P.R. Gokulakrishnan, C.J.
1. This Special Civil Application is to quash and set aside both the orders passed by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court and also to confirm the order of termination passed by the petitioner Mill against the respondent herein.
2. The short facts in this case are that the respondent was working in the petitioner Mill for more than 40 years. On 17-3-1980, the petitioner (sic respondent) picked up a quarrel with Bhavsar who is the Supervisor in one of the departments of the Mill and used abusive words against him. Ultimately, a charge-sheet was framed against the respondent and enquiry was conducted. It was found that the respondent used filthy language against the Supervisor and had committed the offence with which he was charged for. The management ultimately dismissed him from service on 22-3-1980.
3. When the matter went to the Labour Court, the Labour Court held that the enquiry held by the management was perfect both legally and procedurally and that the respondent had committed the offence with which he was charged for. The Labour Court thought it fit to hear on the question of punishment awarded by the management. On this point, the Labour Court heard the arguments and rejected the prayer for reinstatement advanced on behalf of the respondent herein. Nevertheless the Labour Court observed:
It is true that the applicant has resorted to indiscipline of high nature by using the words against Shri Bhavsar which I have reproduced above and which words have entailed his dismissal from service by the Mills Company vide the order Ex. 12/2 dated 22-3-1980.
After observing so, the Labour Court opined that the order of dismissal should be substituted by direction that the respondent herein should be paid all his benefits as if he was retrenched from service on 31-12-1982. This modified punishment the Labour Court wanted to impose was termed as serving 'the ends of justice'. The order of the Labour Court finally states that the respondent is entitled to the retrenchment compensation computing the benefits as if the respondent was retrenched on 31-12-1982. In his order, we are notable to find any reasoning given by the Labour Court for modifying the punishment except stating that the modification in punishment will serve 'the ends of justice.
4. Aggrieved by the order of the Labour Court, the petitioner as well as the respondent both preferred an appeal before the Industrial Court. These proceedings are governed by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. The Industrial Court also found that the offence levelled against the respondent was proved. Nevertheless it has interfered with the order passed by the Labour Court and gave the respondent 40% of back wages from 22-3-1980 to 31-12-1982 by way of compensation. It is against this order that the present writ petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution.
5. The power of the lower Tribunals, especially that the Labour Court, is culled out under Section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. They have power to find out the 'propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer' under the said Section 78. The order of the Industrial Court has not spelt out any reason for interfering with the award made by the Labour Court even though it has stated that it entirely agreed with the conclusion of the lower court. It has modified the award by stating that the respondent will be given 40% of the back wages. These types of orders, in our opinion, lack reasoning and application of the mind both by the Labour Court and also by the Industrial Court. It is stated by the Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent that the respondent is dead and his legal representative is his widow. The counsel appearing for the respondent undertakes to appear for the widow who is being brought on record in the place of the respondent herein.
6. The nature of the relief given by the Industrial Court no doubt reduces the relief given by the Labour Court even though the Industrial Court has not spelt out the reason for the same. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and also quantum of benefit given to the deceased worker of the petitioner Mill, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the Industrial Court. Nevertheless we are not able to refrain from observing that the method in which the Courts below have approached the problem in passing the orders in question, both the Labour Court and the Industrial Court, is not proper as they have not given reasoned orders for giving the reliefs to the respondent herein - the Labour Court observing that for 'the ends of justice' it is awarding the retrenchment compensation, while the Industrial Court granted 40% of back wages observing that it is given on the facts and circumstances of the case. Such type of disposal, in our view, cannot be appreciated and such arbitrary conclusion by the courts of this nature should be avoided. Any order passed must be a reasoned order in accordance with the facts and law that is placed before the courts. Simply stating that it is 'in the interest of justice' and on the facts and circumstances of the case 'the award is given cannot be countenanced by the court of Law. We are sure that this observation will serve as a guideline for these authorities while disposing of the cases that will come before them in future.
In as much as we are not prepared to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution regarding the award given by the authorities below. Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs.