Skip to content


Bipinbhai Vadilal Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat-i. Bipinbhai Vadilal (Huf) V. Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat-i. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectDirect Taxation
CourtGujarat High Court
Decided On
Case NumberIncome-tax Reference Nos. 357 of 1977 with 178/77, 218/78, 186/76, 161/78, 158/76 and 11/75
Reported in(1980)17CTR(Guj)95; [1980]126ITR779(Guj)
AppellantBipinbhai Vadilal
RespondentCommissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat-i. Bipinbhai Vadilal (Huf) V. Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujara
Cases ReferredK. V. Narayanan v. K. V. Ranganandhan
Excerpt:
- - , as well as the directors fees and dividends received from the various companies, the shares of which were thrown into the hotchpot of the huf by the aforesaid declaration of march 27, 1964. in the course of assessment proceedings for assessment year 1964-65, the assessee contended that having regard to the transactions as aforesaid, the remuneration received by him as a director-in-charge was required to be treated as income of the huf and the same should be excluded while computing his total income in his total personal income in his status as individual. , and the relevant entries made in the books of account of the company as well as those of the huf and of himself. bipinbhai vadilal) [1978]113itr664(guj) ,declined to answer the question on the ground that the tribunal had.....b. k. metha j. - the assessment years with which we are concerned in this group of references are 1964-65 to 1971-72. the bone of contention between the assessee and the revenue centres round two issues, viz., (i) the managing directors remuneration, and/or (ii) sitting fees of the directors of the company known as m/s. c. doctor & co. pvt. ltd.the assessee, bipinbhai vadilal (hereinafter known as 'the assessee'), who is the applicant of income-tax references nos. 357/77, 178/77, 218/78 and respondent in income-tax reference no. 186/76 claims that the income of the managing directors remuneration and the directors fees is not liable to be included in his assessment as an individual, and, in effect and substance, is the income of his hindu undivided family (hereinafter called 'the huf').....
Judgment:

B. K. METHA J. - The assessment years with which we are concerned in this group of references are 1964-65 to 1971-72. The bone of contention between the assessee and the revenue centres round two issues, viz., (i) the managing directors remuneration, and/or (ii) sitting fees of the directors of the company known as M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd.

The assessee, Bipinbhai Vadilal (hereinafter known as 'the assessee'), who is the applicant of Income-tax References Nos. 357/77, 178/77, 218/78 and respondent in Income-tax Reference No. 186/76 claims that the income of the managing directors remuneration and the directors fees is not liable to be included in his assessment as an individual, and, in effect and substance, is the income of his Hindu undivided family (hereinafter called 'the HUF') assessed as Bipinbhai Vadilal HUF, which is the applicant in Income-tax References Nos. 158/76 and 11/75 and respondent in Income-tax References Nos. 161/78. Since the claims and the contentions are identical, arising out of the same facts and between the same parties, we intend to dispose of these references by this common judgment.

The common facts, which we have mostly extracted below from the statement of case in Income-tax References Nos. 357/77 and 11/75, would be sufficient to enable us to comprehend the background of the aforesaid two issues, and they are as follows :

The assessee is assessed in his status as an individual and also as karta of his HUF. He was director of several companies including M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd. He was holding 61 shares in M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd. 19 shares in Oriental Corporation Pvt. Ltd. 260 shares in C. V. Mehta Pvt. Ltd., and 100 shares in Mehta & Sons Pvt. Ltd. By a resolution passed at the meeting of the board of directors of the said company, M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., held on November 7, 1961, a committee consisting of two directors, namely, the assessee and his mother, Smt. Vimlaben Vadilal, was appointed to manage the business and affairs of the said company with effect from November 15, 1961. Under the said resolution, a remuneration of Rs. 40,000 or 10 per cent. of the net profits of the company, whichever was higher, was to be paid to the said two directors in proportion of 2 : 1. In other words, if the remineration payable was Rs. 16,000. They were accordingly designated as directors-in-charge and extensive powers for active management of the company were conferred upon them, which they were authorised to exercise jointly and severally. It appears that by a declaration dated March 27, 1964, the assessee threw the aforesaid shares in different companies into the hotchpot of his HUF consisting of himself, his wife and one son and one daughter. On the same day, he wrote a letter to M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., requesting the company to credit the managing directors remuneration and directors fees payable to him to the account of the aforesaid HUF in the trading books of the company. Accordingly, the remuneration payable to the assessee was credited to his individual account up to February 29, 1964, and to the account of his HUF from March 1, 1964, onwards. The assessee, therefore, pursuant to the resolution of the aforesaid company in the matter of remuneration, became entitled to receive remuneration of Rs. 32,000 for the financial years 1963-64 and 1964-65 and Rs. 50,717 for the financial year 1965-66, 1965-66 and 1966-67 which are the subject-matter of Income-tax Reference No. 357/77. A separate set of books of accounts of the HUF, which, inter alia, comprised of the managing directors remuneration and directors sitting fees payable to the assessee as managing director and director of M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd. Consequently, no part of the remuneration payable and received by the assessee was credited in his personal books of accounts. He submitted separate returns of income-tax and wealth-tax for the HUF and included therein the remuneration received from M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., as well as the directors fees and dividends received from the various companies, the shares of which were thrown into the hotchpot of the HUF by the aforesaid declaration of March 27, 1964.

In the course of assessment proceedings for assessment year 1964-65, the assessee contended that having regard to the transactions as aforesaid, the remuneration received by him as a director-in-charge was required to be treated as income of the HUF and the same should be excluded while computing his total income in his total personal income in his status as individual. He relied in support of this claim on his declaration of March 27, 1964, the letter of even date addressed in pursuance thereof to M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., and the relevant entries made in the books of account of the company as well as those of the HUF and of himself.

The ITO, however, did not accept this contention and included the income received by way of remuneration in the assessment in his individual status for the assessment year 1964-65, 1965-66 and 1966-67.

Being aggrieved by the order of the ITO, the assessee preferred appeals before the AAC, who held that the remuneration received by the assessee from M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., was the income of his HUF.

The ITO, therefore, carried the matter in appeal in respect of each of tax Appellate Tribunal by preferring three appeals in respect of each of the assessment years. By a common order passed on November 26, 1973, the Tribunal affirmed the order of the AAC that the remuneration received by the assessee was not his individual income but was the income of his HUF.

At the instance of the Commissioner, the Tribunal by its order referred the question to this court whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the remuneration received by the assessee was the income of his HUF. The reference was numbered as Income-tax Reference No. 155 of 1974. This court, by its judgment and order of February 20, 1976 (CIT v. Bipinbhai Vadilal) : [1978]113ITR664(Guj) , declined to answer the question on the ground that the Tribunal had failed to consider and decide the crucial point necessary for the determination of the controversy between the parties since the real point was, whether or not the income of remuneration was diverted at source to the coffers of the HUF, or it was merely an application of the income for the benefit of the HUF by the assessee. The Tribunal thereupon proceeded to pass order under s. 260(1) of the I.T. Act, 1961, in accordance with the direction given by this court. By its order of July 30, 1976, the Tribunal, for reasons recorded therein, held that the remuneration which accrued or arose to or was received by the assessee was his individual income and he applied the same for the benefit of his HUF. The Tribunal, therefore, set aside the order of the AAC and restored the order of the ITO. The Tribunal, in doing so, had proceeded to decide the question on the assumption that the remuneration was capable of being thrown in the family hotchpot and in that view of the matter it did not consider it necessary to go into the larger question, whether the remuneration was, in the very nature of things, incapable of being thrown into the hotchpot of the HUF. At the instance of the assessee, therefore, the following two questions, which are the subject-matter of Income-tax Reference No. 357/77, have been referred to us for our opinion :

'1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the remuneration received from M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., was the income of the assessee, Shri Bipinbhai Vadilal, and not of his Hindu undivided family ?

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that there was no diveration of income at source but it was only a case of application of income after its acfrual ?'

Similarly, for the assessment year 1967-68 and 1968-69, this court had by its order of February 20, 1976, in Income-tax Reference No. 162 of 1974, declined to answer the composite question referred to by the Tribunal, whether the income from the remuneration as managing director of M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., and the directors fees received from other companies were not assessable in the hands of the assessee in his status as individual for the reasons recorded in the order of this court in Income-tax Reference No. 155 of 1974. (CIT v. Bipinbhai Vadilal : [1978]113ITR664(Guj) ) for the earlier years 1964-65 and 1966-67. The Tribunal, therefore, proceeded to pass an order under s. 260(1) of the I.T. Act, 1961, on the same lines as it did in its order of July 31, 1976, pertaining to assessment years 1964-65 and 1966-67, pursuant to the refusal of this court to answer the question referred in Income-tax Reference No. 155/74. The Tribunal held that the income of remuneration received from M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., and the directors fees received from the other companies were liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee in his status as individual. At the instance of the assessee, therefore, the following two questions, which are the subject-matter of Income-tax Reference No. 178/77, are referred to this court for its opinion :

'1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the remuneration received by the assessee from M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., and the directors fees received by him from various companies was income of the assessee and not his Hindu undivided family ?

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that there is no diversion of income at source but it was a case of application of income after its accrual ?'

Similarly, on the same facts and in the circumstances for the assessment year 1970-71, the following question has been referred at the instance of the assessee to this court which is the subject-matter of Income-tax Reference No. 218 of 1978 :

'Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the remuneration (other than by way of directors fees) received from M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd. M/s. Oriental Corporation Pvt. Ltd. M/s. C. V. Mehta Pvt. Ltd., and M/s. Mehta & Sons Pvt. Ltd., was the income of the assessee-individual and not of his Hindu undivided family ?'

For the assessment year 1971-72, on the same facts and in the circumstances, the Tribunal, at the instance of the assessee, has referred the following questions, which is the subject-matter of Income-tax Reference No. 186076, to us for our opinion :

'Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the remuneration received by the assessee as managing director from M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., and the directors fees received by him from the aforesaid companies were income of his Hindu undivided family and, therefore, not liable to be included in his total income ?'

Corresponding, the HUF has also preferred an appeal against the order of the ITO in its assessment declining to treat the aforesaid income as income of the HUF and though, in appeal before the Tribunal, it succeeded, it sought a reference since the revenue has not accepted at the earlier stage the decision of the Tribunal that the income was the income of the HUF and sought the reference, namely, Income-tax Reference Nos. 155 (CIT v. Bipinbhai Vadilal : [1978]113ITR664(Guj) ) and 162 of 1974 pertaining to assessment years 1964-65 and 1968-69. The following question has, therefore, been referred to us at the instance of the HUF, which is the subject-matter of Income-tax Reference No. 11 of 1975, pertaining to assessment year 1965-66 :

'Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the remuneration received by Shri Bipinbhai Vadilal from M/s. C. Doctor & Co. (P) Ltd., was assessable in the hands of the assessee-Hindu undivided family ?'

Similarly, on the same facts and in the circumstances, the following question is referred to us at the instance of the HUF which is the subject-matter of Income-tax Reference No. 158/76 pertaining to assessment year 1971-72 :

'Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that for assessment year 1971-72, the remuneration and directors fees received by the assessee from M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., was assessable in the assessment of the assessee-HUF ?'

On the same facts and in the circumstances of the case, for assessment year 1970-71, the following question has been referred to us, which is the subject-matter of Income-tax Reference No. 163/78 :

'Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the remuneration and directors fees received by Mr. Bipinbhai Vadilal from M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., were assessable in the hands of Mr. Bipinbhai Vadilal in his individual capacity and not in the hands of the Hindu undivided family ?'

This is how this group of references has come to us.

At the time of hearing of these references, Mr. J. Shah, learned advocate for the assessee, raised the following four contentions before us :

(1) The order of the Tribunal is completely vitiated inasmuch as it misdirected itself by its failure to give a finding of fact on the true question as directed by this court in its order in Income-tax References Nos. 155 and : [1978]113ITR664(Guj) .

(2) In the absence of a finding of fact as required by this court that the managing directors remuneration was fully traceable to the individual, the case was squarely within the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in P. N. Krishna Iyer v. CIT : [1969]73ITR539(SC) .

(3) The Tribunal committed and error of law inasmuch as it failed to consider all the relevant documents which clearly established that the intention of the assessee was to impress the sources, viz., the remuneration of the office of managing director, with a character of joint family.

(4) In any case, the Tribunal committed an error of law in drawing a wrong inference from the proved facts that there was no diversion of title at source.

Before we deal with these contentions, we should remind ourselves precisely as to what were the reasons which weighed with this court in declining to answer the questions submitted for its opinion in Income-tax References No. 155 (CIT v. Bipinbhai Vadilal : [1978]113ITR664(Guj) ) and 162 of 1974. The Division Bench of this court, speaking through P. D. Desai J., emphasised, in the first instance, that it is imperative in such cases for a Tribunal to find out on application of proper tests whether a particular income has arisen, accrued to or received by an individual or is that of an HUF either on account of its being a return for the investment of his funds or by reason of an overriding title in his favour. The Division Bench, having regard to the concession made by the assessee in the course of the hearing before the AAC ruled out the first inquiry, whether the income of remuneration was a return of investment of the funds of the HUF. In the opinion of the Division Bench, the alternative inquiry, whether an overriding title was created in favour of the HUF so as to impress the income from remuneration with the character of a joint Hindu family property was still required (but which) was still not held by the Tribunal and, therefore, the Division Bench found itself unable to answer the questions referred to it in the said references. The Division Bench, therefore, observed as under (p. 672) :

'The Tribunal, however, with respect, missed the real point and failed to determine whether or not by the deed and conduct of the assessee the income was taken away from him even before it accrued or arose to him or was received by him or whether by such deed and conduct the assessee merely applied his own income for the benefit of the HUF. Under the circumstances, it becomes difficult for us to answer the first question referred for our opinion.'

It, therefore, became necessary for the Tribunal to inquire into and determine, whether the income of remuneration was income of the assessee in his status as an individual which he has applied for the benefit of the HUF or, by an overriding title, the said income was diverted at source in favour of the HUF and did not in fact reach the individual assessee. In this background, we have to answer the contention raised by the learned advocate for the assessee.

In our opinion, the first two questions are misconceived. The Tribunal has given a finding of fact on appreciation of some evidence. The grievance that it had not taken into consideration the relevant material which it should have, and, therefore, the decision has been vitiated, is by itself an argument to which we will address ourselves when we deal with contention No. (3). For the present purpose, suffice it to say that the Tribunal has addressed itself to the crucial question as indicated by the Division Bench of this court and given findings in that behalf. The question in a nutshell, was whether the income of remuneration was diverted at source by a paramount title in favour of the HUF. In this question, and its answer, it is implicit that the income under scrutiny has or has not, as the case may be, arisen, accrued to or been received by an individual assessee whose income it is alleged to be. If the Tribunal has given its finding in the particular case before us, that the income of remuneration from the office of managing director of M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., was not diverted at source by a paramount title, it is obvious that in that case it must be held to be an income accrued to or received by the assessee. The distinction which the learned advocate for the assessee attempted to make that since the Tribunal has not in terms given its findings that the income of remuneration in question has not arisen, accrued to or been received by the assessee, the Tribunal has failed to decide the question which the Division Bench required for resolving the dispute effectively, is, in our opinion, without any substantial difference, since the Tribunal has, in effect and substance, decided the question that there was no creation of any right or overriding title in favour of the HUF in respect of the said income.

The support which the learned advocate for the assessee sought to derive from the decision of the Supreme Court in P. N. Krishna Iyers case : [1969]73ITR539(SC) is also not well founded. The facts in that case were that one P. N. Kerishna Iyer set up in 1923 a motor transport business in the erstwhile princely State of Travancore. Some dispute arose between the said Krishna Iyer and his brother about the division of their joint family estate in 1945. By a mutual agreement of October 23, 1951, they agreed and undertook to treat the motor transport business together with the workshop, stores, agency, cinema, etc., as the business of the joint family and on partition were allotted to Krishna Iyer. The said petition was accepted by the ITO concerned. In July, 1952, a private limited company, P. S. N. Motors (Private) Ltd., was floated with the object of taking over the motor transport business carried on by the assessee. By the articles of association the said Krishna Iyer was APPLICANTointed as the governing director of the company for life and to draw such remuneration and exercise such powers detailed in the agreement to be entered into between him and the company in that behalf. He purchased 100 shares of the company of the face value of Rs. 100 each, in pursuance of the articles. On August 18, 1952, he was appointed by the company as its governing director with an office allowance of Rs. 3,000 per month and a commission of 15 per cent. on the net profit. On the same day, the directors approved the purchase, from the HUF of Krishna Iyer, of assets less liabilities of the transport business valued at Rs. 8,01,074. Credit entries were made in the books of account of the company Krishna Iyer was allotted 4,880 fully paid up shares of the company in consideration of the valuable services rendered by him in the promotion of the company and his services placed at its disposal. The ITO, however, brought to tax the remuneration received by Krishna Iyer from the company together with the commission and sitting fees in the hands of Krishna Iyer for the assessment year 1954-55, in his status as individual. The AAC, however, modified that order and directed that the income other than salary, commission and sitting fee received from the company be included in the assessment of the HUF. This order of the AAC was, however, revised by the Commissioner under s. 33(b) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, and he included the income from salary, commission and sitting fee aggregating to Rs. 43,240 in the total income of the HUF. The Tribunal, however, reversed the order of the Commissioner in appeal directing that these items be included in the assessment of the HUF. At the instance of the revenue, the question, whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the income from salary, commission and sitting fees obtained by Krishna Iyer from the company represented his individual income and not the income of the HUF was referred to the High Court of Kerala. The High Court answered the question in the negative. The assessee, therefore, carried the matter in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, speaking through Shah J., as he then was, referred to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court where a similar question, whether remuneration earned by a member of the HUF as an officer of a company or a firm was the income of the family or individual income of the member, had arisen and accordingly referred to two recent judgments of the court in V. D. Dhanwatey v. CIT : [1968]68ITR365(SC) and Palaniappa Chettiar v. CIT : [1968]68ITR221(SC) and held as under (73 ITR at p. 545) :

'Income received by a member of a Hindu undivided family from a firm or a company in which the funds of the Hindu undivided family are invested, even though the income may be partially traceable to personal exertion of the member, is taxable as the income of the Hindu undivided family, if it is earned by detriment to the family funds or with the aid or assistance of those funds; otherwise it is taxable as the members separate income....

The shares which qualified the assessee to become a member of the company were purchased with the aid of joint family funds. The shares which were allotted to the assessee in lieu of his services were also treated as shares belonging to the joint family. The entire capital assets of the company originally belonged to the joint family and were made available to the company in consideration of a mere promise to pay the amount for which the assets were valued. The income was primarily earned by utilising the joint family assets or funds and the mere fact that in the process of gaining the advantage an element of personal service or skill or labour was involved did not alter the character of the income. In cases of this class the character of the receipt must be determined by reference to its source, its relations to the assets of the family of which the recipient was the member and the primary object with which the benefit received was disbursed. The conclusion of the High Court cannot be said to be vitiated by any error.'

We have not been able to find any support for the proposition which the learned advocate for the assessee canvassed before us since it is not the case of the assessee that the income from remuneration of the office of managing director of M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., was primarily earned by utilising the joint family assets or funds. The only principle which the decision in Krishna Iyers case : [1969]73ITR539(SC) propounds is that if the income is earned by a member of a family by detriment to the family funds or with the aid or assistance of those funds, it could be an income of the HUF even though it may be partially traceable to personal exertion of the member concerned. As a matter of fact, so far as the present case is concerned, there is a clear concession made by the assessee as recorded by the Division Bench of this court in its order in Income-tax References No. 155 (CIT v. Bipinbhai Vadilal : [1978]113ITR664(Guj) ) and 162 of 1974 that the remuneration was not earned by utilising the family assets or funds nor with the aid or assistance of those funds. The division Bench has clearly referred to that concession in the following terms (p. 671) :

'It might be stated, however, that in the instant case it is not necessary to investigate whether the remuneration is returned for the HUFs investment of its funds in the company in view of a clear concession made on behalf of the assessee during the course of the hearing of the appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to the effect that he was not appointed as the director-in-charge because of the HUF funds having been invested in the company and that his appointment as such had nothing to do with the funds of the HUF. There is, therefore, no scope for investigation on those lines.'

The Division Bench has also referred elaborately as to what were the contentions urged on behalf of the assessee in the course of the hearing of appeals before the AAC, where the aforesaid concession was said to have been made. The Division Bench observed as under (p. 668) :

'During the course of the hearing of the appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, it was conceded on behalf of the assessee that it was not his case that he was appointed as the director-in-charge because of the investment of the HUF funds in the company. In fact, it was in terms admitted that his appointment as the director-in-charge had nothing whatsoever to do with the funds of the HUF. The only argument which was advanced before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was that the assessee had manifested a clear intention to transfer the managing directors remuneration to the HUF books and that this intention became apparent from his conduct in throwing 61 shares into the hotchpot of the HUF and the manner in which the remuneration was subsequently dealt with in the books of account of the HUF as well as of the company.'

Having regard to this singular contention and in view of the concession made by the assessee before the AAC, we do not think that there is any scope now remaining for the assessee to press into service the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishna Iyers case : [1969]73ITR539(SC) .

The learned advocate for the assessee, therefore, made a very strenuous attempt to impress upon us that there was no unequivocal concession made by the assessee as recorded by the Division Bench nor such concession, if any, which is clearly erroneous, can amount to estoppel so as to preclude the assessee from contending now, as he intends to do, that the remuneration was earned with the aid or assistance of the joint family funds or at least with detriment to the family funds, and unless, therefore, the income is traceable wholly to the personal exertion of the assessee for which a clear finding ought to have been made by the Tribunal, the conclusion urged would be vitiated since the Tribunal did not address itself to the question as directed by this court. We have, therefore, permitted the learned advocate, in spite of the clear finding made by the Division Bench of this court, to show and satisfy us whether or not the assessee had made the concession as recorded by the Division Bench. The learned advocate, therefore, invited our attention to the relevant portion in the order of the AAC, A-Range, Ahmedabad, on November 30, 1971, in Appeal No. II/STC/VII/30/71-72 pertaining to assessment year 1966-67. The AAC referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji v. CIT : [1970]78ITR33(SC) , for purposes of finding out the true test to determine the nature of income received by a member of aHUF from a firm or a company to which he may be rendering services, and thereafter proceeded to observe as under :

'Applying this test to the facts of the present case, the ITO had concluded that the remuneration earned by the appellant belonged to him individually and not to his HUF. Further, there was no evidence to support that he was appointed as the managing director of the company only because of the funds having been invested by the HUF in the company to the family on its investments.... (sic).

6. Shri G. K. Shah has admitted that the appellant was not appointed as the managing director, because of the HUFs funds having been invested in the company. In other words, his appointment as managing director in the company has nothing to do with the funds of his HUF. His argument is different. He had held 61 shares in M/s. C. Dr. & Co. Pvt. Ltd. In the accounting year 1963-64, he had thrown all these shares in the hotchpotch of his HUF. Shri Shah has thrown all his weight on the intention of the appellant to transfer the managing directors remuneration to the HUFs books and this intention is confirmed by the entries in the books of HUF... '.

Even before the ITO no such claim was made and the ITO found that there was no evidence to support the contention that he was appointed as managing director of the company because of the funds of the HUF having been invested in the company. In the appeal preferred by the assessee against the aforesaid order of the AAC, it is interesting to note as to what was the contention urged on behalf of the assessee before the Tribunal. The Tribunal recapitulated the contention urged on behalf of the assessee after referring to the contention of the revenue in the following terms :

'Mr. C. R. Taishete, the learned departmental representative, mainly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji v. CIT reported in : [1970]78ITR33(SC) , and submitted that the remuneration received by the assessee was compensation made for the services rendered by him and therefore it was his individual income.... Mr. H. M. Talati, on the other hand, submitted that since there was clear expression of assessees intention to treat the remuneration received by him as income of his HUF there was no question of applying the test laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision.'

In this state of the record, we are afraid, we cannot agree with the first limb of the contention of the learned advocate for the assessee that there was no concession made in fact as recorded by the Division Bench. If the concession was made, and we are in no doubt that such a concession was made having regard to what we have set out above, there is no scope for pressing in service the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishna Iyers case : [1969]73ITR539(SC) or Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandjis case : [1970]78ITR33(SC) . We must, therefore, reject the first limb of his contention.

The second limb of his contention that the admission was erroneous in fact is to be determined from the evidence to which we will shortly refer when we will deal with contention No. (3) urged by the learned advocate for the assessee. The first two contentions, therefore, stand rejected.

The third contention is that the Tribunal has committed an error of law inasmuch as it failed to consider all the relevant documents which clearly established that the intention of the assessee was to impress the source, viz., the remuneration of the office of managing director, with a character of joint family asset. The learned advocate for the assessee contended that by declaration of March 27, 1964, the assessee threw his shares in different companies including 61 shares in M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., into the hotchpotch of his HUF consisting of himself, his wife and two children. He urged that the effect of this declaration is to blend his separate properties into the joint family properties and no formalities are necessary in order to bring this about, and the only question is one of intention on the part of the member concerned to abandon his separate rights and invest it with the character of joint family property. In support of his contention, he relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in R. Subramania Iyer v. CIT : [1955]28ITR352(Mad) . The scope of the doctrine of blending has been explained by the Supreme Court in Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai v. Desai Mallappa alia Mallesappa : [1961]3SCR779 , in the context of a question whether that doctrine is applicable to the case of a Hindu female inheriting immovable property from his father as limited owner, Gajendragadkar J., as he then was, speaking for the court, observed that this doctrine has been recognised in several decisions and has now become a part of Hindu law. The decision of the Privy Council in Rajanikanta Pal v. Jagamohan Pal, AIR 1923 PC 57, was referred to where the Privy Council held that where a member of a joint Hindu family blends his self-acquired property with property of the joint family, either by bringing his self-acquired property into a joint family account, or by bringing joint family property into his separate account, the effect is that all the property so blended becomes a joint family property. Gajendragadkar J. thereafter posed the question whether this doctrine was applicable in regard to property held by a Hindu female as a limited owner and found it difficult to answer the question in the affirmative. He held as under (p. 1271 of AIR 1961 SC) :

'The rule of blending postulates that a coparcener who is interestead in the coparcenary property and who owns separate property of his own may be deliberate and intentional conduct treat this separate property as forming part of the coparcenary property. If it appears that property which is separately acquired has been deliberately and voluntarily thrown by the owner into the joint stock with the clear intention of abandoning his claim on the said property and with the object of assimilating it to the joint family property, then the said property becomes a part of the joint family estate; in other words, the separate property of a coparcener loses its separate character by reason of the owners conduct and get thrown into the common stock of which it becomes a part. This doctrine, therefore, inevitably postulates that the owner of the separate property is a coparcener who has an interest in the coparcenary property and desires to blend his separate property with the coparcenary property. There can be no doubt that the conduct on which a plea of blending is based must clearly and unequivocally show the intention of the owner of the separate property to convert his property into an item of joint family property. A mere intention to benefit the members of the family by allowing them the use of the income coming from the said property may not necessarily be enough to justify an inference of blending but the basis of the doctrine is the existence of coparcenary and coparcenary property as well as the existence of the separate property of a coparcener. How this doctrine can be applied to the case of a Hindu female who has acquired immovable property from her father as a limited owner it is difficult to understand.'

The meaning and scope of the doctrine of throwing into common stock or common hotchpotch was again explained in Goli Eswariah v. CGT : [1970]76ITR675(SC) in the context of the question whether the act of throwing self-acquired properties into joint family properties amounts to gift or not. Hedge J., speaking for the court, explained the doctrine in the following terms (p. 678) :

'To pronounce on the question of law presented for our decision, we must first examine what is the true scope of the doctrine of throwing into the common stock or common hotchpot. It must be remember that a Hindu family is not a creature of a contract. As observed by this court in Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai v. Desai mallappa : [1961]3SCR779 , the doctrine of throwing into common stock inevitably postulates that the owner of a separate property is a coparcener who has an interest in the coparcenary property and desires to blend his separate property with the coparcenary property. The existence of a coparcenary property is absolutely necessary before a coparcener can throw into the common stock his self-acquired properties. The separate property of a member of a joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by him into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein. The separate property of a Hindu ceases to be separate property and acquires the characteristics of joint family or his ancestral property not by any physical mixing with his joint family or his ancestral property but by is own volition and intention by his waiving and surrendering his separate rights in it as separate property.'

The scope and width of the doctrine of blending again came to be examined by the Supreme Court in Pushpa Devi v. CIT : [1977]109ITR730(SC) , where a question arose whether a female member of a joint family is competent to blend her separate property of which she may be an absolute owner with joint family property, or whether such right to blend was limited to coparceners only. In that context, Chandrachud J. (as he then was), speaking for the court, again referred to the above set out passage from the decision of Gajendragadkar J. in Mallesappa Bandeppas case : [1961]3SCR779 , and, after reviewing the relevant authorities of the Supreme Court as well as other High Courts, felt it necessary to have a fresh look at the doctrine of blending, and observed as under (p. 738) :

'The theory of blending under the Hindu law involves the process of a wider sharing of ones own properties by permitting the members of ones joint family the privilege of common ownership and common enjoyment of such properties. But while introducing new shares in ones exclusive property, one does not by the process of blending efface oneself by renouncing ones own interest in favour of others. To blend is to share along with others and not to surrender ones interest in favour of others to the exclusion of oneself.... Thus, the expression blending; is inapposite in the case of a Hindu female who puts her separate property, be it her absolute property or limited estate, in the joint family stock.

It is well settled that a Hindu coparcenary is a much narrower body than the joint family and it includes only those persons who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property.'

In Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel v. CIT : [1962]44ITR266(Guj) , a question arose whether after the throwing into hotchpotch of a self-acquired property, a subsequent partition of the properties, including the one thrown into hotchpotch, amounted to a transfer of property within the meaning of s. 16(3)(a)(iii) and (vi) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. The Division Bench of this court, speaking through K. T. Desai C.J., referred to this well-known proposition of Hindu law that a separate or self-acquired property can, by being thrown into common stock with the intention of abandoning separate claims upon it, be converted into joint family property. The Division Bench agreed with the observation of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Duggirala Sadasiva Vittal v. Bolla Rattain, AIR 1958 AP 145, 146, where the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court stated the doctrine of blending or throwing into common hotchpotch in the following terms :

'It is clear law that a person might impress his self-acquired or separate property in whole or in part with joint family character. He might throw it into th hotchpot or blend it with joint family property or by a declaration of clear intention convert the self-acquired property into joint family property... By a clear expression of intention, such as by a statement in a deposition or by an affidavit or by executing a document, or by course of conduct he may alter the character of the self-acquired or separate property into joint family property. No formalities, whatsoever, are required for impressing the self-acquired property with the character of joint family property.'

In Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddi v. Lakkireddi Lakshmama : [1964]2SCR172 , the court was concerned with the question as to when an inference can be made about the blending of separate property with the joint family property by a coparcener. Shah J, as he then was, speaking for the court, state as under (p. 1604) :

'Law relating to blending of a separate property with joint family property is well-settled. Property separate or self-acquired of a member of a joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein; but to establish such abandonment a clear intention to waive separate rights must be established. From the mere fact that other members of the family were allowed to use the property jointly with himself, or that the income of the separate property was utilised out of generosity to supporty persons whom the holder was not bound to support, or from the failure to maintain separate accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for an act of generosity or kindness will not ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal obligation. It is true that Butchi Tirupati who was one of the devisees under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy was a member of the joint family consisting of himself, his five brothers, and his father, Bala Konda. It is also true that there is no clear evidence as to how the property was dealt with, nor as to the appropriation of the income thereof. But there is no evidence on the record to show that by any conscious act or exercise of volition Butchi Tirupati surrendered his interest in the property devised in his favour under the will of Venkata Konda Reddy so as to blend it with the joint family property.'

In. Narayana Raju v. G. Chamaraju, AIR 1968 SC 1276, Shah J. (as he then was), speaking for the court, again considered as to when such an inference is warranted. He stated (at p. 1280) :

'It must be established that there was a clear intention on the part of the coparcener to waive his separate rights and such an intention will be inferred merely from acts which may have been done from kindness or affection (see the decision in Lala Muddum Gopal v. Khikhindu Koer [1891] LR 18 IA 9 . For in a series of documents, self-acquired property was described and dealt with a as ancestral joint family property, it was held by the Madras High Court that the mere dealing with self-acquisitions as joint family property was not sufficient but an intention of the coparcener must be shown to waive his claims with full knowledge of his right to it as his separate property. The important point to keep in mind is that the separate property of a Hindu coparcener ceases to be his separate property and acquires the characteristics of his joint family or ancestral property, not by mere act of physical mixing with his joint family or ancestral property, but by his own volition and intention, by his waiving or surrendering his special right in it as separate property. A mans intention can be discovered only from his words or from his acts and conduct. When his intention with regard to his separate property is not expressed in words, we must seek for it in his acts and conduct. But it is the intention that we must seek in every case, the acts and conduct being no more than evidence of the intention'

The principle laid down in Lakkireddis case : [1964]2SCR172 and G. Narayanas case : [1968]3SCR464 was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in K. V. Narayanan v. K. V. Ranganandhan : [1976]3SCR637 .

In CIT v. Kalu Balu Lal Chand : [1959]37ITR123(SC) , the facts were that one B. K. Rohatgi, who was the karta of his HUF became interested, in about the year 1930, in a concern called the Indian Electric Works carried on by one Mikhi Ram and other persons. It was agreed that a company should be flated for the purposes of acquiring and taking over the said concern as a going concern. B. K. Rohatgi was one of the promoters of that company. He took over the business of the said concern pursuant to the agreement with the original proprietors with effect from March 1, 1930. On December 19, 1930, the company was incorporated as a private limited company known as Indian Electric Works Ltd. The articles of the said company provided that the first managing director would be the said Shri Rohatgi or his assigns or successors and that he would continue as such till he would resign or be removed from the office. The articles also provided for his remuneration as managing director at Rs. 6,000 per annum or commission at the rate of 15% on the net profits of the company computed in the prescribed manner. An agreement to that effect was entered into between the company and the said Shri Rohatgi on January 31, 1934. Out of 950 ordinary shares of Rs. 500 each issued and subscribed, 326 shares stood in the name of the said B. K. Rohatgi and 356 shares in the name of his brother. It was common ground that prior to the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1933-34, the managing directors remuneration received by Rohatgi was credited in the books of the HUF just as divided income. It was common ground that the company was flated mainly with the funds provided by the HUF. The income from the remuneration as well as dividend was treated as income of the HUF up to 1942-43. In the assessment year 1943-44, it was claimed that the remuneration of Rs. 61,282 was the personal earning of Rohatgi and should be treated as part of the income of the HUF. The claim was rejected by the ITO and the AAC. However, the Tribunal apportioned the amount between the two categories, namely, for services rendered by the family in flatting and financing the company and the remuneration for the personal services of Rohatgi and allocated Rs. 30,000 to the personal services and rest to the family. The High Court in reference advised that the apportionment was unjustified and the said income of remuneration was the personal income of Rohatgi. In appeal before the Supreme Court at the instance of the revenue, a contention was urged that the position of a managing director is different from that of a partner or a managing agent and, therefore, the principles applicable to the income derived by a karta as a partner or managing agent cannot apply to the remuneration received by the karta as managing director. Negativing this contention, Das C.J., speaking for the court, held as under (pp. 128, 129, 130) :

'In the first place it is said that under the Indian Companies Act, a Hindu undivided family cannot, by reason of the definition give in section 2(9A), be appointed a managing agent of a company. In the next place, the office of a managing director, it is urged, involves a personal element and the appointment of a managing director must necessarily be of a particular person for his personal skill and other qualities and, therefore, the remuneration received by him must be his personal earnings. Neither of these two considerations appears to us to be tenable. Vis-a-vis the company, the managing director is undoubtedly the individual person who is appointed as such. The company is not concerned with the managing directors Hindu undivided family or the members thereof, just as the outside partners known only the karta in his individual capacity as their partner and are not concerned with his Hindu undivided family or its members. The question whether the amount received by the karta by way of managing directors remuneration in the one case or as his share of profits in the partnership business in the other case is his personal income or is the income of his Hindu undivided family cannot arise as between the company and the karta as the managing director or between the outside partners and the karta as a partner. Neither the company nor the outside partners, as the case may be, is or are interested in such a question. Such question can arise only as between the karta and the members of his family and the answer to the question will depend on whether the remuneration or profit was earned with the help of joint family assets....

What are the facts here ?... The articles of association of the company provided for the appointment as managing director of the very person who, as the karta of the family, had promoted the company. The acquisition of the business, the flatation of the company and the appointment of the managing director appear to us to be inseparably linked together. The joint family assets were used for acquiring the concern and for financing it and in lieu of all that detriment to the joint family properties the joint family got not only the shares standing in the names of two members of the family but also, as part and parcel of the same scheme, the managing directorship of the company when incorporation.'

The principles which emerge from the above authorities can be summed up as under :

(1) The rule of blending postulates that a coparcener interested in the coparcenary property by his deliberate volition and intentional conduct treats his separate property as part of the coparcenary property.

(2) The basis of the doctrine is the existence of the coparcenary and coparcenary property as well as the existence of the separate property of a coparcener.

(3)(a) A coparceners intention can be discovered only from his words or from his acts and conduct. It is only when such an intention is not expressed in words, we must seek for it in his acts and conduct. The expression of intention may be made in a statement in a deposition by an affidavit or by executing a document or by the course of conduct. However, an act of generosity or kindness will not ordinarily be regarded as a legal obligation;

(b) no formalities whatsoever are required for impressing the self-acquired property with the character of joint family property.

(4) The answer to the question, whether the remuneration received by the karta of an HUF or as his shares of profits in the partnership business, will depend on whether the remuneration or profit was earned with the joint family assets.

We must point out that at the time when the assessee was a appointed along with his mother, Smt. Vimlaben, to manage the affairs of M/s. C. Doctor & Co. Pvt. Ltd., by virtue of the resolution of November 7, 1961, the shares of the said company were not the property of the HUF. It was only on March 27, 1964, i.e., more than 2 years after such appointment, to manage the affairs of the company, that the shares of M/s. C. Doctor & Co. along with shares of other companies were thrown into the common hotchpot of the HUF. Thus, the appointment as managing director cannot be traced to the shares held by the HUF and hence the remuneration earned by him as managing director and directors sitting fees flowing from the appointment which was made at a time when the shares were not the property of the HUF cannot be said to be have been earned as a result of the investment of HUF funds in the shares of this company.

Applying these established principles, we have to decide whether the assessee has, by express words, or by his act or conduct, declared his intention to treat his remuneration as managing director of M/s. C. Doctor & Co., as the joint family property Since we have got and express declaration, we have to look to that declaration for purposes of finding out whether the necessary intention can be spelt out. It should be noted at the outset that we are not going into the larger question, whether any coparcenary property existed so as to justify the claim of blending by the assessee. It should be further noted that this declaration of March 27, 1964, does not refer to the remuneration for the office of managing director of M/s. C. Doctor & Co. The reference to the remuneration is conspicuous by its absence. If there had been an intention on the part of the assessee to blend this income of remuneration with the coparcenary property, if at all there was any, it would have been certainly referred to in the declaration and the assessee would have, by appropriate words, expressed his intention in that behalf. The assessee relies on his letter of the same date, that is, March 27, 1964, addressed to the company and the entries made in the account of the HUF in the trading books of the company pursuant to this letter. The said letter together with the entries is heavily relied upon by the assessee in support of his claim of blending of income of remuneration with the other income of the coparcenary property. The aforesaid letter addressed to the company by the assessee, though a cryptic one, makes an interesting reading. By the said letter the assessee requested the company, 'to credit now onwards managing directors remuneration and directors fees payable to me to my Bipinbhai-HUF account with you'. Pursuant to this letter, the company has credited the income of the remuneration in the account of the HUF in its trading books. The corresponding entries are to be found in the books of the HUF also to that effect. In our opinion, the aforesaid letter does not warrant the conclusion that there was a clear intention on the part of the assessee to treat the income of the remuneration as the income of his HUF. The only direction which is contained in the letter is to credit then onwards the managing directors remuneration and the directors fees which were due and payable to the assessee to the account of the HUF in the books of the company. In our opinion, neither the letter nor the entries in pursuance thereof constituted a cogent and satisfactory piece of evidence which can be said to manifest a deliberate volition and intentional conduct to treat his income of remuneration and directors fees as coparcenary property. The separate property of a Hindu coparcener 'ceases to be his separate property and acquires the characteristic of joint family or ancestral property not by mere act of physical mixing with his joint family or ancestral but his own volition and intention by his waiving or surrendering his special right in it as a separate property (vide G. Narayana Rajus case : [1968]3SCR464 ). It cannot be contended by any stretch of imagination, with violence to the language, that the mere direction given by the assessee to the company, to credit the income of his remuneration and directors fees in his HUFs account and the credit entries made in pursuance thereof by the company, can be said to be sufficient for justifying an inference that the assessee had waived or surrendered his special right in it as a separate property. Since there is no other evidence except this letter and the entries made in pursuance thereof in the books of account of the company as well as the HUF, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has failed to consider any other relevant evidence in that behalf. The third contention, therefore, stands rejected.

For the same reasons, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal has not committed an error of law in concluding that the said letter did not create any right or overriding charge in the said income of remuneration or directors fees in favour of the HUF. In CIT v. Sitaldas Tirathdas : [1961]41ITR367(SC) , the Supreme Court indicated as to what would be the true test for ascertaining the diversion of income by an overriding charge and it held that the true test for the application of the rule of diversion of income by an overriding charge is, whether the amount sought to be deducted, in truth, never reached the assessee as his income. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, in the ultimate analysis, it is the nature of obligation which is the decisive factor. The Supreme Court recognised the difference between an obligation to pay the amount and an obligation under which the amount cannot be said to be a part of the income of an assessee. It is a very thing distinction; none the less it is a fine one. If under the obligation an income is diverted before it reaches the assessee, it would not amount to application of income. In Sitaldass case : [1961]41ITR367(SC) , there was no charge on the income of the assessee for payment of maintenance allowance to his wife or children while in Raja Bejoy Singh Dudhuria v. CIT [1933] 1 ITR 135 , there was a charge for maintenance allowance on the income of the assessee, and, therefore, the Privy Council observed that the income of the assessee must be deemed to have never reached him. In P. C. Mullick v. CIT [1938] 6 ITR 206 , the direction of a testator to his executors was to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000 out of the income of the estate on the occasion of his Adya Sradh. The Privy Council held that it was not a case of diversion of income but was an application of income. In Diwan Kishen Kishore v. CIT , a sum out of the income of an impartible estate payable to the junior member under an award given by an arbitrator and according to the will of the father who was the holder of the estate was considered to be a diversion of income. The Supreme Court in Sitaldass case : [1961]41ITR367(SC) , doubted the correctness of the decision of the Privy Council in Bejoy Singh Dudhurias case [1933] 1 ITR 135. In Seth Motilal Manekchand v. CIT : [1957]31ITR735(Bom) , the Bombay High Court held that the payment made to the mother out of a moiety of the income coming to the share of the father and son, each pursuant to the partition between them constituting an HUF which owned a managing agency, was diversion of income since in the opinion of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, speaking through Chagla C.J., the mother had a legal enforceable right against the partner who was under a legal obligation, to pay that amount. The Supreme Court, therefore, in Sitaldass case : [1961]41ITR367(SC) , on a review of those authorities, concluded that the case before it was not one of a diversion of income but only of an application thereof. Hidayatullah J. as he then was, speaking for the court, therefore, observed as under (p. 375) :

'In our opinion, the present case is one in which the wife and children of the assessee who continued to be members of the family received a portion of the income of the assessee, after the assessee had received the income as his own. The case is one of application of a portion of the income to discharge an obligation and not a case in which by an overriding charge the assessee became only a collector of anothers income. The matter in the present case would have been different, if such an overriding charge had existed either upon the property or upon its income, which is not the case. In our opinion, the case falls outside the rule in Bejoy Singh Dudhurias case [1933] 1 ITR 135 and rather falls within the rule stated by the Judicial Committee in P. C. Mullicks case [1938] 6 ITR 206 .'

In CIT v. Ramanlal Chimanlal, Income-tax Reference No. 46 of 1970, decided on August 19, 1972, a Division Bench (of this court), speaking through P. D. Desai J., distinguished the aforesaid two counts of application as under :

'These two classes of cases which are distinct and separate, sometimes appear to bear a close resemblance at first because in both the cases there is a common factor, namely, existing obligation to make a payment. The dissimilarity arises, however, because of the nature of the obligation which is really and materially different in each of them. The obligation as a result of which income is diverted at source is substantially different from the obligation in consequence of which income is applied after its accrual or receipt. The obligation of the former kind ordinarily arises out of an overriding charge existing either upon the asset or its income or is traceable to an assignment or creation of a superior title over it or springs from a division of the assets between joint owners or co-owners and requires that the income which accrues or is received from such asset should be applied to discharge the said obligation. The obligation of the latter kind as usually undertaken or incurred by the taxpayer, be it by virtue of a decree, settlement, agreement, testamentary direction or the like and requires that a portion of ones own income after its accrual or receipt should be paid to another to get relied of the said obligation. In the former case, there would be diversion of income in such a way that it never became the income of the taxpayer and such artificial or notional income would not be subject to tax in his hands. The latter case would be one of application of income in a particular manner after its accrual or receipt and the portion of income so applied would be chargeable to tax in the taxpayers hands...'

Applying this well known test, we are unable to agree with the learned advocate for the assessee that this a case of diversion of income at source. The reasons for our disagreement are obvious. No overriding charge exists either upon the estate or its income. It is not traceable to any assignment or the creation of a superior title over it since no title is confirmed clearly. It does not arise out of division of assets where any overriding charge or title is created in favour of the beneficiaries. There is no enforceable legal right for the receipt of income of remuneration or directors fees either against the company or the assessee. The letter of March 27, 1964, merely requests the company to credit the amount of remuneration payable to the assessee in the account of the HUF in the trading books of the company. The income which is to be credited is that which is payable to the assessee. We, therefore, do not find any intention on the part of the assessee to create an overriding charge so as to successfully contend that the income ceased to be his income and formed part of the HUF. The 4th contention should, therefore, be rejected.

We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in these references as under :

ITR 357/77 : Questions Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.

ITR 178/77 : Questions Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.

ITR 218/78 : In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.

ITR 186/76 : In the negative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.

ITR 11/75 : In the negative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the revenue.

ITR 158/76 : In the negative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the revenue.

ITR 161/78 : In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.

In the facts and in the circumstances of these references, there should be no order as to costs in each of them.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //