decree passed in favour of the landlord has become in executable by the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased simply because the original landlord has died after the passing of the decree. This is so because the requirement of the landlord and his heirs and legal representatives continues and they are in position to meet with the statutory obligations that may ensure on account of the execution of the decree. Therefore, the contention raised by the petitioner-original plaintiff fails.
5. It is not necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code which provide that questions arising between the parties should be determined by the same court and not by separate suit. Since the question has not been raised before the lower courts, for the purpose of determination of this revision application the question does not directly arise and therefore, it is not necessary to go in further details.
6. No other contention is raised. In the above view of the matter, the counsel for the petitioner prays that he be permitted to withdraw the revision application and be granted time to vacate the premises up to December 31, 1986. In the facts and circumstances of the case the request appears to be reasonable. It is directed that decree for possession obtained in regular Civil Suit No. 110 of 1973 of the court of Civil Judge (JD) Petlad, shall not be executed till December 31, 1986 on the condition that the petitioner tenant-original plaintiff shall file a usual undertaking in this Court latest before January 16, 1985. Subject to the aforesaid direction, the revision application is permitted to be withdrawn. Rule discharged with no order as to costs.