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Union of India (Uoi) and ors. Vs. Yogendrasingh Sahebsingh Varma - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectService
CourtGujarat High Court
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1985)2GLR905
AppellantUnion of India (Uoi) and ors.
RespondentYogendrasingh Sahebsingh Varma
Excerpt:
.....in favour of the respondent-plaintiff that the civil court has clearly declared that the respondent is entitled to usual pay without any interruption or break from the date of his service in the railway department......does not in any way specify as to the payment of salary from the date of the suit uptil the date of the decree that is from 3-9-1968 to 15-3-1971, and hence the discretion as to the payment of such salary for the said period should be left to the railway administration as per rule 2044-a of the railway establishment code. in this appeal, short question we have to decide is as to whether the decree in favour of the respondent makes it clear for the payment of the salary to the respondent during the period from 3-9-1968 to 15-3-1971 which is the date of the suit and the date of the decree respectively. if the decree of the civil court has not given this salary to the respondent herein, naturally, the power to decide payment of such salary has to be left to the discretion of the.....
Judgment:

P.R. Gokulakrishnan, C.J.

1. This Letters Patent Appeal is against the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of our High Court in Special Civil Application No. 2496 of 1981. Respondent here in had prayed for quashing and setting aside the impugnedorderdt.5-2-1975passedbythe Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Western Railway, Bhavnagar, and for directing the appellants herein to make payment of the emoluments for the intervening period as claimed by him. The learned Single Judge has allowed the petition granting the prayer made by the 1st respondent herein. It is as against this judgment that the present Letters Patent Appeal is filed. Mr. R.M. Vin, Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the decree in favour of the respondent does not in any way specify as to the payment of salary from the date of the suit uptil the date of the decree that is from 3-9-1968 to 15-3-1971, and hence the discretion as to the payment of such salary for the said period should be left to the Railway Administration as per Rule 2044-A of the Railway Establishment Code. In this appeal, short question we have to decide is as to whether the decree in favour of the respondent makes it clear for the payment of the salary to the respondent during the period from 3-9-1968 to 15-3-1971 which is the date of the suit and the date of the decree respectively. If the decree of the Civil Court has not given this salary to the respondent herein, naturally, the power to decide payment of such salary has to be left to the discretion of the Railway Administration under Rule 2044-A of the Railway Establishment Code. To appreciate the contention put forth by Mr. Vin, it would be useful to extract the order of the Civil Court in favour of the respondent herein. The order runs as follows:

It is hereby declared that the impugned orders under which the plaintiff has ultimately come to be removed from service were in violation of the principles of natural justice and it is further declared that the impugned orders were bad in law and hence null and void.

It is further declared that the plaintiff continues to be in service with his usual pay and allowances admissible under the rules, which the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff his plaintiff (sic) towards the arrears from 14-8-1967 to 2-9-1968.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff his costs of the suit and shall further bears their own.

Pronounced in open court on this 16th day of March 1971.

2. We can also usefully extract Rule 2044-A of the Railway Establishment Code in order to find out the power of the Railway Administration to decide the pay and allowances of the railway servant in cases where a railway servant is reinstated in service either after dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement. The rule runs as follows:

2044-A.(1) Where the dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement of a railway servant is set aside by a court of law and such railway servant is reinstated without holding any further inquiry the period of absence from duty shall be regularised and the railway servant shall be paid pay and allowance in accordance with the provisions of Sub-rule (2) or (3) subject to the directions, if any, of the court. (2) Where the dismissal removal or compulsory retirement of a railway servant is set aside by the Court solely on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, and where he is not exonerated on merits, the pay and allowance to be paid to the railway servant for the period intervening between the date of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement including the period of suspension preceding such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case maybe, and the date of reinstatement shall be determined by the competent authority and the said period shall be regularised in accordance with the provisions contained in Sub-rules (4), (5) and (7) of Rule 2044 (F.R. 54).

3. It is clear from the decree of the Civil Court extracted above that the Civil Court has declared that the plaintiff is deemed to be in service continuously and that he is entitled to his usual pay and allowances admissible under the rules. In the next paragraph of the decree, the Civil Court has stated that the respondent plaintiff is entitled from arrears of pay from 14-8-1967 to 2-9-1968. Mr. Vin, Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants pointing out this paragraph, submitted that the Civil Court has granted pay to the respondent only for the period prior to the filing of the suit and as such pay as regards the period during the pendency of the suit has to be left to the discretion of the Railway Administration. In view of Rule 2044-A of the Railway Establishment Code we are afraid, we cannot agree with this contention. The prayer of the respondent in the suit for the period prior to the suit has been specifically granted by the decree and as regards his service, the Civil Court in an unambiguous terms declared that the plaintiff continues to be in service with his usual pay and allowances admissible under the rules. It has also directed the appellants herein to pay to the plaintiff such emoluments. There is absolutely no ambiguity in this decree and the decree clearly reads that the respondent is entitled to his pay and allowances as if he continues to be in service without any dismissal or removal. The learned single Judge of our High Court has considered all these aspects and observed as follows:

A mere look at the findings on issue No. 10 shows that the civil court directed the railway administration to pay up all arrears of salary to the petitioner. In the decretal portion, it is further held that the plaintiff is declared to have continued in service with his usual pay etc., which have been paid by the railway administration. Once this direction is given by the Civil Court it would not be open to the respondents to invoke Rule 2044-A(1) and (2) read with Rule 2044 Sub-rule (4)(5) and (7).

4. The learned single Judge has further observed:

It must be held that the respondents had no authority or power to invoke provisions of Rule 20 44-A(2) read with Rule 20 44(4). Hence, it must be held that the respondents are required to comply with clear directions of the Civil Court's decree and to pay up all arrears of salary and other allowance to the petitioner as provided under the decree.

5. Thus, it is clear both from the judgment of the learned Single Judge and also from the decree of the Civil Court in favour of the respondent-plaintiff that the Civil Court has clearly declared that the respondent is entitled to usual pay without any interruption or break from the date of his service in the railway department. Hence it is futile to contend that the Civil Court has not granted pay allowable to the respondent-plaintiff during the intervening period that is during the period from the date of the suit to the date of the decree. For all these reasons we are in complete agreement with the reasonings of the learned single Judge of our High Court. Accordingly this Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed.


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