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State Vs. Surabhai Mafatbhai - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtGujarat High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1982)2GLR596
AppellantState
RespondentSurabhai Mafatbhai
Cases ReferredMeek v. Wheeler County
Excerpt:
- - 518 situated within the revenue limits of village vadaj, ahmedabad taluka, admeasuring about acres 19-02 gunthas, is bad in law and void, inasmuch as section 202 of the code being corresponding law stood repealed in light of the provisions contained in section 19 of the gujarat public premises (eviction of unauthorised occupants) act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the public premises act') which repealed not only the bombay government premises (eviction) act, 1955 but also any other corresponding law for eviction of occupants from the public premises. in submission of the plaintiff, the said notice was bad in law, ultra vires, and, therefore, null and void, inasmuch as it was without jurisdiction and against the principles of natural justice. the plaintiff, therefore, served a.....b.k. mehta, j.1. this appeal, at the instance of the state government, is directed against the judgment and order of the city civil court ahmedabad, dated february 27, 1980, granting declaration that the notice for summary eviction issued by the city deputy collector, ahmedabad, purporting to act under section 202 of the bombay land revenue code, 1879 (hereinafter referred to as 'the code') from the land of s. no. 518 situated within the revenue limits of village vadaj, ahmedabad taluka, admeasuring about acres 19-02 gunthas, is bad in law and void, inasmuch as section 202 of the code being corresponding law stood repealed in light of the provisions contained in section 19 of the gujarat public premises (eviction of unauthorised occupants) act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the public.....
Judgment:

B.K. Mehta, J.

1. This appeal, at the instance of the State Government, is directed against the judgment and order of the City Civil Court Ahmedabad, dated February 27, 1980, granting declaration that the notice for summary eviction issued by the City Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad, purporting to act under Section 202 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') from the land of S. No. 518 situated within the revenue limits of village Vadaj, Ahmedabad Taluka, admeasuring about acres 19-02 gunthas, is bad in law and void, inasmuch as Section 202 of the Code being corresponding law stood repealed in light of the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Public Premises Act') which repealed not only the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 but also any other corresponding law for eviction of occupants from the public premises. In order to appreciate the rival contentions in the proper perspective, it is necessary to refer shortly to the pleadings of the parties hereto.

2. The plaintiff claims that according to the rules and regulations of the State Government, a policy was evolved to grant lands to agriculturists who are in cultivation thereof for continuous period of three years on recovery of the occupancy price. Since the plaintiff was cultivating, the land of S. No. 518 situate within the revenue limits of village Vadaj of Ahmedabad taluka, he has become the owner thereof, and neither the State Government nor its agents, officers or servants were entitled to interfere with his possession, or to cause any obstruction, or restrain him from enjoyment thereof. The land in question was originally a waste land and was not fit for cultivation since it was of uneven level. The State Government had given the said land to the plaintiff before a considerable number of years and since then it is in his possession and cultivation. We spent a considerable amount in making it fit for cultivation and recently he has sown in the field after cultivating the same. The City Deputy Collector, by his notice served on the plaintiff on June 5, 1976, called upon him to hand over the vacant possession of the land within thirty days of the receipt of the said notice since he was not authorised to hold the same, and his possession thereof was unauthorised. The City Deputy Collector was, therefore, entitled to summarily evict him in exercise of his powers under Section 202 of the Code and he was, therefore, called upon to hand over the possession as stated above. In submission of the plaintiff, the said notice was bad in law, ultra vires, and, therefore, null and void, inasmuch as it was without jurisdiction and against the principles of natural justice. The plaintiff, therefore, served a statutory notice as required by Section 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, dated June 23, 1976 which has been served on the Government on July 24, 1976, and since the Government failed to comply with the demand made in the notice, the plaintiff filed the suit in the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, by his Civil Suit No. 2749 of 1976 praying for a declaration and permanent injunction as stated above.

3. The State Government resisted the suit, contending, inter alia, that sec. No. 518 is admeasuring in all acres 72-27 gunthas and is shown in the revenue record as waste and Gauchar land. The State Government joined issue with the plaintiff that there was-no laid down policy to grant waste land to agriculturists who are claiming to cultivate the land, or about the grant of the said land or any part thereof to the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff had been put in possession since many years, and/or that he was cultivating the said land as alleged by him. According to the State Government, the plaintiff had entered upon the said land unauthorisedly and illegally and, therefore, in exercise of the powers under Section 202 of the Code the City Deputy Collector has proceeded to evict the plaintiff, who was wrongfully in possession of the Government land. On these pleadings, the learned City Civil Judge raised the necessary issues.

4. The only issue on which the suit of the plaintiff was decreed is pertaining to the validity and legality of the impugned notice. The said issue has been raised in the following terms:

2. Whether the plaintiff proves that the notice of summary eviction dated 5-6-1976 issued by the City Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad under Section 202 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code to him is illegal, without jurisdiction and against the principle of natural justice and hence void and not binding to him?

5. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the impugned notice, which is in the purported exercise of the power under Section 202 of the power under Section 202 of the Code was bad in law and void since Section 202 of the Code stood repealed in light of the repealing Section 19 of Public Premises Act which repealed not only the earlier Act, namely, the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 but every other corresponding law providing for eviction of occupants from the public premises, and in as much as the alleged possession of the land was unauthorised, the State Government can initiate proceedings for summary eviction only under the Public Premises Act since the land would be public premises within the definition of the said term in Section 2(f) read with Section 2(c) and (d) of the said Public Premises Act. In that view of the matter, the learned City Civil Judge held that Section 202 of the Code ceased to have an effect with respect to the eviction of an occupant from any Government land on the ground stated in Section 202 of the Code and, therefore, the City Deputy Collector has no power, authority or jurisdiction to take any action, under the said section. Even otherwise, the learned City Civil Judge was of the view that the impugned notice was, in effect and substance, an order of summary eviction and, therefore, the suit was maintainable, and in as much as the impugned notice of summary eviction was bad in law and void, it did not oblige the plaintiff to challenge the same by filing an appeal against it. He, therefore, held that the impugned notice was bad in law and, therefore, void and ineffective. The learned Judge, therefore, granted prohibitory injunction restraining the Government, its agents and servants from dispossessing the plaintiff though he reserved the liberty to the State Government to take appropriate action for eviction of the plaintiff from the suit land, if so advised. It is this judgment and order of the learned City Civil Judge which is the subject matter of this appeal before me.

6. At the time of hearing of this appeal, the learned Government Pleader Mr. Vin appearing for the State Government urged the following three contentions:

(1) The learned City Civil Judge committed a serious error of law in holding that Section 202 of the Code is repealed by Section 19 of the Public Premises Act, inasmuch as he has failed to appreciate that the provision contained in Section 202 was namely procedural one prescribing the manner in which the Collector would evict any person wrongfully in possession of the land, and it did not amount to any substantive law proceeding for eviction of the occupants from the public premises.

(2) Having regard to the purpose, object and the contents of the Code, the learned City Civil Judge was clearly in error of law in holding that the provisions in the Code pertaining to summary eviction of persons unauthorized occupying, or wrongfully in possession of any Government land, are corresponding law providing for eviction of occupants from the public premises and, therefore, they were expressly repealed.

(3) The learned City Civil Judge committed an error of law in holding that Section 202 of the Code is repealed, in as much as on the well accepted and recognised principles of construction of statutes, this is a case of repeal by necessary implication.

7. A neat and interesting question of law arises in this appeal for consideration, as to what is the width and ambit of Section 19 of the Public Premises Act. It should be noted at the outset that the said Act was put on the statute book with effect from 26th June 1973, and it was meant to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises, and for certain incidental matters. The term 'public premises' has been defined by Section 2(f) of the Public Premises Act so as to mean any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of the State Government, and includes any premises belonging to, or taken on lease, by or on behalf of any Municipal Corporation, or Municipality or a Panchayat in the State, or any corporation established under the Central or State Act and owned and controlled by the State Government, or any university constituted under any law in the State of Gujarat, or any institution recognised by the University Grants Commission, or declared by the Central Government to be University within the meaning of the said term under the University Grants Commission Act, 1956. The term 'premises' means, inter alia, any land or any buildings or part of a building Section 2(d). The term 'land' has been given the same meaning as given under the Code Section 2(c). It includes benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to earth. The term 'unauthorised occupation' in relation to any public premises means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, or continuance therein after the initial authority has expired, or has been determined for any reason whatsoever Section 2(h). Section 4 of the Public Premises Act prescribes issue of notice to show cause against the proposed order of eviction. Notice can be issued on any of the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 4. Clause (a) comprises of four sub-grounds namely (i) arrears of rent for a period of more than two months, (ii) subletting of the premises without the permission of the State Government or the Corporation, (iii) acts of waste materially diminishing the value, or substantially impairing the utility of the premises, and (iv) contravention of express or implied terms of the authority. The grounds in Clauses (b) and (c) are respectively (i) unauthorised occupation of the public premises, or (ii) requirement thereof by the State Government or the Corporation. It is not necessary to refer any other provisions except the repealing and saving provision contained in Section 19 of the Public Premises Act. Section 19 of the said Act reads as under:

19. The Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act. 1955 and any other corresponding law providing for the eviction of occupants from public premises are hereby repealed:

Provided that anything done or any action taken (including rules or orders made, notices issued, evictions ordered or effected, damages assessed, rents or damages or costs recovered and proceedings initiated) or purported to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act, and shall be deemed to be, and to have always been, as valid and effective as if such thing or action was done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act, as if this Act had been in force when such thing was done or such action was taken.

8. Before I deal with the view of the learned City Civil Judge, which has been strongly assailed by the learned Government Pleader, it would be necessary for me to remind myself as to what is the precise connotation of the term 'corresponding law' as explained by the Supreme Court and other High Courts of this country.

9. In A.B. Abdul kadir and Ors. v. State of Kerala : AIR1962SC922 , the Supreme Court was concerned with the validity of a notification of August 3, 1950 framing new rules for the issue of licences issued under the Cochin Tobacco Act and Travancore Tobacco Act, which stood repealed by the Finance Act. 1950 on the introduction of the Central Act in Part A State of Travancore-Cochin with effect from April, 1. 1950 inter alia on the ground that it was void ab initio, in as much as it was purported to be issued under the Act which stood repealed from April 1, 1950. In that context, the Supreme Court was required to consider as to what was the import of the expression 'corresponding law' used in Section 13(2) of the Finance Act, 1950. The Kerala High Court dismissed the petition of the different tobacoo dealers who were challenging the validity of the said notification and the rules on the ground that the rules were in force and were justifiable under item 62 of List II of the Seventh schedule. The High Court did not deal with what is the effect of Section 13(2) of the Finance Act on the Cochin Act or Travancore Act with effect from the coming into force of the Finance Act, 1950. Section 11(1) of the Finance Act extended the Central Act and the rules and orders made there under, which were in force immediately after the commencement of the Finance Act to all part B States except Jammu and Kashmir. Section 13(2) of the Finance Act specifically provided that from April 1, 1950 any law corresponding to Central law will be repealed from that date. The contention on behalf of the dealers was that Cochin Act as well as Travancore Act was a law corresponding to Central Act therefore stood repealed as from April 1. 1950. The Supreme Court, speaking through Wanchoo J., observed as under in paragraph II at page 925:

It was pointed out by this Court in Custodian of Evacuee Property v. Abdul Shakoor AIR 1961 1087, that where the Act repealed provides substantially for all matters contained in the Act effecting the repeal there is correspondence between the two Acts and the earlier Act would thus stand repealed; it is not necessary that there should be complete identity between the repealing Act and the Act repealed in every respect. Therefore, when Section 13(2) of the Finance Act provides that on the extension of the Central Act from April 1, 1950 to the part B State of Travancore-Cochin, any law corresponding to the Central Act is repealed with effect from that date, all that we have to see is whether the law repealed substantially provided for the same matters as the Central Act even though it may, not be identical in all respects.

10. In order to determine the contentions urged on behalf of the State Government, it would be necessary to consider whether Section 19 is a case of an express repeal or repeal by necessary implications. What are the methods of express repeal is indicated in Crazies on Statute Law 7th Edition, at page 350 under the caption 'Methods of express repeal.' A repeal schedule is annexed to all Acts so as to alter the statute law on a subject. In some of the statutes, a provision is inserted to the effect' that 'all provisions inconsistent with the Act repealed,' or 'all Acts and parts of Acts in conflict with the provisions of these Acts are hereby repealed'. Similarly a provision contained in a codifying statute expressly repealed all former Acts 'within the purview' of the new Code. All these express methods of repeal create problems almost as difficult as those created by implied repeal (vide: Statutory Construction by Crawford, p. 626). Though these are some of the express methods of repeal, they have been treated, for all intents and purposes, as repeal by implications. The following principles digested in Statutory Construction by Crawford in this respect read as under:.. As we have previously pointed out, there is considerable justification for regarding a repeal caused by such a statutory provision as a repeal by implications. Provision of this character leave the question open as to what laws are inconsistent. This is equally true, even where inconsistent statutes are enacted. In either case, whether the repealing act contains a provision that all inconsistent acts are repealed or not, all preexisting inconsistent acts are necessarily abrogated. As a result, the rules of law which apply to implied repeals generally will be applicable to repeals caused by the use of the expression 'all acts or parts of acts inconsistent here with' or expressions of similar import.

(Article 307 at page 628 in Crawford's Statutory Construction).

11. In Cruise on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, under the caption 'Methods of express repeal' at page 350, the following observation is illustrative:

It is now usual to annex a repeal schedule to all Acts which considerably alter the statute law, by which means many doubts as to the inconsistency of enactments are settled by Parliament, In some cases a provisions is inserted to the effect that 'all provisions inconsistent with the Act are repealed', by which lawyers are simply put on inquiry as to inconsistency, or left to wait till by a Statute Law Revision Act the virtually repealed enactments are expurgated; for an Act repealing all enactments inconsistent with itself really goes to further than the general law.

12. In Garnett v. Bradlay (1878) 3 App. Case 844. Lord Blackburn has expressed this difficulty in the following terms:

Mr. Greaves pointed out in 1961 as to the Statute Book as he knew it, that 'there are many instances in which even direct repeals which refer to the enactment intended to be repealed are so worded that it is impossible to ascertain how much of the old statutes are repealed. Here there must be actual legislation fix what is and what is not repealed.' A second class of repeals consists in repealing in express terms every enactment inconsistent with the Act in which the repeal is found, without referring to any Act at all; so that doubt is thrown on every previous enactment, and it must be compared with the whole and every part of the repealing Act to ascertain whether it is repealed or not. Such repealing clauses are nearly as bad as implied repeals, which abound in the Statute Book and are the roost difficult of all to ascertain.

Since the expression 'corresponding law' is one lacking precise import, the principles of interpretation of statute which apply to implied repeals generally will be applicable to such repeals caused by the use-of such expression on the accepted principles or authority as observed by Lord Blackburn in Garnett' s case (supra). By and large two questions will arise: (i) whether the new law is intended as a substitute for the old; or (ii) whether the new is irreconcilably inconsistent with the old, so that the former is thereby terminated. In the ultimate analysis what is the legislative intent is the determining factor, whether the old law shall cease or whether it shall be supplemented (vide: Statutory Construction by Craw-ford, Act. 308, page 628). It is also settled on principle that Courts will not recognize an implied repeal unless the intent to repeal clearly appears and the presumption is always against the intention of the Legislature to repeal the legislation by implication. This presumption is rebutted, if it is shown that new law is inconsistent with, or repugnant to the old law (vide: Municipal Council. Palai v. T.J. Joseph : [1964]2SCR87 . The Court would generally strive to avoid a repeal by implication by either resorting to reasonable or harmonious construction. What is the extent of inconsistency or repugnancy between the two statutes which would warrant a legislative intent to supplant or repeal the earlier statute is indicated in Article 311 at page 631 of Statutory Construction by Crawford. It provides as under:

The inconsistency or repugnancy between two statutes necessary to supplant or repeal the earlier one, must be more than a-mere difference in their terms and provisions. There must be what is often called 'such a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot reconciled and made stand together.' In other words, they must be absolutely repugnant, or irreconcilable. Otherwise, there can be no implied repeal, as we have pointed out in the preceding section, for the intent of the legislature to repeal the old enactment is utterly lacking. Since there is a presumption against an implied repeal, and since the court will seek to avoid such a repeal by any fair and reasonable construction, the inconsistency must be clear, manifest, and irreconcilable.

Another rule of law which is so well-entrenched by the recognized principles of interpretation is that it is not by itself sufficient to warrant an implied repeal merely from a fact that a later enactment relates to the same subject matter as that of an earlier one. The rule has been succinctly pointed out by Crawford in Statutory Construction in Article 312 at page 634 as under:.. An implied repeal will not take place under these circumstances, unless the new statutes are inconsistent and irreconcilable, or unless the new statute is clearly intended as a complete substitute for the old me. The court will endeavor to give both effect, if possible. In other words, there must be some expression of the legislative intent to repeal the existing statute. The two statutes must repeal the existing statute. The two statutes must relate to the same subject matter and have the same purpose. And, as we have already suggested, it is essential that the new statute cover the entire subject matter of the old, otherwise there is no indication of the intent of the legislature to abrogate the old law. Consequently, the later enactment will be construed as a continuation of the old one....

The court in American Bakeries Company v. Haines City (Fla.) (180 So. 524) has succinctly stated the law relating to implied repeals so far as subject matter is concerned:

'An intent to repeal prior statutes or portions thereof may be made apparent, where there is a positive and irreconcilable repugnancy between the provisions of a later enactment and those of prior existing statutes. But the mere fact that a later statue relates to matters covered in whole or in part by a prior statute does not cause a repeal of the older statutes.

If the statutes may operate upon the same subject without positive inconsistency repugnancy in the practical effect and consequences, they should each be given effect designed for them, unless a contrary intent clearly appears.'

An illustration of this principle will be found in United States v. Bruno 15 Fed. Supp. 793 where a statute penalizing the false procurement of naturalization was held not impliedly repealed by a statute penalizing false swearing in naturalization proceedings, since there was nothing inconsistent between the two statutes. The question, at this juncture, might be asked; what is the reason for the rule now Under discussion 7 An answer has been given in a relatively recent case Meek v. Wheeler County -Tex -125 S.W. (2) 331:

It undoubtedly is true that a construction which repeals former statutes, by implication is not to be favored; and it is also true that statutes in pari materia and relating to the same subject are to be taken and construed together; because is to be inferred that they had one object in view, and were intended to be considered as constituting one entire and harmonious system. But when the new statue in itself, comprehends the entire subject and creates a new, entire, and independent system, respecting that subject matter, it is universally held to repeal and supersede all previous systems and laws respecting the same subject matter.

13. This last rule which I have set out from Crawford's statutory Construction has been quoted with approval in Municipal Council. Palai's case (supra) by the Supreme Court. In Municipal Council, Palai's case the Supreme Court indicated three broad tests to determine whether there is a repeal by necessary implication. Firstly, whether there is a positive and irreconcilable repugnancy between the provision of old and new statute. Secondly, whether the two statutes relate to the same subject matter and have the same purpose, and thirdly, whether the new statute purports to replace the old one in its entirety or only partially. Another rule of law recognized in the principles of interpretation is that the enactment of a general law broad enough in its scope and application to cover the field of operation of a special or a local statute will generally not repeal a statute which limits its operation to a particular phase of the subject covered by the general law to particular locality within the jurisdiction scope of general statute (vide; Sutherland on Statutory Cons', truction Vol. I, 3rd Edi. 436). This rule is also quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Municipal Council Palai's case (supra).

14. It is in light of these well recognized principles of construction of statutes that I have to consider whether the learned City Civil Judge was right in reaching the conclusion that Section 202 of the Code was repealed by necessary implication in light of the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Public Premises Act. With all due respects to him, it is not possible for me to agree with the view which he has been persuaded to lake in the matter. The reasons for my disagreement are obvious. In the first place, even assuming that the Public Premises Act relates to the same subject matter as that of the Code, this, would not be sufficient to warrant the conclusion of an implied repeal of similar provisions of the Code. It is difficult to urge successfully that the provisions of summary eviction in the Code, as provided in Section 79A thereof, and Section 4 of the Public Premises Act, are inconsistent or irreconcilable. It is much more impossible to content that the Public Premises Act, clearly intended to be a complete substitute for the subject matter of summary eviction of unauthorised occupants provided in the Code. Unless, therefore, the provisions contained in the Public Premises Act cover the entire subject matter of summary eviction of unauthorised occupants in the Code it cannot be held that there is, by necessary implication, repeal of the provisions contained in Section 202 of the Code. Having regard to purpose and the object of the Code which, as apparent from the preamble, is to consolidate and amend the law relating to Revenue Officers and to assessment and recovery of land revenue and to other matters connected with the land revenue legislation, it is manifestly clear that the Public, Premises Act, which has been placed on the statute book to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupant from the public premises and other matters incidental thereof, was not envisaged to comprehend the entire subject of, unauthorised and wrongful occupation and summary eviction of such occupants on the revenue paying land of the Government. At this stage, a brief reference to the subject of summary eviction for unauthorised or wrongful occupation of the revenue paying land, as provided in the Code, is necessary, Section 79A is the section which invests the power in the Collector for summary eviction of such persons. Section 79A reads as under:

79A. Any person unauthorized occupying or wrongfully in possession of, any land

(a) to the use or occupation of which by reason of any of the provisions of this Act he is not entitled or has ceased to be entitled, or

(b) which is not transferable without previous sanction under Section 73A or by virtue of any condition lawfully annexed to the tenure under the provisions of Section 62, 67 or 68 may be summarily evicted by the Collector.

15. The other provisions of the Code which make the occupation unauthorised or wrongful are to be found in Sections 48, 61, 64 and 73AA. Section 48(4) empowers the Collector or any Survey Officer to summarily evict any holder who uses or attempts to use any un alienated land liable to payment of land revenue for any prohibited purpose. Section 61 provides for penalties for unauthorised occupation of land. Para 4 of Section 61 empowers the Collector to summarily evict any person unauthorisedly occupying any land which has been forfeited. Section 66 empowers the Collector to summarily evict the occupant or tenant or other person holding under or through him for putting the land to use for which it is not meant. Section 73AA empowers the Collector to summarily evict a person who has transferred it to a member of tribal class. Section 202 provides, as stated above, only the manner in which summary eviction can be enforced by the Collector. I have not been able to appreciate how the learned City Civil Judge has considered this provision contained in Section 202 of the Code as a corresponding law, or part thereof, and, therefore, consequently repealed in light of the provision contained in Section 19 of the Public Premises Act. The substantive and procedural law of summary eviction in the Code is a special law in respect of the Government land. It is no doubt true that 'public premises' as defined in Section 2(f) of the Public Premises Act means any premises belonging to Government including any land which has been defined in the same terms as defined in the Code. It appears that the learned Judge was, therefore, persuaded to take the view that since the Public Premises Act provides for eviction from the public premises, it would also take in its sweep the eviction of unauthorised occupants from the Government land and, therefore, the procedural law as laid down in Section 202 of the Code being the same subject matter and, therefore, would amount to corresponding law and necessarily stood repeated. In my opinion, the learned Judge overlooked the well-recognised rule of law of interpretation that enactment of a general law broad enough in its scope and application to cover the field of operation of a special, or local statute will generally not repeal a statute which limits its operation to a particular phase of the subject covered by the general law. It is well-recognized on the principles of statutory construction that there is a presumption that local or special law will not be repealed though this presumption is liable to be rebutted and overcome by irreconcilable inconsistency between the prior special Act and subsequent general law or where the entire subject matter of the special Act is covered by the general law (vide): Article 314, page 637 of Statutory Construction by Crawford). No irreconcilable inconsistency has been spelt out by comparison of the relevant provisions of the Code and the Public Premises Act so as to rebut the presumption that special law contained in the Code was repealed by the general law contained in the Public Premises Act. It cannot be stated without violence to the language that the entire subject matter of summary eviction as provided in the Code is sought to be covered by the provisions in the Public Premises Act. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Government Pleader was perfectly justified in urging all the three contentions set out above. The learned City Civil Judge was, therefore, clearly in error in holding that Section 202 of the Code stood repealed by the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Public Premises Act and, therefore, the impugned notice is bad. The learned City Civil Judge has granted the decree on this short ground only and, therefore, the judgment aid order of the learned City Civil Judge requires to be set aside.

16. The matter shall, therefore, go back to the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, which will dispose of the matter on other issues, after giving opportunities to the parties to adduce evidence in support of their rival contentions, that might have been raised, or that may be required to be raised in light of the pleadings of the parties.

17. The result is that this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the learned City Civil Judge, Ahmedabad is set aside and the matter is remanded for carrying out the directions as given above. Having regard to the fact that this is a question of interpretation of the statutes, there should be no order as to costs in this appeal.


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